Rajnish Kumar vs State Of Punjab & Ors

HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

CWP-3137-2016 (O&M)

Rajnish Kumar ... Petitioner

VS.

State of Punjab & Ors. ... Respondents

1. Judgment reserved on 11.08.2026
2. Judgment pronounced on 05.11.2026
3. Judgment uploaded on 06.11.2026
4. Whether operative or full judgment Full
5. Delay in pronouncement of full judgment and reasons, if any NA

CORAM: HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE SANDEEP MOUDGIL

Present: Mr. Sandeep Kumar, Advocate for the petitioner

Mr. Vikas Arora, DAG Punjab

Mr. PS Thiara, Advocate for respondents No.2&3

Sandeep Moudgil, J.

1. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India has been invoked for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari
quashing the Vigilance Enquiry Report (Annexure P9) in so far as it relates to
the petitioner as well as the Departmental Enquiry Report (Annexure P13) and
the consequential termination order dated 22.01.2016 (Annexure P-16),
whereby the contractual services of the petitioner as Education Instructor in the
Centre for Training and Employment of Punjab Youth (C-PYTE) were
terminated on the ground that he had obtained appointment without possessing
the requisite teaching experience and on the basis of experience certificates
which could not be verified.
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2. Briefly stated that pursuant to a public notice dated 31.01.2010
(Annexure P-3) inviting application for recruitment of Education Instructor
with persons having minimum of five years of teaching experience, the
petitioner applied and was selected on 30.04.2010 (Annexure P-4) on
contractual basis which was subsequently extended from time to time.

3. This Court, in CWP No. 22604 of 2010 ( Laj Pal Singh Bains v. State of
Punjab) , vide order dated 14.09.2012, directed an enquiry into the recruitment
process undertaken by C-PYTE and pursuant thereto, the Vigilance Bureau
conducted an enquiry and submitted its report dated 29.07.2013 (Annexure P-
9), wherein certain irregularities including concerning the petitioner's selection
were noticed, particularly with regard to his experience certificates.

4. Consequently, disciplinary proceedings under Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil
Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970, were initiated against the
petitioner and a charge-sheet dated 23.09.2014 (Annexure P-12) was issued and
in the enquiry conducted by Shri Surjit Singh Dhillon, retired IAS Officer, the
charge against the petitioner stood proved vide impugned report dated
05.05.2015 (Annexure P-13) which was followed by passing of the impugned
order dated 22.01.2016 (Annexure P-16), terminating his contractual
engagement.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the certificate issued by
Arya Senior Secondary School, Dhuri, had been duly countersigned by the
District Education Officer (Secondary) on 27.04.2007 and was also entered in
the official record at Serial No. 692, however, the respondents, without
obtaining proper verification from the concerned authorities, could not have
treated the said certificate as fictitious merely because its verification could not
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be completed during the enquiry proceedings. It is further contended that the
petitioner was granted time to obtain verification from the office of the DEO
and his inability to appear before the Inquiry Officer on 31.03.2015 could not,
by itself, establish that the certificates were fabricated.

6. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner was not supplied with
the documents forming the basis of the Vigilance and departmental enquiries
despite requests made by him and that the respondents failed to appreciate the
cancellation report dated 15.11.2015 submitted in FIR No. 14 dated
17.01.2014, which, according to the petitioner, recorded that the experience
certificates furnished by the candidates were genuine and was subsequently
accepted by the competent Court.

7. Learned counsel also contends that the impugned order has been passed
mechanically as the termination was imposed by way of penalty, whereas
respondent No.3 was not the authority competent to impose such penalty under
the Bye-laws and Manual governing respondent No.2 and also as per
instructions dated 09.12.2014, one month notice before dispensing with the
petitioner’s services was not given to him.

8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents 2 to 4 submits that two
experience certificates furnished by the petitioner reflected experience of only
approximately two years and six months against requirement of 5 years’
teaching experience and that too the certificate issued by DAV Public School,
Dhuri, had not been countersigned by the District Education Officer. He
submits that the petitioner, despite being afforded sufficient opportunity, failed
to establish their genuineness or produce satisfactory proof of the requisite
experience.
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9. It is further submitted that the departmental proceedings were initiated
pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in CWP No. 22604 of 2010. The
petitioner was served with a charge-sheet, participated in the enquiry
proceedings and was afforded an opportunity to submit his defence. The
enquiry was conducted by a retired IAS Officer, who, after considering the
material available on record and the explanation furnished by the petitioner,
returned a finding that he did not possess the requisite five years' teaching
experience.

10. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

11. The controversy essentially concerns the petitioner's eligibility for
appointment to the post of Education Instructor and the validity of the findings
recorded in the departmental enquiry regarding the experience certificates
furnished by him.

12. A perusal of the enquiry report dated 05.05.2015 reveals that the
petitioner was specifically confronted with the two experience certificates
furnished by him, namely, the certificate issued by Arya Senior Secondary
School, Dhuri, for the period from 20.01.1996 to 28.02.1997 and the certificate
issued by DAV Public School, Dhuri, for the period from 31.01.2007 to
30.04.2008. During the course of the enquiry, the petitioner admitted that the
two certificates produced by him accounted for approximately two years and
six months of experience. He further stated that although he had been teaching
since 1996, he did not possess any other experience certificate in writing to
substantiate the remaining period.

13. The Inquiry Officer also noticed that the petitioner had specifically
asserted that the certificate issued by Arya Senior Secondary School, Dhuri,
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had been countersigned by the District Education Officer (Secondary) and that
the same was entered in the official record. He was granted an opportunity to
get the certificate verified through the office of the DEO. On 20.03.2015, the
petitioner informed the Inquiry Officer that the DEO's office required
verification from the concerned school and, accordingly, sought further time.
The matter was adjourned to 31.03.2015. However, the petitioner did not
appear on the said date. Even thereafter, no satisfactory verification or
documentary material establishing the genuineness of the certificates was
furnished before the Inquiry Officer.

14. On an overall consideration of the material, the Inquiry Officer
concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish the genuineness of the
experience certificates and, more importantly, did not possess the requisite five
years' teaching experience prescribed for the post. The said finding is not based
merely upon the petitioner's absence on 31.03.2015 but also takes into account
his own statement regarding the extent of experience reflected in the
certificates and his failure to substantiate the remaining experience through any
documentary material.

15. It is true that inability to verify a document and its affirmative proof of
fabrication are two distinct matters. However, the present controversy cannot
be examined in isolation from the admitted position that the petitioner was
required to possess five years' teaching experience and that the documents
produced by him accounted for only approximately two years and six months.

16. That apart, the disciplinary authority was required to consider the
material relevant to the departmental charge, and the mere existence of a
cancellation report does not conclusively establish that the petitioner possessed
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the prescribed five years' experience or that the documents produced by him
satisfied the recruitment conditions.

17. Also, the petitioner has not been able to establish, on the material placed
before this Court, that the impugned order was passed by an authority wholly
lacking jurisdiction. The fact that approval was obtained from the Minister-in-
Charge, by itself, neither establishes nor disproves the competence of the
authority passing the order.

18. In CIFC v/s Abrar Ali, (2018) 1 SCC (L&S) 310 , it was held by the
Hon'ble Apex Court that –
"The High Court should not have entered into the arena of
facts which tantamount to re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled
law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaiya reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584, this Court held as
follows:
"7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an
appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic
inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible
on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and
properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question
of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence
will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in
departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with
findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where
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such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly
perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal
acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or
finding, on the material on record. The courts will however
interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of
natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the
order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on
extraneous considerations."

19. In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan, (2006) 2
SCC 373 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the scope of judicial review as
confined to correct the errors of law or procedural error if it results in manifest
miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. In para 7, the
Hon'ble Court has held: "By now it is a well established principle of law that
the High Court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the
Constitution does not act as an Appellate Authority. Its jurisdiction is
circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error if any
resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural
justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by appreciating the
evidence as an Appellate Authority....."

20. This Court is not exercising appellate jurisdiction over the findings
recorded by the Inquiry Officer. Interference is warranted where the findings
are based on no evidence, suffer from perversity, are contrary to the prescribed
procedure or are otherwise vitiated by a violation of the principles of natural
justice. The Court cannot undertake a fresh factual enquiry, reassess the entire
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evidence as an appellate authority or substitute its own conclusions merely
because another view of the material may also be possible.

21. For the foregoing reasons, no ground for interference with the impugned
departmental enquiry report or the consequential termination order dated
22.01.2016 is made out.

22. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

23. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of
accordingly.
05.11.2026
(Sandeep Moudgil)
V.Vishal

Judge
Yes/No
1. Whether speaking/reasoned? :
2. Whether reportable? : Yes/No
V VISHAL SHONKAR
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integrity of this document