Mohinder Pal Singh And Others vs Ramesh Kumar And Others

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court

CM-14935-C-2026 in/and
RSA-3879-2026 (O&M) -:1:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CM-14935-C-2026 in/and
RSA-3879-2026 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 20.11.2026
Mohinder Pal Singh and Others
… Applicants/Appellants
Versus
Ramesh Kumar and Others
... Respondents
-.-
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRINDER AGGARWAL
Present:- Mr. Nitesh Jhajhria, Advocate
for the applicants/appellants.
-.-
VIRINDER AGGARWAL , J . (Oral)
CM-14935-C-2026
1. The present Regular Second Appeal (hereinafter referred to as
the “RSA”) assailing the concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the
Courts below has been filed along with an application under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, read with Order XLI Rule 3A CPC, seeking
condonation of 340 days’ delay in filing the accompanying appeal.
2. Learned counsel for the applicants-appellants submits that
they could not adequately monitor the progress of the litigation, as their
counsel failed to communicate the judgment and decree passed by the
Additional District Judge, Fazilka. It is contended that the applicants came
to know of the passing of the said judgment and decree only on
26.09.2026. Learned counsel further submits that a litigant ought not to be
Digitally signed by GAURAV
SOROT
Date: 2026.11.20 14:45:59
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SOROT

CM-14935-C-2026 in/and
RSA-3879-2026 (O&M) -:2:-
made to suffer on account of the lapse or negligence of counsel engaged to
represent him. In support of this proposition, reliance has been placed upon
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rafiq and Another vs. Munshilal
and Another, AIR 1981 SC 140 , wherein the following observations were
made:–
"What is the fault of the party who having done everything in his power
expected of him, would suffer because of the default of his advocate....
The problem that agitates us is whether it is proper that a party should
suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or misdemeanour of his
agent.... We cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice
merely because his chosen advocate defaulted."
2.1. Learned counsel for the applicants further contends that the
applicants have a prima facie case on merits and that the circumstances
explained hereinabove constitute sufficient cause for the delay.
Accordingly, a prayer has been made for condonation of the delay of 340
days in filing the accompanying appeal.
3. Having heard learned counsel for the applicants and, with his
able assistance, having meticulously scrutinised the paper-book, this Court
proceeds to examine the prayer for condonation of delay in the light of the
statutory scheme governing limitation and the settled principles of law.
Section 3 of the Limitation Act mandates dismissal of every suit, appeal or
application instituted, preferred or made beyond the prescribed period of
limitation, irrespective of whether limitation has been pleaded as a defence.
Section 5, however, vests the Court with discretionary power to entertain
an appeal or application beyond the prescribed period, provided the
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SOROT
Date: 2026.11.20 14:46:00
+05'30'
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GAURAV
SOROT

CM-14935-C-2026 in/and
RSA-3879-2026 (O&M) -:3:-
applicant satisfactorily establishes sufficient cause for having been
prevented from approaching the Court within the stipulated period.
3.1. The expression “sufficient cause” warrants a judicious
interpretation, requiring the Court to strike an appropriate balance between
the advancement of substantial justice and adherence to the statutory
mandate governing limitation. While a liberal and justice-oriented
approach may be adopted to facilitate adjudication on merits, such an
approach cannot dilute the applicant’s obligation to furnish a cogent, bona
fide and satisfactory explanation accounting for the delay. The discretion
vested in the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is, therefore,
neither absolute nor automatic, but must be exercised judiciously, having
regard to the facts and circumstances of each case and the settled
principles governing the exercise of such discretion.
3.2. The scope and parameters of the discretionary jurisdiction
conferred upon the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as well as
the principles regulating its exercise, have been comprehensively
elucidated by the Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by
L.Rs. & Ors. vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), 2024 INSC 286 .
The relevant discussion contained in paragraphs 9 to 26 of the said
judgment, which provides authoritative guidance on the subject, is
reproduced hereunder:–
“9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms lays down
that no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made
after the period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed
even though limitation has not been set up as a defence subject to
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SOROT
Date: 2026.11.20 14:46:00
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GAURAV
SOROT

CM-14935-C-2026 in/and
RSA-3879-2026 (O&M) -:4:-
the exceptions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the
Limitation Act.
10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is
reproduced here-in-below:-
“3. Bar of limitation.- (1) Subject to the
provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive),
every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and
application made after the prescribed period shall be
dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as
a defence.”
11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and
application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal,
we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in
context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if
the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.
12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after
the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of
the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the
dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the
Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no
objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or
referred to in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation
upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond
limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions
are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation
Act but we are concerned only with the exception contained in
Section 5 which empowers the courts to admit an appeal even if it
is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed
appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal
within the period prescribed. In other words, the courts are
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SOROT
Date: 2026.11.20 14:46:01
+05'30'
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GAURAV
SOROT

CM-14935-C-2026 in/and
RSA-3879-2026 (O&M) -:5:-
conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after
the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed
appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it
within time. The said power to condone the delay or to admit the
appeal preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature
and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based
upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise
due diligence etc.
13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not
adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the
applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and
rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice.
14. It may also be important to point out that though on one hand,
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally, but on
the other hand, Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a
substantive law of mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a
strict sense. In Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux and Ors. vs. Munshi
(Dead) by LRs. and Ors., it has been observed that different
provisions of Limitation Act may require different construction,
as for example, the court exercises its power in a given case
liberally in condoning the delay in filing the appeal under Section
5 of the Limitation Act, however, the same may not be true while
construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows
that though liberal interpretation has to be given in construing
Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3 of
the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly.
15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation
is based, the object behind the law of limitation and the
mandatory and the directory nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of
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SOROT
Date: 2026.11.20 14:46:01
+05'30'
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GAURAV
SOROT

CM-14935-C-2026 in/and
RSA-3879-2026 (O&M) -:6:-
the Limitation Act that we have to examine and strike a balance
between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the
matters of condoning the delay. 16. Generally, the courts have
adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase
‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of 1 (2007) 11 SCC 285 the
Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts
to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner
which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. vs. Katiji and Ors., this Court in
advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for
‘sufficient cause’ held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to
benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain
every day’s delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal
to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter,
it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial
justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations
and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned.
Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is
adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for
not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for
exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The
phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and cause
for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to
defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a
matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking
aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient
cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on
the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an
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SOROT
Date: 2026.11.20 14:46:02
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SOROT

CM-14935-C-2026 in/and
RSA-3879-2026 (O&M) -:7:-
appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and
this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder
treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may
proceed on such assumption creating new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And
Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd3 has emphasized that even
after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an
appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary
jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite
establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may
refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the
party.
19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and
Ors., it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption
from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of
hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when
mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not
properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to
condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.
20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and
Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors.5 wherein while observing, as
above, this Court further laid down that if some person has
obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when
the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the
benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage
simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,
where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the
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SOROT
Date: 2026.11.20 14:46:02
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GAURAV
SOROT

CM-14935-C-2026 in/and
RSA-3879-2026 (O&M) -:8:-
delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation
of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its
discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court
should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an
informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency
of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial
law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as
‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial
justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of
limitation.
22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok
Kumar Chokhani & Ors.7, that the merits of the case cannot be
considered while dealing with the application for condonation of
delay in filing the appeal.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, this
Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be
exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also
observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of
the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed
under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law
as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on
equitable grounds.
24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid
decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which
equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal
Digitally signed by GAURAV
SOROT
Date: 2026.11.20 14:46:03
+05'30'
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GAURAV
SOROT

CM-14935-C-2026 in/and
RSA-3879-2026 (O&M) -:9:-
approach and in implementing the statute as it stands. Paragraph
12 reads as under:-
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has
no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court
has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The
legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it
is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently
been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.”
25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide
paragraph 15 went on to observe as under:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In
case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on
his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation
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SOROT
Date: 2026.11.20 14:46:03
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GAURAV
SOROT

CM-14935-C-2026 in/and
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of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant
to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as
aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:-
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that
there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the
right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or
availed of for a long time must come to an end or
cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal
approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of
substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same
cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation
Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been
explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary
in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient
cause is established for various factors such as, where
there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due
diligence;
Digitally signed by GAURAV
SOROT
Date: 2026.11.20 14:46:04
+05'30'
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GAURAV
SOROT

CM-14935-C-2026 in/and
RSA-3879-2026 (O&M) -:11:-
vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter,
it does not mean that others are also entitled to the
same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause
shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on
the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and
condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions
have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the
statutory provision.”
4. In the present case, the applicants-appellants cannot absolve
themselves of the responsibility arising from their own lack of diligence
by attributing the entire delay to the counsel engaged to represent them
before the First Appellate Court. It is incumbent upon a litigant to remain
reasonably vigilant and maintain periodic communication with the counsel
engaged, so as to keep abreast of the progress of the litigation. The
responsibility for monitoring the proceedings cannot be wholly shifted
upon the counsel, nor can it be presumed that every procedural
development must invariably be communicated to the litigant individually.
Significantly, no affidavit of the erstwhile counsel has been placed on
record to lend credence to the assertion that the judgment and decree were
not communicated to the applicants-appellants. Furthermore, the
explanation furnished does not satisfactorily account for the entire period
of delay of 340 days.
4.1. It is well settled that the sufficiency of cause under Section 5
of the Limitation Act is to be examined on the qualitative touchstone of the
explanation furnished and not merely by reference to the quantitative
Digitally signed by GAURAV
SOROT
Date: 2026.11.20 14:46:04
+05'30'
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GAURAV
SOROT

CM-14935-C-2026 in/and
RSA-3879-2026 (O&M) -:12:-
length of delay. The duration of delay, by itself, is neither decisive nor
determinative; what assumes significance is whether the explanation is
cogent, bona fide and satisfactorily accounts for the period of inaction.
Even a comparatively short delay may prove fatal where no sufficient
cause is disclosed, whereas a substantial delay may, in an appropriate case,
warrant condonation if adequately explained. However, the justice-
oriented approach underlying Section 5 cannot be extended to condone
unexplained negligence, prolonged inaction or lack of due diligence. In the
present case, the applicants-appellants have failed to furnish a satisfactory,
consistent and continuous explanation accounting for the delay. The
grounds urged, even when considered cumulatively, do not establish
sufficient cause warranting exercise of discretionary jurisdiction in their
favour.
4.2. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the
applicants-appellants have failed to discharge the statutory burden of
establishing sufficient cause for condonation of 340 days’ delay in filing
the accompanying Regular Second Appeal. Consequently, the application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, read with Order XLI Rule 3A CPC,
is dismissed .
RSA- 3879-2026
1. The appellants have failed to establish sufficient cause
warranting condonation of the inordinate delay of 340 days in filing the
accompanying appeal. Upon a careful and considered appraisal of the
pleadings and the material available on record, this Court finds that the
applications seeking condonation of the aforesaid delay are devoid of
Digitally signed by GAURAV
SOROT
Date: 2026.11.20 14:46:05
+05'30'
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integrity of this document
GAURAV
SOROT

CM-14935-C-2026 in/and
RSA-3879-2026 (O&M) -:13:-
merit and, accordingly, stand dismissed by separate, reasoned orders of
even date.
2. In view of the foregoing discussion and the findings recorded
hereinabove, the main appeal is also dismissed in limine , being barred by
limitation. The appellants’ failure to furnish a cogent, bona fide and
satisfactory explanation accounting for the substantial delay disentitles
them to any further indulgence. Such dismissal necessarily follows from
the statutory scheme governing limitation and the settled principle that the
discretionary jurisdiction to condone delay cannot be invoked in the
absence of sufficient cause, particularly where the explanation tendered
fails to satisfactorily account for the material period of inaction.
3. In view of the final disposal of the main appeal, all pending
miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of
accordingly.

( VIRINDER AGGARWAL )
20.11.2026 JUDGE
Gaurav Sorot
Whether reasoned / speaking? Yes / No
Whether reportable? Yes / No
Digitally signed by GAURAV
SOROT
Date: 2026.11.20 14:46:05
+05'30'
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
GAURAV
SOROT