BHAGWAT PRASAD RATRE vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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CGHC010311082026 2026:CGHC:39117

AFR
Digitally signed
by YOGESH
TIWARI
Date: 2026.09.08
17:26:05 +0530
YOGESH
TIWARI
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Order Reserved on 18.08.2026
Order Delivered on 07.09.2026
WPC No. 4179 of 2026
Bhagwat Prasad Ratre S/o. Shri Sukhram Ratre Aged About 40 Years
R/o. Village - Madhaibhatha, Post - Madhaibhatha, Tahsil - Bilaigarh,
District - Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.), Presently Officiating Sarpanch,
Gram Panchayat Madhaibhatha
... Petitioner
versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department of
Panchayat And Rural Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar,
Nava Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)
2 - The Commissioner Bilaspur Division, Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur
(C.G.).
3 - The Collector District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.).
4 - The Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) And Prescribed Authority
Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.).
5 - The Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat, Bilaigarh, District -
Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.).
6 - Dinanath Jatwar S/o Aghori Jatwar Aged About 34 Years Caste-
Satnami, R/o. Village Madhaibhatha, Tahsil Bilaigarh, District
Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.).
--- Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

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For Petitioner : Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, Advocate
For State : Mr. Anand Dadariya, Deputy Advocate
General
For Caveator : Mr. Vikram Pratap, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
CAV Order
1. Heard Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, learned counsel for the petitioner.
Also heard Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate
General, appearing for the State as well as Mr. Vikram Pratap,
learned counsel for the caveator.
2. The present writ petition has been filed calling in question the
order dated 06.07.2026 passed by the learned Commissioner,
Bilaspur Division, Bilaspur in Revision Case
No.202607990500002/A-89, whereby the learned Commissioner,
while entertaining the revision preferred by respondent No.6, has
stayed the operation and implementation of the order passed by
the Prescribed Authority-cum-Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue),
Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) removing responde nt
No.6 from the office of Sarpanch under Section 40(1) of the
Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereinafter referred
to as ‘the Act’) and debarring him under Section 40(2) of the Act.
The petitioner has prayed for following relief(s) :-
“(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or
direction, quashing the impugned interim
order dated 06.07.2026 (Annexure P/1)
passed by the Commissioner, Bilaspur

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Division, Bilaspur in Revision Case No.
202607990500002/A-89, whereby the
operation and implementation of the order
passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer
(Revenue) and Prescribed Authority has been
stayed for a period of thirty days.
(ii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction
directing respondent Nos.1 to 4 to give full
effect to the order passed by the Sub-
Divisional Officer under Sections 40(1) and
40(2) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj
Adhiniyam, 1993, removing respondent No.5
from the office of Sarpanch and debarring him
for six years, during pendency of the revision
proceedings.
(iii) Pass such other order or direction as this
Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
facts and circumstances of the case.”
3. The case of the petitioner, in brief, is that the petitioner, along with
other elected Panchs of Gram Panchayat Madhaibhatha, Janpad
Panchayat Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.),
submitted a complaint alleging illegal withdrawal and
misappropriation of Panchayat funds by respondent No.6 by
preparing and utilizing a false Panchayat resolution. Pursuant
thereto, an enquiry was conducted by the enquiry committee
constituted by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat,
Bilaigarh. The enquiry committee considered the Panchayat
records, bank documents, statements of witnesses and other

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relevant material and submitted its report, which culminated in the
communication dated 06.11.2025 recommending initiation of
proceedings under Section 40(1) of the Act against respondent
No.6.
4. It is further the case of the petitioner that an independent enquiry
was thereafter undertaken by the Collector, Sarangarh-Bilaigarh,
on the complaint submitted by the petitioner and other Panchs.
During the course of the said proceedings, statements of the
concerned persons, including the then Secretary of the Gram
Panchayat, were recorded. The Secretary stated that the bank
proposal dated 05.06.2025 had been prepared by another person
and that his signatures had been obtained under pressure. Upon
consideration of the material available on record, the Collector, by
noting dated 10.02.2026, found a prima facie case and referred
the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), being the
prescribed authority under the Act, for initiation of proceedings
under Section 40 of the Act.
5. Thereafter, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), after initiating
proceedings under Section 40 of the Act, afforded opportunity of
hearing to respondent No.6 and considered the enquiry reports,
documentary evidence as well as the defence taken by
respondent No.6. Upon consideration of the material placed
before him, the prescribed authority passed an order removing
respondent No.6 from the office of Sarpanch under Section 40(1)

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of the Act and further debarring him from contesting Panchayat
elections for a period of six years under Section 40(2) of the Act.
6. It is not in dispute that consequent upon the order of removal,
consequential proceedings were initiated by the Chief Executive
Officer, Janpad Panchayat, under Section 38 of the Act for
appointment of a temporary Sarpanch. Pursuant thereto, by order
dated 22.06.2026, the petitioner was appointed as temporary
Sarpanch and thereafter assumed charge of the office. It is also
the case of the petitioner that consequentially the bank account of
the Gram Panchayat came to be operated by the petitioner
pursuant to the Panchayat resolution.
7. Aggrieved by the order of removal, respondent No.6 preferred an
appeal before the Collector and also sought interim protection.
The learned Collector, after considering the matter, did not grant
interim relief and rejected the application for stay by order dated
25.06.2026. Thereafter, respondent No.6 approached the learned
Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, by way of revision against the
order refusing interim protection. The learned Commissioner, by
the impugned order dated 06.07.2026, stayed the implementation
of the order of removal for a period of thirty days.
8. Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner submits that the impugned interim order is wholly
unsustainable inasmuch as the order of removal passed by the
prescribed authority had already been acted upon before the

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learned Commissioner proceeded to grant interim relief. It is
submitted that pursuant to the removal of respondent No.6, the
office of Sarpanch had fallen vacant, consequential proceedings
under Section 38 of the Act had already been initiated and the
petitioner had been appointed as temporary Sarpanch and had
also assumed charge. Therefore, according to learned counsel,
the interim order passed by the learned Commissioner does not
merely preserve the existing position but has the effect of restoring
respondent No.6 to an office from which he had already been
removed.
9. Mr. Khetrapal further submits that the learned Commissioner has
not recorded any prima facie finding regarding the illegality,
perversity or jurisdictional error in the order passed by the
prescribed authority. It is contended that the order of removal was
passed after enquiry and after affording adequate opportunity of
hearing to respondent No.6. Therefore, in the absence of any
finding warranting interference with the order of removal, the
learned Commissioner could not have granted an interim order
which virtually nullifies the consequences of the final order passed
by the prescribed authority.
10. It is submitted by Mr. Khetrapal that the material collected during
the enquiry was not merely in the nature of an unverified
allegation. The enquiry proceedings had disclosed, inter alia, that
the proposal submitted before the State Bank of India for

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withdrawal of an amount of Rs.2,97,000/- was different from the
proposal allegedly passed in the Gram Panchayat meeting and
that the then Secretary had stated that his signatures on the
relevant proposal were obtained under pressure. It is also
submitted that another amount of Rs.63,000/- was allegedly
withdrawn without any valid Panchayat resolution. According to
learned counsel, these circumstances were duly considered by the
competent authorities before the order under Section 40 of the Act
was passed.
11. Mr. Khetrapal next submits that the learned Commissioner has
failed to consider the fact that the petitioner had already assumed
charge as temporary Sarpanch and that the affairs of the Gram
Panchayat were thereafter being conducted pursuant to the
statutory orders. It is contended that granting interim protection to
respondent No.6 at this stage would create serious administrative
uncertainty and would result in conflicting claims with regard to the
office of Sarpanch. It is also submitted that the impugned order
has been passed without properly considering the principles
governing grant of interim relief, namely, prima facie case, balance
of convenience and irreparable injury.
12. Mr. Khetrapal in support of his submissions, has placed reliance
upon the orders passed by co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.
(C) No.3729 of 2023, decided on 22.08.2023; W.P.(C) No.1668
of 2018 and W.P.(C) No.1679 of 2018, decided on 21.06.2018 ,

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as well as the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench of
this Court in W.A. No.78 of 2024, decided on 19.02.2024 , and
submits that the principles laid down therein lend support to the
contention that an interim order ought not to be passed in a
manner which has the effect of restoring a person to an office from
which he has already been removed and thereby disturbing a
position which has already stood altered and acted upon pursuant
to the order of the competent authority.
13. On the other hand, Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate
General appearing for the State, opposes the submissions
advanced on behalf of the petitioner and submits that the
impugned order dated 06.07.2026 passed by the learned
Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, Bilaspur, is purely interlocutory in
nature and has been passed in exercise of the revisional
jurisdiction conferred under the Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Appeal
and Revision) Rules, 1995. It is submitted that respondent No.6,
being aggrieved by the order dated 03.06.2026 passed by the
Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) and Prescribed Authority under
Section 40 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993,
removing him from the office of Sarpanch and debarring him from
contesting Panchayat elections for a period of six years, had
availed the statutory remedy of appeal before the Collector and,
upon rejection of his prayer for interim protection, had approached
the revisional authority. He would submit that the learned
Commissioner, while considering the revision and the prayer for

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interim protection, was competent to pass an appropriate
interlocutory order so as to preserve the subject matter of the
proceedings and ensure that the statutory remedy available to
respondent No.6 does not become illusory or infructuous. The
impugned order neither finally adjudicates the legality of the order
dated 03.06.2026 nor records any conclusive finding in favour of
respondent No.6 on the allegations which culminated in his
removal. The substantive revisional proceedings are still pending
consideration and the rights and contentions of the parties are yet
to be finally adjudicated. It is, therefore, submitted that merely
because the order of removal had, in the meantime, been acted
upon and consequential administrative steps had been taken, the
revisional authority could not be said to have become functus
officio or denuded of its jurisdiction to consider and grant interim
protection. If the mere implementation of an order were treated as
an absolute bar against grant of interim relief, the statutory
appellate and revisional remedies themselves would, in several
cases, become ineffective merely on account of administrative
action having been taken before the prayer for interim relief could
be considered.
14. Mr. Dadariya submitted by learned State counsel that the
subsequent appointment of the petitioner as temporary Sarpanch
under Section 38 of the Act does not confer upon him any
independent, vested or indefeasible right to continue in the office
irrespective of the result of the statutory proceedings initiated by

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respondent No.6. Section 38 itself contemplates a temporary
arrangement in the event of a casual vacancy and the person so
appointed merely officiates until the vacancy is duly filled in
accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The
appointment of the petitioner, therefore, remains consequential
upon the subsistence of the vacancy occasioned by the removal of
respondent No.6 and cannot acquire a status higher than the
statutory order from which such appointment flows. The fact that
the petitioner has assumed charge or that the Panchayat bank
account is being operated by him pursuant to such temporary
arrangement cannot, by itself, create any substantive right in his
favour or render the order of removal immune from appellate or
revisional scrutiny. Learned State counsel would submit that the
statutory scheme contained in Sections 38, 85 and 89 of the Act,
read with the Chhattisgarh Panchayats (Appeal and Revision)
Rules, 1995, particularly Rule 8 thereof, recognises the power of
the competent authority to consider suspension or stay of the
execution of an order during pendency of the statutory
proceedings. Thus, the mere fact that consequential proceedings
under Section 38 have been undertaken cannot operate as a legal
impediment against the revisional authority exercising its
jurisdiction to grant limited interim protection. On the contrary,
such interim protection may become necessary to preserve the
efficacy of the statutory remedy. If, during the pendency of the
appeal or revision, the temporary arrangement is permitted to

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culminate in a further electoral process and a fresh Sarpanch is
elected, a situation may arise where, even if respondent No.6
ultimately succeeds in the statutory proceedings and the order of
removal is set aside, restoration of the original position may
become legally and practically complicated on account of the
intervening electoral process. The consequence of permitting such
irreversible developments during pendency of the statutory
remedy may, therefore, be far more prejudicial to the party
challenging the order of removal than the limited inconvenience
which may be caused to the petitioner by continuation of the
interim arrangement.
15. It is lastly submitted by Mr. Dadariya that the challenge to the
impugned interim order is premature and does not disclose any
exceptional circumstance warranting interference by this Court in
exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. The learned
Commissioner has merely granted interim protection for a limited
period of thirty days and has not finally determined the revision or
expressed any final opinion regarding the validity of the order
passed by the prescribed authority. At the interlocutory stage, this
Court ought not to undertake an adjudication of the merits of the
allegations of financial irregularity, alleged illegal withdrawal of
Panchayat funds, preparation or use of an allegedly false
Panchayat resolution, or the evidentiary material considered by
the prescribed authority, particularly when the statutory
proceedings remain pending before the competent authority. The

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petitioner, being merely a temporary Sarpanch appointed pursuant
to Section 38, cannot claim that the temporary arrangement has
crystallised into an indefeasible right so as to defeat the statutory
remedy of respondent No.6. The interim order passed by the
learned Commissioner, instead of causing any irreversible
prejudice to the petitioner, merely seeks to preserve the position
during the pendency of the statutory proceedings and prevents the
creation of further complications which may arise from an
intervening electoral or administrative process. It is thus submitted
that the impugned order neither suffers from any patent
jurisdictional error nor from perversity or manifest illegality
warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate any legally
enforceable right which stands adversely affected by the limited
interim protection granted by the learned Commissioner.
Accordingly, the writ petition, being devoid of merit and having
been filed against a purely interlocutory order passed in pending
statutory proceedings, deserves to be dismissed, leaving it open
to the competent revisional authority to decide the pending
proceedings on their own merits and in accordance with law.
16. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned
State counsel and perused the pleadings, documents and material
available on record. This Court has also carefully considered the
nature and scope of the impugned order dated 06.07.2026, the
circumstances in which the order of removal passed by the

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prescribed authority came to be stayed, and the subsequent
proceedings undertaken pursuant thereto.
17. The principal issue which arises for consideration is whether, in the
facts and circumstances of the present case, the learned
Commissioner was justified in granting interim protection after the
order of removal had already been acted upon and the petitioner
had, pursuant to the consequential proceedings under Section 38
of the Act, been appointed as temporary Sarpanch and had
assumed charge. At this stage, this Court is not called upon to
examine the correctness of the allegations forming the basis of the
proceedings under Section 40 of the Act or to adjudicate upon the
ultimate merits of the pending revision. The consideration is
confined to the legality and propriety of the impugned interim order
and, in particular, whether such interim relief could have been
granted when its practical consequence was to disturb the position
already brought into existence pursuant to the order of the
prescribed authority.
18. From the material placed on record, it is apparent that proceedings
under Section 40 of the Act were initiated against respondent No.6
pursuant to complaints alleging irregular withdrawal and
misappropriation of Panchayat funds. An enquiry was conducted
by the competent authorities and the material collected during the
enquiry was considered before proceedings under Section 40
were initiated. The prescribed authority thereafter considered the

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material available on record and the defence of respondent No.6
and passed an order removing him from the office of Sarpanch
and debarring him under Section 40(2) of the Act. The petition
itself records that the proceedings before the prescribed authority
were conducted after affording opportunity of hearing to
respondent No.6.
19. The subsequent events are also of considerable significance.
Pursuant to the order of removal, the Chief Executive Officer
initiated consequential proceedings under Section 38 of the Act
and, thereafter, the petitioner was appointed as temporary
Sarpanch on 22.06.2026 and assumed charge of the office. Thus,
by the time the learned Commissioner considered the prayer for
interim relief, the order of removal had already been acted upon
and its consequential statutory effects had already taken place.
20. In such circumstances, the learned Commissioner was required to
consider the distinction between an interim order which merely
protects the subject matter of the proceedings and an interim
order which has the effect of undoing a completed action. Once
respondent No.6 had been removed from the office pursuant to
the order of the prescribed authority and the vacancy had
thereafter been dealt with in accordance with the statutory
mechanism, an order staying the implementation of the removal
order could not be treated as a mere protective order. Its practical
consequence would be to revive the position which had ceased to

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exist. The impugned order dated 06.07.2026, though expressed in
terms of staying the operation and implementation of the order of
removal, therefore has a consequence much beyond preservation
of the subject matter of the revision. In substance, it nullifies, for
the period of the interim order, the consequences flowing from the
order passed by the prescribed authority. The petitioner had
already been appointed as temporary Sarpanch and had assumed
charge. Therefore, the interim order has the effect of disturbing an
arrangement which had already been brought into existence
pursuant to the statutory process.
21. It is equally significant that the learned Commissioner, while
granting interim protection, has not recorded any specific finding
demonstrating that the order passed by the prescribed authority
was prima facie without jurisdiction, perverse or in breach of the
principles of natural justice. On the contrary, the material placed
before this Court indicates that the order of removal was preceded
by enquiry and consideration of the material available on record.
The petitioner has specifically pleaded that respondent No.6 was
afforded opportunity of hearing before the prescribed authority.
22. This Court is conscious of the fact that the revisional authority has
jurisdiction to consider an application for interim relief during
pendency of the revision. However, such discretion is required to
be exercised judicially and in accordance with the settled
parameters governing interim relief. The existence of revisional

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jurisdiction by itself does not mean that an interim order can be
passed in such a manner as to substantially grant the very
consequence which would follow only upon success in the
substantive proceedings.
23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Public Services Tribunal Bar
Association v. State of U.P. and another, (2003) 4 SCC 104 , has
held in paras 36 and 38 as under :-
“36. In Suman Dutta case this Court set aside
the order passed by the High Court staying
the order of termination as an interim measure
in the pending proceeding. It was observed:
(SCC p. 311, para 2)
"[W]e are clearly of the opinion that the
High Court erred in law in staying the order
of termination as an interim measure in the
pending writ petition. By such interim order
if an employee is allowed to continue in
service and then ultimately the writ petition
is dismissed, then it would tantamount to
usurpation of public office without any right
to the same."
*
38. From the abovequoted decisions, it is
evident that this Court has consistently been
of the view that by way of an interim order the
order of suspension, termination, dismissal
and transfer etc. should not be stayed during
the pendency of the proceedings in the court. ”

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24. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh
and others v. Prem Chopra, (2024) 12 SCC 426 , has held in
paras 18 and 19, as under :-
“18. There is a difference between stay of
operation of an order and quashing of an
order which has been explained by this Court
in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Lid. v. Church of
South India Trust Assn., (1992) 3 SCC 1 as
under: (SCC p. 9, para 10)
"10. ……..While considering the effect of
an interim order staying the operation of
the order under challenge, a distinction
has to be made between quashing of an
order and stay of operation of an order.
Quashing of an order results in the
restoration of the position as it stood on
the date of the passing of the order which
has been quashed. The stay of operation
of an order does not, however, lead to
such a result. It only means that the order
which has been stayed would not be
operative from the date of the passing of
the stay order and it does not mean that
the said order has been wiped out from
existence."
19. Following the said decision, this Court in
Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. v. U.P.
SEB, (1997) 5 SCC 772, has held that an
order of stay which is granted during the
pendency of a writ petition/suit or other
proceeding comes to an end with the

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dismissal of the substantive proceedings and
it is the duty of the court in such cases to put
the parties in the same position that they
would have been in but for the interim order of
the court. In that case, this Court rejected the
contention that when the operation of the
notification itself was stayed. no surcharge
could be demanded upon the amount
withheld. It was held thus: (SCC pp. 779-80,
para 11)
"11.... Holding otherwise would mean that
even though the Electricity Board, who
was the respondent in the writ petitions
succeeded therein, yet deprived of the late
payment surcharge which was due to it
under the tariff rules/regulations. It would
be a case where the Board suffers
prejudice on account of the orders of the
court and for no fault of its. It succeeds in
the writ petition and yet loses. The
consumer files the writ petition, obtains
stay of operation of the notification revising
the rates and fails in his attack upon the
validity of the notification and yet he is
relieved of the obligation to pay the late
payment surcharge for the period of stay.
which he is liable to pay according to the
statutory terms and conditions which terms
and conditions indeed form part of the
contract of supply of supply entered into
by him with the Board. We do not think
that any such unfair and inequitable
proposition can be sustained in law.

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equally well settled that an order of stay
granted pending disposal of a writ
petition/suit or other proceeding, comes to
an end with the dismissal of the
substantive proceeding and that it is the
duty of the court in such a case to put the
parties in the same position they would
have been but for the interim orders of the
court. Any other view would result in the
act or order of the court prejudicing a party
(Board in this case) for no fault of its and
would also mean rewarding a writ
petitioner in spite of his failure. We do not
think that any such unjust consequence
can be countenanced by the courts. As a
matter of fact, the contention of the
consumers herein, extended logically
should mean that even the enhanced rates
are also not payable for the period
covered by the order of stay because the
operation of the very notification
revising/enhancing the tariff rates was
stayed. Mercifully, no such argument was
urged by the appellants. It is
ununderstandable how the enhanced rates
can be said to be payable but not the late
payment surcharge thereon, when both
the enhancement and the late payment
surcharge are provided by the same
notification operation of which was
stayed."
(emphasis in original)”

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25. Reverting to the facts of the case in the light of above judicial
precedents, it is quite vivid that in the present case, the order of
removal had already been implemented. The petitioner had been
appointed as temporary Sarpanch and had assumed charge. The
learned Collector had also declined to grant interim protection. In
these circumstances, the learned Commissioner was required to
consider whether there existed any exceptional circumstance
warranting interference with the existing position at the interim
stage. The impugned order, however, does not disclose adequate
consideration of these material circumstances.
26. Another relevant consideration is the balance of convenience. The
petitioner has already assumed charge pursuant to the
consequential proceedings initiated after removal of respondent
No.6. If the impugned interim order is permitted to operate, it
would result in uncertainty as to the person entitled to discharge
the functions of Sarpanch and would disturb the functioning of the
Gram Panchayat. The public administration of the Panchayat
cannot be permitted to remain subject to conflicting claims created
by an interim order which effectively reverses an action already
completed.
27. The material placed on record further indicates that the allegations
against respondent No.6 relate to alleged withdrawal and
utilization of Panchayat funds without following the prescribed
procedure. The enquiry material was considered by the competent

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authorities before proceedings under Section 40 were initiated.
This Court, at the present stage, is not required to adjudicate upon
the correctness of those allegations or record any final opinion on
the merits of the removal proceedings. However, the existence of
such material is certainly a relevant consideration while examining
whether the learned Commissioner was justified in granting interim
protection having the effect of restoring the removed office-holder.
It is also required to be kept in mind that the present proceedings
arise out of an interim order passed in a pending statutory
proceeding. The Court is not examining, in the present writ
petition, the ultimate correctness of the order of removal passed
under Section 40 of the Act. The only question is whether the
interim protection granted by the learned Commissioner, in the
facts existing on the date of the impugned order, was legally
sustainable.
28. In the considered opinion of this Court, once the order of removal
had already been implemented and the petitioner had already
been appointed as temporary Sarpanch and assumed charge, the
learned Commissioner ought not to have passed an interim order
which, in its practical operation, had the effect of restoring
respondent No.6 to the office from which he had already been
removed. Such an order does not merely preserve the subject
matter of the proceedings; rather, it substantially alters the position
which had come into existence pursuant to the order of the
prescribed authority.

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29. The fact that the revision preferred by respondent No.6 remains
pending does not, by itself, justify restoration of the removed
Sarpanch by way of interim relief. The revisional proceedings are
required to be adjudicated on their own merits. If respondent No.6
ultimately succeeds in the substantive proceedings, the
appropriate consequences may follow in accordance with law.
However, at the interlocutory stage, the revisional authority was
required to exercise greater caution before disturbing a position
which had already been acted upon.
30. This Court, therefore, finds that the learned Commissioner has
failed to properly consider the effect of the prior implementation of
the order of removal, the appointment and assumption of charge
by the petitioner as temporary Sarpanch, and the fact that the
application for interim protection had already been considered by
the learned Collector. The impugned order, consequently, cannot
be sustained.
31. At the same time, it is made clear that this Court has not
expressed any opinion on the ultimate merits of the proceedings
initiated against respondent No.6 under Section 40 of the Act. The
observations made herein are confined only to the legality of the
impugned interim order dated 06.07.2026 and shall not prejudice
the rights and contentions of respondent No.6 in the pending
statutory proceedings.
32. Accordingly, having considered the matter in its entirety, this Court

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is of the considered view that the impugned interim order dated
06.07.2026 passed by the learned Commissioner, Bilaspur
Division in Revision Case No.202607990500002/A-89, cannot be
sustained in law, particularly when the order of removal passed by
the prescribed authority had already been acted upon and the
petitioner had, pursuant to the consequential proceedings under
Section 38 of the Act, been appointed as temporary Sarpanch and
had assumed charge. The impugned order, in its practical effect,
amounts to restoration of respondent No.6 to the office from which
he had already been removed. Consequently, the impugned
interim order dated 06.07.2026 passed by the learned
Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, Bilaspur is hereby quashed and
set aside, and the order passed by the learned Collector declining
interim relief is upheld. The learned Commissioner, Bilaspur
Division, is directed to forthwith transmit the entire records of the
proceedings, including the records received from the learned
Collector and the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), if the same
are presently in his custody, to the concerned Collector.
Thereafter, the learned Collector, Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, shall
proceed to adjudicate the substantive proceedings on their own
merits, in accordance with law, after affording due opportunity of
hearing to all concerned parties. Having regard to the fact that the
dispute relates to the right to hold an elected statutory office and
consequential civil rights of the parties, the learned Collector shall
make all endeavour to decide the matter expeditiously, preferably

24
within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the
records.
33. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on
the merits of the substantive proceedings or on the correctness of
the findings recorded by the prescribed authority, and the learned
Collector shall decide the matter independently, uninfluenced by
any observation made in the present order.
34. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition
stands allowed . There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh



The date when the
The date when the
The date when the judgment is
judgment is
judgment is
uploaded on the website
reserved
pronounced
Operative Full
18.08.2026 07.09.2026 ------ 08.09.2026

25
Head-Note
An interim order staying termination amounts to quashing the
termination order or obliterate it from existence. Ordinarily, Courts
should not permit an employee to continue in public office merely on the
strength of an interim order, as continuation may amount to usurpation
of a public office if the writ petition ultimately fails.