UDAY BHAGAT And ORS. vs STATE OF JHARKHAND And ORS.
- Court
- Jharkhand High Court
2026:JHHC:13641
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P (C) No. 3358 of 2007
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1. Uday Bhagat
2. Gandura Bhagat
3. Lighter Bhagat
All son of Late Biga Bhagat.
4. Sakra Bhagat
5. Somra Bhagat
6. Budu Bhagat
7. Dhadhu Bhagat
All sons of Late Lothe Bhagat
8. Sukra Bhagat Son of Late Uday Bhagat @ Sani Bhagat
All by caste Oraon all residents of village Sero, PO & P.S.- Bero, District-
Ranchi. ....... Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi
2. The Divisional Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi,
3. …………….
(B) Biglu Orain-Son
(C) Deo Lal Oraon-Son
(D) Manika Oraon
All residing at Vill. Pahar Kandaria, PO & PS-Bero, District-Ranchi
...... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
For the Petitioners : Mr. Alok Lal, Advocate
Mr. Santosh Kumar, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Rahul Saboo, GP-II
Mr. Gaurang Jajodia, AC to GP-II
For the Pvt .Resp. : Mr. P.P.N. Roy, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Pandey Ashok Nath Roy, Advocate
Ms. Sakshi Charu, Advocate
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th
Order No.16/Dated: 6 May, 2026
I.A No.17020 of 2025
1. The instant interlocutory application has been filed for deletion of
name of the respondent no.3(A), namely, Heera Orain @ Bundhain
Orain-wife of original respondent no.3, namely, late Chola Oraon from
the arrays of the respondent as she had died during pendency of the
present writ petition.
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2. It has been stated that the said information has been given orally on
behalf of the private respondent during hearing of the present
proceeding in the Court on 10.12.2025 when the matter was listed for
haring. Thereafter, the instant injterlocutory application has been filed
for deletion of the name of Heera Orain @ Bundhain Orain whose legal
heirs and successors have already been impleaded as respondent nos.
3(B), (C) and (D) in the present proceeding.
3. There is no opposition by the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents.
4. Accordingly, I.A No.17020 of 2025 stands allowed.
5. Let the name of the respondent no.3(A), namely, Heera Orain @
Bundhain Orain be deleted from the arrays of the respondents.
6. Office to proceed accordingly.
7. I.A. No.17020 of 2025 stands disposed of.
W.P.(C) No.3358 of 2007
Prayer:
8. The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
has been preferred for the following reliefs:
“That in the instant writ application, the petitioner prays for
quashing of order dated 17.4.2007 (Annexure-2) passed by the
respondent no.2 in S.A.R. Revision Ranchi No.47/2007, whereby
and whereunder the revision filed by the petitioner have been
dismissed as being barred by limitation and the explanation given
by the petitioner for condonation of delay has not been accepted
resulting in dismissal of the revision application.”
Factual Matrix
9. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition
reads as under:
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(i) The petitioners had filed revision application S.A.R. Revision
Ranchi No. 47 of 2007 before the respondent no.2 against the
order dated 08.09.2006 passed by Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi
in SAR. Appeal No. 217 (R) 15 of 1999-2000 whereby and where
under the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi restore the land in
respect of Khata No.4, Plot Nos. 423, 1064, 1365, 1473, 1587,
1588, 1589, 1613, 1648, 1844, 1924 and 2037 having an area of
1.44 acres, 1.67 acres, 0.10 acre, 1.67 acres, 0.93 acres, 0.04
acres, 0.54 acres, 0.64 acre. 1.23 acres, 0.19 acres, 0.02 acres,
0.09 acres and 1.79 acres respectively situated at village Sero P.S.
Bero District Ranchi in favour of respondent No.3.
(ii) The respondent no. 3 Chola Oraon (since deceased) had filed an
application under section 46 of the Chotanagpur Tendency Act
for giving permission to sale the land in favour of Lothe Bhagat,
Biga Bhagat, Dhanu Bhagat, Sukra Bhagat before the rent suit
Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi which was registered as Misc.
Case No 65/R8 II R of 1990-91.
(iii) The respondent no.3 filed an application for sale of the land on
the ground that the aforesaid lands are situated in village Pahar
Kandaria because of the distance the respondent no.3 was facing
great difficulty in cultivating the land therefore he wants to sale
the land for a price of Rs 85,000/- and purchase a land at near by
place in the village Soren.
(iv) On the said application of the respondent no. 3, a general notice
was issued for inviting objection if any. Since no objection was
filed by any of the person t he competent authority accorded
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sanction under section 46 of CNT Act fixing Rs. 1,10,000/- as the
price of the aforesaid land in terms of order dated 15.01.1991.
(v) Petitioners’ states that Dhanu Bhagat refused to get the sale deed
executed in his favour with the father of the petitioner nos. 1 to 3
and Lothe Bhagat and Sukra Bhagat.
(vi) It is pleaded that the sons of Biga Bhagat requested the
respondent no.3 to register and execute the sale deed in the
proportionate share.
(vii) The respondent no.3 on the request of the petitioners and as per
the agreement and contract executed the sale deed which was
registered as Sale Deed No. 417 dated 21.01.1997 in respect of
land in Khata No.4, Plot Nos. 423, 1064, 1065, 1365, 1473, 1587,
1588, 1589, 1613, 1648, 1844, 1924 and 2037 having an area of
1.01 acre, 1.25 ¼, 0.07 1/2 , 1.25 ¼ , 0.69 ¾ ,0.03 acre, 0.40 ½
acre, 0.48 3/4 , 0.92 ¼ , 0.14 ¼, 0.1 ½ , 0.66 1/4 , and 1.33 ½
respectively having a total area of 8. 35 ¾ acres situated at
village Sero, P.S. Bero Thana No.6 District Ranchi.
(viii) After the execution of said sale deed the petitioners came into
possession of the land and got their name mutated in the office of
Circle Officer, Bero Anchal, Bero Ranchi vide mutation case
no.34 R/97-98 and thereafter they are paying rent to the State of
Bihar now Jharkhand.
(ix) Further, Biga Bhagat died living behind his three sons, the
petitioner no. 1 to 3, and ever since the death of Biga Bhagat these
petitioner nos. 1 to 3 succeeded his properties as legal heirs and
they are in possession over the land in question with petitioner
nos-4 to 8.
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(x) It is pleaded that in the year 2000 the respondents no.3 initiated
a proceeding under section 144 Cr.P.C which was later on
converted in/under section 145 Cr.P.C and the possession of the
petitioner in terms of the order dated 25.08.2004 was declared.
(xi) The respondent no.3 in a counter blast of the complaint case no.
480 of 1998 under sections 323/379 IPC hatched a conspiracy to
cancel the sale deed executed by him earlier and in pursuance
thereto respondent no.3 filed complaint case no. 595 of 1995 and
S.A. Appeal No. 217 R/15 of 1999-2000 against the petitioners.
(xii) It is pleaded that in the said proceeding in SAR Appeal No. 217/R
15 of 1999-2000 no notice was ever served upon the petitioners
as Biga Bhagat father of petitioners nos.1 to 3 and Lothe Bhagat
the father of the respondent no. 4 to 7 had died much earlier and
the respondent no. 3 did not substitute their legal heirs, the
petitioners herein and the respondent no.1 proceeded to dispose
of the appeal filed by the respondent no 3 against dead persons.
(xiii) The respondent no. 1 in the order dated 08.07.2006 has held that
the permission was sought for by respondent no. 3 for transfer of
the land in favour of Lothu Bhagat, Bigha Bhagat, Dhanu Bhagat,
Sukra Bhagat but the land has been registered in the name of
Bigha Bhagat, Sukra Bhagat, Uday Bhgat, Gandura Bhagat,
Lighter Bhagat, Dhadhu Bhagat therefore the sale deed executed
in their favour is liable to be cancelled and the names entered into
the record of right in favour of the purchaser should also be
cancelled.
(xiv) The petitioners had no knowledge of the proceeding pending
before the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi as no notice was ever
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served upon them, therefore, the petitioners could not appear in
the proceeding before the respondent no.1 and contest the case.
(xv) Further, the order as contained in annexure-1 passed by the
respondent no. 1 is an ex-parte order and the petitioners had no
knowledge of the pendency of the proceeding.
(xvi) It is pleaded that the petitioners came to know about the order as
contained in annexure-1 only on 08.01.2007 when revenue
Karamchri of Bero Anchal was making inspection of the land
covered under the order as contained in annexure-1 to this
application thereafter, the petitioners after getting the knowledge
of the order impugned filed an application for obtaining certified
copy of the order.
(xvii) After getting certified copy of the order as contained in
Annexure-1, the petitioners filed revision application before
respondent no.2 which was registered as SAR Revision Ranchi
No. 47 of 2007.
(xviii) It is pleaded that the respondent no.2 without appreciating the
circumstance under which the revision application could not be
filed by the petitioner in time rejected on the ground of delay.
(xix) The order passed by the respondent no.2 is misconceived and
deserves to be dismissed on the only ground that the petitioners
have been able to establish that they have no knowledge of
pendency of the proceeding before the respondent no. 1.
(xx) The respondent no.2 has failed to appreciate that the delay in
filing the revision application for revision was neither intentional
nor wilful and as such the revision application should not have
been dismissed in mechanical fashion.
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10. Being aggrieved with the order dated 17.04.2007 passed in S.AR
Revision No.47 of 2007 by the respondent no.2, the present writ petition
has been preferred by the writ petitioners.
11. Thus, it is the case of the writ petitioners that as per permission required
under the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (in short, CNT Act) the land
was to be transferred by way of registered sale deed no.417 dated
21.01.1997.
12. The said order of permission was granted by the Deputy Commissioner
and order for transfer of the land, subsequently, has been challenged by
one Chola Oraon for seeking a prayer for annulment of transfer on the
ground that the permission was got by committing fraud.
13. The land was transferred in pursuance to the permission granted by the
Deputy Collector-Land Reforms, Sadar, Ranchi-competent authority
and the order passed in Misc. Case No.65/R 8 II R/90-91 vide order
dated 15.01.1991.
14. It was the grievance of the appellant, namely, Chola Oraon, that the
consideration amount which was agreed since had not been paid and, as
such, the land was not transferred. But subsequent thereto by way of
impersonation the document has been created to show that the land
actually has been transferred.
15. The order of transfer of the land as available in Khata No.4 comprising
of 11.15 acres of land has been said to be transferred in favour of the
opposite parties, namely, Biga Bhagat.
16. Chola Oraon had preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner,
Ranchi being S.A.R Appeal No.217 R/15 of 1999-2000 taking the
ground inter alia that the fraud has been committed by way of
impersonation.
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17. The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi got the matter enquired by the
Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Sadar, Ranchi who submitted his
report vide letter no.322 dt. 17.02.2003.
18. The appellate authority, based upon the report dated 17.02.2003, has
annulled the transfer of the land by forwarding a copy thereof to the
District Sub-Registrar for cancellation of the transfer of the land in
favour of the opposite party.
19. The aggrieved party has preferred a revision being SAR Revision
No.47 of 2007 against the order dated 08.07.2006 passed by the
appellate authority. In the said revision petition, an application for
condonation of delay has been appended and the matter was fixed for
hearing on merit.
20. It is the specific case of the writ petitioners that the order passed by the
appellate authority was an ex-parte order as would also be found from
the face of the order and, as such, by making reference of the order
being ex-parte and the moment came to the notice of the writ petitioner,
the revision has been filed.
Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners
21. The grievance of the writ petitioners is that the revisional authority
without properly appreciated the aforesaid ground has rejected the
delay condonation application by coming to the conclusion that the
explanation so furnished is found to be unsatisfactory and devoid of
merit and, accordingly, the revision petition has been rejected vide order
dated 17.04.2007.
22. The said order dated 17.04.2007 is under challenge solely on the
ground that without referring any cogent reason showing the
explanation not found to be satisfactory the order was passed on
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17.04.2007 which is mechanical one, particularly, on the pretext of the
fact that the appellate authority has not bothered to call upon the
opposite party before deciding the appeal.
23. This Court has called upon the private respondents, the respondent
nos.3 (A) to (D) herein, who are being represented by Mr. P.P.N. Roy,
the learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Pandey Ashok Nath Roy and
Ms. Sakshi Charu, the learned counsels.
24. The State is being represented by Mr. Rahul Saboo, the learned GP-II
assisted by Mr. Gaurang Jajodia, the learned associate counsel.
Submission of the learned state Counsel
25. The learned State counsel has submitted solely basing upon his
argument that an inquiry report dated 17.02.2003 by which it came to
the notice that the element of fraud has been committed by
impersonation and by taking the aforesaid ground the appellate
authority has come to the conclusion for annulling the transfer and,
therefore, due recommendation was made to the District Sub-Registrar
and circle officer for annulling the aforesaid sale deed.
26. The learned State counsel, therefore, has submitted that the reasons that
has been assigned, since, based upon the inquiry report dated
17.02.2003 and, therefore, the order passed by the appellate authority
cannot be said to be unjustified.
27. However, the learned State counsel has not opposed the submission
which has been made on behalf of the learned counsel for the writ
petitioners regarding non-availability of the reason said to be based
upon the application of mind while rejecting the revision petition by
throwing it and threshold on the ground of limitation.
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Submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the Private
Respondent:
28. On the other hand, Mr. P.P.N. Roy, the learned senior counsel appearing
for the private respondents has submitted that the case, since, is based
upon the element of fraud as would be evident from the inquiry, the
learned senior counsel, therefore, submits that in such an admitted case
where the element of fraud has been made the basis of passing an order
by the appellate authority, then the issue of limitation is to be considered
also going into the conduct of the petitioners and if that would be taken
into consideration then what is being argued on behalf of the writ
petitioners that there is no reason assigned by revisional authority while
considering the delay condonation application, is not worth to be
considered.
Analysis
29. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the pleadings made in the writ petition as also the counter
affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents.
30. This Court before proceeding needs to refer herein that this Court has
called upon the original record of Misc. Case No. 65/R 8 II R/90-91 to
appreciate the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties and after
much effort, the original record has been placed to this Court.
31. The factual aspect which has been argued on behalf of the writ
petitioners is limited to the extent that the issue of limitation has not
been properly appreciated as would be evident from the order passed
by the revisional authority.
32. While on the other hand, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
private respondents has harped upon the propriety of the order passed
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by the appellate authority, since, the appellate authority has passed an
order annulling the transfer of the land on the basis of the element of
fraud having been found in course of the inquiry.
33. It is pertinent to note that the Statute itself delineates a hierarchy of
forums, commencing with the original authority, followed by the
appellate authority, and thereafter the revisional authority, as
contemplated under the provisions of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act,
1908. The legislative scheme, thus, expressly provides for the
availability of statutory alternative remedies in the form of appeal and
revision.
34. Here, it is admitted that the permission for transfer of land was said to
be accorded by the competent authority, i.e., the Deputy Commissioner
under the Statute, as required under section 46 (1) of the Act of 1908.
35. The said order or sanction/permission has been disputed so far as its
genuineness is concerned on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for
the private respondents.
36. The land after having been transferred on the basis of such permission
granted said to be fulfilment of condition of transfer of land as per the
Statutory mandate, then one application was preferred before the
Deputy Commissioner for cancellation of the transfer registered as SAR
Appeal No.217(R) 15 of 1999-2000.
37. The grievance was raised that the permission which is being said to be
granted by the competent authority is actually no permission in the eyes
of law, since, after non-payment of the consideration amount one of the
parties, the transferee, has retracted from transferring the land but
subsequent thereto the opposite party has got the land transferred by
impersonating the opposite party.
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38. The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi got the matter enquired by the
Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Sadar, Ranchi. The inquiry was finally
conducted by the Deputy Collector-Land-Reforms and a report was sent
contained in letter no.322 dated 17.02.2003 and based upon the same
the Deputy Commissioner based upon the same has recommended the
District Sub-Registrar to cancel the transfer of the said land.
39. The sole ground as has been taken on behalf of the writ petitioners that
whatever may be the reason which led the Deputy Commissioner in the
capacity of the appellate authority it was the bounden duty of the
authority concerned in order to forbid the miscarriage of justice to issue
notice upon the opposite party. But the said exercise had not been
carried out.
40. However, the writ petitioners being aggrieved with the said order has
preferred a revision before the revisional authority, i.e., the Divisional
Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi being S.A.R
Revision No.47 of 2007 along with the delay condonation application,
since, by the time as is being taken as a ground that the order dated
08.07.2006 passed by the appellate authority has come to the notice of
the writ petitioners because there was already lapse of 8 months’ time.
41. The said delay condonation application has been considered by the
revisional authority. But the explanation so furnished for condonation
of delay has not been found to be satisfactory and the said order is under
challenge in the present writ petition.
42. Mr. P.P.N. Roy, the learned senior for the private respondents has
placed an order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A
No.634 of 2022 wherein the issue of limitation has been taken into
consideration and by taking aid thereof it has been submitted that delay
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of 8 months is quite long and, as such, it was not fit to be condoned and,
accordingly, the order so passed reviewing to condone the delay cannot
be said to be justified.
43. This Court is conscious as per the law settled that irrespective of the
period of delay the delay is to be condoned depending upon the
sufficient cause if shown by the party concerned.
44. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient
cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been made
in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14
SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at
paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be
blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is
“adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the
purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more
than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices
to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances
existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means
that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was
a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of
a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently”
or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each
case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises
discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy
the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from
prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished,
the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The
court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a
device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building
Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena
[(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and
Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012)
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5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court
explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient
cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and
vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the
requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof
than that of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long
as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the
party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished,
can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket
formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 :
AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC
195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly
affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when
the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision
to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The
statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full
effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the
law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to
be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being
to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of
the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from
lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England,
Vol. 28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at
least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of
limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty
than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence
to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of
actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.”
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and
uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or
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deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by
long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction,
negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff
Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2
SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon
Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 :
2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially
engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly
in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR
1992 SC 1701] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant
has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which
means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or
remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay
by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided
only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an
order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
45. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should
not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on
its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be
alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”.
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the
reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented
by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a
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satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the
application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether
the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior
purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation
Ltd. Vrs. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin
Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti,
(2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal
Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 .
46. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression
‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or
lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or
not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a
particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this
regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao &
Ors., (2002) 3 SC 195 , wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as
hereunder:-
“12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within
the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or
any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as
to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want
of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether
explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be
dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket
formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay
caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not
proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and
reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal
drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and
refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want
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of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand,
while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact
that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has
accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by
condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a
pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation
furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable
points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss
and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates,
either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party
to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have
to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to
pass upon the parties either way.”
47. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs.
Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762 , has held that merely because
sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is
no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has
been held as hereunder:
“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient
cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay
in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a
condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction
vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing
further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be
dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the
court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the
delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration
of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or
its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry
while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown
would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as
relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle
during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out
that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material
and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under
Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the
court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of
Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have
been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section
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14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in
dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5
without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty
in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the
appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the
appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other
fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed
out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's
application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was
appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period
prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground.”
48. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation
application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause
for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether
it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a
right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to
look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to
inaction and laches on its part.
49. It is also evident from the aforesaid judgment that the sufficient cause,
as per the interpretation, will be the circumstances which indicates that
there is no dereliction or no casual approach having been taken by the
party concerned in approaching the higher Forum by preferring an appeal
against the impugned judgment/decree.
50. The parties to the litigation are to be vigilant, but if no idea of the pending
proceeding, then the same is to be taken into consideration for the
purpose of condoning the delay so that the culmination of the suit may
not prejudice in the interest of the party concerned, in whose absence the
judgment/decree has been passed. Equally, it is also to be seen that the
party may not be allowed to take the ground as luxury in order to misuse
the judicial proceeding causing prejudice to the other side. The Court is
to assess both the aspects of the matter.
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51. There is no dispute that the issue of limitation is to be taken into
consideration liberally unless the contesting party is in a position to show
that the delay is deliberate one.
52. The sole question which requires consideration in this case is as to
whether while rejecting the application for condonation of delay the
revisional authority has considered the impact of an order passed which
is ex-parte and the second thing which requires consideration is that what
lead the revisional authority in coming to the conclusion that the
explanation so furnished is not found to be satisfactory.
53. This Court is considering the second issue first for the reason that
whether it is a Court of law of quasi-judicial authority where the
Limitation Act, 1963 applicable, then it is the bounden duty of the
concerned authority to come out with a specific reason for the purpose
of reflection of the mind as to what led the concerned authority in coming
to the conclusion that the explanation which has been furnished is not
found to be satisfactory.
54. If the power has been conferred upon the statutory authority, then it is
the bounden duty to consider the ground which is to be reflected from
the face of the order, otherwise such order will be said to be without any
reason and without any consideration and no one can dispute that the
reason is the soul of the order and in absence of the reason, the order will
not be said to be an order in the eyes of law.
55. The reason reflects the application of mind and then only it is to be said
that the due consideration in the eyes of law has been made. The
consideration has been defined by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. vs. A.
Masilamani, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530.
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56. When an opportunity is required to be provided under the mandate to the
public servant, the same cannot be said to be mere formality, rather, the
requirement with the competent authority to delve upon the reply by
exercising active application of mind for its consideration.
57. “Consideration” means proper application of mind, as has been held by
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance
Corporation of India and Ors. (Supra) at paragraph 19, which reads
hereunder as :-
19. The word “consider” is of great significance. The dictionary
meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to
be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be
active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider”
postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus,
formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense
application of mind with reference to the material available on record.
The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind.
The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by
the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order.
From the interpretation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court with
respect to meaning of ‘consideration’, it would be evident that
consideration can only be said to be proper consideration if there is
active application of mind by the concerned authority who is
considering the reply of defence furnished by the persons against whom
the allegations have been levelled.
58. This Court adverting to the order passed by the revisional authority has
found that no reason has been assigned as to what led the revisional
authority in coming to the conclusion that the explanation so furnished
is not satisfactory.
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59. The second issue that the delay of 8 months in the backdrop of the fact
that the order passed by the appellate authority is without issuance of
notice upon the writ petitioners.
60. This Court for the purpose as to whether the notice was issued or not
has considered the trial record and found that no notice was issued even
prior to calling upon the report of element of commission of fraud or
after submission of the inquiry report by the Deputy-Collector-Land
Reforms.
61. It also appears from the order passed by the appellate authority that
there is no reference of the issue of issuance of notice upon the other
side, the writ petitioners herein.
62. The order being an ex-parte and, as such, in a case where ex-parte order
is being challenged before the higher Forum and if in the meantime, the
period to file the appeal or revision, as the case may be, expired, then
the concerned authority as of the Court of law and quasi-judicial
functionary is required to consider the factum of having no knowledge
about the pending proceeding or its outcome where no notice has been
issued to the party concerned.
63. Even it is not a case of ex-parte proceeding, rather proceeding so far as
the order passed by the appellate authority is concerned, it is a case
where no notice was issued by the appellate authority, In such
circumstances, if the limitation petition was filed, then it was the
bounden duty of the revisional authority being the Statutory revisional
Forum under the provision of the Act of 1908 in the context of the fact
that under the CNT Act, 1908 the suit generally not is being entertained,
then the availability of the Forum for much importance and in that view
of the matter it would have been considered by the revisional authority
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in that angel also but having not done so the revisional authority has
committed gross error.
64. Merely because the element of fraud is there, it does not mean that the
other side will not have an opportunity to defend, rather in such
circumstances giving opportunity to the other side will have more
bearing to justify to come to the truth of element of fraud or not?
65. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the
order which has been passed by the revisional authority, therefore,
suffers from an error and, as such, is to be interfered with.
66. Accordingly, the order dated 17.04.2007 passed in S.A.R. Revision
No.47 of 2007 by the revisional authority is hereby quashed and set
aside.
67. In consequence thereof, the revisional application being S.A.R.
Revision Case No.47 of 2007 is restored to its original file.
68. The revisional authority is to pass an order, on the issue of limitation in
accordance with law, based upon the material already available on
record within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy
of the order.
69. Depending upon the outcome of the order which is to be passed on the
issue of limitation, the revisional authority will be going to the merit
and pass an order which shall be within a further period of two months,
meaning thereby, the proceeding is to be completed within a maximum
period of four months in total.
70. It is made clear that this Court has not exercised its mind on the issue
on merit and the revisional authority is to decide the case based upon
the material already available on the original record.
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71. Let the entire record of Misc. Case No. 65/R 8 II R/90-91 be sent back
to the revisional authority forthwith.
72. While considering the issue, the revisional authority will provide the
effective opportunity of hearing to the parties.
73. Both the parties along with the learned State counsel have undertaken
before this Court that they will appear before the revisional authority,
i.e., the Divisional Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi
on 20.05.2026 positively at 11:00 AM.
74. The office of the revisional authority will acknowledge their appearance
and proceed with the matter.
75. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is directed to supply
the copy of the application for condonation of delay well in advance
prior to 20.05.2026 along with the memo of revision application to the
learned counsel appearing for the private respondents as well as to the
learned State counsel.
76. Let the original record of Misc. Case No.65/R 8 II R/90-91 be handed
over to Mr. Rahul Saboo, the learned State counsel for sending it back
to the revisional authority for proper consideration of the issue.
77. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the instant writ petition
stands disposed of.
78. Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
Dated:06.05.2026.
Sudhir
AFR
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