K.Samundeeswari vs The Director General of Police
- Court
- Madras High Court
2026:MHC:4383
WP No. 5692 of 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 26-10-2026
CORAM
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE C.KUMARAPPAN
WP No. 5692 of 2022
CNR:{HCMA010333932022}
K.Samundeeswari
..Petitioner(s)
Vs
1. The Director General of Police
Dr.Radhakrishnan Salai,
Chennai.
2. The Deputy Inspector General of Police
Salem Range, Salem.
3. The Superintendent of Police
Namakkal District, Namakkal.
..Respondent(s)
Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying
to issue a Writ of Mandamus, to direct the respondents to promote the Petitioner
as Inspectors of Police with effect from the date on which the Petitioners juniors
were promoted.
For Petitioner(s): Mr.S.Chellapandian
For Respondent(s): Mr.K.K.Ram Siddhartha,
Additional Government Pleader
ORDER
This Writ Petition has been filed seeking issuance of a Writ of
Mandamus, directing the respondents to promote the petitioner as Inspector of
Police with effect from the date on which her juniors were promoted.
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2. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner
was recruited as Grade-I Constable on 23.02.1981. After recruitment, the
selected candidates were sent for training in three batches, and their seniority
was fixed based on the marks secured by them in the examination. It is the
further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that one Yashothai, a
similarly placed person, had approached this Court by filing W.P.No.451 of
2008, seeking consideration of her representation. Pursuant to the directions
issued by this Court, the seniority was revised. As a result of such revision, the
petitioner's juniors moved up the seniority ladder and were placed above the
petitioner. When similarly placed persons approached this Court by filing
W.P(MD).No.10989 of 2010, seeking revision of seniority and consequential
promotion, this Court granted them such relief, and the Writ Appeal filed by the
Department was also dismissed. Therefore, it is the contention of the learned
counsel for the petitioner that she is entitled to be promoted as Inspector of
Police with effect from the date on which her juniors were promoted.
3. Per contra, the learned Additional Government Pleader stoutly opposed
the aforesaid contention and submitted that, in the present case, the petitioner
was recruited in 1981 and her seniority was fixed immediately after the
completion of training. Having failed to challenge the seniority so fixed for
nearly three decades, the petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition only after
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her superannuation on 30.06.2019. Therefore, it is the contention of the learned
Additional Government Pleader that, irrespective of the merits of the Writ
Petition, the same is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
He would further invite the attention of this Court to the fact that Yashothai,
upon whose case the petitioner relies, belongs to the Ramanathapuram Range,
whereas the petitioner belongs to the Salem Range. Therefore, he would
contend that Police Constables belonging to different Ranges cannot claim
seniority on par with one another on the basis of their respective positions at the
time of selection. Hence, he prayed to dismiss the present Writ Petition.
4. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made on
either side.
5. As rightly contended by the learned Additional Government Pleader, in
the present case, the petitioner attained superannuation on 30.06.2019. It was
only after her superannuation that she approached this Court seeking revision of
the seniority fixed in 1981. It is well-settled principle of law that settled
seniority cannot be disturbed after a long lapse of time. In the present case, the
petitioner had not only accepted the seniority so fixed but had also continued in
service without challenging the same. She has approached this Court seeking
revision of seniority only after her superannuation on 30.06.2019. Therefore, as
rightly contended by the learned Additional Government Pleader, irrespective of
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the merits of the Writ Petition, the same is liable to be dismissed on the ground
of delay and laches.
6. In this regard, it would be useful to refer to the following judgments.
For ready reference, the same are extracted one after another:-
(a) In M.Samuel Satyendranath Vs. State Bank of India (W.P.No.39494
of 2015 dated 17.08.2023), the relevant portion is extracted hereunder:-
“12. In this regard, the learned counsel for the respondents
relied upon the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India
reported in 2014 4 SCC 108 in the case of Chennai Metropolitan
Water Supply and Sewarage Board and others Vs T.T.Murali Babu,
wherein held as follows:-
“In the case at hand, though there has been four years’
delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to
address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether
such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification.
That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains
more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely
careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the
responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext
of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that
remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the
cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is
likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’
ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation
which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated
to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give
indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with
‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our
considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence
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and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown
the petition overboard at the very threshold.”
(b) In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs.
T.T.Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 , which reads as follows:-
“15. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR
1987 SC 251] the Court observed that: (SCC p. 594, para 24)
“24. … it is well settled that the power of the High
Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the
exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy
and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic.”
It has been further stated therein that: (Nandlal Jaiswal case
[(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] , SCC p. 594, para 24)
“24. … If there is inordinate delay on the part of the
petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ
jurisdiction.”
Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating
that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction
at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring in injustice.”
(c) In C.Jacob Vs. Director of Geology & Mining reported in (2008) 10
SCC 115, which reads as follows:-
“13. Where an employee unauthorisedly absents himself
and suddenly appears after 20 years and demands that he should
be taken back and approaches the court, the department naturally
will not or may not have any record relating to the employee at
that distance of time. In such cases, when the employer fails to
produce the records of the enquiry and the order of
dismissal/removal, court cannot draw an adverse inference
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against the employer for not producing records, nor direct
reinstatement with back wages for 20 years, ignoring the
cessation of service or the lucrative alternative employment of the
employee. Misplaced sympathy in such matters will encourage
indiscipline, lead to unjust enrichment of the employee at fault
and result in drain of public exchequer. Many a time there is also
no application of mind as to the extent of financial burden, as a
result of a routine order for back wages.”
(d) In State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar reported in (1995) 4 SCC
683, the relevant portion is extracted hereunder:-
“25. In our view, the above allegation is in no way sufficient to
hold that the writ petitioner (respondent here) has explained
properly and satisfactorily the undue delay of 20 years which had
occurred between the alleged taking of possession of his land and
the date of filing of writ petition in the High Court. We cannot
overlook the fact that it is easy to make such kind of allegations
against anybody that too against the State. When such general
allegation is made against a State in relation to an event said to
have occurred 20 years earlier, and the State's non-compliance with
petitioner's demands, the State may not at all be in a position to
dispute such allegation, having regard to the manner in which it is
required to carry on its governmental functions. Undue delay of 20
years on the part of the writ petitioner, in invoking the High Court's
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for
grant of compensation to his land alleged to have been taken by the
governmental agencies, would suggest that his land was not taken
at all, or if it had been taken it could not have been taken without
his consent or if it was taken against his consent he had acquiesced
in such taking and waived his right to take compensation for it.
(e) In State of M.P. Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal reported in (1986) 4 SCC 566,
which reads as follows:-
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“24. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court
to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise
of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the
indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ
petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High
Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of
its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay
is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not
ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion
and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices.
The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ
jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after
unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only
hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties.
When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights
in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs
with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such
jurisdiction. We do not think it necessary to burden this
judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where
it has been emphasised time and again that where there is
inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are
created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline
to interfere, even if the State action complained of is
unconstitutional or illegal. We may only mention in the passing
two decisions of this Court one in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v.
International Airport Authority of India [(1979) 3 SCC 489 :
AIR 1979 SC 1628 : (1979) 3 SCR 1014] and the other in Ashok
Kumar Mishra v. Collector [(1980) 1 SCC 180 : AIR 1980 SC
112 : (1980) 1 SCR 491] . We may point out that in R.D. Shetty
case, even though the State action was held to be
unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution, this Court refused to grant relief to the petitioner
on the ground that the writ petition had been filed by the
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petitioner more than five months after the acceptance of the
tender of the fourth respondent and during that period, the
fourth respondent had incurred considerable expenditure,
aggregating to about Rs 1.25 lakhs, in making arrangements for
putting up the restaurant and the snack bar. Of course, this rule
of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a strait
jacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and
creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the
exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the
petitioner. But, such cases where the demand of justice is so
compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in
spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their
very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a
matter within the discretion of the court; ex hypothesi every
discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote
justice and not to defeat it.
(f) In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Shri Balwant
Regular Motor Service reported in 1968 SCC OnLine SC 54, which reads as
follows:-
“11. In any event, we are satisfied that it is not open to the
private operators including Respondent 1 to apply for a writ in the
nature of certiorari for quashing the order of the RTA dated September
10/11, 1965 in view of their conduct. It is not disputed that the private
operators including Respondent 1 were present in the meeting of the
RTA held on September 10/11, 1965 either personally or through duly
appointed Counsel. Respondent 1 and the other private operators
assured the RTA at the hearing that they would withdraw the writ
petitions pending in the High Court. On such assurances, and subject to
the actual withdrawal of the writ petitions in terms of the assurance, the
RTA considered the matter in the said meeting and after hearing the
parties, made an order giving effect to the compromise. It is obvious
that the private operators including Respondent 1 were parties to the
order dated September 10/11, 1965, had accepted that order, acted
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upon it and derived benefits and advantages from it for nearly one year
and 9 months. But for the said order which suspended the operation of
the permit of the appellant till July 1, 1967 the private operators
including Respondent 1 could not have got temporary permits to
operate on the same routes as no stage carriage permits could be issued
under Section 62 of the Act during the subsistence of substantive
permits. In these circumstances we consider that there was such
acquiescence in the RTA's order dated September 10/11, 1965 on the
part of Respondent 1 and other private operators as to disentitle them to
a grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is well-
established that the writ of certiorari will not be granted in a case
where there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant
to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and
other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party. The
principle is to a great extent, similar to though not identical with the
exercise of discretion in the Court of Chancery. The principle has been
clearly stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v.
Prosper Armstrong Hurd. Abram Farewall, and John Kemp4 as
follows:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to
a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an
argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded
upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by
any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried
upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and
the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking
the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
This passage was cited with approval by this Court in a recent case —
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Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial court, Bombay5.
In our opinion, the principle of this decision applies to the present case
and since Respondent 1 and the other private operators had not even
pleaded any circumstances justifying the delay or their conduct, the
High Court was in error in granting a writ of certiorari in their
favour.”
7. Apart from the above, a perusal of the petitioner's affidavit reveals that
she relies upon the revision of seniority granted in the case of Yashothai.
Admittedly, the said Yashothai was a Constable belonging to the
Ramanathapuram Range, whereas the petitioner belongs to the Salem Range. In
this regard, the learned Additional Government Pleader relied upon the
judgment of this Court in W.P.No.14518 of 2022 etc. batch, dated 04.01.2024,
wherein a similar claim was made by a petitioner belonging to the Salem Range,
seeking seniority on par with the very same Yashothai. This Court dismissed the
Writ Petition on the ground that the petitioners therein were not similarly placed
persons, as they belonged to a different Range. The facts of the present case are
identical to those of the case relied upon by the learned Additional Government
Pleader. Therefore, even on merits, the present Writ Petition is liable to be
dismissed, as the petitioner and Yashothai, upon whose seniority the petitioner
relies, do not belong to the same Range.
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8. In the result, the present Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs.
26-10-2026
Index: Yes
Speaking order
Neutral Citation: Yes
KV
To
1. The Director General of Police
Dr.Radhakrishnan Salai,
Chennai.
2. The Deputy Inspector General of Police
Salem Range, Salem.
3. The Superintendent of Police
Namakkal District, Namakkal.
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C.KUMARAPPAN J.
KV
WP No. 5692 of 2022
26-10-2026
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