Mohinder Singh vs Jagir Singh Etc.

-1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
RSA-1520-1997 (O&M)
Reserved on : 09.07.2026
Pronounced on : 10.09.2026
MOHINDER SINGH (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS
...Appellant
Versus
JAGIR SINGH AND OTHERS
...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PARMOD GOYAL
Present: Mr. Sandeep Khunger, Advocate
Mr. Saksham Khunger, Advocate
for the appellant.
Mr. Inderjit Sharma, Advocate
for respondents No.1 and 2.
PARMOD GOYAL, J.
Present regular second appeal has been preferred by
appellant/plaintiff being aggrieved by judgment and decree dated
16.05.1997, passed by the then learned Additional District Judge,
Gurdaspur, whereby judgment and decree dated 04.12.1991, passed by
Senior Sub Judge, Gurdaspur vide which suit for specific performance
preferred by appellant/plaintiff was decreed, was modified to the extent that
appellant/plaintiff is entitled to recovery of earnest money paid to
respondents/defendant instead of relief of specific performance.
2. Appellant/plaintiff in his suit for specific performance had
claimed that respondent/defendant No.1 who was owner in possession of
1/15th share of land measuring 3 kanals 15 marlas out of 56 kanals 5 marlas
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
2026.09.11 16:25
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integrity of this document

RSA-1520-1997 -2-
situated in village Pandori Bainsan had agreed to sell suit land for a total
consideration of Rs.9,000/- and had executed agreement to sell dated
14.02.1983 after receipt of Rs.4,000/- as earnest money. Subsequently,
another agreement dated 27.06.1983 was entered between the parties
whereby balance consideration of Rs.5,000/- was also paid and
respondent/defendant No.1 had agreed to execute sale deed within one
month of the sanction of mutation in his favour. It was claimed that
possession of land was also delivered at the time of part performance of the
agreement. It was claimed that though entire consideration amount was paid,
however, respondent/defendant No.1 sold the land to respondents/defendants
No.2 and 3 for a total consideration of Rs.25,000/- on 30.12.1987. That
respondents/defendants No.2 and 3 being residents of same village had full
knowledge about the agreement to sell in favour of appellant/plaintiff and
respondents/defendants No.2 and 3 had colluded with respondent/defendant
No.1 to defeat the rights of appellant/plaintiff. Appellant/plaintiff had
accordingly sought specific performance with possession and in alternative
decree for recovery of Rs.18,000/- which included Rs.9,000/- as liquidity
damages.
3. Respondent/defendant No.1 had denied the execution of
agreement dated 14.02.1983 and 27.06.1993 as well as receipt of any
amount from appellant/plaintiff. Respondent/defendant No.1 asserted that
suit is not maintainable and is beyond limitation. Accordingly, dismissal of
suit was prayed for.
4. Respondents/defendants No.2 and 3 claimed themselves to be
bonafide purchaser for consideration. They claimed that agreement to sell
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
2026.09.11 16:25
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RSA-1520-1997 -3-
was entered on 21.12.1987 and on the basis of said agreement, sale deed was
executed in their favour on 30.12.1987 for a total consideration of
Rs.25,000/- and since then they are in physical possession of land.
5. From the pleadings of parties, following issues were framed :-
1. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD
2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?
OPD
3. Whether defendant No.1 agreed to sell the suit land to the
plaintiff and executed agreements to sale dated 14.2.83 and
27.6.83 and received a total sum of Rs.9,000/- as earnest
money? OPP
4. Whether the plaintiff had been ready and willing to perform his
part of the contract? OPP
5. Whether the suit is time barred? OPD
6. Whether plaintiff is entitled to decree for possession of the suit
land by means of specific performance of the agreement for sale
in question? OPP
7. Whether defendants No.2 & 3 are bonafide purchasers for value
and without notice of the agreement of sale? OPD
8. Relief.
6. Learned Court of first instance had decided issues No.1 and 2 in
favour of appellant/plaintiff and against respondents/defendants and issues
No.3, 4, 6 & 7 were decided in favour of appellant/plaintiff and accordingly,
suit for specific performance preferred by appellant/plaintiff was decreed.
7. Learned First Appellate Court on appeal preferred by
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
2026.09.11 16:25
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RSA-1520-1997 -4-
respondents/defendants No.2 and 3 had duly accepted the findings of learned
Court of first instance as regards to execution of agreement, payment of
entire consideration amount of Rs.9,000/- in two installments at the time of
execution of agreements to sell dated 14.02.1983 (Ex.P1) and 27.06.1983
(Ex.P2). Learned Appellate Court had also concurred with the finding of
learned Court of first instance that respondents/defendants No.2 and 3 were
not bonafide purchasers as they always knew about the agreement executed
by respondent/defendant No.1 in favour of appellant/plaintiff, being co-
villagers as made out from evidence of respondent/defendant No.1-Om
Prakash (DW6). However, relief of specific performance as granted by
learned Court of first instance was modified. It was held that since
appellant/plaintiff could not have sold specific portion in the joint land,
therefore, agreements dated 14.02.1983 (Ex.P1) and 27.06.1983 (Ex.P2)
were held to be vague regarding description of property and held not
enforceable by way of specific performance. Accordingly, instead of relief
of specific performance, relief of recovery of amount paid as earnest money
was granted by partly allowing the appeal preferred by
respondents/defendants No.2 and 3.
8. Both the Courts have concurrently found that
respondent/defendant No.1 had duly executed agreements dated 14.02.1983
and 27.06.1983, and had received total sale consideration of Rs.9,000/- fixed
thereunder (Rs.4,000 on 14.02.1983 and remaining Rs.5,000/- on
27.06.1983). The Courts below have accepted the evidence led by
appellant/plaintiff in the shape of scribe as well as witnesses of agreement
and had rejected self-serving evidence of DW6 i.e. defendant No.1 who had
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
2026.09.11 16:25
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RSA-1520-1997 -5-
merely denied signature not only on agreement but also on written
statement. Learned First Appellate Court had rightly held that the second
agreement dated 27.06.1983 was in continuation to agreement dated
14.02.1983 and had to be read along with the contents of 14.02.1983 and,
therefore, is not vague as argued by learned counsel for
respondents/defendants.
9. The finding of facts arrived at by both the Courts below
regarding due execution of agreements dated 14.02.1983 and 27.06.1983,
cannot be held to be erroneous or perverse as same is based upon
appreciation of evidence of appellant/plaintiff, witnesses to agreement and
that of respondent/defendant No.1. The concurrent finding of fact as
recorded by Court below is therefore upheld. It is held that agreements dated
14.02.1983 and 27.06.1993 were duly executed by respondent/defendant
No.1 for a total sale consideration of Rs.9,000/- (whereby Rs.4,000/- was
paid on 14.02.1983 and remaining Rs.5,000/- was paid on 27.06.1983).
10. Both the Courts have also rightly concluded that suit was within
limitation and agreement was not open ended as it was agreed between the
parties that respondent/defendant No.1 shall execute sale deed in favour of
appellant/plaintiff within one month from the date when mutation was
sanctioned in favour of respondent/defendant No.1. However, prior to
sanctioning of mutation, respondent/defendant No.1 had sold the suit
property to respondents/defendants No.2 and 3 vide sale deed dated
30.12.1987, therefore, suit preferred by appellant/plaintiff for specific
performance on 07.01.1988 cannot be held to be beyond limitation or
premature. Execution of sale deed in favour of respondents/defendants No.2
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
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RSA-1520-1997 -6-
and 3 was a clear case of refusal on the part of respondent/defendant No.1 to
adhere to his part of agreement which he had entered on 14.02.1983 and
27.06.1983.
11. Both the Courts have also rejected the claim of
respondents/defendants No.2 and 3 that they were bonafide purchasers of
suit property, not knowing about execution of agreements dated 14.02.1983
and 27.06.1983. Learned Courts below have taken in consideration
evidence led by parties whereby it stood proved that appellant/plaintiff,
respondent/defendant No.1 and respondents/defendants No.2 and 3 were all
residents of same village. Even DW5-Nirmal Singh who was examined by
respondents/defendants in his cross-examination had admitted that
agreement executed by respondent/defendant No.1 in favour of
appellant/plaintiff had come in knowledge of respondents/defendants No.2
and 3 when they entered into agreement to sell and got executed sale deed in
their favour. DW5 had admitted that respondents/defendants No.2 and 3 had
come to know about execution of agreement in favour of appellant/plaintiff
on 21.12.1987. The fact that respondent/defendant No.1 had executed
agreement dated 21.12.1987 in favour of respondents/defendants No.2 and 3
and had executed sale deed on 30.12.1987 for a total consideration of
Rs.25,000/- in fact goes to show that sale was completed in haste within 8
days knowing well that appellant/plaintiff may raise his claim over the suit
property. Learned counsel for appellant/plaintiff has also referred to
jamabandi to argue that defendants were not only co-villagers but were also
co-sharers. Therefore, the finding recorded by both the Courts below that
respondents/defendants No.2 and 3 were aware about the agreement to sell
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
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RSA-1520-1997 -7-
executed between respondent/defendant No.1 and appellant/plaintiff is based
upon correct appreciation of evidence led by parties and cannot be interfered
in the second appeal.
12. The main bone of contention in the present case is whether
learned First Appellate Court had rightly concluded that description of
property is vague and, therefore, agreement to sell is not executable, thereby
denying relief of specific performance to appellant/plaintiff. Learned
Appellate Court had dealt with above noted issue in the following manner :-
“10. The next argument advanced in this case is that the plaintiff entered
into agreement with defendant No.1 for the purchase of land 3
kanals 15 marlas being 1/15 share of land measuring 56 kanals 5
marlas comprised in khasra No.14R/24 (2-10), 25 (5-18), 15R/1/2
(1-2), 9 (7-15), 10 (4-10), 12 (1-0), 5R/16/2 (2-7), 16/2 (2-7), 15R/21
(7-13), 17R/3 (5-19). The learned counsel has further referred me to
the copy of jamabandi Ex.P3 and has contended that the perusal of
this document would show that Om Parkash is owner to the extent of
1/15th share out of land 56 kanals 5 marlas. He has further
contended that no other copy of jamabandi has been filed by the
plaintiff/respondent to show that he is owner of any other property.
The learned counsel then wanted me to compare the land mentioned
in Ex.P1 with the detail of the land given in Ex.P3. He has contended
that only khasra No.14/24 (2-10), 25 (5-18), 17/3 (5-19) and 4 (8-0)
is also shown in copy of jamabandi Ex.P3. The area of khasra No.4
has been given only 2 kanals 12 marlas in the jamabandi. The
contention of the learned counsel is that such khasra numbers
mentioned in Ex.P1 are not given in Ex.P3 and there is no evidence
that Om Parkash the executant of agreement Ex.P1 had also any
share in land comprised in rectangle No.15, khasra No.1/2, 9, 10,
12, 5R/16/2. The learned counsel has argued that Om Parkash is not
owner of any specific portion of the land shown in Ex.P3 copy of
jamabandi for 1983-84. His further contention is that only 4 khasra
numbers, which are mentioned in Ex.P3 are also mentioned in Ex.P1
and out of these khasra numbers the share of plaintiff could not come
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
2026.09.11 16:25
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RSA-1520-1997 -8-
to 3 kanals 15 marlas. The contention of the learned counsel is that it
has been mentioned in Ex.P1 that the sale-deed would be executed
by Om Parkash after the sanctioning of the mutation and that the
mutation has not been sanctioned so far. The learned counsel has
argued that the detail of the property is not correctly given and that
the period during which the sale-deed is to be executed is also not
mentioned and that as such, the agreement Ex.P1 is indefinite and
ague and specific performance cannot be allowed. On the other
hand, the contention of the counsel for the defendants/respondents is
that there is no ambiguity in the agreement as the sale-deed is to be
executed in a month’s time after the sanction of mutation in favour of
Om Parkash. Regarding the land, he has mentioned that Om
Parkash is recorded to be in possession of land 17/3 (2-0), 17/4 (2-
12) and that in case the suit is decreed, the plaintiff/respondent can
take possession out of this land. I have carefully considered the
arguments advanced by counsel for both the parties. The agreement
cannot be said to be vague for the non-fixing of time but it is
certainly vague as far as the description of the land is concerned.
Though Om Parkash has been shown to be in cultivating possession
of rectangle No.17, khasra No.3 (2-0), 4 (2-12) but he has got no
authority to dispose of this very land and to claim the ownership of
this very land. At the time of partition he may get this land or he may
get possession of some other land detailed in Ex.P3. The agreement
is for the purchase of 3 kanals 15 marlas of land out of total land 56
kanals 5 marlas as shown in Ex.P1 and it is not only for the land
which is now in possession of Om Parkash. Since there is no
evidence that khasra number other than which tally in Ex.P1 and
Ex.P3 belongs to Om Parkash, he had no right to enter into any
agreement for the sale of that portion of the land. Thus certainly the
agreement is vague and cannot be specifically enforced.”
13. On consideration, I find that the above noted conclusion as
arrived by way of para No.10 of the impugned judgment is against evidence
led by parties as well as against law. In agreement dated 14.02.1983 (Ex.P1)
it had been clearly described that respondent/defendant No.1 had agreed to
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
2026.09.11 16:25
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RSA-1520-1997 -9-
sell land measuring 3 kanals 15 marlas being 1/15th share of land measuring
56 kanals 5 marlas comprised in khasra No.14R/24 (2-10), 25 (5-18),
15R/1/2 (1-2), 9 (7-15), 10 (4-10), 12 (1-0), 5R/16/2 (2-7), 16/2 (2-7),
15R/21 (7-13) and 17R/3 (5-19).
14. In order to prove that respondent/defendant No.1 was owner to
the extent of 1/15th share out of land measuring 56 kanals 5 marlas
jamabandi for the year 1983-84 was placed as Ex.P3. Ex.P3 shows that
respondent/defendant No.1 was owner to the extent of 1/15th share of land
measuring 56 kanals 5 marlas stated therein. This fact has been duly
accepted and noticed by learned Appellate Court also, however, learned
Appellate Court had noticed that out of various numbers mentioned in
agreement to sell dated 14.02.1983 (Ex.P1) only four khasra numbers i.e.
14/24 (2-10), 25 (5-18), 17/3 (5-19) and 4 (8-0) are mentioned in jamabandi
Ex.P3. Learned First Appellate Court had concluded that remaining khasra
numbers mentioned in agreement were not shown to be in the ownership of
respondent/defendant No.1 and since respondent/defendant No.1 was not
owner of any specific portion of land, but was owner of 1/15th share,
therefore, could not have sold specific khasra numbers which were shown to
be in his favour in the revenue record. It was noted by learned First
Appellate Court that respondent/defendant No.1 was in possession of land
comprised in khasra Nos.17/3 (2-0) and 17/4 (2-12) which was subject to
partition and share in the total land and, therefore, sale agreement was
vague.
15. However, learned First Appellate Court had in fact failed to
take notice of the fact that it was specific case of appellant/plaintiff that
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
2026.09.11 16:25
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RSA-1520-1997 -10-
respondent/defendant No.1 was owner in possession of joint land to the
extent of 1/15th share out of total land measuring 56 kanals 5 marlas.
Jamabandi for the year 1983-84 (Ex.P3) clearly describes joint land in which
respondent/defendant No.1 had share to the extent of 1/15th share was land
measuring 56 kanals 5 marlas. It had also come on record as made out from
jamabandi (Ex.P3) that respondent/defendant No.1 was in possession of
khasra Nos.17/3 (2-0) and 17/4 (2-12) that means he was in possession of 4
kanals 12 marlas which seems to be in excess of his 1/15th share, however,
same was to be settled at the time of partition. Similarly, area under khasra
No.17/3 in agreement and Ex.P3 jamabandi was shown to be 5 kanals 19
marlas out of which 4 kanals 12 marlas were in possession of
respondent/defendant No.1. Therefore, it has been unequivocally proved that
respondent/defendant No.1 was owner of 1/15th share of land measuring 56
kanals 5 marlas which comes to 3 kanals 15 marlas. This fact was duly
pleaded by appellant/plaintiff in his plaint and has not been denied by
respondent/defendant No.1. This admission on the part of
respondent/defendant No.1 that he was owner of 3 kanals 15 marlas i.e. to
the extent of 1/15th share out of 56 kanals 5 marlas which is also subject
matter of agreement to sell has not been taken notice of by learned First
Appellate Court.
16. Learned First Appellate Court has further failed to take notice
of sale deed allegedly executed in favour of respondents/defendants No.2
and 3 which was already held to be not bonafide. Sale deed dated
30.12.1987 (Ex.D1) goes to show that even in sale deed it was clearly
mentioned by respondent/defendant No.1 while transferring land to the
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
2026.09.11 16:25
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RSA-1520-1997 -11-
extent of 3 kanals 15 marlas that he had got share to the extent of 3 kanals 15
marlas which is also subject matter of agreement to sell.
17. Therefore, the conclusion drawn by learned First Appellate
Court that sale deed was vague is totally erroneous and perverse against
admission as well as evidence led by parties. It is very strange that
agreement was for 3 kanals 15 marlas out of 56 kanals 5 marlas as described
in jamabandi for the year 1983-84 (Ex.P3). Therefore, agreement to sell was
with regards to share in the property and even if few of the khasra numbers
are wrongly mentioned, the identity of property is clearly made out and it
was agreed by respondent/defendant No.1 to sell 3 kanals 15 marlas which is
equivalent to 1/15th share in total land measuring 56 kanals 5 marlas which
was subsequently sold by respondent/defendant No.1 in favour of
respondents/defendants No.2 and 3 vide sale deed dated 30.12.1987 (Ex.D1)
in order to defeat agreements to sell made in favour of appellant/plaintiff.
18. In view of above discussion, the conclusion drawn by learned
First Appellate Court cannot be accepted. Judgment and decree dated
16.05.1997, passed by learned First Appellate Court is therefore set aside.
Since appellant/plaintiff had succeeded in proving due execution of
agreement and payment of entire consideration amount and the subsequent
agreement to sell made in favour of respondents/defendants No.2 and 3 was
found to be malafide and was entered into by respondent/defendant No.1
only to defeat the rights of appellant/plaintiff in order to get out of
agreement to sell, appellant/plaintiff who had already performed his part of
contract by paying entire consideration amount is entitled to the relief of
possession by way of specific performance.
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
2026.09.11 16:25
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RSA-1520-1997 -12-
19. Accordingly, judgment and decree passed by learned Court of
first instance is restored and appeal preferred by appellant/plaintiff is
allowed. Pending application(s), if any, is/are disposed of accordingly.
(PARMOD GOYAL)
10.09.2026 JUDGE
chiranjeev
Whether Speaking/Reasoned : Yes
Whether Reportable : Yes
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
2026.09.11 16:25
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