The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Pankaj Sharma

Court
Madhya Pradesh High Court

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:34867
1 WA-3495-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
&
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE ANURADHA SHUKLA
th
ON THE 19 OF NOVEMBER, 2026
WRIT APPEAL No. 3495 of 2026
CNR No.: MPHC030267512026
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
PANKAJ SHARMA AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri G.K. Agrawal - Government Advocate for the appellants/State.
Shri Yash Sharma - Advocate for the respondents.
ORDER
Per: Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
This writ appeal under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha
Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, has been filed
against the order dated 01/04/2026 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P.
No.28348/2022.
2. Heard on I.A. No.13905/2026, an application seeking condonation
of delay of 85 days in filing the present writ appeal.
3. Except mentioning that the delay has occurred on account of
administrative exigencies, no other reason has been assigned. Even the dates
on which different steps were taken have not been disclosed. Furthermore, it
coercive
is not the case of appellants that any departmental or action has been
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Signed by: PRINCEE
BARAIYA
Signing time: 11/19/2026
03:57:12 AM

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taken against officer/employee who is primarily responsible for the delay. It

is, therefore, prayed that the delay in filing the appeal may be condoned.
4. Counsel for the respondents opposed the application and prayed for
the rejection of the application.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
6. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Ramkumar
Choudhary decided on 29/11/2024 i n SLP (C) Diary No. 48636/2024 has
held as under:-
"6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay
occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the
State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic
approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/
applications/ appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the
part of the officials in merely communicating the information on
time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government
exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous
delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due
to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the
State, though valuable Government lands were involved.
Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery
touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases
before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the
officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are
responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of
the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be
followed by all the States scrupulously."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Odisha and Others Vs.
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Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, reported in 2026 SCC

OnLine SC 191, has held as under:
"13. However, since there is a long line of decisions of this Court
propounding the law that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed
by the legislature in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is
adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful
manner which subserves the ends of justice and in view of the
submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have considered it appropriate to
consider the matter in some depth.
14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land Acquisition,
Anantnag v. Mst Katiji9, a coordinate Bench noting that the justifiably
liberal approach which this Court has been adopting in matters
instituted before it is not being followed by the courts lower in the
hierarchy, mandated that a justice oriented approach is indeed called
for when a ‘State’ seeks condonation of delay as distinguished from ‘a
private party’.
15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon'ble Justice M.N.
Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate Bench in G. Ramegowda
v. Land Acquisition Officer10 had referred to Katiji (supra) in
paragraph 14 and quoted the following passage therefrom:
“When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted
against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred
for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being
done because of a non-deliberate delay …
It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its
power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”
Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it was held as under:
15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another
aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by
Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually
affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest.
The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions
and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as
for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must
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BARAIYA
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take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a
somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where
Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have
suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or
agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it.

17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes
“sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be
somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into
the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental
decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their
making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible.
It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government
must have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these
limitations on governmental functioning — of course, within
reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be
rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in
such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning
is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the
opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the
Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was
one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be
imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. …
16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were consistently
followed by this Court until adoption of a different and seemingly
strict approach while dealing with applications for condonation of
delay during the last decade and a half became discernible starting with
the decision in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited11,
where a delay of 427 days in filing the relevant special leave petition
was not condoned. University of Delhi v. Union of India12 is another
decision (of a three-Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of 916
days was not condoned. While upholding the decision of the relevant
high court under challenge refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days
in presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 by the heirs of a deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in
Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA)13 very recently reiterated
that the law of limitation is founded on public policy, the object is that
a legal remedy is put to an end so that no litigation remains pending
for an indefinite period. It was also held, departing from the earlier
view, that the merits of the case cannot be considered at the stage of
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BARAIYA
Signing time: 11/19/2026
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considering the application for condonation of delay.

17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union
of India authoring the judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the
view taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other
decisions following the same while not interfering with an order of
condonation of delay passed by the relevant high court. However, it
was observed that a distinction ought to be drawn between an
‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered as cause for
condonation of delay. It was also emphasized that a different approach
has to be adopted while this Court is considering an application for
condonation of delay in presentation of an appeal/application and
when it sits in appeal over a discretionary order of the high court
granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former,
whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the
latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of
grant of the prayer for condonation has to be examined.
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the
decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) adopting a
liberal approach is the exasperation and consequent lament expressed
by none other than Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of
authoring a brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v.
Amateur Riders Club, Bombay15 and admonishing officers of the
“revenue” in not acting with promptitude. This order was made within
six years of the decision in Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better
than quoting the same in its entirety hereunder:
1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior counsel for the
Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed
by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this Court has been
making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public interest
by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost on the
point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over a few
years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous improvement
as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in November 1993.
The explanation for the delay, had better be set out in petitioner's own
words:
“(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition drafted
from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for approval to the
Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case file. (h) The Board
returned the case file to the Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993 who
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BARAIYA
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re-sent the same to the Board on September 20, 1993 requesting that
draft SLP was not approved by the Board. The Board after approving
the draft SLP sent this file to CAS on October 1, 1993.”

3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable
ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this
Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters
might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this
optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a
litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the
shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of
limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting
relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other
private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to
present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional
decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But
there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation
offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the
attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common
interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits
making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem
to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it
affects its own interest.
4. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly, dismissed.
The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by time.
(emphasis in original)
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur Riders (supra), one
after the other, leaves none in doubt that it did not take much time for
this Court to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid
down in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much
optimism that matters would improve. Their Lordships, however,
found no visible support for such optimism and the Court's patience
having been tested to the extreme limit, held that there is a point
beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant
labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the
Government."
8. State of M.P. had issued the guidelines in the year 2018 as well as
on 04/04/2024, but still it appears that State authorities are not ready to mend
their ways and they are proceeding as per their whims and wishes.
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BARAIYA
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9. Be that whatever it may be.

10. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that
the appellants have failed to furnish plausible explanation for the delay of 85
days.
11. No sufficient cause has, therefore, been made out for condonation
of delay.
12. Accordingly, I.A. No.13905/2026 is rejected.
13. Consequently, the writ appeal is also dismissed as barred by time.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
(ANURADHA SHUKLA)
JUDGE
JUDGE
PjS/-

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Signed by: PRINCEE
BARAIYA
Signing time: 11/19/2026
03:57:12 AM