Chemplast Sanmar Limited & Ors. vs Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors.
- Court
- Appellate Tribunal For Electricity
IN THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR ELECTRICITY
(Appellate Jurisdiction)
IA NO.448 of 2026 IN DFR No.114 OF 2026
IA NO.472 of 2026 IN DFR No.121 OF 2026
IA NO.477 of 2026 IN DFR No.122 OF 2026
IA NO.482 of 2026 IN DFR No.123 OF 2026
IA NO.487 of 2026 IN DFR No.124 OF 2026
IA NO.542 of 2026 IN DFR No.139 OF 2026
IA NO.438 of 2026 IN DFR No.112 OF 2026
Dated: 27.05.2026
Present: Hon’ble Ms. Seema Gupta, Officiating Chairperson
Hon’ble Mr. Virender Bhat, Judicial Member
In the matter of:
IA No.448 of 2026 IN DFR No.114 of 2026
1. Chemplast Sanmar Limited
Through its Authorized Signatory Mr. T.C.A. Varadharajan
Having Registered Office at
No. 9, Cathedral Road, Chennai – 600 086
Email: [email protected]
2. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinlys Limited
Through its Authorized Signatory Mr. T.C.A. Varadharajan
Having Registered Office at
No. 9, Cathedral Road, Chennai – 600 086
Email: [email protected]
3. Sanmar Matrix Metals Limited
Through its Authorized Signatory Mr. T.C.A. Varadharajan
Having Registered Office at
No. 9, Cathedral Road, Chennai – 600 086
Email: [email protected] … Appellant(s)
_________________________________________________________________________________
IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 1 of 39
Versus
1. Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission
Through its Secretary
th
4 Floor, SIDCO Corporate Office Building,
Thiru-vi-ka Industrial Estate, Guindy,
Chennai – 600 032
Email: [email protected]
2. Tamil Nadu Power Distribution Corporation Limited
Formerly c/o Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation
Through its Chairman cum Managing Director
144, Anna Salai, Chennai – 600 002
Email: [email protected]
3. Tamil Nadu Transmission Corporation Limited
Through its Managing Director
144, Anna Salai, Chennai – 600 002
Email: [email protected] … Respondent (s)
Counsel on record for the Appellant(s) : Anand K. Ganesan
Swapna Seshadri
Aishwarya Subramani
Harsha V Rao
for App. 1, 2 & 3
Counsel on record for the Respondent(s) : Anusha Nagarajan
for Res. 2
IA No.472 of 2026 IN DFR No.121 of 2026
Tamil Nadu Spinning Mills Association
Through its Chief Advisor cum CEO
No.2, Karur Road, Modern Nagar,
Dindigul – 624 001, Tamil Nadu
Email: [email protected] … Appellant
Versus
1. Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission
Through its Secretary
_________________________________________________________________________________
IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 2 of 39
th
4 Floor, SIDCO Corporate Office Building
Guindy, Chennai – 600 032
Email: [email protected]
2. Tamil Nadu Power Distribution Corporation Limited
Formerly known as Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution
Corporation Limited
Through its Chairman cum Managing Director
th
10 Floor, 144, Anna Salai, Chennai – 600 002
Email: [email protected] … Respondent (s)
Counsel on record for the
Appellant(s)
: Darpan K. M.
Prashant Upadhyay
Easha Chandhok
Mahima Sadawat
Rajt Jonathan Shaw
Amrita Sharma
for App. 1
Counsel on record for the
Respondent(s)
: Anusha Nagarajan
for Res. 2
IA No.477 of 2026 IN DFR No.122 of 2026
Tamil Nadu Spinning Mills Association
Through its Chief Advisor cum CEO
No.2, Karur Road, Modern Nagar,
Dindigul – 624 001, Tamil Nadu
Email: [email protected] … Appellant
Versus
1. Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission
Through its Secretary
th
4 Floor, SIDCO Corporate Office Building
Guindy, Chennai – 600 032
Email: [email protected]
2. Tamil Nadu Power Distribution Corporation Limited
_________________________________________________________________________________
IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 3 of 39
Formerly known as Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution
Corporation Limited
Through its Chairman cum Managing Director
th
10 Floor, 144, Anna Salai, Chennai – 600 002
Email: [email protected] … Respondent (s)
Counsel on record for the Appellant(s) : Darpan K. M.
Prashant Upadhyay
Easha Chandhok
Mahima Sadawat
Rajt Jonathan Shaw
Amrita Sharma
for App. 1
Counsel on record for the Respondent(s) : Anusha Nagarajan
for Res. 2
IA No.482 of 2026 IN DFR No.123 of 2026
Tamil Nadu Spinning Mills Association
Through its Chief Advisor cum CEO
No.2, Karur Road, Modern Nagar,
Dindigul – 624 001, Tamil Nadu
Email: [email protected] … Appellant
Versus
1. Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission
Through its Secretary
th
4 Floor, SIDCO Corporate Office Building
Guindy, Chennai – 600 032
Email: [email protected]
2. Tamil Nadu Power Distribution Corporation Limited
Formerly known as Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution
Corporation Limited
Through its Chairman cum Managing Director
th
10 Floor, 144, Anna Salai, Chennai – 600 002
Email: [email protected] … Respondent (s)
_________________________________________________________________________________
IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 4 of 39
: Darpan K. M.
Counsel on record for the Appellant(s)
Prashant Upadhyay
Easha Chandhok
Mahima Sadawat
Rajt Jonathan Shaw
Amrita Sharma
for App. 1
Counsel on record for the
Respondent(s)
: Anusha Nagarajan
for Res. 2
IA No.487 of 2026 IN DFR No.124 of 2026
Tamil Nadu Spinning Mills Association
Through its Chief Advisor cum CEO
No.2, Karur Road, Modern Nagar,
Dindigul – 624 001, Tamil Nadu
Email: [email protected] … Appellant
Versus
1. Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission
Through its Secretary
th
4 Floor, SIDCO Corporate Office Building
Guindy, Chennai – 600 032
Email: [email protected]
2. Tamil Nadu Power Distribution Corporation Limited
Formerly known as Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution
Corporation Limited
Through its Chairman cum Managing Director
th
10 Floor, 144, Anna Salai, Chennai – 600 002
Email: [email protected] … Respondent (s)
Counsel for the Appellant(s) : Darpan K. M.
on record
Prashant Upadhyay
Easha Chandhok
Mahima Sadawat
Rajt Jonathan Shaw
Amrita Sharma
for App. 1
Counsel on record for the
Respondent(s)
: Anusha Nagarajan
for Res. 2
_________________________________________________________________________________
IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 5 of 39
IA No.542 of 2026 IN DFR No.139 of 2026
1. Madras Steel Re-Rollers Association
Through its Authorized Signatory Shiny T.C.
Having Registered Office at
nd
2 Floor Chokhani Towers,
26/6 Whites Road,
Royapettah Chennai - 600014
Email: [email protected]
2. Tulsyan NEC Limited
Through its Authorized Signatory Sanjay Agarwalla
Having Registered Office at
V Floor, 147 Greams Road
Chennai – 600 006
Email: [email protected] ; [email protected]
3. Chitrakoot Steel and Power Pvt. Ltd.
Through its Authorized Signatory Sanjay Agarwalla
Having Registered Office at
Apex Plaza, 3, Nungambakkam High Road
Chennai – 600 034
Email: [email protected] ; [email protected]
4. Arun Vyapar Udyog Limited
Through its Authorized Signatory K. Venkatraman
Having Registered Office at
th
5 Floor, Chokani Towers,
29/6 Whites Road, Royapettah,
Chennai – 600 014
Email: [email protected]
5. Arun Smelters Pvt. Ltd.
Through its Authorized Signatory K. Venkatraman
Having Registered Office at
th
5 Floor, Chokani Towers,
29/6 Whites Road, Royapettah,
Chennai – 600 014
Email: [email protected]
6. Janakiram Steel and Power Pvt. Ltd.
_________________________________________________________________________________
IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 6 of 39
Through its Authorized Signatory M Shanmugam
Having Registered Office at
rd
16/155, “AA” Block, 3 Avenue,
Anna Nagar, Chennai – 600040
Email: [email protected] ;
[email protected]
7. JR Metal Chennai Ltd.
Through its Authorized Signatory M Shanmugam
Having Registered Office at
rd
16/155, “AA” Block, 3 Avenue,
Anna Nagar, Chennai – 600040
Email: [email protected] ;
[email protected]
8. Jeppiaar Furnace and Steels Pvt. Ltd.
Through its Authorized Signatory Mr. S. Habibur Rahman
Having Registered Office at
M/s. Jeppiaar Furnace and Steels Pvt. Ltd.
158, Kunnavakkam Village, Panruti Post,
Kancheepuram, District – 631 604, Tamil Nadu
Email: [email protected]
9. GBR Metals Pvt. Ltd.
Through its Authorized Signatory Venkatesh Rathi
Having Registered Office at
GBR Metals Pvt Ltd, 4, Ramanan Road,
Chennai – 600079
Email: [email protected]
[email protected]
10. Meenakshi Udyog India Pvt. Ltd.
Through its Authorized Signatory Meenakshi Udyog
Having Registered Office at
Meenakshi Udyog (India) Pvt. Ltd.
nd
No.3, 2 Floor, Alsa Mall,
Montieth Road, Egmore,
Chennai – 600008
Email: [email protected]
[email protected]
_________________________________________________________________________________
IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 7 of 39
11. Mil Steel and Power Pvt. Ltd. (Previously known as
Kanishk Ferrous & Energy Ltd)
Through its Authorized Signatory Mr. Ashutosh Goenka
Having Registered Office at
th
No. 29/16, 4 Floor Whites Road,
Royapettah, Chennai – 600014
Email: [email protected]
12. Sakthi Steel Industries Ltd.
Through its Authorized Signatory V. Vaigunthan
Having Registered Office at
M/s. Sakthi Steel Industries Ltd.
nd
No.18, loganathan Nagar, 2 Street Choolaimadu,
Chennai – 600094
Email: [email protected]
[email protected]
13. Kaaveri Steels (I) Pvt. Ltd.
Through its Authorized Signatory B. Jamaludeen
Having Registered Office at
7/1 & 4/3, Komal Road, Maruthur Village,
Therizhandur, Kuttalam,
Mayiladuthurai – 609808
Email: [email protected]
[email protected]
14. SL Lumax Ltd.
Through its Authorized Signatory Dongha Kim
Having Registered Office at
G-15, SIPCOT Industrial Park, Irungattukottai,
Sriperumbudur, Kancheepuram – 602117
Email: [email protected]
15. Arise Industries and Agency Pvt. Ltd.
Through its Authorized Signatory Deepak Kothari
Having Registered Office at
SF. No. 22/1A, Musiri Thurayur Main Road,
Jambunathpuram (PO), Musiri (TK)
Trichy – 621 205
Email: [email protected] ;
[email protected] ; [email protected]
_________________________________________________________________________________
IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 8 of 39
16. Kanishk Steel Industries Private Limited
Through its Authorized Signatory Ashok Bohra
Having Registered Office at
Old No. 4, New No. 7, Thiru Vi Ka,
rd
3 Street, Royapettah High Road,
Mylapore, Chennai – 600 004
Email: [email protected] ;
[email protected]
17. Kanishk Metals Recycling Private Limited
Through its Authorized Signatory Ashok Bohra
Having Registered Office at
Old No. 4, New No. 7, Thiru Vi Ka,
rd
3 Street, Royapettah High Road,
Mylapore, Chennai – 600 004
Email: [email protected] ;
[email protected]
18. Vaibhav Merchantile Limited
Through its Authorized Signatory Dinesh Gour P
Having Registered Office at
B-50/E, SIPCOT
Industrial Complex, Gummidipoondi,
Thiruvallur Dist. – 601 201
Email: [email protected]
[email protected]
19. K.L. Concast Private Limited
Through its Authorized Signatory P. Yugandhar
Having Registered Office at
No. 147/1, Periyaobulapuram Village,
Madharapakkam Road, Gummidipoondi – 601201,
Thiruvallur Dist, Tamilnadu – 601201
Email: [email protected]
20. RBA Exports
Through its Authorized Signatory
S. Balasubramanian, General Manager
Having Registered Office at
Plot No. 56-61, EPIP, SIPCOT,
Gummidipooni – 601 201
Email: [email protected]
_________________________________________________________________________________
IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 9 of 39
21. Noble Tech Industries Private Limited
Through its Authorized Signatory
Ravish Kumar, Assistant Manager – Litigation,
Having Registered Office at:
1102, Sankalp Iconic Tower,
Opp. Vikramnagar, Bopal Ambli Road, Bodakdev,
Ahmedabad City, Ahmedabad, 380054, Gujarat.
th
Corporate Address – 6 Floor, Tower A, Global
Business Park, Sector 26, Gurugram,
Haryana 122002
Email: [email protected] … Appellant(s)
Versus
1. Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission
Through its Secretary
th
4 Floor, SIDCO Corporate Office Building
Thiru-vi-ka Industrial Estate,
Guindy, Chennai – 600 032
Email: [email protected]
2. Tamil Nadu Power Distribution Corporation Limited
Formerly C/o Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution
Corporation
Through its Chairman cum Managing Director
144, Anna Salai, Chennai – 600 002
Email: [email protected]
3. Tamil Nadu Power Transmission Corporation Limited
Through its Managing Director
144, Anna Salai, Chennai – 600 002
Email: [email protected] … Respondent (s)
Counsel on record for the Appellant(s) :
Anand K. Ganesan
for App. 1 to 21
Counsel on record for the Respondent(s) :
Anusha Nagarajan
for Res. 2
_________________________________________________________________________________
IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 10 of 39
IA No.438 of 2026 IN DFR No.112 of 2026
The India Cements Limited
Through its Authorized Signatory, Mr. S. Vijayaraghavan
Coromandel Towers, 93,
Santhome High Road, Karpagam Avenue,
R.A. Puram, Chennai – 600028
Email: [email protected] … Appellant
Versus
1. Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission
Through its Secretary, Dr. C. Veermani
th
4 Floor, SIDCO Corporate Office Building,
Thiru-vi-ka Industrial Estate,
Guindy, Chennai – 600 032
Email: [email protected]
2. Tamil Nadu Power Distribution Corporation Limited
(Formerly known as Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution
Corporation Limited)
Through its Chairman cum Managing Director,
Dr. J. Radhakrishnan
144, Anna Salai, Chennai – 600 002
Email: [email protected] … Respondent (s)
Counsel on record for the
Appellant(s)
: Dushyant Manocha
Mrinalini Mishra
Priyanka Prasanth
Kashish Chhabra
Srijesh Kumar Singh
Mukul Arya
Sabeeh Akhter
Anannya Ghosh
Doel Bose for App. 1
Counsel on record for the
Respondent(s)
: Anusha Nagarajan for Res. 2
_________________________________________________________________________________
IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 11 of 39
O R D E R
PER HON’BLE MR. VIRENDER BHAT, JUDICIAL MEMBER
1. These applications under consideration in this order have been filed
by the appellants along with the appeals seeking condonation of delay in
filing the appeals.
2. The challenge in these appeals is to the 04 tariff orders passed by
st
the 1 respondent Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission (herein
after referred to as the Commission) i.e. 2012 Retail Tariff Order, 2012
Transmission Tariff Order, 2013 Retail Tariff Order and 2017 Retail Tariff
Order. The appellants are High Tension Open Access Captive Power
nd
Generators/consumers of the 2 respondent Tamil Nadu Power
Distribution Corporation Limited (in short TNPDCL formerly known as
Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited). The details
of the appellants, orders of the Commission assailed therein and the
extent of delay in filing the appeals are given in the following table: -
S.
No
.
DFR
No.
Parties IA No. for
Condona-
tion of
Delay
Impugned Orders Date of
Total
Dela
y (in
days)
1. 112/
2026
Impugned
Order
India Cements
IA.438/2026 Retail Tariff Order
30.3.2012
5054
Ltd. v. TNERC
No.1/2012
& Ors.
Transmission Tariff
30.3.2012 5054
Order No.2/2012
_________________________________________________________________________________
IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 12 of 39
Retail Tariff Order-
20.6.2013 4607
TP No.1/2013
TP No.1/2017 11.8.2017 3094
2. 114/
2026
Chemplast
Sanmar Ltd. &
Ors. v. TNERC
IA.448/2026 Retail Tariff Order
30.3.2012 5055
No.1/2012
Transmission Tariff
30.3.2012 5055
& Ors.
Order No.2/2012
Retail Tariff Order
20.6.2013 4608
– TP No.1/2013
TP No.1/2017 11.8.2017 3095
3. 121/
2026
Tamil Nadu
Spinning Mills
Ass. v. TNERC
IA.472/2026 TP No.1/2013 20.6.2013 4610
& Anr.
4. 122/
2026
Tamil Nadu
Spinning Mills
Ass. v. TNERC
IA.477/2026 TP No.1/2017 11.8.2017 3097
& Anr.
5. 123/
2026
Tamil Nadu
Spinning Mills
Ass. v. TNERC
IA.482/2026 Tariff Order
30.3.2012 5057
No.1/2012
& Anr.
6. 124/
2026
Tamil Nadu
Spinning Mills
Ass. v. TNERC
IA.487/2026 Tariff Order
30.3.2012 5057
No.1/2012
7. 139/
2026
Madras Steel
IA.542/2026 Retail Tariff Order
30.3.2012 5100
Re-Rollers
Ass. & Ors. v.
TNERC & Anr.
No.1/2012
Transmission Tariff
30.3.2012 5100
Order No.2/2012
Retail Tariff Order
20.6.2013 4623
– TP No.1/2013
TP No.1/2017 11.8.2017 3110
3. Brief conspectus of the facts leading to the filing of these appeals,
relevant for the disposal of these applications, is that concept of Deemed
Demand Charges was evolved by the Commission in Tamil Nadu
Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for
Determination of Tariff) Regulations, 2005 and was reiterated in the Tariff
Order No.2 of 2006 issued by the Commission on 15.05.2006. Thus, the
_________________________________________________________________________________
IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 13 of 39
said Order No.2 of 2006 provided the benefit of Deemed Demand
Charges (in short “DDC") to the High-Tension Captive Consumers of non-
renewable energy using open access facility.
4. Subsequently, the Commission passed 2012 Retail Tariff Order,
2012 Transmission Tariff Order and 2013 Retail Tariff Order in the years
2012-13 which do not contain anything specifically with regards to the
continuation of "Deemed Demand Charges" to High Tension Open
Access Captive Power Generators/Consumers. A circular dated
29.07.2013 came to be issued by the Chief Financial Controller/Revenue,
TANGEDCO to all the Superintending Engineers of the Distribution
Circles, the subject of which is “ Tariff Order No.1 of 2013 dt. 20.06.2013
– Grid Availability Charges – Deemed demand – reg .”. After extracting
paragraph nos.5.66, 5.67 and 5.68 of the 2013 Tariff Order, the circular
mentions as under: -
“………
4. Further, in the order No.2 dated 15.05.2006, various
charges applicable to all OA customers covered
under TNERC’s Intra State Open Access Regulation
2005 has been issued. The charges included
“Deemed Demand” charges also. In the latest Tariff
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IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 14 of 39
Order No.1 dated 20.06.2013, similar charges
except “Deemed Demand” has been ordered.
5. From the above, it could be clearly observed that the
concept of ‘Deemed Demand’ has not been
envisaged in the Tariff Order dated 20.06.2013 in
T.P. No.1 of 2013. Hence, the applicable demand
charges for Open Access consumers shall be
collected without applying “Deemed Demand”
concept.
6. Therefore, all the superintending Engineers are
requested to take necessary action accordingly.”
5. It is evident that the circular was issued on the understanding that
the concept of Deemed Demand Charges envisaged in the Order No.2 of
2006 was replaced by the concept of Billable Demand in 2013 Retail Tariff
Order and thus, made it clear that the applicable demand charges for open
access consumers shall be calculated without applying “Deemed
Demand” concept.
6. It appears that, according to the appellants, there was nothing in the
2012 Retail Tariff Order/Transmission Tariff Order as well as 2013 Retail
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IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 15 of 39
Tariff Order to suggest that Deemed Demand concept has been
withdrawn. The appellants have been of the understanding that the
benefit of Deemed Demand Charges to HT Open Access Captive Power
Generators/Consumers granted vide order no.2 of 2006 was never
withdrawn under any of the subsequent tariff orders and such benefit
could be withdrawn only upon following procedure contemplated for
change in tariff policy and not by an administrative communication like the
above referred circular dated 29.07.2013. Accordingly, the appellants
approached the Hon’ble Madras High Court by way of various writ
petitions seeking issuance of a Writ of Certiorari/Mandamus thereby
quashing the said circular dated 29.07.2013. In some of the writ petitions,
further relief was sought to forebear the TANGEDCO from demanding or
levying demand charges without applying “Deemed Demand” concept as
envisaged in Tariff Order No.2 of 2006 dated 15.05.2006 as well as for
quashing of the levy of demand charges and for refund of the demand
charges paid pursuant to bills raised by TANGEDCO in terms of the said
circular dated 29.07.2013.
7. The writ petitions were allowed by the Single Bench of the High
Court vide common order dated 14.09.2018 thereby quashing the
impugned circular dated 29.07.2013.
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IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 16 of 39
8. The said judgment of the learned single judge of the High Court was
nd
assailed by the 2 respondent herein before the Division Bench of the
High Court by way of writ appeal no.947/2019 and batch. The Division
Bench allowed the writ appeals vide common judgment dated 12.12.2025
thereby setting aside the common order dated 14.09.2018 of the learned
single judge. Consequently, the writ petitions filed by the appellants
herein stood dismissed.
9. The Division Bench of the High Court, in the said judgment dated
12.12.2025, rejected the contention of the appellants that Tariff Order
No.2 of 2006 is still in force and the tariff fixed under 2013 Tariff Order is
not applicable to them. It held that the Tariff Order No.2 of 2006 had been
explicitly superseded by the 2012 Tariff Order which came into effect from
01.04.2012 and remained in force for more than a year by which time Tariff
Order of 2013 came to be passed by the Commission thereby rationalizing
new tariff for High Tension Supply Consumers with “Billable Charges” in
place of "Deemed Demand Charges". It was further held that impugned
circular dated 29.07.2013 is the instruction of Finance Controller to the
Regional Superintendents to follow the Tariff Order of 2013, and therefore,
without challenging the Tariff Order of 2013 before the appellate authority,
writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution only questioning
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IA Nos.448,472,477,482,487,542 & 438 of 2026
In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 17 of 39
the consequential letter addressed to the subordinates is not
maintainable.
10. Against the said common judgment of the Division Bench of the High
Court dated 12.12.2025, the appellants herein approached Hon’ble
Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petitions which were dismissed
vide order dated 09.03.2026. Paragraphs 4 & 5 of the said order of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court are material and are extracted hereinbelow: -
“4. After some arguments, learned counsel for the
petitioners pray to withdraw these petitions with liberty
to challenge the Tariff Order before the appropriate
forum by filing appeal(s).
5. In such circumstances, we deem it appropriate to
dismiss these petitions as withdrawn with liberty as
prayed for. All contentions including one regarding
maintainability of the appeal(s) are kept open to be
raised before the appropriate forum.”
11. It is in these circumstances that the appellants approached this
Tribunal by way of the captioned appeals.
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In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 18 of 39
12. We have heard Mr. P. Chidambaram, learned senior counsel and
Mr. B.P. Patil, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants as well as Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel
nd
and Mr. P. Wilson, learned senior counsel on behalf of the 2 respondent
TNPDCL on the aspect of delay in filing these appeals.
13. The plea of condonation of delay in filing the appeals is primarily
premised on Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was vehemently
argued by learned senior counsels appearing for the appellants that the
case of the appellants is covered under section 14(1) of the Limitation Act
as they had no occasion to challenge the tariff orders until the judgment
dated 12.12.2025 was delivered by the Division Bench of the Hon’ble High
Court in writ appeals. It is argued that in the absence of specific withdrawal
of "Deemed Demand Charges", the appellants bonafidely challenged the
circular dated 29.07.2013 before the High Court by way of the writ
petitions. It is, further, argued that since similar matter with regards to
"Deemed Demand Charges" was being prosecuted in good faith in these
writ petitions, the period up to 12.12.2025 i.e. the date of judgment
delivered by the Division Bench of the High Court ought to be excluded.
It is the submission of the learned senior counsels that prior to the Division
Bench judgment, there were no pleadings and no judicial/quasi-judicial
order to the effect that 2013 Retail Tariff Order, by introduction of “Billable
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In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 19 of 39
Demand” and “rationalization” of HT Sub-Categories, had withdrawn the
"Deemed Demand Charges" and the Division Bench judgment being the
first and only instrument that identified the implied withdrawal of "Deemed
Demand Charges" vide 2013 Retail Tariff Order, the cause of action for
the appellants to challenge the said Tariff Orders crystalized only on
12.12.2025. It is argued that till 12.12.2025, the position was that none of
the Tariff Orders had withdrawn "Deemed Demand Charges" and the
nd
demand of 2 respondent for such charges was unlawful, and therefore,
there was no occasion for the appellants to challenge any Tariff Order. It
is submitted that in fact, no such challenge would have been possible at
that time before this Tribunal in view of the position of law as it stood then
that "Deemed Demand Charges" were still continuing and had not been
expressly withdrawn.
14. The learned senior counsels also referred to the order dated
09.03.2026 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petitions
filed by the appellants whereby liberty was given to the appellants to
challenge the Tariff Orders before appropriate forum by filing appeals. It
is submitted that the Supreme Court granted such liberty to the appellants
being aware about the Tariff Orders passed between the years 2012 and
2017. The submission is that the Supreme Court could not have directed
the appellants to challenge the Tariff Orders in the appropriate forum in
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case the Tariff Orders were unchallengeable. It is submitted that the
expression “all contentions including one regarding maintainability of the
appeals are kept open to be raised before the appropriate forum” used in
the order by the Hon'ble Supreme Court cannot be treated as an adverse
signal but only a direction to this Tribunal to decide the question and not
to use it as a threshold barrier to the admission of the appeals. It is
submitted that rejection of the appeals on the aspect of limitation would
render the liberty granted by the Supreme Court as nugatory.
15. Thus, it is the submission of the learned senior counsels that the
appellants have made out sufficient grounds for condonation of delay in
filing the appeals and therefore, the applications deserve to be allowed.
nd
16. On behalf of the 2 respondent, it is submitted by the learned
senior counsels that bare perusal of 2012 Tariff Orders as well as 2013
Retail Tariff Order makes it clear that the comments of the stakeholders
on continuation of Deemed Demand benefit were noted but deliberately
and consciously not accepted by the Commission which is clearly
indicative of the fact that "Deemed Demand Charges" concept was
discontinued. It is further pointed out that any confusion in this regard was
cleared in the 2017 Tariff Order in which it was specifically stated that
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"Deemed Demand Charges" have been withdrawn by 2012 Transmission
Tariff Order itself.
17. The learned senior counsels would further argue that the appellants
have failed to make out any case under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
It is submitted that in writ proceedings before the High Court, appellants
had challenged the circular dated 29.07.2013, whereas in the instant
appeals, they have assailed the Tariff Orders and therefore, the matter in
issue in the two proceedings cannot be said to be identical. It is argued
that under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, the relief sought in the
previous proceedings must be similar as the relief sought in the
subsequent proceedings which is filed beyond the period of limitation. It is
also argued that in order to be entitled to the benefit under Section 14, it
is to be shown that the court in which the previous proceedings were being
prosecuted was unable to entertain the proceedings due to defect in
jurisdiction, which is not the case herein as both the Single Bench as well
as the Division Bench of the High Court decided the issue raised by the
appellants on merits.
18. As regards to the liberty granted to the appellants by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court to approach this Tribunal, it is submitted by the learned
senior counsels that the objections on the ground of limitation are also
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part of objection to the maintainability of the appeals, and therefore, it
cannot be said that the limitation aspect has not been left open by Hon'ble
Supreme Court.
Our Analysis:
19. The contentions of the parties on these applications and the rival
submissions made by the learned senior counsels for the parties revolve
around the interpretation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act which is
extracted hereinbelow: -
“14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court
without jurisdiction.—(1) In computing the period of
limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff
has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil
proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of
appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be
excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same
matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court
which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like
nature, is unable to entertain it.
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(2) In computing the period of limitation for any
application, the time during which the applicant has
been prosecuting with due diligence another civil
proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of
appeal or revision, against the same party for the same
relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is
prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of
jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to
entertain it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of
Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in
relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted
by the court under rule 1 of that Order, where such
permission is granted on the ground that the first suit
must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the
court or other cause of a like nature.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
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(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil
proceeding was pending, the day on which that
proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended
shall both be counted;
(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be
deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;
(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be
deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of
jurisdiction.”
20. Perusal of this legal provision would reveal that it allows a litigant to
exclude the time spent pursuing previous legal proceedings bonafidely
before a court that lacked jurisdiction. What this Section ensures is that
bonafide and genuine litigants are not penalized for technical errors or
incorrect choice of forum, provided that the previous proceedings were
prosecuted with due diligence. To claim the benefit on Section 14, the
affected party must specify to the court that following essential conditions
exist: -
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(a) The previous proceedings were against the same
defendants/parties and related to the same cause of action or
relief;
(b) The applicant was actively pursuing the previous case with
reasonable care and due diligence;
(c) The previous case was filed and pursued under the genuine and
honest belief that the court had the jurisdiction to entertain and
decide it; and
(d) The previous court was unable to entertain the suit due to lack of
jurisdiction or other cause of like nature.
21. On this aspect, we find the following observations of the Supreme
Court in Union of India and Ors v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. and Anr.
(2004) 3 SCC 458 very pertinent and are extracted hereinbelow: -
“ 14. In the submission of Mr Malhotra, placing reliance
on CST v. Parson Tools and Plants to attract the
applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the
following requirements must be specified: (SCC p. 25,
para 6)
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"6. (1) both the prior and subsequent proceedings
are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same
party;
(2) the prior proceedings had been prosecuted with
due diligence and a in good faith;
(3) the failure of the prior proceedings was due to
a defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like
nature;
(4) both the proceedings are proceedings in a
court."
In the submission of the learned Senior Counsel, filing
of civil writ petition claiming money relief cannot be said
to be a proceeding instituted in good faith and secondly,
dismissal of writ petition on the ground that it was not
an appropriate remedy for seeking money relief cannot
be said to be "defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a
like nature" within the meaning of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act. It is true that the writ petition was not
dismissed by the High Court on the ground of defect of
jurisdiction. However, Section 14 of the Limitation Act is
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In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 27 of 39
wide in its application, inasmuch as it is not confined in
its applicability only to cases of defect of jurisdiction but
it is applicable also to cases where the prior
proceedings have failed on account of other causes of
like nature. The expression "other cause of like nature"
came up for the consideration of this Court in Roshanlal
Kuthalia v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberoi and it was held
that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide enough to
cover such cases where the defects are not merely
jurisdictional strictly so called but others more or less
neighbours to such deficiencies. Any circumstance,
legal or factual, which inhibits entertainment or
consideration by the court of the dispute on the merits
comes within the scope of the section and a liberal
touch must inform the interpretation of the Limitation Act
which deprives the remedy of one who has a right. ”
22. In a subsequent case titled Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v.
Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department (2008) 7 SCC 169, the
Supreme Court extensively discussed and summarized the applicability of
Section 14 and it was held: -
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"21. Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion
of time of proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction.
On analysis of the said section, it becomes evident that the
following conditions must be satisfied before Section 14 can be
pressed into service:
(1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil
proceedings prosecuted by the same party;
(2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due
diligence and in good faith;
(3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect
of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature;
(4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must
relate to the same matter in issue; and
(5) Both the proceedings are in a court."
23. When we analyze the case of the appellants herein in the light of the
legal principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above
referred judgments, we feel of the considered opinion that the appellants
are disentitled to claim benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The
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reasons for reaching such a conclusion are not far to seek, which we
explain hereinbelow.
24. In 2006 Tariff Orders, the Commission had carved out a separate
head of “Grid Availability Charges” under which the concept "Deemed
Demand Charges" was introduced. However, in the subsequent Tariff
Orders passed in the year 2012, there was no section on “Grid Availability
Charges” under which head the concept of "Deemed Demand Charges"
had been evolved in 2006 Tariff Order. The comments of stakeholders
for continuation of "Deemed Demand " were noted but no provision in the
same was made in the Tariff Order. The Tariff Orders specified that
demand charges were payable on the basis of Billing Demand i.e. the
demand recorded in the particular month or 90% of sanctioned demand.
These facts clearly indicate that the concept of "Deemed Demand
Charges" was discontinued in 2012 Tariff Order. Similarly, during the
hearings before passing of 2013 Tariff Orders also, the stakeholders had
specifically requested for continuation of "Deemed Demand" concept
which was not accepted by the Commission. Therefore, in the tariff
schedule of the said order Billing Demand was provided on the basis of
which "Demand Charges" were payable by open access consumers being
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the demand recorded in a particular month or 90% of the sanctioned
demand.
25. Further, bare perusal of the circular dated 29.07.2013 issued by
nd
Chief Financial Controller/Revenue of the 2 respondent would reveal
that it is founded upon the Commission’s retail Tariff Orders 2013 dated
20.06.2013 and merely clarifies that the concept of "Deemed Demand
Charges" is not envisaged in the said order. It is not an independent
circular whereby the concept of "Deemed Demand Charges" was
nd
withdrawn by the 2 respondent but only a clarificatory circular in order to
clear any confusion in the minds of the stakeholders with regards to
"Deemed Demand Charges". Therefore, we are unable to discern the
wisdom of the appellants to assail this circular dated 29.07.2013 in the
Hon'ble High Court by way of writ petitions instead of impugning the 2013
Tariff Orders before the appropriate forum i.e. this Tribunal, on the basis
of which the said circular had been issued. In view of such conduct of the
appellants, we are constrained to note that they have shown total lack of
bonafide and due diligence in assailing the circular dated 29.07.2013
before the High Court by way of the writ petitions.
26. Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act lays emphasis on due diligence
and good faith. When a party appears to have deliberately chosen a
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In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 31 of 39
wrong forum instead of approaching the right forum at the first possible
opportunity, the party cannot be understood to have acted in good faith
and with due diligence.
27. Under Section 2(h) of the Limitation Act, nothing shall be deemed to
be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. The
facts narrated hereinabove do not in any manner indicate good faith on
the part of the appellants in approaching the High Court by way of the writ
petitions.
28. Then comes the 2017 Retail Tariff Order which contained clause
2.11.14 as under: -
“2.11.14 IT is clarified that the Commission took a
conscious and reasoned decision to withdraw the
Deemed Demand benefit, vide its Transmission Tariff
Order No.2 of 2012 dated March 30, 2012 as there
are no appeals on this Order on this issue. The
consumers can always reduce their Contract
Demand. The Commission does not find any
justification for revisiting this issue.”
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In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 32 of 39
29. Evidently, therefore, any confusion in the minds of the appellants
with regards to the discontinuation or otherwise of "Deemed Demand
Charges" was cleared in the said Tariff Orders of 2017. The 2017 Tariff
Orders did not leave any room for ambiguity, whatsoever, in this regard
and indicated in clear terms that the concept of "Deemed Demand
Charges" stood withdrawn vide Transmission Tariff Orders 2012 dated
30.03.2012. The appellants ought to have withdrawn the writ petitions at
that very juncture from the High Court and ought to have approached this
Tribunal by way of appeals assailing the Tariff Orders of 2012, 2013 and
2017. That having not been done, it is difficult to say that the appellants
were acting in good faith and with due diligence. It is true, as contended
on behalf of the appellants that 2017 Tariff Orders does not decide the
issue of "Deemed Demand Charges" and only states that the
Commission, vide Tariff Orders No.2 of 2012 (Transmission Order) has
withdrawn the "Deemed Demand Charges" concept. However, this was
enough for the appellants to accept the position that the "Deemed
Demand Charges" have been withdrawn vide 2012 Tariff Orders and to
commence the appropriate legal proceedings in this regard in the
appropriate forum. However, instead of doing so, the appellants
continued with the writ petitions in the High Court probably for the reason
that an interim order had been passed in their favour in the writ petitions.
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30. Considering these overall facts and circumstances, we are unable
to countenance the submissions on behalf of the appellants that the cause
of action for them to assail the Tariff Orders crystalized on 12.12.2025
only when the writ appeals were allowed by the Division Bench of the High
Court. It is fallacious on the part of the appellants to state that the Division
Bench judgment is the first and only instrument that identifies the
withdrawal of "Deemed Demand” benefit by way of Tariff Orders of 2012
and 2013.
31. It has been argued on behalf of the appellants that to deny
admission of the appeals on the ground of limitation would render the
liberty granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in order dated 09.03.2026
nugatory as such liberty was granted being aware about the Tariff Orders
passed by the Commission from the year 2012-2017. We do not feel
impressed by these arguments and have been noted only to be rejected.
We have already extracted the said order dated 09.03.2026 passed by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition of the appellants in
paragraph no.8 hereinabove. Liberty has been given to the appellants to
challenge the Tariff Orders before the appropriate forum i.e. this Tribunal
by filing appeals while leaving all contentions including one regarding
maintainability of the appeals open to be raised before this Tribunal.
There can be no gainsaying that the aspect of maintainability includes
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In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 34 of 39
inherent statutory bar to the legal proceedings which would, in turn,
include bar under the Limitation Act, 1963. On this aspect, we find it
profitable to refer to the following observations of the High Court of
Bombay in Deepak Manaklal Katariay v. Ashok Motilal Katariya and
Others, writ petition No.2315 of 2015 decided on 29.11.2024: -
“13. Maintainability pertains to whether a legal
proceeding is competent to be entertained, factoring in
procedural and substantive requirements.
Maintainability relates to whether the suit is
procedurally valid and not inherently barred. A case
dismissed for lack of maintainability does not
necessarily negate the existence of Jurisdiction, as it
may only reflect procedural infirmities. Unlike
jurisdiction, maintainability addresses preliminary
objections arising from procedural non-compliance or
statutory bars rather than the inherent authority of the
court. Examples of factors affecting maintainability
include:
(i) Bar under Statutes: Prohibitions on the
initiation of proceedings due to legislative provisions
(e.g., res judicata under Section 11 of CPC).
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In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 35 of 39
(ii) Limitation Period: Filing of proceedings after
the prescribed period under the Limitation Act, 1963.
(iii) Locus Standi: The legal standing of the
petitioner to institute proceedings.
14. Jurisdiction derives its authority from statutes
conferring power on the court. Maintainability arises
from procedural and statutory compliance requirements
for initiating proceedings. Lack of jurisdiction results in
the nullity of proceedings, as the court inherently lacks
authority to adjudicate. Non-compliance with
maintainability bars leads to dismissal without deciding
the merits of the case but does not affect the court's
inherent power.
15. Thus, while jurisdiction focuses on the court's
authority, maintainability examines the legal validity of
the proceedings.”
32. In the case titled Arifa and Others v. Abhiman Apartment Co
Operative Housing Society Limited and Others (2025) 10 SCC 700, the
issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the liberty granted
to file a fresh suit by the Hon'ble Supreme Court would enable the party
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In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 36 of 39
to revive a cause of action and save limitation and it was observed as
under: -
“11. We perfectly agree with the findings in the
impugned judgment regarding limitation and res
judicata and cannot but observe that the liberty granted
by the High Court in the second appeal was akin to
flogging a dead horse; which cannot give a fresh lease
of life to either the cause of action; to save limitation or
the grounds on which the declaration and consequential
relief has been prayed for in the present suit; which
grounds were already adjudicated in the earlier suit and
found against the plaintiff by three courts.”
33. Therefore, it would be preposterous to say that the liberty granted
by the Supreme Court to the appellant to approach this Tribunal entitles
them to steer clear of the bar of limitation and would prevent this Tribunal
in entertaining and deciding the objections of limitation raised by the
respondent No.2. Once the Supreme Court kept open the issue of
maintainability to be raised before this Tribunal, it is implicit therein that
this Tribunal has to consider all the objections to the maintainability of the
appeals including the bar of limitation.
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Conclusion: -
34. Having regard to the above narrated facts and circumstances in
which these appeals came to be filed by the appellants, we are of the
opinion that the appellants are not entitled to benefit under Section 14 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 as they have not been acting in good faith and
with due diligence throughout. The situation appearing in this case
demonstrates absence of good faith and diligence of great magnitude on
the part of the appellants and therefore, law should not come to the rescue
of such a litigant. The appellants have exhibited total lack of diligence in
pursuing the reliefs sought for in these appeals. Firstly, in the year 2013,
they chose to impugn the circular dated 29.07.2013 by way of writ petition
in the Hon'ble High Court which had been issued on the basis of 2012
Tariff Order, instead of assailing the said Tariff Order before this Tribunal.
Then again, they exhibited utmost lack of diligence and bonafide in the
year 2017 after the 2017 Tariff Order was passed which clarified that
"Deemed Demand Charges" concept has been done away with vide 2012
Tariff Order but still they chose not to assail the Tariff Orders before this
Tribunal and continued with the writ petitions before the Hon’ble High
Court. The delay in filing these appeals is enormous which has remained
to be explained satisfactorily by the appellants and thus cannot be
condoned.
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In DFR Nos.114,121,122,123,124,139 &112 of 2026 Page 38 of 39
35. Hence, the applications are found to be devoid of any force and are
accordingly dismissed.
DFR No.114 OF 2026 & IA No. 451 OF 2026 & IA No. 566 OF 2026 &
IA No. 450 OF 2026 & IA No. 449 OF 2026
DFR No.121 OF 2026 & IA No. 476 OF 2026 & IA No. 475 OF 2026 &
IA No. 474 OF 2026 & IA No. 473 OF 2026
DFR No.122 OF 2026 & IA No. 481 OF 2026 & IA No. 480 OF 2026 &
IA No. 479 OF 2026 & IA No. 478 OF 2026
DFR No.123 OF 2026 & IA No. 486 OF 2026 & IA No. 485 OF 2026 &
IA No. 484 OF 2026 & IA No. 483 OF 2026
DFR No.124 OF 2026 & IA No. 491 OF 2026 & IA No. 490 OF 2026 &
IA No. 489 OF 2026 & IA No. 488 OF 2026
DFR No.139 OF 2026 & IA No. 546 OF 2026 & IA No. 545 OF 2026 &
IA No. 544 OF 2026 & IA No. 543 OF 2026
DFR No.112 OF 2026 & IA No. 441 OF 2026 & IA No. 440 OF 2026 &
IA No. 439 OF 2026
36. In view of the dismissal of the applications for condonation of delay,
these appeals are found to be barred by limitation and are dismissed as
such. All other applications filed along with the appeals also stand
disposed of.
th
Pronounced in the open court on this the 27 day of May, 2026.
(Virender Bhat)
Judicial Member
(Seema Gupta)
Officiating Chairperson
✓
REPORTABLE / NON-REPORATBLE
tp
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