Zeba Khan vs. State Of U.P.

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2026 INSC 144

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 825 OF 2026
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 12669 of 2025]

ZEBA KHAN … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & OTHERS … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

R. MAHADEVAN, J.

Leave granted.
2. The present Criminal Appeal is directed against the Judgment and Order
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dated 30.07.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in
Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 22824 of 2025, whereby the High
Court granted bail to Respondent No. 2, Mazahar Khan, in connection with FIR
No. 314 of 2024 registered at Police Station Saray Khwaja, District Jaunpur,
Uttar Pradesh, for offences punishable under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and
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471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 .
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SACHIN KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA
Date: 2026.02.11
18:08:05 IST
Reason:

1
Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
2
For short, “IPC”

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3. The prosecution case, as borne out from the record, is that FIR No. 314 of
2024 dated 23.08.2024 was lodged by the complainant alleging the existence of
a large-scale organised scam and racket involving fabrication and circulation of
forged legal qualifications and academic certificates, particularly within the
State of Uttar Pradesh. It is alleged that under the said racket, individuals were
falsely projecting themselves as advocates and were appearing before this Court
as well as various High Courts.

4. The specific allegations against Respondent No. 2 are that he had been
continuously residing in the State of Maharashtra for substantial periods,
including between the years 2016 and 2019. During the said period, Respondent
No. 2 neither took admission in any recognised law college in Uttar Pradesh nor
appeared in any law examination. Despite this, he allegedly fabricated and
procured a forged Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) degree and corresponding
marksheets bearing Enrolment / Roll No. PU-16/6710273, purportedly issued by
Sarvodaya Group of Institutions, claimed to be affiliated with Veer Bahadur
Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur, Uttar Pradesh. It is further alleged that
the said forged decree and marksheets were subsequently used by Respondent
No. 2 to falsely project himself as a duly qualified advocate.


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5. The complainant further alleged that upon verification, Veer Bahadur
Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur, by letter dated 10.08.2024, categorically
informed that Sarvodaya Group of Institutions was not affiliated with the
University and that the marksheet relied upon by Respondent No. 2 was never
issued by the University. It was also stated that Respondent No. 2 had been
preparing, using and circulating such forged degrees and certificates not only for
himself but also for others, thereby operating a systematic racket for supplying
fake academic qualifications. In furtherance thereof, Respondent No. 2 allegedly
printed and circulated visiting cards bearing the national emblem “Satyameva
Jayate” falsely displaying multiple academic qualifications such as LL.B.,
LL.M. and Ph.D., all purportedly obtained through fraudulent means. These acts
were intended to lend legitimacy to Respondent No. 2, attract unsuspecting
persons, and induce them into procuring forged degrees through him. The FIR
records that these activities were not isolated but formed part of a larger
criminal conspiracy involving several fake degree holders linked with
Respondent No. 2.

6. Pursuant to the aforesaid FIR, Respondent No. 2 was arrested on
28.04.2025. His bail application was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge,
Jaunpur, vide order dated 12.05.2025. Thereafter, Respondent No. 2 approached
the High Court by filing Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 22824 of 2025,

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which came to be allowed by the impugned order dated 30.07.2025. Aggrieved
thereby, the complainant / appellant has preferred the present Criminal Appeal.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

7. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court while
granting bail to Respondent No. 2, completely ignored material evidence
available on record and proceeded on false, misleading and suppressed facts
presented on behalf of the said respondent. It was contended that Respondent
No. 2 deliberately concealed the existence of as many as nine FIRs registered
against him in order to secure a favourable bail order. The allegations in these
FIRs relate to serious offences including forgery, cheating, sexual harassment,
criminal intimidation, theft, trespass and rioting.
7.1. It was further submitted that the High Court committed a manifest error in
placing reliance on a copy of the result with marks downloaded from an online
verification portal, which was produced by Respondent No. 2 to substantiate his
claim of possessing a valid LL. B degree. Respondent No. 2 is, in fact, accused
of having forged the marksheets and degree pertaining to the very same result.
Even otherwise, the downloaded marksheet itself contains a categorical
disclaimer that it cannot be treated as an original marksheet. This vital and
material aspect was completely overlooked by the High Court while exercising
its jurisdiction.

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7.2. The learned counsel submitted that the High Court failed to take into
consideration the letter issued by Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University,
which categorically states that the University has never issued any LL. B degree
or marksheet to Respondent No. 2. Equally ignored was the communication
issued by Sarvodaya Vidyapeeth Mahavidyalaya, which unequivocally records
that the said institution does not offer any law course whatsoever.
7.3. It was further submitted that Respondent No. 2 falsely projected himself
as an innocent victim by asserting that he was unaware of the forged nature of
the LL. B. degree. This claim, it was contended, is demonstrably false. Even
after registration of the present FIR, and despite the degree being prima facie
found to be forged, Respondent No. 2 clandestinely appeared before this Court
and managed to secure membership of the Supreme Court Bar Association,
thereby continuing his misrepresentation.
7.4. The learned counsel submitted that subsequent to the registration of the
present FIR in the year 2024, four additional FIRs have been lodged against
Respondent No. 2. Out of these, three FIRs were registered by different
Universities across two States, namely Maharashtra & Karnataka, and pertain to
offences relating to forgery and facilitation of forged academic degrees in
diverse disciplines including law and M. Phil (Health Sciences).
7.5. It was further submitted that Respondent No. 2 is the President of a Public
Education Trust which runs Kohinoor Arts, Commerce and Science College. An
FIR registered by Yashwantrao Chavan Maharashtra Open University reveals a

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gross abuse of position by Respondent No. 2. The said college was an
examination centre for the University, where Respondent No. 2 himself was
appearing for the M.A. (Hindi) examination. A fact-finding committee
constituted by the University recorded that Respondent No. 2 coerced teachers
of the college to write the examination on his behalf by exploiting his position
as President of the institution.
7.6. It was submitted that after issuance of notice by this Court vide order
dated 18.08.2025, Respondent No. 2 grossly abused the liberty granted to him
by stalking and intimidating the appellant with the intent of forcing her to
withdraw the proceedings. It was further alleged that Respondent No.2
clandestinely took photographs of the appellant and circulated them on social
media platforms in order to malign and defame her. Additionally, Respondent
No. 2 secured admission into an LL. M. programme at Sandip University,
Nashik, by once again relying upon the very same forged and fabricated LL. B.
degree.
7.7. The learned counsel pointed out that despite a specific direction issued by
this Court vide order dated 22.09.2025, Respondent No. 2 disclosed only four
out of the nine FIRs in his counter affidavit. Further, in the petition filed before
the High Court seeking quashing of the present FIR, Respondent No. 2 falsely
asserted that he had no criminal antecedents. In the said petition, he portrayed
himself as a practising advocate of this Court in order to trivialise the allegations
and claim reputational injury. Contradictorily, in the bail application filed before

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the High Court, Respondent No. 2 stated that he does not practise as an advocate
in any court of law, thereby clearly approbating and reprobating to suit his
convenience.
7.8. It was further submitted that the State Bar Council of Maharashtra and
Goa, after issuance of notice by this Court in the present proceedings, removed
the enrolment of Respondent No. 2 and debarred him from practice as an
advocate.
7.9. The learned counsel submitted that the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad
Bench, vide order dated 23.09.2025 made scathing observations against
Respondent No. 2, noting his deliberate and repeated non-compliance with
judicial orders, including orders passed by this Court. The High Court observed
that Respondent No. 2 is a person of criminal turpitude with no respect for the
rule of law, and that it was a travesty that such a person was heading an
academic institution.
7.10. It was submitted that a holistic appraisal of the material on record clearly
establishes that Respondent No. 2 not only forged his LL. B. degree to falsely
project himself as an advocate, but has consistently approached courts with
unclean hands. Even assuming arguendo that Respondent No. 2 did not himself
forge the documents, the undisputed fact remains that he has repeatedly
procured, relied upon and benefited from forged and fabricated degrees. As on
date, it has come to light that Respondent No. 2 holds a forged LL. B. degree
and a forged M. Phil. degree, on the basis of which he also obtained a doctorate.

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There are further allegations of his active involvement in facilitating forged
degrees for others.
7.11. The learned counsel submitted that Respondent No. 2 appears to be
integrally connected with a larger, organised racket engaged in the manufacture,
circulation and monetisation of forged academic degrees of reputed institutions.
Being the head of an academic institution, Respondent No. 2 was uniquely
positioned to operate such activities under a veneer of legitimacy, thereby
posing a serious threat to public confidence in the education system and the
administration of justice.
7.12. In view of the foregoing submissions, it was contended that the impugned
order granting bail to Respondent No. 2 is wholly unsustainable both in law and
on facts, and deserves to be set aside. Having regard to the nature, gravity and
magnitude of the allegations, and in order to safeguard the integrity of the
investigation as well as public confidence in the justice delivery system, the
learned counsel also prayed for transfer of the investigation to a specialised
agency.

8. The learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 1 – State of Uttar
Pradesh supported the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and
prayed for setting aside the order granting bail to Respondent No. 2.


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8.1. It was submitted that FIR No. 314 of 2024 came to be registered on the
basis of a complaint lodged by the appellant against Respondent No. 2 and two
others, alleging the existence of an organised racket involving forged LL. B.
degrees and fabricated marksheets.
8.2. The learned counsel submitted that Respondent No. 2 is a history sheeter,
with as many as nine criminal cases pending against him.
8.3. It was further submitted that the investigation has unearthed grave and
serious allegations against Respondent No. 2, which are substantiated by official
communications issued by statutory and academic authorities. Veer Bahadur
Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur, Uttar Pradesh, vide its letter dated
10.08.2024 addressed to the appellant, categorically informed that Sarvodaya
Group of Institutions was not affiliated with the said University and that the
marksheet relied upon by Respondent No. 2 was never issued by the University.
Further, Sarvodaya Vidyapeeth Mahavidyalaya, Mirganj, Jaunpur, vide its letter
dated 09.05.2025 addressed to the Investigating Officer, stated that the college
was granted recognition only for certain Bachelor of Arts courses by Veer
Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University, and that it does not offer any LL.B. (law)
course.
8.4. It was also submitted that as per the Bar Council of India, there are 23
colleges affiliated with Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur,
which are recognised to offer either the three-year or five-year LL. B. courses.
Significantly, Sarvodaya Group of Institutions does not find mention in the said

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list of recognised law colleges, despite Respondent No. 2 claiming to have
completed his three-year LL. B. course from the said institution.
8.5. The learned counsel further submitted that the enrolment details of
Respondent No. 2 were forwarded to the Sub-Inspector by the District Bar
Association, Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar, Maharashtra, vide letter dated
05.09.2024. Respondent No. 2 was enrolled as an advocate with the Bar Council
of Maharashtra and Goa on 26.06.2023 bearing Roll No. MAH/ 2493/2023. It
was also submitted that Respondent No. 2 secured membership of the Supreme
Court Bar Association bearing Membership No. K-00408/OS, and that a
temporary membership card valid for two years was issued to him on
04.12.2024.
8.6. It was urged that the nature of the allegations against Respondent No. 2 is
extremely serious. His conduct, which includes falsely projecting himself as an
advocate before courts and public authorities, reflects a deliberate and sustained
abuse of the judicial process and constitutes a continuing offence, directly
undermining public faith in the legal system.
8.7. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the learned
counsel submitted that the High Court erred in granting bail granted to
Respondent No. 2 by the impugned order, which warrants interference by this
Court.
9. Per contra , the learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 2 – accused
submitted that Respondent No. 2 was arrested on 28.04.2025 and was granted

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bail by the High Court vide order dated 30.07.2025 after completion of
investigation and filing of the chargesheet. It was contended that the present
appeal is an abuse of the process of law and is motivated by long-standing
family and property disputes.
9.1. It was further submitted that it is a well settled principle of criminal
jurisprudence that bail is the rule and jail the exception , and that cancellation of
bail is not to be ordered mechanically but only upon the existence of
supervening circumstances such as misuse of liberty, tampering with evidence,
intimidation or influence of witnesses, likelihood of absconding, or violation of
bail conditions. According to the learned counsel, none of these circumstances
arise in the present case.
9.2. It was contended that the record does not disclose any material suggesting
a likelihood of tampering with evidence, nor has any perversity or patent
illegality in the impugned order been demonstrated so as to justify interference
by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The bail granted by the High
Court is neither arbitrary nor perverse and has been passed after due
consideration of relevant factors, including the absence of any custodial
necessity.
9.3. The learned counsel further submitted that Respondent No. 2 has not
misused the liberty granted to him, has scrupulously complied with the bail
conditions, and has neither intimidated witnesses nor obstructed the
administration of justice. It was urged that Respondent No. 2 has cooperated

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throughout the investigation, poses no flight risk, and has not committed any
offence while on bail. It was submitted that mere reiteration of allegations
contained in the FIR cannot constitute a valid ground for cancellation of bail.
9.4. It was also submitted that the FIR emanates from deep-rooted family and
property disputes, particularly relating to the management and control of
Kohinoor Education Society, Aurangabad, and other pending civil litigations
between family members, including a Special Leave Petition stated to be
pending before this Court. According to the learned counsel, the appellant has
initiated multiple proceedings against Respondent No. 2 and his family
members across different States and that the present criminal proceedings are
intended as a pressure tactic in the backdrop of ongoing civil disputes.
9.5. It was further urged that Respondent No. 2 is not the main accused in
most of the cases relied upon by the appellant and has been implicated primarily
with the aid of Section 34 IPC. It was also pointed out that proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 42 of 2025 arising out of FIR No. 314 of 2024 have already
been stayed by the High Court in quash proceedings, and therefore, cancellation
of bail at this stage would be wholly unwarranted and oppressive.
9.6. Accordingly, it was submitted that the present appeal is actuated by
personal animosity and that no legally sustainable ground for cancellation of
bail has been made out.
9.7. On these grounds, it was prayed that the appeal be dismissed as being
devoid of merit.

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10. The learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 3 – Bar Council of
India submitted that vide order dated 17.11.2025, the name of Respondent No. 2
along with his enrolment number has been removed from the rolls of the Bar
Council and he has consequently been debarred from appearing before any court
of law. It was further submitted that any order that may be passed by this Court
shall be duly complied with by the Bar Council of India.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

11. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel
appearing for the parties and carefully perused the materials placed before us.

12. In the present appeal, the appellant seeks annulment of the bail granted by
the High Court on the ground that the impugned order is manifestly perverse,
legally untenable, and vitiated by non-application of mind. The High Court
proceeded to grant bail by placing reliance on documents whose genuineness
constitutes the very subject matter of the criminal prosecution, compounded by
the suppression of material facts and serious criminal antecedents on the part of
Respondent No. 2. Such an approach strikes at the very foundation of settled
bail jurisprudence.



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LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING ANNULMENT / CANCELLATION
OF BAIL

13. It is trite that while personal liberty occupies a position of high
constitutional value, an order granting bail does not enjoy immunity from
appellate scrutiny where it is shown to be arbitrary, perverse, or passed in
disregard of material considerations. The discretion to grant bail, though wide,
is structured by well-settled legal principles and is neither uncanalised nor
unfettered.

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14. In State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc. , and Yogendra Pal Singh v.
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Raghvendra Singh @ Prince and another , this Court authoritatively clarified
that cancellation of bail on account of post-bail misconduct stands on a
fundamentally different footing from annulment of a bail order which is itself
unjustified or legally unsustainable at its inception. An order granting bail is
liable to be interfered with where it reveals reliance on irrelevant considerations,
ignores relevant material, or suffers from perversity without the necessity of
waiting for supervening circumstances.

15. In Manik Madhukar Sarve and others v. Vitthal Damuji Meher and
5
others , in which, one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.) was a member of the
Bench, this Court set aside the grant of bail in appeal, holding that the discretion

3
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702
4
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2580
5
(2024) 10 SCC 753

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exercised by the High Court was vitiated. The Court comprehensively restated
the parameters governing the exercise of jurisdiction to grant bail, including the
nature and gravity of the accusation, the role attributed to the accused, criminal
antecedents, the likelihood of tampering with evidence or witnesses, the risk of
abscondence, and the overall impact on society. The following paragraphs are
pertinent:

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transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material
available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the
impact on the society resulting in such an order. In P v. State of
M.P. [(2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a three-Judge Bench of this Court
[authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations
that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to
an accused under Section 439(1) CrPC in the following words: (SCC p. 224,
para 24)
‘24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail
once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening
circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of
bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit
him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during
trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC
(Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court
would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below
granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or
premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is
susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.’
(emphasis supplied)

19. In State of Haryana v. Dharamraj [(2023) 17 SCC 510 : 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 1085], speaking through one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.), the Court,
while setting aside an order [Dharamraj v. State of Haryana, 2021 SCC OnLine
P&H 4632] of the Punjab and Haryana High Court granting (anticipatory) bail,
discussed and reasoned: (SCC paras 6-11)
“6. A foray, albeit brief, into relevant precedents is warranted. This
Court considered the factors to guide grant of bail in Ram Govind
Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh [(2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri)
688] and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [(2004) 7 SCC 528 :
2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis
Chatterjee [(2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765], the relevant
principles were restated thus: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
‘9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with
an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the
accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to
exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in
compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of
decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among
other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had committed the offence;
( ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

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such an order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant
material, the appellate court would be well within its power to set aside
and cancel the bail. (Also refer: Puran v. Rambilas [(2001) 6 SCC 338 :
2001 SCC (Cri) 1124] ; Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat [(2008) 13
SCC 584 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 813])”
(Emphasis Supplied)


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16. Recently, in Salil Mahajan v. Avinash Kumar and another , this Court
once again crystallised the distinction between an appeal against grant of bail
and an application seeking cancellation of bail. It was reiterated that in an appeal
against grant of bail, the superior court is concerned with examining the legality,
propriety, and correctness of the bail order itself, and not the subsequent
conduct of the accused. Where the bail order suffers from perversity, illegality,
non-consideration of relevant factors such as the gravity of the offence, impact
on society, or criminal antecedents, interference is fully justified. The following
observations are pertinent:
“7. At the outset, it is well settled by this Court that an appeal against the grant
of bail and an application seeking cancellation of bail are on different footing.
The grounds for testing the legality of an order granting bail are well settled .
Recently, in Ashok Dhankad v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2025 SCC OnLine SC
1690], this Court had summarized the position of law as follows:
“19. The principles which emerge as a result of the above discussion are
as follows:
(i) An appeal against grant of bail cannot be considered to be on the
same footing as an application for cancellation of bail;
(ii) The Court concerned must not venture into a threadbare analysis
of the evidence adduced by prosecution. The merits of such
evidence must not be adjudicated at the stage of bail;
(iii) An order granting bail must reflect application of mind and
assessment of the relevant factors for grant of bail that have
been elucidated by this Court.

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2025 SCC OnLine SC 2732

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[See: Y v. State of Rajasthan (Supra); Jaibunisha v. Meherban
and Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu]
(iv) An appeal against grant of bail may be entertained by a
superior Court on grounds such as perversity; illegality;
inconsistency with law; relevant factors not been taken into
consideration including gravity of the offence and impact of the
crime;
(v) However, the Court may not take the conduct of an accused
subsequent to the grant bail into consideration while considering
an appeal against the grant of such bail. Such grounds must be
taken in an application for cancellation of bail; and
(vi) An appeal against grant of bail must not be allowed to be used as
a retaliatory measure. Such an appeal must be confined only to
the grounds discussed above.”
(emphasis supplied)

8. We deem it appropriate to advert to the exposition of law, in Vipan Kumar
Dhir v. State of Punjab [(2021) 15 SCC 518], where while setting aside the
grant of anticipatory bail this Court observed:
“11. In addition to the caveat illustrated in the cited decision(s), bail can
also be revoked where the court has considered irrelevant factors or has
ignored relevant material available on record which renders the order
granting bail legally untenable. The gravity of the offence, conduct of the
accused and societal impact of an undue indulgence by Court when the
investigation is at the threshold, are also amongst a few situations, where
a Superior Court can interfere in an order of bail to prevent the
miscarriage of justice and to bolster the administration of criminal
justice system. This Court has repeatedly viewed that while granting bail,
especially anticipatory bail which is per se extraordinary in nature, the
possibility of the accused to influence prosecution witnesses, threatening
the family members of the deceased, fleeing from justice or creating
other impediments in the fair investigation, ought not to be overlooked.”
(emphasis supplied)

17. Thus, a consistent and well settled doctrinal thread emerges from the
aforesaid decisions: the power to grant bail, though discretionary, is subject to
judicial discipline and appellate oversight. While personal liberty remains a
cherished constitutional value, a bail order is liable to be interfered with where

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the exercise of discretion is perverse, illegal, or manifestly unjustified; where it
is founded on irrelevant or extraneous considerations; or where material and
relevant factors bearing on the grant of bail have been ignored.

18. Equally well-settled is the distinction between an appeal against an order
granting bail and an application seeking cancellation of bail founded on post-
bail conduct or supervening circumstances. In an appeal against the grant of
bail, the focus of judicial scrutiny is the legality, propriety, and sustainability of
the bail order as it stood at the time of its grant. Where such an order is shown to
suffer from non-application of mind, reliance on disputed or prima facie suspect
material forming the subject-matter of trial, suppression or non-consideration of
material facts, or disregard of binding legal principles, annulment of the bail
order is not only permissible but warranted in order to avert a miscarriage of
justice.

19. Accordingly, where a bail order is demonstrated to be legally untenable or
fundamentally perverse, interference by the appellate court is not an exception,
but a judicial imperative. Such interference does not trench upon the sanctity of
personal liberty; rather, it subserves the rule of law by ensuring that
discretionary relief is granted in conformity with settled legal standards and that
the administration of criminal justice is not undermined by arbitrary or
capricious orders.


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APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT CASE

20. The criminal proceedings arise out of FIR No. 314 of 2024 dated
23.08.2024 lodged by the complainant, who is related to Respondent No. 2 and
is stated to be his sister-in-law. It is not in dispute that there are existing disputes
between the parties relating to ancestral and family property, and that civil
proceedings in that regard are pending.

21. It is alleged in the FIR that Respondent No. 2 had been projecting himself
as possessing a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) degree purportedly issued by
Sarvodaya Group of Institutions, which was claimed to be affiliated with Veer
Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur, Uttar Pradesh.

22. According to the prosecution, the law degree and marksheet are forged
and fabricated, and Respondent No. 2 deliberately relied upon such documents
to falsely project himself as a law graduate. It is further alleged that on the
strength of these forged credentials, he appeared before this Court and other
Courts. The accusations extend beyond personal use and include allegations that
Respondent No. 2 was actively involved in preparing, using and circulating
forged degrees and certificates for others as well, thereby operating an organised
racket facilitating fake educational qualifications. Thus, serious allegations have
been made against Respondent No. 2.

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23. The High Court granted bail to Respondent No. 2 based on the
submissions advanced on behalf of Respondent No. 2 that the LL.B. degree was
genuine and issued by Sarvodaya Group of Institutions and that the informant
being his sister-in-law, had falsely implicated him due to an ongoing property
dispute.

24. However, the material placed on record prima facie contradicts these
assertions. A communication dated 05.09.2024 issued by Veer Bahadur Singh
Purvanchal University to the District Magistrate, Jaunpur, categorically states
that Sarvodaya Group of Institutions was not affiliated with the University.
Further, during investigation, the Investigating Officer received a
communication dated 09.05.2025 from Sarvodaya Vidyapeeth Mahavidyalaya,
Mirganj, Jaunpur, clarifying that the institution had recognition only for seven
Bachelor of Arts courses and did not conduct LL.B. classes.

25. At this stage, the prosecution case stands fortified by the aforesaid
categorical communications that the marksheet relied upon by Respondent No. 2
was never issued by Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University and that the
institution in question had no affiliation for imparting legal education. These
materials go to the very root of the prosecution case and cannot be brushed aside
as peripheral. Even otherwise, the disclaimer appearing on the marksheet
downloaded by Respondent No. 2 clearly states that it cannot be treated as an
original marksheet and ought to have alerted the High Court to exercise

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circumspection. There are further allegations that the website or portal reflecting
the marksheet itself is forged, that the email ID appearing therein is common to
websites of other institutions, that the mobile number provided is defunct, and
that the website appears to be a mirror website of another University.

26. The allegations against Respondent No. 2 are thus not confined to an
isolated instance of forgery but prima facie disclose systematic and organised
course of conduct involving the fabrication, procurement and use of forged
educational qualifications, particularly law degrees, which has a direct bearing
on the integrity of the legal profession and the administration of justice. The
details of the criminal cases registered against Respondent No. 2 are as follows:

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27. The above tabulation demonstrates that multiple FIRs have been
registered against Respondent No. 2 across different States alleging similar
offences relating to educational fraud and forgery.

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28. In Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh @ Lalla Babu and another , this
Court underscored that criminal antecedents cannot be ignored, particularly
where the nature of allegations and their societal impact are grave. The Court

7
(2012) 9 SCC 446

26

clarified that while a history-sheeter is not disentitled to bail as a rule,
antecedents constitute a significant factor in the exercise of judicial discretion.
The relevant passage reads as under:
“28. Coming to the nature of crime it is perceivable that two persons came on a
motorcycle and kidnapped Bihari Lal and kept him in confinement for eight
days. The role of the accused is clearly stated . It is apt to note that a history-
sheeter has a recorded past. The High Court, in toto, has ignored the criminal
antecedents of the accused. What has weighed with the High Court is that the
accused had spent seven months in custody. That may be one of the factors but
that cannot be the whole and the sole factor in every case. It depends upon the
nature of the offence, the manner in which it is committed and its impact on
the society. We may hasten to add that when we state that the accused is a
history-sheeter we may not be understood to have said that a history-sheeter is
never entitled to bail. But, it is a significant factor to be taken note of regard
being had to the nature of crime in respect of which he has been booked. In
the case at hand, as the prosecution case unfolds, the accused did not want
anyone to speak against his activities . He had sent two persons to kidnap Bihari
Lal, who remained in confinement for eight days. The victim was tortured.
Kidnapping, as an offence, is on the increase throughout the country. Sometimes
it is dealt with formidable skill and sometimes with terror and sometimes with
threat or brute force. The crime relating to kidnapping has taken many a
contour. True it is, sometimes allegations are made that a guardian has
kidnapped a child or a boy in love has kidnapped a girl. They do stand on a
different footing. But kidnapping for ransom or for revenge or to spread terror
or to establish authority are in a different realm altogether. In the present case
the victim had been kidnapped under threat, confined and abused. The sole
reason for kidnapping is because the victim had shown some courage to speak
against the accused. This may be the purpose for sustaining of authority in the
area by the accused and his criminal antecedents, speak eloquently in that
regard. In his plea for bail the accused had stated that such offences had been
registered because of political motivations but the range of offence and their
alleged years of occurrence do not lend prima facie acceptance to the same.
Thus, in the present case his criminal antecedents could not have been totally
ignored.”
(Emphasis Supplied)


27

8
29. Similarly, in Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another , this
Court set aside a bail order on the ground that relevant factors, including
criminal antecedents, had been completely ignored, holding that such a grant of
bail amounted to a deviant exercise of discretion warranting appellate
interference. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below:

30. The principles reiterated by a three-Judge Bench in Brijmani Devi v.
9
Pappu Kumar and another further emphasise that while personal liberty under
Article 21 of the Constitution is invaluable, courts must balance such liberty
against the nature of the accusations, supporting material, criminal antecedents,

8
(2016) 15 SCC 422
9
(2022) 4 SCC 497

28

and the broader societal impact. Bail discretion must be exercised judiciously
and supported by reasons grounded in the material on record. The following
observations are apposite:

29

the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment
that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an
accused.”
(Emphasis Supplied)


31. Of particular concern in the present case is the prima facie material
indicating that Respondent No. 2 suppressed his criminal antecedents before the
High Court by stating that he had no criminal history except the present FIR.
Such incorrect and incomplete disclosure appears to have materially influenced
the exercise of discretion in his favour, thereby vitiating the bail order.

32. The submission that Respondent No. 2 has not misused liberty granted to
him cannot be considered in isolation. There are prima facie allegations of
stalking and intimidation of the appellant after the grant of bail. This Court vide
order dated 22.09.2025, expressly cautioned Respondent No. 2 that any attempt
to intimidate or coerce the appellant into withdrawing the proceedings would
invite strict action. The existence of a family or property dispute does not dilute
the gravity of allegations involving impersonation as a legal professional and the
use of forged credentials before courts, which have serious public and
institutional ramifications extending far beyond a private dispute.

33. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered view that the
impugned order dated 09.04.2025 granting bail to Respondent No. 2 is legally
unsustainable and is liable to be set aside.


30

INVESTIGATION BY A SPECIAL AGENCY – WHETHER
WARRANTED

34. The appellant has further sought a direction for transfer of the
investigation in the present case to a special agency, alleging the existence of a
larger racket involving forged degrees and invoking considerations of public
interest.

35. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the investigation has already
culminated in the filing of a chargesheet on 14.05.2025, and cognizance has
been taken by the learned Magistrate vide order dated 26.05.2025.

10
36. In Disha v. State of Gujarat and others , this Court was concerned with
allegations relating to a large-scale financial scam involving collection of
approximately Rs. 60 crores on the pretext of assuring high returns. Despite the
filing of the chargesheet, a prayer was made for transfer of investigation to an
impartial agency such as the CBI. Rejecting the said prayer, this Court held that
once investigation is complete and the chargesheet is filed, transfer of
investigation can be directed only in exceptional circumstances demonstrating a
real likelihood of bias, mala fides, or abuse of power. The following paragraphs
are apposite:



10
(2011) 13 SCC 337

31

“ 14. In Gudalure M.J. Cherian v. Union of India [(1992) 1 SCC 397] this Court
however, held that the power of directing investigation by CBI after charge-
sheet was filed, should not ordinarily be used, but only when necessary. The
investigation having been completed by the police and charge-sheet submitted to
the court, it is not for this Court, ordinarily, to reopen the investigation specially
by entrusting the same to a 31ummarized31 agency like CBI. The same view has
been reiterated by this Court in Punjab & Haryana High Court Bar Assn. v.
State of Punjab [(1994) 1 SCC 616 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 455 : AIR 1994 SC 1023].

15. In R.S. Sodhi v. State of U.P. [1994 Supp (1) SCC 143 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 248:
AIR 1994 SC 38] this Court examined the case where the accusations were
directed against the local police personnel. The Court held that it would be
desirable to entrust the investigation to an independent agency like CBI so that
all concerned including the relatives of the deceased may feel assured that an
independent agency was looking into the matter and that would lend the final
outcome of the investigation credibility. However faithfully the local police may
carry out the investigation, the same would lack credibility since the allegations
were against them.

16. This Court refused to direct the investigation by CBI, after the charge-sheet
was filed in Vineet Narain v. Union of India [(1996) 2 SCC 199 : 1996 SCC
(Cri) 264 : AIR 1996 SC 3386].

17. In case of persons against whom a prima facie case is made out and a
charge-sheet is filed in the competent court, it is that court which will then deal
with that case on merits in accordance with law. (See Union of India v. Sushil
Kumar Modi [(1998) 8 SCC 661 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 84].)

21. Thus, it is evident that this Court has transferred the matter to CBI or any
other special agency only when the Court was satisfied that the accused had
been a very powerful and influential person or State authorities like high police
officials were involved and the investigation had not been proceeded with in a
proper direction or it had been biased. In such a case, in order to do complete
justice and having belief that it would lend the final outcome of the investigation
credibility, such directions have been issued.”
(Emphasis Supplied)


37. Similarly, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in K.V. Rajendran v.
11
Superintendent of Police, CBCID South Zone, Chennai and others , declined

11
(2013) 12 SCC 480

32

to transfer investigation to the CBI despite allegations of delay and improper
investigation. This Court held that mere dissatisfaction with the manner of
investigation or bald allegations unsupported by cogent material cannot justify
invocation of extraordinary jurisdiction for transfer of investigation to a central
or special agency. The following observations are relevant:
“ 13 …This Court has time and again dealt with the issue under what
circumstances the investigation can be transferred from the State investigating
agency to any other independent investigating agency like CBI. It has been held
that the power of transferring such investigation must be in rare and exceptional
cases where the court finds it necessary in order to do justice between the
parties and to instil confidence in the public mind, or where investigation by the
State police lacks credibility and it is necessary for having “a fair, honest and
complete investigation”, and particularly, when it is imperative to retain public
confidence in the impartial working of the State agencies. Where the
investigation has already been completed and charge-sheet has been filed,
ordinarily superior courts should not reopen the investigation and it should be
left open to the court, where the charge-sheet has been filed, to proceed with the
matter in accordance with law. Under no circumstances, should the court make
any expression of its opinion on merit relating to any accusation against any
individual. (Vide Gudalure M.J. Cherian v. Union of India [(1992) 1 SCC 397],
R.S. Sodhi v. State of U.P. [1994 Supp (1) SCC 143 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 248 : AIR
1994 SC 38], Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Assn. v. State of Punjab
[(1994) 1 SCC 616 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 455 : AIR 1994 SC 1023] , Vineet Narain
v. Union of India [(1996) 2 SCC 199 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 264] , Union of India v.
Sushil Kumar Modi [(1996) 6 SCC 500 : AIR 1997 SC 314] , Disha v. State of
Gujarat [(2011) 13 SCC 337 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 628 : AIR 2011 SC 3168] ,
Rajender Singh Pathania v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2011) 13 SCC 329 : (2012) 1
SCC (Cri) 873] and State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar [(2011) 14
SCC 770 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1034 : AIR 2012 SC 364].)

15. In State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights [(2010) 3
SCC 571 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 401] a Constitution Bench of this Court has
clarified that extraordinary power to transfer the investigation from State
investigating agency to any other investigating agency must be exercised
sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations where it becomes necessary
to provide credibility and instil confidence in investigation or where the incident
may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may
be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental rights.

33

(See also Ashok Kumar Todi v. Kishwar Jahan [(2011) 3 SCC 758 : (2011) 2
SCC (Cri) 75 : AIR 2011 SC 1254] .)

16. This Court in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. [(2008) 2 SCC 409 : (2008) 1 SCC
(Cri) 440] held : (SCC p. 416, para 31)
“31. … this Court or the High Court has power under Article 136 or
Article 226 to order investigation by CBI. That, however, should be done
only in some rare and exceptional case, otherwise, CBI would be flooded
with a large number of cases and would find it impossible to properly
investigate all of them.”

17. In view of the above, the law can be 33ummarized to the effect that the Court
could exercise its constitutional powers for transferring an investigation from
the State investigating agency to any other independent investigating agency like
CBI only in rare and exceptional cases. Such as where high officials of State
authorities are involved, or the accusation itself is against the top officials of the
investigating agency thereby allowing them to influence the investigation, and
further that it is so necessary to do justice and to instil confidence in the
investigation or where the investigation is prima facie found to be
tainted/biased.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

38. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, no specific or
substantiated material has been placed on record to demonstrate that the
investigation conducted by the State Police was vitiated by mala fides, bias, or
extraneous influence attributable to Respondent No. 2. There is also no
allegation of involvement of any high-ranking police officials so as to cast doubt
on the credibility of the investigation.

39. In the absence of such exceptional circumstances, and particularly when
the investigation stands completed and cognizance has already been taken by the
competent court, this Court finds no justification to invoke its extraordinary
jurisdiction to direct transfer of the investigation to a special agency.

34

40. It is also apposite to note that issues pertaining to the verification of law
degrees and enrolment of advocates are already the subject matter of
comprehensive directions issued by this Court in Ajay Shankar Srivastava v.
12
Bar Council of India and another as supplemented by order dated
13
18.11.2025 in M. Varadhan v. Union of India and another . Pursuant thereto,
a High-Level Committee has been constituted and is functioning under the
continuous monitoring of this Court. At the instance of the Bar Council of India,
a nationwide verification process is presently underway with the active
involvement of Universities and State Bar Councils. The regulatory framework
and supervisory mechanism put in place by this Court, therefore, adequately
address the concerns pertaining to forged degrees and fraudulent enrolments.
41. In view of the above, the prayer for transfer of investigation to a special
agency is declined. It is, however, clarified that the Bar Council of India and the
State Bar Councils shall continue to implement, in letter and spirit, the
directions already issued by this Court and shall submit such progress reports as
may be called for by this Court or by the High-Level Committee.
DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL FACTS IN BAIL APPLICATIONS –
GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND SUGGESTIONS

42. It has been consistently emphasised by this Court that an accused or
applicant seeking bail is under a solemn obligation to make a fair, complete and

12
(2023) 6 SCC 144
13
WP(C) No. 1319 of 2023

35

candid disclosure of all material facts having a direct bearing on the exercise of
judicial discretion. Any suppression, concealment or selective disclosure of such
material facts amounts to an abuse of the process of law and strikes at the very
root of the administration of criminal justice.

43. In the present case, Respondent No. 2 deliberately concealed his criminal
antecedents before the High Court, both in the petition for quashing FIR as well
as in successive bail applications. Even before this Court, only partial disclosure
was made in the counter-affidavit, despite the existence of multiple criminal
cases on record. This conduct cannot be viewed as an isolated lapse but reflects
a growing and disturbing trend of accused persons securing discretionary relief
by suppressing material facts.

44. This Court has, on numerous occasions, strongly deprecated such
14
conduct. In Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha , this Court disapproved the act
of an accused who had concealed the dismissal of earlier bail applications as
well as the pendency of proceedings before this Court, and issued specific
directions mandating disclosure of all previous and pending bail applications.
The Court reiterated that suppression of material facts constitutes fraud on the
court, attracting the maxim suppressio veri, expressio falsi . The relevant
paragraphs read as under:

14
(2024) 4 SCC 432

36

37

38

39

40


8. In Pradip Sahu v. State of Assam [(2024) 4 SCC 448] the accused who
was found to be guilty of concealing material facts from the court and
against him the High Court [Gauhati High Court] had directed [Pradip
Sahu v. State of Assam, 2021 SCC OnLine Gau 2835] for taking
appropriate legal action, had challenged the order passed by the High
Court before this Court. In the aforesaid case, first bail application filed by
the appellant there was dismissed [Pradip Sahu v. State of Assam, 2021
SCC OnLine Gau 2832] by the High Court [On 11-11-2021], thereafter he
moved a second bail application before the High Court in which notice was
issued on 30-11-2021 [Pradip Sahu v. State of Assam, 2021 SCC OnLine
Gau 2833]. During the pendency of the aforesaid application before the
High Court, the appellant therein moved a fresh bail application before the
trial court on 1-12-2021, which was granted on the same day. The
aforesaid facts came to the notice of the High Court on 8-12-2021 [Pradip
Sahu v. State of Assam, 2021 SCC OnLine Gau 2834] when a report of the
Registrar (Judicial) was received, who was directed to conduct the enquiry
in the matter. However, on an apology tendered by the appellant therein
and also considering the facts as stated that he belonged to Tea Tribe
community and his brother, a cycle mechanic, who was also pursuing the
case, did not appreciate the intricacy of the law. As a result of which, the
mistake occurred. This Court, having regard to the unqualified apology
tendered by the appellant therein, had set aside the order passed by the
High Court to file FIR/complaint against the appellant therein.
9. May be in the facts of Pradip Sahu case [2021 SCC OnLine Gau 2834],
this Court had accepted unconditional apology tendered by the appellant
therein and in the given fact situation accepted his apology but it is
established that there is a consistent effort by the litigants to misrepresent
the Court wherever they can.

22. In our opinion, to avoid any confusion in future it would be
appropriate to mandatorily mention in the application(s) filed for grant of
bail:
22.1. Details and copies of order(s) passed in the earlier bail
application(s) filed by the petitioner which have been already decided.
22.2. Details of any bail application(s) filed by the petitioner, which is
pending either in any court, below the court in question or the higher court,
and if none is pending, a clear statement to that effect has to be made.
22.2.1. This Court has already directed vide order passed in Pradhani
Jani case [(2024) 4 SCC 451] that all bail applications filed by the
different accused in the same FIR should be listed before the same Judge
except in cases where the Judge has superannuated or has been transferred
or otherwise incapacitated to hear the matter. The system needs to be
followed meticulously to avoid any discrepancies in the orders.

41

22.2.2. In case it is mentioned on the top of the bail application or any
other place which is clearly visible, that the application for bail is either
first, second or third and so on, so that it is convenient for the court to
appreciate the arguments in that light. If this fact is mentioned in the order,
it will enable the next higher court to appreciate the arguments in that
light.
22.3. The Registry of the court should also annex a report generated
from the system about decided or pending bail application(s) in the crime
case in question. The same system needs to be followed even in the case of
private complaints as all cases filed in the trial courts are assigned specific
numbers (CNR No.), even if no FIR number is there.
22.4. It should be the duty of the investigating officer/any officer
assisting the State counsel in court to apprise him of the order(s), if any,
passed by the court with reference to different bail applications or other
proceedings in the same crime case. And the counsel appearing for the
parties have to conduct themselves truly like officers of the court.

23. Our suggestions are with a view to streamline the proceedings and
avoid anomalies with reference to the bail applications being filed in the
cases pending trial and even for suspension of sentence .”
(Emphasis Supplied)

15
45. In Munnesh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , this Court noticed the absence of
even basic factual particulars in bail pleadings resulting in avoidable
adjournments and unnecessary wastage of judicial time.

46. Further, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Kaushal Singh v. State of
16
Rajashtan , recommended that all High Courts consider incorporating specific
rules mandating disclosure of criminal antecedents and involvement in other
criminal cases at the bail stage. The Court observed that such disclosure
requirements would ensure informed adjudication and prevent abuse of judicial
process, and accordingly directed circulation of the judgment to the Registrars

15
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1319
16
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1473

42

General of all High Courts for appropriate consideration. The relevant
paragraphs read thus:

(Emphasis Supplied)

47. As repeatedly observed by this Court, bail applications are examined at
multiple stages – from the trial Court to the High Court and ultimately this
Court – where courts are often constrained to take a prima facie view on
incomplete or selectively presented records. Non-disclosure of material aspects
such as criminal antecedents, prior bail rejections, duration of custody,
compliance with constitutional and statutory safeguards, and the progress of trial
may result in the unwarranted grant of bail, or conversely, the prolonged

43

incarceration of accused persons despite substantial custody having already been
undergone.

48. Thus, this Court is of the view that every petitioner or applicant seeking
bail, at any stage of proceedings, is under an obligation to disclose all material
particulars, including criminal antecedents and the existence of any coercive
processes such as issuance of non-bailable warrants, declaration as a proclaimed
offender, or similar proceedings, duly supported by an affidavit, so as to
promote uniformity, transparency and integrity in bail adjudication.

49. Additionally, in the interest of justice, the following illustrative disclosure
framework is provided, which is purely recommendatory in nature, evolved in
continuation of, and consonance with the principles laid down by this Court
concerning full and candid disclosure in bail proceedings. The framework is
intended to act as a facilitative guide, leaving it open to the concerned courts to
adopt, adapt, or refine the same in accordance with their procedural framework
and the exigencies of individual cases.

(A) CASE DETAILS

• FIR Number & Date
• Police Station, District and State
• Sections invoked
• Maximum punishment prescribed



44

(B) CUSTODY & PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE

• Date of Arrest
• Total period of custody undergone

(C) STATUS OF TRIAL

• Stage of proceedings (Investigation / Chargesheet / Cognizance / Framing
of charges / Trial)
• Total number of witnesses cited in the chargesheet
• Number of prosecution witnesses examined

(D) CRIMINAL ANTECEDENTS

• FIR No. & Police Station
• Sections
• Status (Pending / Acquitted/ Convicted)

(E) PREVIOUS BAIL APPLICATIONS

• Court

• Case No.
• Outcome of case

(F) COERCIVE PROCESSES

• Whether any Non-Bailable Warrant was issued
• Whether declared a proclaimed offender

50. The Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is directed to circulate a copy of this
judgment to the Registrar Generals of all the High Courts. The High Courts may
examine the feasibility of issuing appropriate administrative directions or
incorporating suitable provisions in their respective Rules, consistent with their

45

rule-making powers. A copy of this judgment shall also be circulated to the
District Judiciary for guidance.

CONCLUSION
51. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 09.04.2025 passed by the
High Court is set aside. The bail granted to Respondent No. 2 is cancelled.
Respondent No. 2 is directed to surrender before the jurisdictional Court within
a period of two weeks from today. In the event of failure to do so, the trial Court
shall take appropriate steps in accordance with law to secure his custody. It is
clarified that the trial Court shall proceed with the trial independently and
conclude the proceedings expeditiously in accordance with law.
52. With the aforesaid observations, suggestions and directions, this criminal
appeal is allowed.
53. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

………….…………………………J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]



………….…………………………J.
[R. MAHADEVAN]
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 11, 2026.