PRINCE TRANSPORT AND ORS vs HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD AND ORS
- Court
- Calcutta High Court
16.11.2026
Ct. no.10
Sl. No.04
b.r.
WPA 30558 of 2026
Prince Transport & Ors.
Vs.
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
Mr. Debabrota Saha Roy, Sr.Adv.
Mr. Pingal Bhattacharyya
Mr. A. Paul
…. For the petitioners
Mr. Biswanath Chatterjee
Ms. Sayanee Bera
Mr. S.K. Pathak
…. For the Respondents.
1. The affidavit of Service filed in court today be kept on
record.
2. Mr. Debabrata Saha Roy, the Learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the petitioners, undertakes to pay the deficit
court fees in course of today.
a) The core issue involved herein is whether, at the first
instance of irregular reporting of the vehicle, the respondent
oil company can blacklist the petitioners for violation of the
terms and conditions of the letter of acceptance and the
Transport Discipline Guidelines.
3. The present Writ Petition has been field challenging inter
alia, the legality, validity and sustainability of the Order dated
03.10.2026 passed by the respondent No. 7, blacklisting the
petitioners on industry basis for a period of two years in
respect of tank truck No. NL01AF-2062, and imposing penalty
2
under Clause 8 of the Transportation Agreement for alleged
breach of Clauses 4A, 4B, 19B, 22E and 22F of the said
Agreement read with Clauses 8.2.1C, 8.2.1(v) and 8.2.2.18 of
the Transport Discipline Guidelines (hereinafter referred to as
the “TGD” for the sake of brevity and convenience).
4. Apropos the facts of the case are as follows:-
a) The Petitioner No. 1 is a partnership firm engaged in the
business of transportation of bulk petroleum products. The
petitioner participated in the tender floated by the
respondent oil company for transportation of bulk
petroleum products.
b) Upon being found successful, a provisional Letter of
Acceptance, (LOA) hereinafter referred to as “LOA” was
issued in favour of the petitioner for a period of five years
with effect from 01.01.2025 upto 31.12.2029, directing
them, inter alia, to complete the formalities as mentioned in
the Letter of Acceptance(LOA).
c) The petitioners were accordingly directed to execute a
Contractual Agreement forthwith upon payment of
performance security of Rs. 50,000/- by way of Demand
Draft.
d) Upon receipt of such provisional Letter of Acceptance, the
petitioner placed all their seven owned tank trucks for
physical verification at the Haldia Terminal, as per the
conditions stipulated in the provisional Letter of
Acceptance.
3
e) After completion of the entire procedure of physical
verification, the respondent oil company directed the
petitioners to submit a security deposit of Rs. 8,00,000/- by
way of Demand Draft for execution of the Agreement.
f) As per the direction of the respondent oil company, the
petitioner deposited the said security amount on
21.01.2025, and accordingly the agreement was executed
between the petitioner and the respondent oil company in
pursuance of the terms and the condition mentioned
therein.
th
g) After placement of the 7 tank truck i.e. on and from
March, 2025 the said tank trucks were functioning
seamlessly from the Haldia Terminal to all parts of West
Bengal and other places across India for transportation of
bulk petroleum products.
h) In respect of one owned tank truck of the petitioner,
being NL01AF-2062, the vehicle was loaded for the last time
on 19.03.2025. Thereafter, the respondent oil company was
unable to load the said tank truck further due to
malfunctioning thereof. The respondent oil company was
informed of the said issue electronically on various dates,
as is evident from the screenshots of the emails, annexed to
the present Writ Petition. Despite repeated emails sent to
the respondent oil company, the same remained pending for
consideration.
i) The petitioners also informed the respondent oil company
with regard to the mechanical defect in the said tank truck
4
and sought permission to replace the said vehicle with
another vehicle. On 24.10.2025 the respondent oil company
through email requested the petitioner to apprise it with
regard to the inactive status of the Vehicle Tracking System
(VTS), since the same had remained inactive on the VTS
Portal for the past few days, and requested them to activate
the same again and to informed accordingly the expected
timeline by which the VTS would be activated.
j) In reply thereto, the petitioners informed the respondent
oil company that due to serious mechanical problems the
vehicle in question could not be plied, and thus sought
permission to replace the said vehicle with another vehicle
of higher model and/or higher capacity. Despite repeated
representations made to the respondent oil company, on
23.06.2026 the respondent oil company sought an
explanation from the petitioner for non-reporting of the
vehicle for the last three months from the date of the last
loading i.e. 19.03.2025.
k) In response to such email, the petitioner on 26.06.2026
further informed the respondent oil company and sought
similar permission for replacement of the said vehicle with
another vehicle of a higher capacity and/or higher model.
Thereafter, on 26.08.2026, the respondent oil company
issued a show cause notice to the petitioners on the ground
of gross irregularity and violation of the Clauses embodied
in the agreement read with the Transport Discipline
Guidelines. In response to the said Show Cause Notice the
5
petitioner submitted a reply refuting the allegation made
therein.
l) After submission of the reply to the Show Cause Notice,
the petitioners received the order of blacklisting for two
years on industry basis, which is the subject matter of
challenge in the present Writ Petition.
5. The Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits
as follows:-
a) The respondent oil company without giving an
opportunity of hearing to refute the allegations, passed an
order of blacklisting which is contrary to the clauses
mentioned in the Show Cause Notice, and is thus ex facie
illegal, arbitrary and in utter disregard to the principles of
natural justice, and is not sustainable in the eye of law and
the impugned order dated 3.10.2026 is thereby liable to be
quashed and set aside.
b) There is a gross illegality and infirmity in the impugned
order of blacklisting dated 3.10.2026. In this context the
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner places reliance
upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of State Bank of India and Others Vs. Rajesh Agarwal and
Others reported in (2023) VI SCC 1. The relevant paragraph
Nos. 80 and 81 are quoted herein below:
“80. Audi alteram partem has several facets, including the
service of a notice to any person against whom a prejudicial
order may be passed and providing an opportunity to
explain the evidence collected. In Tulsiram Patel, this Court
explained the wide amplitude of audi alteram partem: (SCC
p.476, para 96)
6
“96. The rule of natural justice with which we are
concerned in these appeals and writ petitions, namely,
the audi alteram partem rule, in its fullest amplitude
means that a person against thom an order to his
prejudice may be passed should be informed of the
allegations and charges against him, be given an
opportunity of submitting his explanation thereto, have
the right to know the evidence, both oral or documentary,
by which the matter is proposed to be decided against
him, and to inspect the documents which are relied upon
for the purpose of being used against him, to have the
witnesses who are to give evidence against him
examined in his presence and have the right to cross-
examine them, and to lead his own evidence, both oral
and documentary, in his defence. The process of a fair
hearing need not, however, conform to the judicial
process in a court of law, because judicial adjudication of
causes involves a number of technical rules of procedure
and evidence which are unnecessary and not required
for the purpose of a fair hearing within the meaning of
audi alteram partem rule in a quasi-judicial or
administrative inquiry.” (emphasis
supplied)
81. Audi alteram partem, therefore, entails that an entity
against whom evidence is collected must: (i) be provided an
opportunity to explain the evidence against it; (ii) be
informed of the proposed action, and (iii) be allowed to
represent why the proposed action should not be taken.
Hence, the mere participation of the borrower during the
course of the preparation of a forensic audit report would
not fulfil the requirements of natural justice. The decision to
classify an account as fraud involves due application of
mind to the facts and law by the lender banks. The lender
banks, either individually or through a JLF, have to decide
whether a borrower has breached the terms and conditions
of a loan agreement, and based upon such determination
the lender banks can seek appropriate remedies. Therefore,
principles of natural justice demand that the borrowers
must be served a notice, given an opportunity to explain the
findings in the forensic audit report, and to represent before
the account is classified as fraud under the Master
Directions on Frauds.”
6. It is further submitted that the order of blacklisting
violates the principles of natural justice in as much the same
travels far beyond the scope of show cause notice. Without
giving any further opportunity and/or issuing any fresh show
cause notice for blacklisting, the respondent authority, by the
impugned order dated 3.10.2026, has proceeded to blacklist
7
the petitioner for a period of two years on industry basis. The
show cause notice proposes only two consequences namely,
suspension and termination of the agreement. At no stage did
the said notice propose, hint at, or even mention blacklisting
of the petitioners.
7. The impugned order is also a non-speaking order. It does
not deal with the reply of the petitioners or the explanation
offered for irregular reporting, including mechanical
breakdown and request for replacement.
8. Per contra, Learned counsel appearing for the respondent
oil company vehemently opposes the contentions of the
petitioners and submit as follows:-
a) A deliberate fraud has been committed by not disclosing
the actual facts of the case in the present Writ Petition. The
willful and deliberate suppression of material facts
tantamounts to forgery and is contumacious in the eye of law
and on this score alone the present Writ Petition is liable to be
dismissed in limine, with exemplary cost.
In this context, the Learned counsel produced the
screenshot of the emails from which it transpires that the
petitioners had already entered into an agreement with the
Indian Oil Corporation prior to the agreement with the
respondent oil company, and that the vehicle in question has
been plying with the Indian Oil Corporation since 2022.
b) The petitioners have not approached this Court with
clean hands, by bringing on record the entire facts as to the
current position of the said tank truck in question. Such
8
conduct of the petitioner is highly deplorable, and thus the
impugned order dated 03.10.2026 has been rightly passed by
the authority concerned, by blacklisting the petitioner in
terms of the clauses mentioned in the agreement and the
Clauses of the Transport Discipline Guidelines. It is very
much explicit from the terms and conditions of the agreement
that the petitioners were supposed to produce the vehicle,
failing which the penal clauses mentioned in the Transport
Discipline Guidelines would be attracted for irregular
reporting of the vehicle.
c) In this context Learned counsel appearing for the
respondents places reliance upon the following judgments:
i.) 2020 SCC Online SC 1035 ( Galaxy Transport
Agencies, Contractors, Traders Transports and
Suppliers –vs- New J.K. Roadways, Fleet Owners and
Transport Contractors and Ors.) . The relevant
paragraph Nos. 14, 16 and 17 are quoted herein below:
“14. In a series of judgments, this Court has held that
the authority that authors the tender document is the best
person to understand and appreciate its requirements, and
thus, its interpretation should not be second-guessed by a court
in judicial review proceedings. In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v.
Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818, this
Court held:
15. We may add that the owner or the employer of a
project. having authored the tender documents, is the best
person to understand and appreciate its requirements and
interpret its documents. The constitutional understanding
and appreciation of the tender documents, unless courts
there is mala fide or perversity in the understanding or
appreciation to this or in the application of the terms of the
tender conditions. It is possible that the owner or employer
of a project may give an interpretation to the tender
documents that is not acceptable to the constitutional courts
but that by itself is not a reason for interfering with the
interpretation given."
9
16. Further, in the recent judgment in Silppi
Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, 2019 SCC
OnLine SC 1133, this Court held as follows:
"20. The essence of the law laid down in the
judgments referred to above is the exercise of restraint
and caution; the need for overwhelming public interest
to justify judicial intervention in matters of contract
involving the state instrumentalities; the courts should
give way to the opinion of the experts unless the
decision is totally arbitrary or unreasonable; the court
does not sit like a court of appeal over the appropriate
authority; the court must realise that the authority
floating the tender is the best judge of its requirements
and, therefore, the court's interference should be
minimal. The authority which floats the contract or
tender, and has authored the tender documents is the
best judge as to how the documents have to be
interpreted. If two interpretations are possible then the
interpretation of the author must be accepted. The
courts will only interfere to prevent arbitrariness,
irrationality, bias, mala fides or perversity. With this
approach in mind we shall deal with the present
case."
17. In accordance with these judgments and noting that the
interpretation of the tendering authority in this case cannot
be said to be a perverse one, the Division Bench ought not
to have interfered with it by giving its own interpretation
and not giving proper credence to the word "both" appearing
in Condition No. 31 of the N.I.T. For this reason, the Division
Bench's conclusion that JK Roadways was wrongly
declared to be ineligible, is set aside.”
ii.) (2012)11 SCC 257 (Patel Engineering Ltd. Vs-
Union of India & Ors.) The relevant paragraph Nos. 25,
and 28(g) are quoted herein below:
“25. The bid document is not a statutory instrument.
Therefore, the rules of interpretation, which are applicable
to the interpretation of statutes and statutory instruments,
are not applicable to the bid document. Therefore, in a our
opinion, the failure to mention blacklisting to be one of the
probable actions that could be taken against the delinquent
bidder does not, by itself, disable the second respondent
from blacklisting a delinquent bidder, if it is otherwise
justified. Such power is inherent in every person legally
capable of entering into contracts.
28.(g) After considering all material facts, and your reply in
response to the show-cause notice, NHAI is of the
considered view that no justifiable grounds have been
made out in support of your action of non-acceptance of
LOA. Keeping in view the conduct of the addressees, NHAI
10
find that they are not reliable and trustworthy and have
caused huge financial loss to NHAI.”
iii.) (2008)12 SCC 481 (K.D. Sharma –vs- Steel
Authority of India Ltd. & Ors.). The relevant paragraph
Nos. 38 and 52 are quoted herein below:
“38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal
system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of
a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is
supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose
all material facts without any reservation even if they are
against him. He cannot be allowed to play "hide and seek"
or to "pick and choose" the facts he likes to disclose and to
suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts.
The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of
true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are
suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ courts
and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must
disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought
without any qualification. This is because "the court knows
law but not facts".
52. In the case on hand, the appellant has not come
forward with all the facts. He has chosen to state the facts
in the manner suited to him by giving an impression to the
writ court that an instrumentality of State (SAIL) has not
followed doctrine of natural justice and fundamental
principles of fair procedure. This is not proper. Hence, on
that ground alone, the appellant cannot claim equitable
relief. But we have also considered the merits of the case
and even on merits, we are convinced that no case has
been made out by him to interfere with the action of SAIL, or
the order passed by the High Court.”
iv.) WPA 8748 of 2025 with WPA 9056 of 2025
(Bulk LPG Transport Contractors Association, Eastern
India & Ors, -vs- The Union of India.,) (judgment
delivered on 06.05.2025). The relevant paragraph Nos.
24, 28 and 29 are quoted herein below:
“24. The legal position with respect to the scope of judicial
interference in matters pertaining to commercial contracts
involving the State is well-settled and no longer res integra.
The award of a contract whether by a private entity, a
public body, or the State is fundamentally a commercial
transaction. In arriving at decisions in such matters,
commercial considerations are of paramount importance.
The State or its instrumentalities are entitled to adopt a
11
prescribe terms and conditions of the invitation to tender,
which ordinarily do not invite judicial scrutiny, being within
the contractual domain. While the power of judicial review
may be exercised to examine the decision-making process
with a view to prevent arbitrariness, unreasonableness or
favoritism, the Courts do not sit in appeal over commercial
decisions taken by the State. Pragmatic and contextual
adjustments by the tendering authority, as warranted by
the facts and circumstances, are permissible. The Courts
cannot annul or modify the terms of a tender merely on the
ground that alternative formulations may have appeared to
be fairer, more judicious, or more reasonable.
28. Upon consideration of the rival submissions advanced
by the learned counsel for the parties and on a careful
perusal of the materials placed on record, in light of the
settled legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the impugned tender conditions do not manifest any
element of arbitrariness, malafides, discrimination, or bias.
The incorporation of the said conditions by the Respondents
is found to be in furtherance of their legitimate commercial
interests, which is well within their domain and permissible
under law It is further noted that the Respondents have
acted in conformity with the guidelines issued by the
Government of India, and in the absence of any cogent
material to suggest malafide intent, no illegality can be
attributed to their actions. Accordingly, the impugned
clauses cannot be assailed on the ground of being
unreasonable or ineffective in achieving the object sought to
be fulfilled. It is not the case of the Petitioner that they have
been barred from participating in the tender; on the
contrary, sufficient opportunity has been made available to
them, with 75% of the quota still open for competition.
29. In view of the principles enunciated by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, greater latitude is to be accorded to the
State and its instrumentalities in the formulation of tender
conditions, particularly in matters involving commercial and
policy considerations. So long as the impugned conditions
are not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or violative of
constitutional mandates, judicial interference under Article
226 of the Constitution of India is not warranted. In the
absence of any such infirmity, this Court finds no merit in
the….”
d) In view of the above judgments the writ Petition is liable
to be dismissed, as the petitioners have suppressed the
material facts and have not approached this Court with clean
hands. It is also further submitted that the plea of the
petitioners that the vehicle was repossessed also does not
support their contention, since from the email it is evident, as
12
gathered from the Indian Oil Corporation, that the said tank
truck are presently plying with the Indian Oil Corporation.
e) By the conduct of the petitioners, the image of the
respondent oil company has been tarnished and service to the
public at large has also been affected, since the trucks are
hired by the respondent oil company for transporting
petroleum products, which are essential commodities.
Therefore, irregular reporting stands established.
f) The writ petition is not maintainable in view of the
statutory alternative efficacious remedy of arbitration under
the agreement.
9. Having heard the parties and upon perusing the material
available on records, this Court observes and holds as
follows:-
a) The objection as to alternative remedy is considered and
rejected.
b) The challenge in present writ petition is not to the
interpretation of a contractual clause but to an order which is
alleged to have travelled beyond the show cause notice, to
have been passed in violation of the principles of natural
justice, and to have imposed a penalty not proposed. Such a
challenge raises a jurisdictional error and a violation of Article
14 of the Constitution of India, which is amenable to writ
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the existence of an arbitration of
clause. An arbitrator cannot decide the legality of a
blacklisting order which is void for want of natural justice.
The writ petition is therefore, maintainable.
13
c) The show cause notice dated 26.8.2026 mentioned only
of suspension and termination for the alleged violation of
specific clauses of the agreement and the Transport Discipline
Guidelines. The blacklisting was never put to the petitioners
as proposed punishment. The petitioners were, therefore,
never given any opportunity to meet the case of blacklisting.
d) It is settled law that a person cannot be visited with a
punishment which was not proposed in the show cause
notice. The authority must confine itself to the charges and
the proposed penalty disclosed in the notice. Imposing a
different and a graver penalty amounts to condemning the
petitioners not being heard on that penalty.
e) Reliance is place on Gorkha Security Services vs. Govt. of
NCT of Delhi,(2014) 9 SCC 105, wherein the Hon’ble Apex
Court held that a show cause notice for blacklisting must
specifically propose blacklisting and the period thereof, and a
notice proposing only suspension and termination cannot
sustain an order of blacklisting.
f) Suspension, termination and blacklisting are three
distinct and separate consequences with different legal effects.
Suspension is temporary, termination brings a particular
agreement to an end. Blacklisting debars the carrier from all
future contracts with the authority and with other
Departments, and results in civil death.
g) Blacklisting cannot be treated as a part thereof or as an
extension of suspension or termination. The respondent
authorities have, therefore, committed a serious error in law
14
by blacklisting the petitioners as if it were covered by a notice
for suspension and termination.
h) Blacklisting being a major penalty having severe
consequences, requires a specific, clear and unambiguous
Show Cause Notice disclosing the intention to blacklist, the
grounds thereof, and the proposed period of blacklisting.
i) In the present case, no such notice was ever issued. The
petitioner was never informed that blacklisting was under
contemplation. The impugned order has, therefore, been
passed in violation of the mandatory requirements of prior
notice for blacklisting.
j) The impugned order is a non speaking order. It neither
deals with the reply of the petitioners nor discusses the
explanation offered for irregular reporting namely, mechanical
breakdown and request for replacement of the vehicle. The
respondent authority has not assigned any reason as to why
blacklisting, and not suspension or termination as proposed,
was considered necessary. An order which does not disclose
reasons for choosing the gravest penalty cannot be sustained
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
k) The irregular reporting of a vehicle, even if assumed to
be true, is at best a single lapse reporting. The impugned
order does not record any finding of willful default, fraud,
dishonesty and misconduct or repeated violation. The
blacklisting is a drastic measure to be resorted to only in case
of fraud, grave misconduct or persistent violation where the
authority has lost all confidence in the carrier. A single
15
instance of irregular reporting, without any such allegation
cannot justify blacklisting.
l) Even, alleged violation of the specified clauses of the
agreements and the transport discipline guidelines is
accepted, the punishment of blacklisting is disproportionate to
the gravity of the alleged misconduct.
m) The punishment must bear reasonable nexus to the
misconduct. Irregular reporting which is a procedural lapse,
cannot be visited with the extreme punishment of blacklisting
which disturbs the livelihood of the carrier and its employees.
n) Neither the agreement nor the Transport Discipline
Guidelines authorises blacklisting for irregular reporting of a
vehicle without a separate enquiry and without following the
procedure prescribed therein for blacklisting.
o) The authority has, therefore, acted de hors the Agreement
and the Guideline and has exceeded its jurisdiction.
p) In view of the above, this Court find that there is a
serious infirmity and illegal, unreasonableness, arbitrariness
in the impugned order of blacklisting. Imposition of
blacklisting is unwarranted since only suspension and
termination were proposed in the show cause notice and the
order has travelled beyond the Show Cause Notice in violation
of the principles of natural justice. Blacklisting is a penalty of
gravest nature and cannot be imposed without a specific
notice and an opportunity to meet the same.
16
q) The impugned order of blacklisting dated 3.10. 2026,
blacklisting the petitioners for a period of two years on
industry basis, is hereby quashed and set aside.
r) The petitioners are directed to produce the tank truck No.
NL01AF2062 within three weeks from the date of
communication of this order before the authority concerned,
for physical verification, failing which the respondent oil
company shall be at liberty to take necessary steps in
accordance with law without any further reference to this
court.
s) It is also made clear that if the said vehicle is not in their
custody or control shall file an affidavit before the authority
concerned disclosing on oath the present whereabouts of the
vehicle, the person in whose custody it is, and the documents
in support thereof, including any repossession/seizure memo,
if any.
t) It is made clear that if the petitioners comply with the
conditions mentioned in this order, the respondent oil
company shall forthwith permit the petitioners to ply the
vehicle as per the conditions of the letter of acceptance, the
agreement and the transport discipline guidelines, subject to
the outcome of any fresh proceedings.
u) It is made further clear that it shall be open to the
respondent oil company to initiate fresh proceedings, if so
advised, in accordance with law, after issuing fresh show
cause notice specifically proposing blacklisting, disclosing the
ground and the proposed period, and affording an opportunity
17
of hearing and dealing with the reply by a reasoned order. The
period of blacklisting already undergone, if any, shall be taken
into consideration in any such fresh proceedings. The
petitioner shall not be entitled to claim any equity on the basis
of this order in any such proceeding.
v) The petitioner are also directed to pay the penalty
amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- to the respondent oil company on or
before the date of the production of the vehicle.
10. Till the date of production of the vehicle before the
respondent oil company, the petitioner shall remain
suspended on the ground of irregular reporting of the vehicle.
11. With the above observations and directions the Writ
Petition stands disposed of.
12. Since affidavits have not been filed for the allegation
made in this Writ Petition are deemed to have been denied
and not admitted.
13. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied
for, be given to the parties upon compliance of all necessary
formalities.
(Smita Das De,J.)