Savitri Devi vs Roopam Sharma
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~67
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 25.08.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010400142026
+ RC.REV. 306/2026, CAV 409/2026 & CM APPL. 57541/2026
(Stay)
SAVITRI DEVI .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Nagesh Kapoor & Mr.
Ansh Sachdeva, Advs.
versus
ROOPAM SHARMA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Rohan Yadav and Mr.
Aditya Khanna, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (Oral)
1. The present Rent Control Revision Petition has been filed under
1
Section 25 B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 , seeking to
2
assail the Order dated 06.05.2026 passed by the learned Additional
3
Rent Controller-01, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi , in
RC ARC No. 251/2025 titled as “ Roopam Sharma v. Smt. Savitri
Devi.”, whereby the application seeking leave to defend filed by the
Petitioner herein came to be dismissed and an eviction order as against
the Petitioner herein came to be passed.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner seeks to assail the
1
ARC Act
2
Impugned Order
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
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impugned Order on the following three grounds and no other.
3.
The first contention raised on behalf of the Petitioner concerns
the availability of alternative suitable accommodation with the
Respondent. In support thereof, learned counsel for the Petitioner
places reliance upon the averments made in the leave to defend
application filed before the learned ARC, wherein it was specifically
contended that the Respondent has sufficient alternative suitable
accommodation available and, therefore, no bona fide necessity exists
for seeking eviction of the Petitioner from the subject premises. It
would be submitted that the learned ARC has not considered the said
averment and has erroneously passed the impugned order as against
the Petitioner.
4. Secondly, he would refer to, and read out, verbatim, ground B
raised by him in the present Petition, wherein it is submitted as
follows:
"B. BECAUSE the Ld. ARC failed to consider the registered
Lease Deed dated 20.12.2024, the single most material
document on the question of bona fides, and this non-
consideration is fatal to the finding of bona fide requirement as
understood in law. On the Respondent's own case: (i) her
daughter was enrolled as an Advocate in 2015; (ii) her daughter
lost her employment, and the need is said to have arisen, in 2022;
(iii) the subsisting lease dated 04.09.2015 was to expire on
31.03.2026, whereupon the First and Second Floors of premises
No. 846-A would have fallen vacant; (iy) yet on 20:12.2024, more
than two years after the need is said to have arisen, and more than
fifteen months before the existing lease was due to expire, the
Respondent voluntarily executed a fresh registered lease of those
very floors for a further eight years, until 31.12.2032; and (v) five
months thereafter, on 14.05.2025, she instituted the Eviction
Petition asserting that she has no commercial accommodation
available. The Ld. ARC noticed the filing of this document at
paragraph 6 of the impugned Order, and thereafter made no
reference to it whatsoever in the findings recorded at paragraphs 8
3
Learned ARC
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BHATIA
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to 28. The conduct of a landlord in encumbering, after the need has
arisen, the very accommodation which would otherwise have
answered that need, is a circumstance of the highest relevance in
testing whether the pleaded requirement is a genuine felt need or a
device, and to pass over such a document in complete silence is a
non-application of mind to material evidence. It is not the
Petitioner's case that this Hon'ble Court should conclude, at this
stage, that the Respondent's need is mala fide; the Petitioner's case
is narrower and, it is submitted, unanswerable that this material
raises a triable issue which the Petitioner is entitled to have tried.
Bona fide requirement, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222,
refers to a state of mind and connotes a felt need which is the
outcome of a sincere and honest desire, in contradistinction with a
mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant; the state of mind of a
landlord is necessarily to be tested by her conduct, and the
Respondent's conduct in re-letting for eight years after the need
arose was the most direct evidence of that state of mind available
on the record.
Subsequent conduct inconsistent with a pleaded need is a relevant
circumstance Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava, (2001) 2 SCC
604."
5. Thirdly, learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the site
plan which is filed did not reflect the actual position of the premises.
6. He submits that the learned ARC has rendered an erroneous
finding in this respect since the learned ARC himself was of the belief
that there were differences in the site plan placed on record by the
Respondent and the Petitioner and that, in itself, raised a triable issue.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION:
7. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner and,
with his able assistance, had occasion to go through the relevant
documents as also the impugned judgment.
8. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
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BHATIA
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proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
9. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in S arla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
4
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
5 6
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that thejurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
10. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
7
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
8
Grover .
11. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25B of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
4
(1998) 8 SCC 119
5
(2014) 9 SCC 78
6
(2022) 6 SCC 30
7
2024:DHC:9322
8
2025:DHC:11285
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BHATIA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
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“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
12. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
13. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
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BHATIA
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premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
14. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged on behalf of the Petitioner against the
Impugned Order are required to be examined.
15. At this juncture, this Court deems it apposite to reproduce the
consideration accorded by the learned ARC, which reads as follows:
“LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
9) As far as the landlord-tenant relationship is concerned, the
respondent has not disputed that she is tenant in the tenanted
premises. It is contended that the respondent has never paid rent to
the petitioner. It is, however, contended that since the respondent
was not aware as to who was the successor of the erstwhile owner,
therefore, the rent was deposited by way of DR petition. However,
the respondent has herself stated to be the tenant in the demised
premises. Therefore, the respondent being a tenant cannot
challenge the title of the original landlord or his successor in
interest. In this regard it is necessary to mention the law laid down
in the judgment titled as Rajender Kumar Sharma vs. Smt. Leela
Wati reported as 155 (2008) DLT 383, the Hon'ble High Court of
Delhi held that:
“....It is settled law that for the purpose of section 14(1)(e)
of Delhi Rent Control Act, a landlord is not supposed to
prove absolute ownership as required under Transfer of
Property Act. He is required to show only that he is more
than a tenant. In this case, the landlady had placed on
record the documents by which she become owner. The
attornment given by the erstwhile landlord in her favour as
well as an admission made by the tenant by filing petition
under section 27 of Delhi Rent Control Act
acknowledgement the landlordship of landlady. Thus, the
conclusion arrived at by the ARC regarding ownership and
relationship of landlord and tenant were based on sound
legal position and the cogent material before it….”
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
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10) Hence, the objection with respect to title deeds of petitioner
also does not amount to any triable issue as imperfectness of title
does not bar a petition u/s 14 (1) (c) of the DRC Act. In this regard,
it is important to bear in mind the principle laid down in the case of
Sh. Bharat Bhushan Vs. Arti Teckchandani 2008 (153) DLT 247
which is as follows:-
"The concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation
governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act, has to be
distinguished from the one in a title suit. If the premises
wax let out by a person and after his death, the premises
has come in the hands of beneficiary under a Will, the
tenant has no right to challenge the title of such a
beneficiary. If on the death of the original owner the
tenant has any doubt as to who was the owner of the
premises, he is supposed to file an interpleader suit
impleading all the legul heirs of the deceased and ask the
Court to decide as to who shall be the landlord/owner after
the death of the original owner."
11) Besides in the present case, the petitioner has not to prove
absolute ownership. She only has to show that she has a better title
than that of the tenant. The principle is very clear that once a tenant
always a tenant. The tenant cannot dispute the title of his landlord
or his successor-in- interest, Hence, the contention that title
documents of the petitioner are not valid or that they have been
forged and fabricated, does not amount to any triable issue. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bansraj Laltaprasad Mishra
v. Stanley Parker Jones (2006) 3 SCC 91 had held that:
"...13. The underlying policy of section 116 is that where a
person has been brought into possession as a tenant by the
landlord and if that tenant is permitted to question the title
of the landlord at the time of the settlement, then that will
give rise to extreme confusion in the matter of relationship
of the landlord and tenant and so the equitable principle of
estoppel has been incorporated by the legislature in the
said section.”
12) Thus, the petitioner has to show that she has a better title than
that of the tenant. The principle is very clear that once a tenant
always a tenant. The tenant cannot dispute the title of his landlord
or his successor-in- interest. In this regard, reliance is placed upon
the case of Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti Devi reported as 157 (2009)
DIT 450 wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held: -
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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“The imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot
stand in the way of an eviction petition under section 14
(1) (e) of the DRC Act, neither the tenant can be allowed
to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the
landlord und that too when the tenant has been paying rent
to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates
estoppels against such a tenant. A tenant can challenge the
title of landlord only after vacating the premises and not
when he is occupying the premises. In fact, such a tenant
who denies the title of the landlord, qua the premises, to
whom he is paying rent acts dishonestly...”
13) A tenant is estopped from challenging the ownership or
denying the title of the landlord. No interpleader suit is stated to
have been filed by the respondent. Also, the tenant has no locus to
challenge the transfer of ownership in favour of the landlord. It is
also pertinent to note that the law does not require any attornment
as a pre-requisite on the part of the tenant for affirming the title of
the landlord. It is well settled that if the transfer of the landlord's
title is valid, even if the tenancy is not attorned in favour of the
transferee, the lease continues. Thus, a transferee of the landlord's
rights, steps into the shoes of the landlord with all the rights and
liabilities of the transferor landlord in respect of the subsisting
tenancy. Thus, attornment in favour of the new landlord is
unnecessary to confer validity to the transfer of the landlord's rights
and there is no such statutory requirement. Reference may be made
to the case of Hajee K. Assainar vs. Chacku Joseph AIR 1984 Ker
113. Hence, the said contention is devoid of merits.
14) Accordingly, it can be stated that the petitioner is the owner
landlord of the tenanted premises and the respondent is the tenant
in the said premises. Thus, the first ingredient of landlord-tenant
relationship between the parties in the present case, stands
established.
BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT
20) Further, it is contended that the site plan filed by the petitioner
does not reflect the actual position of the premises. However,
barring some differences, identity and extent of the tenanted
premises as shown by the petitioner and the respondent in the
counter site plan are the same. Moreover, it is trite to state that
there is no requirement of the landlord to set out exactly what area
is required in terms of giving measurement. Reliance in this regard
is placed upon the order of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in RC
Rev. No. 224/2023 Sharad Jain Vs. Jayanti Jain Prasad dated
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BHATIA
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28.01.2025.
21) Hence, I find the petitioner has been able to establish her bona
fide requirement for the tenanted premises.
ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION
22) With regard to the plea of alternative accommodation, it is
contended by the respondent that the petitioner has concealed the
various alternative accommodations which are available with the
petitioner. However, it is a well settled proposition of law that it is
not sufficient that any kind of the property should be available to
the petitioner/landlord to rule out the benefit of 14(1)(e) of D.R.C.
Act. The property available with the petitioner/landlord should also
be reasonably suitable property. In M.M Quasim vs/Manohar Lal
Sharma, (1981) 3 SCC 36, the Apex Court has that the landlord
does not have an unfettered right to choose the premises but merely
showing that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his
possession may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim if
the vacant premises were not suitable for the purpose for which he
required the premises.
23) In the present matter, however, no particulars of any purported
alternative accommodation have been pleaded by the respondent. It
is trite to state that the burden is upon the tenant to show that other
alternative suitable accommodation is available with landlord and
how the said premises were suitable for the pleaded requirement.
Reference is made to the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of
Delhi in the case of Lalta Prasad Gupta Vs. Sita Ram, 2017 SCC
Online Del 13026, wherein it was held as under-
"18. Thus, if the tenant seeks leave to defend controverting
the requirement pleaded by landlord on the ground of the
landlord, though at the time of requirement having
alternate premises, having not used the same and instead
having commercially exploited the same, the tenant must
plead (a) the particulars of such premises; (b) the right/title
of the landlord to the same; (c) that the said premises were
vacant and available for use at the time of pleaded
requirement of landlord; (d) how the said premises were
suitable for the pleaded requirement; and (e) how the
landlord has deprived himself thereof i.e. by sale or letting
and support the said pleas with material on the basis
whereof such pleas will be proved."
24) Furthermore, it is also pertinent to note that the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC
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BHATIA
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30 has held for availing leave to defend a mere assertion by the
tenant is insufficient. Section 14 (1) (c) of the Act creates a
presumption in favour of the landlord regarding bona fide need,
which is rebuttable only with substantive material capable of
raising a triable issue. It was further held that the burden of proof is
on the tenant to demonstrate, with cogent evidence, that the
landlord's requirement is not genuine. The Court also reiterated the
settled principle of law that leave to defend should not be granted
on mere asking but when the pleas and contentions raise triable
issues.
25) Further, in the case titled as Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem
Machinery 2000 SC 534, it was observed as under: -
"It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge
of his requirement for residential or business purpose and
he has got complete freedom in the matter. (See: Prativa
Devi (Smt.) v. T.K Krishnan, [1996/ 5 SCC 353. In the
case in hand the plaintiff landlord wanted eviction of the
tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it
was suitable and it cannot be faulted."
26) Even otherwise, it is the prerogative of the landlord to
determine which premises best suits his requirements. It is trite to
state that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial of claim of
landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison
with tenanted premises, wherefrom the landlord is seeking
eviction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court
have repeatedly held that the Courts are not to'sit in the armchair of
the landlord and dictate as to how the available property of the
landlord is to be best utilized by him. The landlord is the absolute
owner of his property and is the best person to decide which
property is to be utilized in what way. The respondent cannot
dictate as to how the landlord is to utilize his property. The
landlord possesses the prerogative to determine their specific
requirements, exercising full autonomy in this regard. It is not
within the purview of the courts to impose directives on the
landlord regarding the nature or quality of their chosen usage of the
tenanted premises. Therefore, the courts refrain from prescribing
any standard or guidelines for the landlord's choices (residential or
commercial). Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble
Delhi High Court in case of Praveen & Anr. Vs. Mulak Raj & Ors.
RC Rev. 417/2016 in this regard Therefore, the said contention is a
bald averment and without ny particulars of any purported
alternative accommodation, does not amount to any triable issue.
27) Hence, I find that the respondent has failed to raise any triable
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BHATIA
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issue on the aspect of alternative accommodation as well”
(emphasis supplied)
16. Having heard learned counsel for the Petitioner and having
perused the material placed on record as well as the Impugned Order,
this Court finds no ground warranting interference in exercise of its
limited revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of
the DRC Act.
17. At the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind that the present
proceedings cannot be treated as an appeal against the order passed by
the learned ARC. This Court is not called upon to undertake a fresh or
independent appreciation of the pleadings and material on record
merely because another view may possibly be taken. The scope of
interference is confined to examining whether the decision-making
process adopted by the learned ARC suffers from any jurisdictional
error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity or an error
apparent on the face of the record.
18. The first contention of the Petitioner concerns the alleged
availability of alternative suitable accommodation with the
Respondent. Learned counsel has submitted that the learned ARC
failed to properly consider the averments made in the leave to defend
application regarding the availability of alternative accommodation.
19. This contention does not merit acceptance. A perusal of the
Impugned Order demonstrates that the learned ARC has specifically
considered the objection of the Petitioner under the separate heading
of “Alternate Accommodation” . The learned ARC has noted the
contention of the Petitioner that the Respondent had concealed
alternative accommodations allegedly available to her. Upon
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BHATIA
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considering the said plea, the learned ARC has found that no
particulars whatsoever of any specific alternative accommodation
were pleaded by the Petitioner.
20. The learned ARC has further noticed that a mere assertion
regarding the existence of alternative accommodation is insufficient to
raise a triable issue. The tenant is required to place before the Court
sufficient particulars regarding the premises allegedly available with
the landlord and to demonstrate that such premises are reasonably
suitable for the requirement pleaded in the eviction petition.
21. Significantly, the learned ARC has not rejected the plea of
alternative accommodation without examination. On the contrary, the
plea has been considered and rejected on the ground that the Petitioner
had failed to furnish the necessary particulars regarding the alleged
alternative premises, the Respondent's right or title thereto, their
availability and vacancy, as well as their suitability for the
requirement pleaded by the Respondent.
22. In the present Revision Petition, learned counsel for the
Petitioner has not been able to demonstrate that the aforesaid finding
is contrary to the pleadings or based upon a material irregularity in the
decision-making process. A general assertion that the Respondent
possesses sufficient alternative accommodation cannot, by itself,
entitle a tenant to leave to defend. The summary procedure
contemplated under Section 25B of the DRC Act cannot be defeated
merely by raising bald or unsubstantiated assertions without
supporting particulars capable of giving rise to a genuine triable issue.
23. This Court also finds that the learned ARC has correctly
proceeded on the principle that the availability of some other property
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BHATIA
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with the landlord is not, by itself, determinative of the question of
bona fide requirement. What is required to be demonstrated is the
availability of an alternative accommodation which is reasonably
suitable f or the requirement pleaded by the landlord. The question of
suitability cannot be determined in the abstract and necessarily
depends upon the nature of the requirement pleaded and the
particulars of the premises said to be available.
24. In the absence of any such material having been placed before
the learned ARC, the conclusion that the Petitioner had failed to raise
a triable issue on the aspect of alternative suitable accommodation
cannot be characterised as perverse, unreasonable or suffering from
any error apparent on the face of the record. This Court, in exercise of
its revisional jurisdiction, therefore finds no reason to interfere with
the said finding.
25. The second and principal ground urged by the Petitioner before
this Court relates to the registered Lease Deed dated 20.12.2024. It is
contended that the Respondent, despite the alleged need having arisen
earlier, entered into a fresh lease in respect of certain portions of
premises No. 846-A for a further period of eight years, and that such
conduct raises a serious question regarding the genuineness of the
Respondent's pleaded requirement.
26. Upon examination of the record, this Court finds that the
aforesaid contention cannot be permitted to form the basis for
interference in the present Revision Petition.
27. The first and foremost difficulty with the said submission is that
the specific plea now sought to be urged on the basis of the Lease
Deed dated 20.12.2024 did not form part of the defence raised by the
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BHATIA
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Petitioner in the leave to defend application or in the affidavit filed in
support thereof. The statutory scheme under Section 25B contemplates
that the tenant seeking leave to defend must disclose the facts which,
according to the tenant, would disentitle the landlord from obtaining
an order of eviction and which are capable of raising a triable issue.
28. The consideration before the learned ARC is necessarily
confined to the case set up by the parties in the pleadings placed
before it. A tenant cannot, after having failed to specifically raise a
particular factual defence before the learned ARC, seek to introduce
such a defence for the first time in revision and invite this Court to
undertake an examination of disputed questions of fact.
29. The plea founded upon the Lease Deed dated 20.12.2024 is not
a pure question of law which can be examined independently on the
basis of admitted facts. The submission necessarily requires an inquiry
into several factual aspects, including the nature and extent of the
portions covered by the lease, their availability and suitability for the
Respondent's requirement, the purpose for which the premises were let
out, the circumstances in which the lease was executed, and whether
the premises in question could reasonably satisfy the requirement
pleaded in the eviction petition.
30. The submission would further require this Court to draw an
inference regarding the state of mind and bona fi des of the Respondent
from the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Lease Deed.
Such an exercise would necessarily entail an appreciation of factual
material and the drawing of inferences therefrom. This is plainly
beyond the limited scope of the revisional jurisdiction exercised under
the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, particularly when the
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BHATIA
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foundation for such an inquiry was not specifically laid before the
learned ARC.
31. The mere fact that the document may have been placed on
record or referred to at some stage cannot by itself alter the position. It
is the specific case and defence pleaded by the tenant which the
learned ARC is required to adjudicate upon. A party cannot
subsequently formulate a new factual case in revision and contend that
the failure of the learned ARC to undertake an inquiry which was not
invited by the pleadings constitutes non-application of mind.
32. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that bona fide
requirement involves a genuine, sincere and honest need and that the
Court is entitled to examine whether the requirement pleaded by the
landlord is genuine. Equally, the conduct of a landlord may, in an
appropriate case and on the basis of properly pleaded material, be
relevant to the assessment of bona fides.
33. However, the applicability of the aforesaid principles depends
upon the facts and pleadings of each case. The observations regarding
the relevance of subsequent conduct cannot be construed as permitting
a tenant to introduce an altogether new factual foundation at the
revisional stage and seek a factual adjudication by the High Court.
The issue before this Court is not whether, on an independent
examination of the Lease Deed and the surrounding circumstances,
another inference regarding the Respondent's bona fides may possibly
be drawn. The issue is whether the Impugned Order suffers from any
jurisdictional error or manifest illegality on account of the
consideration accorded by the learned ARC to the case as it was
pleaded before it. No such error has been demonstrated.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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34. The relevance of subsequent events or subsequent conduct must
necessarily arise in the context of the facts properly placed before the
Court and cannot be invoked as a mechanism to enlarge the scope of
revisional jurisdiction or to introduce a factual defence which was not
specifically urged before the Court of first instance.
35. It is also material to note that the present revision cannot be
converted into a forum for conducting a roving inquiry into the factual
circumstances surrounding the Lease Deed or for testing, in the first
instance, the explanation that may be offered by the Respondent
regarding the same. Such an exercise would amount to permitting a
fresh factual adjudication at the revisional stage, contrary to the well-
settled limitations governing jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act.
36. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the second ground
urged on behalf of the Petitioner.
37. The third contention of the Petitioner relates to the alleged
discrepancy in the site plan filed by the Respondent. It is submitted
that the site plan does not reflect the actual position of the premises
and that the learned ARC itself noticed certain differences between the
site plans filed by the respective parties.
38. This contention also does not warrant interference. The learned
ARC has specifically adverted to the objection concerning the site
plans in paragraph 20 of the Impugned Order. The learned ARC has
observed that, notwithstanding certain differences, the identity and
extent of the tenanted premises, as reflected in the site plans filed by
the parties, were substantially the same.
39. Thus, the learned ARC has not ignored the alleged discrepancy
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
10:37:29
in the site plans. The contention has been specifically noticed and
considered. Upon such consideration, the learned ARC arrived at the
conclusion that the differences pointed out did not affect the identity
or extent of the tenanted premises so as to give rise to a triable issue.
40. The submission of the Petitioner, in substance, invites this
Court to re-appreciate the two site plans and arrive at an independent
factual conclusion regarding the significance of the alleged
discrepancies. Such an exercise is not permissible in the present
proceedings. The revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B(8) does
not enable this Court to reassess the factual material merely because
the Petitioner seeks to persuade this Court that a different conclusion
ought to have been drawn from the same documents.
41. Unless the finding of the learned ARC is demonstrated to be
perverse or based upon a complete misreading or non-consideration of
the material on record, this Court would not be justified in substituting
its own assessment for that of the learned ARC. No such perversity or
material irregularity has been demonstrated in the present case.
42. The fact that there may be certain differences between two site
plans does not, by itself, necessarily raise a triable issue. The material
question is whether such differences have any bearing upon the
identity of the tenanted premises or the adjudication of the bona fide
requirement pleaded by the landlord. The learned ARC, upon
consideration of the material before it, has answered the said question
in the negative. This Court finds no manifest error in the said
conclusion.
43. It must also be borne in mind that the statutory procedure under
Section 25B is intended to provide an expeditious remedy in matters
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BHATIA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
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concerning eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement. Leave to
defend is not to be granted merely because a tenant is able to point out
some discrepancy or raise an issue which is peripheral to the material
ingredients required to be established under Section 14(1)(e) of the
DRC Act. The defence must disclose such facts as would, if
established, disentitle the landlord to an order of eviction.
44. Having examined the Impugned Order in its entirety, this Court
finds that the learned ARC has considered the material objections
raised by the Petitioner, including the objection regarding alternative
accommodation and the alleged discrepancy in the site plan. The
findings returned by the learned ARC are based upon the pleadings
and material placed before it and cannot be said to suffer from any
jurisdictional infirmity, manifest illegality, material irregularity or
perversity.
45. The arguments advanced on behalf of the Petitioner, at best,
seek a reconsideration of the factual material and invite this Court to
substitute its own view for that of the learned ARC. Such an exercise
is impermissible in the limited revisional jurisdiction vested in this
Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
46. This Court is, therefore, unable to hold that the decision-making
process adopted by the learned ARC suffers from any error warranting
interference. The Impugned Order represents a plausible view based
upon the pleadings and material available before the learned ARC.
The mere possibility of another view cannot furnish a ground for
exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
47. Accordingly, finding no merit in the present Revision Petition,
the same is dismissed. The Impugned Order dated 06.05.2026 passed
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
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by the learned ARC is upheld.
48. Accordingly, the present petition along with all pending
application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
AUGUST 25, 2026/
v/va
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
10:37:29