Mukesh Kumar vs Smt Goldi Singh And 2 Others
- Court
- Allahabad High Court
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - A No. - 8775 of 2026
Mukesh Kumar
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Smt Goldi Singh and 2 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : M.P. Srivastava, Manoj Kumar
Kushwahah
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Rama Pati Tripathi, Ravindra Singh
AFR
Court No. - 35
HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
1. Heard Sri M P Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner and
Sri Rama Pati Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the contesting
respondents.
2. The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India has been filed assailing the order dated 10.04.2026 passed by the
Additional Collector (Judicial)/Rent Authority, Kanpur Nagar, in Rent
Case No. 11329 of 2025 (Smt. Goldi Singh and others v. Damodar Lal),
instituted under Section 21(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban
Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 2021').
By the impugned order, the Rent Authority has allowed the application
filed by the landlord-respondents under Section 6(6) of the Act of 2021
seeking to bring the legal representatives of Late Damodar Lal on
record, while rejecting the application filed by the petitioner under Order
VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as the 'CPC').
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3. The facts giving rise to the present petition are that the petitioner's
father, Late Damodar Lal, was a tenant in Shop No. 6, forming part of
Premises No. 82/4, Block-9, Govind Nagar, Kanpur Nagar, since 1975,
where he initially carried on the business of selling betel leaves. The
monthly rent, originally fixed at Rs.35/-, was enhanced from time to
time to Rs.150/- and subsequently to Rs.325/-. Damodar Lal died on
22.12.2024. The petitioner claims that, following his father's death, he
continued in occupation of the shop as his son and legal heir and carried
on the business of repairing electronic goods therein. He further asserts
that he regularly paid rent at the rate of Rs.325/- per month up to June,
2026 and had also been paying house tax and sewer tax in respect of the
premises since 2021.
4. The respondent-landlords instituted Rent Case No. 11329 of 2025
under Section 21(2) of the Act of 2021, seeking eviction from the
aforesaid shop and recovery of arrears of rent quantified at
Rs.10,00,000/-, calculated at the rate of Rs.20,000/- per month with
effect from 11.01.2021. The eviction proceedings were instituted against
Damodar Lal, notwithstanding that he had died on 22.12.2024. Prior to
the institution of the proceedings, a legal notice dated 22.02.2025, stated
to have been served on 24.02.2025, had been issued in his name. The
respondent-landlords also relied upon a proposed tenancy agreement
dated 18.04.2025. Both the notice and the proposed agreement thus bear
dates subsequent to the death of Damodar Lal.
5. After the Rent Authority issued a show-cause notice dated
22.07.2025 in the name of Damodar Lal, the petitioner claims to have
learnt about the pendency of the proceedings through neighbouring
tenants. Subsequently, on 19.12.2025, the respondent-landlords filed an
application under Section 6(6) of the Act of 2021, supported by a joint
affidavit, disclosing the death of Damodar Lal and seeking to bring his
legal representatives on record. Thereafter, on 03.02.2026, the petitioner
filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC,
seeking rejection of the eviction application, principally on the ground
that the proceedings, having been instituted against a person who had
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already died, were non est and void ab initio, and that the subsequent
impleadment of his legal representatives could not cure the defect in the
institution of the proceedings.
6. By the impugned order dated 10.04.2026, the Rent Authority
allowed the application filed by the respondent-landlords for bringing
the legal representatives of Damodar Lal on record and rejected the
petitioner's application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. While doing so,
the Rent Authority observed that the respondent-landlords had moved
the application upon acquiring knowledge of the death of Damodar Lal
and before the petitioner had raised any objection in that regard. It
further held that there was no legal impediment to bringing the legal
representatives on record.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that proceedings
instituted against a sole respondent who had died prior to their institution
are non est in the eyes of law and cannot be sustained. It was contended
that, Damodar Lal having died on 22.12.2024, the legal notice dated
22.02.2025, the purported tenancy agreement dated 18.04.2025 and the
subsequent institution of Rent Case No. 11329 of 2025 are all vitiated by
fraud and misrepresentation and suffer from an inherent legal infirmity.
Learned counsel further submitted that the provisions of Order XXII
Rule 4 CPC, which contemplate substitution of the legal representatives
of a defendant dying during the pendency of proceedings, have no
application where the death has occurred prior to institution. In support
of this submission, reliance was placed upon the decision of the High
1
Court of Mysore in C. Muttu v. Bharath Match Works . A statutory
notice issued in the name of a person who was no longer alive, it was
urged, could not furnish a valid foundation for initiating proceedings
under Section 21(2) of the Act of 2021. On these grounds, it was
contended that the Rent Authority committed a manifest error in
permitting the legal representatives of the deceased tenant to be brought
on record and in rejecting the petitioner's application under Order VII
Rule 11 CPC.
1 AIR 1964 Mys 293
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8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-landlords, on the other
hand, supported the impugned order and submitted that the respondent-
landlords were unaware of the death of Damodar Lal either when the
legal notice was issued or when the eviction proceedings were instituted.
It was contended that, upon acquiring knowledge of his death, the
respondent-landlords, acting bona fide, promptly moved an application
dated 19.12.2025 under Section 6(6) of the Act of 2021, supported by a
joint affidavit, seeking to bring his legal representatives on record.
Emphasis was laid on the fact that the said application had been filed
well before the petitioner moved his application under Order VII Rule 11
CPC. Learned counsel submitted that an inadvertent mistake in issuing
notice to, or instituting proceedings against, a deceased tenant, in the
bona fide belief that he was alive, would not by itself render the
proceedings incurably defective, particularly when the legal
representative claiming through the deceased tenant continues in
occupation of the premises and has an opportunity to contest the eviction
proceedings on all available grounds. Referring to Section 33 of the Act
of 2021, learned counsel further contended that the provisions of Order
VII Rule 11 CPC stand excluded in proceedings under the Act. Reliance
in this regard was placed upon the decision of this Court in Jagdish
2
Kumar Bansal v. Manish Agrawal and another .
9. Having considered the rival submissions and examined the
material available on record, the following issues arise for consideration:
(I) Whether an eviction proceeding instituted against a sole respondent
who had died prior to its institution is liable to be treated as an incurable
nullity, or whether the appropriate legal representatives or other
necessary persons may be brought on record under the procedural
framework governing the Rent Authority, having regard to the principles
underlying Order I Rule 10(2) read with Section 151 CPC; and whether
such impleadment would, by itself, result in relation back to the date of
institution.
(II) Whether a statutory notice under Section 21(2)(b) of the Act of 2021,
issued in the name of a tenant who had died prior to its issuance,
2 2026 SCC OnLine All 24269
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necessarily invalidates the subsequent eviction proceedings, or whether
its validity and legal effect require examination with reference to the
circumstances in which it was issued and served, including the
knowledge of the landlord and its communication to the person upon
whom the tenancy rights and obligations may have devolved.
(III) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
Rent Authority committed any error in rejecting the petitioner's
application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC seeking
rejection of the eviction application at the threshold.
Issue (I): Death Prior to Institution of Proceedings and Death Pendente
Lite - Power to Bring Legal Representatives on Record
10. A distinction is well recognised in procedural law between a case
where a defendant dies during the pendency of a duly instituted
proceeding and one where the person arrayed as a defendant had already
died before the proceeding was instituted. Order XXII Rule 4 CPC
contemplates a situation where the death of a defendant occurs during
the pendency of the suit. It is, therefore, not attracted where the person
arrayed as a defendant had died prior to institution. In the latter situation,
the question of substitution under Order XXII Rule 4 does not arise. The
legal consequence of such prior death, however, has to be considered
separately from the question whether the legal representatives or other
persons claiming through the deceased can be added as parties under an
independent procedural power.
11. The distinction between substitution and addition of parties
assumes significance in this context. Where the defendant has died
before institution, the legal representatives are not sought to be
substituted for a party who was alive when the proceedings commenced.
Rather, their addition is sought so that the controversy may be
effectively adjudicated in their presence. In an appropriate case, where
the person instituting the proceedings had acted under a bona fide
mistake and without knowledge of the prior death, the procedural
principles underlying Order I Rule 10(2) read with Section 151 CPC
may provide guidance in determining whether the legal representatives
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ought to be brought on record. The exercise of such power, however,
must be supported by the statutory or procedural jurisdiction available to
the forum concerned and cannot be founded merely upon an abstract
invocation of the inherent powers of a Civil Court.
12. The proviso to Section 21(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides
an important statutory safeguard in ordinary civil proceedings against the
consequences of an omission to implead the proper party arising from a
mistake made in good faith. Section 21(1), together with its proviso,
reads as follows:
"21. Effect of substituting or adding new plaintiff or defendant.—(1) Where
after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or
added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when
he was so made a party:
Provided that where the court is satisfied that the omission to include a new
plaintiff or defendant was due to a mistake made in good faith, the court may
direct that the suit shall, as regards such plaintiff or defendant, be deemed to
have been instituted on any earlier date which the court may specify."
13. The proviso thus recognises the distinction between the date on
which a person is actually added as a party and the date from which the
proceeding may, by a specific judicial direction, be deemed to have been
instituted against that person. Such relation back is not automatic. It
requires the Court to be satisfied that the omission occurred on account
of a mistake made in good faith and to exercise its discretion by
specifying the earlier date.
3
14. In Karuppaswamy and others v. C. Ramamurthy , the Supreme
Court considered the effect of the proviso to Section 21(1) of the
Limitation Act, 1963 in a case where a suit had been instituted against a
person who had died before its institution. The Court held that the
proviso enables the Court, upon being satisfied that the omission to
implead the proper party was occasioned by a mistake made in good
faith, to direct that the suit, as against the subsequently added legal
representatives, shall be deemed to have been instituted on an earlier
date. The Court emphasised that an assertion of bona fide mistake is not,
by itself, sufficient; the Court must arrive at the requisite satisfaction on
3 (1993) 4 SCC 41
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the basis of the material before it. The decision thus recognises that the
defect arising from the institution of proceedings against a deceased
person is not, in every circumstance, incapable of being remedied. At the
same time, the benefit of the proviso is conditional upon the satisfaction
contemplated therein and cannot be presumed merely from the
subsequent impleadment of the legal representatives.
15. The distinction between Order XXII Rule 4 and Order I Rule 10
CPC was also considered by the Supreme Court in Pankajbhai
Rameshbhai Zalavadiya v. Jethabhai Kalabhai Patel (Deceased) through
4
Legal Representatives and others . The Court held that where a
defendant had died prior to institution of the suit, his legal
representatives could be added under Order I Rule 10 read with Section
151 CPC, subject to the law of limitation. It further observed that the
question of limitation, including the applicability of Section 21 of the
Limitation Act, would remain open for determination. The decision
underscores that the inapplicability of Order XXII Rule 4 does not, by
itself, foreclose the possibility of impleading the legal representatives
under an independent procedural provision. It also makes clear that the
presence of persons necessary for effective adjudication may be secured
by adopting the appropriate procedural course, subject to the applicable
law of limitation. The decision, however, was rendered in the context of
proceedings governed by the CPC and does not dispense with the
requirement of examining the statutory framework governing the forum
before which such impleadment is sought.
16. The position requires particular consideration in the context of the
Act of 2021. Section 33(1) provides that, save as provided in the Act, the
provisions of the CPC shall not apply to the Rent Authority and the Rent
Tribunal. They are to be guided by the principles of natural justice and
have the power to regulate their own procedure in the manner specified
therein. Section 34 confers specified powers of a Civil Court for
discharging their statutory functions. Thus, the procedural powers of the
Rent Authority have to be understood primarily with reference to the
4 (2017) 9 SCC 700
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special enactment, rather than by mechanically importing the provisions
of the CPC.
17. Section 6 also requires consideration. Sub-section (4) thereof
provides for an application for substitution of the heirs or legal
representatives, claimants-occupants or other persons who were parties
to proceedings under the Act and died during their pendency. Sub-
section (6), on the other hand, deals with the obligation of a pleader
appearing for a party to inform the Rent Authority or Rent Tribunal
about the death of that party and the consequential notice to the other
party. Neither provision, in its express terms, specifically deals with the
situation where the person sought to be impleaded had died before
institution of the proceedings. Section 6(6), therefore, does not
independently confer a power of substitution or impleadment in a case of
pre-institution death. Further, Section 41 of the Act expressly applies
Sections 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings under
the Act, but does not specifically refer to Section 21 thereof. The
applicability of the proviso to Section 21(1) to proceedings before the
Rent Authority, therefore, cannot be assumed merely on the basis of its
application to ordinary civil suits.
18. The absence of an express provision dealing with the addition of
the legal representatives of a person who had died before institution does
not, by itself, conclude the question whether the Rent Authority can
secure the participation of persons whose interests may be directly
affected by the adjudication. Section 33(1), while excluding the
application of the CPC, recognises the authority of the Rent Authority to
regulate its procedure, guided by the principles of natural justice and in
the manner contemplated therein. Read in that context, the power to
secure the presence of necessary persons may be regarded as incidental
to the effective exercise of its statutory jurisdiction. The principles
underlying Order I Rule 10 CPC, as explained in Pankajbhai
Rameshbhai Zalavadiya (supra), may provide guidance in that regard,
but the provision itself cannot be applied to proceedings under the Act of
2021. Such procedural competence must remain confined to securing the
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participation of persons necessary for adjudication and cannot be
extended to determining their substantive rights or validating the
institution of proceedings retrospectively.
19. The decision in C. Muttu (supra), relied upon on behalf of the
petitioner, does not warrant a different conclusion. The observation
therein that the suit could not proceed was made in the context of an
application under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC, seeking permission to amend
the plaint by deleting the name of the defendant who had died before
institution of the suit. The decision, therefore, dealt with the
impermissibility of invoking the provision governing substitution on
death during the pendency of proceedings in a case where death had
occurred before institution. The question arising in the present case,
however, concerns the competence of the Rent Authority to secure the
participation of persons claiming through the deceased tenant within the
procedural framework of the Act of 2021. The decision, being
distinguishable on its factual and procedural context, does not determine
the issue arising for consideration herein.
20. The principles emerging from the above discussion may be
summarised as follows:
(i) Order XXII Rule 4 of the CPC applies where a defendant dies during
the pendency of a suit. Where the defendant had died before institution
of the suit, the question of bringing the legal representatives on record
falls to be considered on the principles underlying Order I Rule 10 of the
CPC, and not under the provisions governing substitution on death
pendente lite.
(ii) Impleadment of legal representatives in such a situation is distinct
from substitution under Order XXII Rule 4. Such impleadment may be
permissible to secure the presence of persons necessary for effective
adjudication; however, the effect of such impleadment upon the
proceedings already instituted has to be determined in the light of the
applicable statutory framework. The mere order of impleadment does
not, by itself, establish the validity of the original institution or result in
automatic relation back to the date of institution. In the context of a civil
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suit, the benefit of relation back under the proviso to Section 21(1) of the
Limitation Act, 1963, is conditional upon the Court being satisfied that
the omission to implead the proper party was due to a mistake made in
good faith.
(iii) Under the Act of 2021, the provisions of the CPC do not apply as
such, in view of Section 33(1). Section 6(4) provides for substitution in
the circumstances specified therein, whereas Section 6(6) does not
independently confer a power to substitute or implead a person in
proceedings instituted against someone who had already died. The
competence of the Rent Authority to secure the participation of such
persons must, therefore, be examined within the procedural framework
of the Act, including Section 33, and cannot be founded upon the direct
application of Order I Rule 10 of the CPC.
(iv) Section 41 of the Act of 2021 expressly applies Sections 4, 5 and 12
of the Limitation Act, 1963, but does not refer to Section 21 thereof. The
benefit of the proviso to Section 21(1), which operates in the context of a
suit, cannot, therefore, be assumed to be available in proceedings under
the Act of 2021 merely by invoking the principles underlying the CPC.
(v) The procedural question of impleadment must be kept distinct from
the substantive question of devolution of tenancy rights under Section 6
of the Act of 2021. In the case of a non-residential tenancy, the
entitlement of a claimant must be examined in the light of Section 6(3).
Likewise, where eviction is sought on the ground specified in Section
21(2)(b), the validity and effect of the statutory demand notice, including
its issuance and service, require independent examination. Subsequent
impleadment, by itself, neither establishes succession to the tenancy nor
dispenses with the requirement of independently examining the validity
and effect of the statutory demand notice.
21. In the present case, the respondent-landlords filed the application
for bringing the legal representatives on record on 19.12.2025, supported
by a joint affidavit, whereas the petitioner raised his objection by filing
the application dated 03.02.2026. The earlier filing of the application by
the landlords is a circumstance relevant to their plea that the omission
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WRIA No. - 8775 of 2026
was occasioned by a bona fide mistake, though it cannot, by itself,
conclusively establish the same. The question whether the landlords
were genuinely unaware of the death of Damodar Lal when the notice
was issued and the proceedings were instituted must be examined on the
basis of the material available before the Rent Authority. The chronology
of the applications cannot substitute such examination, nor can the filing
of the application dated 19.12.2025, by itself, establish that the original
proceedings are entitled to relate back to the date of institution.
22. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the present premises are
non-residential. Section 6(3) of the Act of 2021 provides that, in the
event of the death of a tenant of non-residential premises, the right of
tenancy for the remaining period devolves upon the person who has
succeeded the business of the deceased tenant. Consequently, the mere
relationship of an applicant with the deceased tenant would not, by itself,
conclude the question of succession to such tenancy. The claim of the
petitioner and of the other persons sought to be impleaded must be
considered in the light of the said statutory provision, wherever their
entitlement to continue the tenancy is in issue. The petitioner's presence,
in particular, cannot be disregarded when he claims to be in occupation
of the premises and asserts an independent right to continue the tenancy.
The fact that the deceased tenant had carried on the business of selling
betel leaves, whereas the petitioner claims to be carrying on the business
of repairing electronic goods, may also require consideration while
determining whether the statutory requirement of succession to the
business is satisfied. No conclusion on that question can be drawn
merely from the relationship of the petitioner with the deceased tenant or
from his occupation of the premises.
23. In view of the above discussion, the fact that the original
proceedings were instituted in the name of a person who had already
died does not, by itself, conclude the question whether the proceedings
can validly continue against the persons subsequently brought on record.
Equally, the subsequent impleadment of such persons cannot, merely on
that account, be treated as validating the original institution or
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determining their entitlement to the tenancy. The permissibility and legal
effect of impleadment have to be examined within the procedural
framework of the Act of 2021. The procedural order bringing the legal
representatives on record, therefore, cannot foreclose the petitioner's
objections concerning the legal effect of the original institution, the
devolution of tenancy rights or the validity of the statutory demand
notice. These aspects are required to be considered independently by the
Rent Authority in accordance with law.
Issue (II): Legal Effect of a Statutory Notice under Section 21(2)(b)
Issued in the Name of a Deceased Tenant
24. The petitioner has further questioned the validity of the legal
notice dated 22.02.2025, stated to have been served on 24.02.2025, on
the ground that it was issued in the name of Damodar Lal, who had died
on 22.12.2024. According to the petitioner, since the notice was issued to
a person who was no longer alive, it could not satisfy the statutory
requirement of notice or furnish a valid foundation for the eviction
application.
25. The legal effect of this objection has to be examined with
reference to the precise statutory provision under which eviction is
sought. Section 21(2)(b) of the Act of 2021 contemplates eviction on the
ground that the tenant has not paid the arrears of rent and other charges
payable in full, as specified in Section 13(1), for two consecutive
months, including interest for delayed payment as may be specified in
the tenancy agreement, within one month from the date of service of a
notice of demand for payment of such arrears and other charges. Section
21(3) further provides that no order for eviction on the said ground shall
be made if the tenant makes payment to the landlord or deposits with the
Rent Authority the arrears of rent and other payable charges, including
interest, within one month from the date of service of the demand notice
upon him. The requirement of notice is, therefore, an integral part of the
statutory ground of eviction founded upon default in payment of arrears.
The notice is intended to communicate the demand to the person liable
to discharge the tenancy obligations and to afford the statutorily
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prescribed opportunity to make payment before eviction is sought on
that ground.
26. In the case of a non-residential tenancy, Section 6(3) provides that,
upon the death of the tenant, the right of tenancy for the remaining
period devolves upon the person who has succeeded the business of the
deceased tenant. Further, Section 6(1) provides that the terms of the
agreement executed between the landlord and tenant shall bind their
successors in the event of the death of either party, and that the successor
shall have the same rights and obligations as agreed in the tenancy
agreement for the remaining period of the tenancy. The person
succeeding to the tenancy under the statutory scheme would, therefore,
be required to discharge the obligations attaching to it. The statutory
requirement of notice under Section 21(2)(b), however, cannot be treated
as satisfied merely because a notice addressed to the deceased tenant was
dispatched at the address of the tenanted premises. Equally, the fact that
the notice bears the name of the deceased tenant would not, without
examination of the circumstances of its issuance and service, be
sufficient to conclude that the proceedings are necessarily unsustainable
at the threshold.
27. The relevant considerations would include whether the landlord
was aware of the tenant's death when the notice was issued; whether the
person who succeeded the business and claims the tenancy was in
occupation of the premises at the relevant time; whether the notice was
actually delivered at the premises and came to the knowledge of such
person; and whether the communication, in its substance and manner of
service, satisfied the statutory requirement of a demand upon the person
liable to pay the arrears. These matters must be examined with reference
to the statutory object of the notice and cannot be resolved merely by
reference to the description of the addressee.
28. The petitioner's allegations that the respondent-landlords filed the
rent case on the basis of forgery and misrepresentation raises questions
which require examination of the relevant material. The circumstance
that the respondent-landlords are stated to reside on the first floor of the
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same building may also be relevant while examining their plea of
ignorance, though it cannot, by itself, establish prior knowledge of the
death. Similarly, the fact that the petitioner claims to have continued in
occupation of the shop would not, without more, establish either the
actual service of the statutory notice upon him or compliance with the
requirement of Section 21(2)(b).
29. It follows that the mere circumstance that the notice dated
22.02.2025 was issued in the name of Damodar Lal after his death
cannot, in the facts of the present case, be treated as conclusively
determining the maintainability of the eviction proceedings at the
threshold. At the same time, the notice cannot be regarded as valid
merely on the ground that it was addressed to the tenanted premises or
that the petitioner was in occupation thereof. Its legal efficacy, including
the question whether the statutory demand was duly communicated to
the person upon whom the tenancy obligations had devolved, must be
determined upon consideration of the pleadings and the relevant
evidence. The determination of this question shall also take into account
the petitioner's claim under Section 6(3) and the nature of the tenancy
obligations alleged to have devolved upon him.
Issue (III): Scope of the Petitioner's Objection Seeking Rejection of the
Eviction Application
30. The petitioner has also challenged the proposed tenancy
agreement dated 18.04.2025 and the legal notice dated 22.02.2025 on the
ground that both documents came into existence after the death of
Damodar Lal. He has further disputed the rate of rent asserted by the
respondent-landlords, contending that the rent was Rs.325/- per month
and not Rs.20,000/- per month, as claimed in the eviction application. He
also asserts that rent and municipal taxes were regularly paid by him.
These objections, insofar as they relate to the genuineness of the
documents, the actual rate of rent, the alleged default and the petitioner's
entitlement to continue in occupation, raise matters which must be
considered in the light of the respective pleadings and the evidence
adduced by the parties.
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31. The petitioner's application was styled as one under Order VII
Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC. However, in view of Section 33(1)
of the Act of 2021, the provisions of the CPC do not apply to
proceedings before the Rent Authority, save to the extent expressly
provided in the Act. In this regard, this Court in Jagdish Kumar Bansal v.
Manish Agrawal and another, while examining the applicability of Order
VII Rule 11 CPC to proceedings under the Act of 2021, has held that the
independent remedy of seeking rejection of proceedings by invoking the
said provision stands excluded by virtue of Section 33. The application,
therefore, could not be adjudicated by mechanically applying the
provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC as though the proceeding were an
ordinary civil suit. At the same time, the objection raised by the
petitioner required consideration on its substance, namely, whether the
eviction application was liable to be rejected at the threshold on account
of the death of the person against whom it had been instituted and the
alleged invalidity of the statutory notice.
32. The decision in Jagdish Kumar Bansal (supra) also makes it clear
that the exclusion of the remedy under Order VII Rule 11 CPC does not
take away the right of a party to raise objections relating to
maintainability, jurisdiction, limitation, existence of the landlord-tenant
relationship or any other legal or factual issue arising in the proceedings.
Such objections remain available to the parties and are required to be
considered by the Rent Authority in accordance with the Act of 2021.
The principle underlying Order VII Rule 11 CPC, as explained by the
Supreme Court in Saleem Bhai and others v. State of Maharashtra and
5
others , is that while considering whether a plaint discloses a cause of
action or is barred by law, the Court ordinarily examines the averments
in the plaint and does not adjudicate disputed questions by reference to
the defence. Though the provision itself is not directly attracted to
proceedings before the Rent Authority, the distinction between a
threshold objection founded upon the proceeding itself and a defence
requiring factual adjudication remains relevant. The Authority must
examine whether the statutory requirements for entertaining the eviction
5 (2003) 1 SCC 557
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application are disclosed, while avoiding a premature determination of
disputed factual questions.
33. In the present case, the petitioner's objections concerning the
landlords' alleged forgery and misrepresentation, the actual service and
communication of the statutory notice, the genuineness of the proposed
tenancy agreement, the rate of rent and the alleged payment of rent
cannot all be conclusively determined merely on the basis of the
assertions made in the petitioner's application. These matters require
consideration of the respective pleadings, affidavits and other material,
and, where necessary, a summary inquiry in accordance with the
procedure contemplated under Section 33 of the Act of 2021. The fact
that the petitioner has raised serious objections regarding the
circumstances in which the notice and proposed tenancy agreement came
into existence does not, by itself, warrant rejection of the eviction
application without such examination.
34. The rejection of the petitioner's application, however, shall not be
understood as an adjudication upon the validity of the statutory notice,
the genuineness of the proposed tenancy agreement, the rate of rent or
the petitioner's entitlement to continue in occupation. Those matters shall
remain open for determination by the Rent Authority in accordance with
the Act of 2021 and the procedure prescribed thereunder.
35. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the order permitting the
legal representatives of Late Damodar Lal to be brought on record
cannot be construed as a determination of the legal effect of institution of
the proceedings after his death, or of the rights and liabilities of the
persons so impleaded under the Act of 2021. The question whether, and
to what extent, the proceedings can validly continue against the persons
brought on record, as well as their entitlement to the tenancy under
Section 6 of the Act, remains open for consideration by the Rent
Authority.
36. The petitioner shall also be at liberty to raise all objections
available to him in law concerning the demand notice relied upon by the
landlords, including its issuance and service, and its legal effect in the
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WRIA No. - 8775 of 2026
facts and circumstances of the case. The Rent Authority shall consider
these objections, along with the other issues arising in the proceedings,
independently and in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2021,
after affording due opportunity of hearing to the parties. The
observations made in this judgment shall not be understood as
expressing any opinion on the merits of those issues.
37. Subject to the aforesaid clarifications, no ground for interference
with the impugned order dated 10.04.2026 is made out in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ
petition is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.)
November 16, 2026
Sushma
Digitally signed by :-
SUSHAMA YADAV
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad