VINAYAK TAMRAKAR vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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CGHC010330232026 2026:CGHC:38265-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 2252 of 2026
Vinayak Tamrakar S/o Girja Shankar Tamrakar, Aged About 58 Years
Presently Confined Jail, Through His Wife - Lalita Tamrakar W/o.
Vinayak Tamrakar Aged About 52 Years, R/o Temer Para, Killa Mandir,
Durg, District Durg (C.G.)
MANPREET
KAUR
... Petitioner(s)
Digitally signed
by MANPREET
KAUR
Date: 2026.09.01
11:14:02 +0530
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Home
Affairs, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Nava Raipur Atal Nagar, District
Raipur (C.G.)
2 - The Station House Officer, Police Station / Chowki Jevra Sirsa,
Police Station Pulgaon, District Durg (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Add. A.G.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Judge ,
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
31.08.2026
1.
Heard Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, learned counsel for the petitioner.

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Also heard Mr. Ashish Shukla, learned Additional Advocate
General for respondents / State.
2. The petitioner has filed this petition with following prayer:
“a). Quash and set-aside the FIR bearing Crime
No. 247/2026 dated 07.03.2026, registered at
Police Station- Pulgaon, Chowki- Jewra Sirsa,
District- Durg (C.G.), insofar as the present
petitioner Vinayak Tamrakar is concerned, for the
alleged offences under Sections 8 and 18 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985.
b). Quash the consequential Final Report/Charge-
sheet bearing Final Report No. 540/2026 dated
29.07.2026, insofar as the present petitioner is
concerned, whereby the petitioner has been
charge-sheeted for the alleged offences
punishable under Sections 8, 18, 29 and 27-A of
the NDPS Act and the other provisions mentioned
therein.
c). Quash and set aside the order dated
30.07.2026 passed by the learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Pulgaon, District Durg,
whereby cognizance has been taken against the
petitioner for the aforesaid offences.
d). Quash and set aside the subsequent order
dated 08.08.2026 passed by the learned Court
below whereby charges have been framed
against the petitioner for the offences punishable
under Sections 8, 18, 29 and 27-A of the NDPS
Act, and discharge the petitioner from the said

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criminal case.
e). Consequently, quash all consequential
proceedings arising out of Crime No. 247/2026,
including the criminal case pending before the
learned Court below, insofar as they relate to the
present petitioner.
f). Pass any other order or direction which this
Hon'ble Court may deem just, fit and proper in the
facts and circumstances of the case, in the
interest of justice.”
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on receipt of secret
information on 06.03.2026 that illegal cultivation of opium was
being carried out in a field adjoining the field of Vinayak Tamrakar
near the Shivnath River at Village Jhejhri, Police Outpost Jevra
Sirsa, the police party, after recording the information and
completing the requisite preliminary formalities in the presence of
independent witnesses and informing the concerned authorities,
proceeded to the spot along with officials of the FSL, Revenue,
Excise and NCB Departments. Upon inspection, accused Vikas
Bishnoi was found present at the field and the cultivation of
suspected narcotic plants was noticed; owing to insufficient light,
the proceedings were initially deferred and the spot was secured.
On the following day, i.e., 07.03.2026, the proceedings were
resumed and, upon examination by the FSL officer, the plants
were found to be opium plants. After complying with the
procedural requirements under the NDPS Act, the opium plants

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were counted, uprooted along with their roots, stems, leaves,
flowers and fruits, and on weighing were found to be 62,424.4
kilograms, comprising approximately 1,430,100 plants, valued at
about Rs.7,88,00,000/-. The contraband was seized and sealed in
accordance with law, and accused Vikas Bishnoi was arrested.
During his memorandum statement, he allegedly disclosed the
involvement of Vinayak Tamrakar, Manish Thakur, Shravan
Bishnoi and Achala Ram in the illegal cultivation. Accordingly,
Dehati Nalishi was registered for the offence punishable under
Sections 8 and 18 of the NDPS Act and was thereafter forwarded
to Police Station Pulgaon, where the regular crime was registered
and investigation was taken up.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the learned
trial Court has committed a grave error in taking cognizance and
thereafter framing charges against the petitioner, as the very
foundation of the prosecution case does not attribute the alleged
cultivation of opium to him. It is contended that the secret
information dated 06.03.2026 specifically named co-accused
Vikas Bishnoi as the person engaged in cultivating and looking
after the alleged opium crop, whereas the petitioner was not
named therein at all. Referring to the contemporaneous spot
panchnama, learned counsel would further submit that the alleged
cultivation was found in Khasra Nos.309 and 310, which,
according to the prosecution documents themselves, belonged to
Madhumati Tamrakar and Preetibala Tamrakar, and therefore the

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land on which the alleged narcotic crop was found was not owned
by the petitioner. It is further argued that Vikas Bishnoi was
physically found present at the spot when the police party reached
there and the initial proceedings were directed against him,
whereas no narcotic substance was recovered from the person or
immediate possession of the petitioner. Learned counsel would
submit that even the memorandum statement of Vikas Bishnoi
does not specifically state that the petitioner himself cultivated the
alleged opium crop and, at the highest, the allegation against the
petitioner is that water, electricity or certain agricultural facilities
were allegedly made available from his adjoining agricultural
premises, which, by itself, cannot establish conscious possession,
knowledge or intentional participation in the cultivation of narcotic
substances. It is contended that there is no independent witness
or other material to show that the petitioner was ever seen
planting, tending, harvesting, collecting or possessing the alleged
opium crop. According to learned counsel, the case against the
petitioner was subsequently developed during investigation,
particularly on the basis of material and memorandum allegedly
recorded after the initial discovery, whereas the foundational
documents, including the secret information, spot proceedings
and search proceedings, do not attribute the subsequently alleged
role to him. Serious doubt has also been raised regarding the
chronology of the petitioner’s alleged memorandum, which is
stated to have been recorded on 10.03.2026 but bears the

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signature of the Investigating Officer dated 12.03.2026, without
any satisfactory explanation. Learned counsel would further
submit that the articles subsequently seized from the petitioner’s
premises, including bank passbooks, CCTV cameras,
submersible pumps, sprinklers and other agricultural or electrical
equipment, are ordinary articles and neither constitute narcotic
substances nor independently establish conscious possession or
participation in the alleged cultivation. The statements of the
prosecution witnesses Ganesh Chandrakar and Hemchand Sahu,
as well as those of the landowners and other witnesses,
according to learned counsel, merely refer to the agricultural
arrangements and police proceedings and do not specifically
establish that the petitioner cultivated opium or knowingly
permitted such cultivation. It is also contended that no lease deed,
agreement, receipt, written authorization or other independent
documentary evidence has been produced to demonstrate that
the petitioner had taken the disputed land for the purpose of
cultivating opium. Learned counsel would further argue that the
essential ingredients of Sections 29 and 27-A of the NDPS Act are
wholly absent, as there is no independent material showing any
conspiracy between the petitioner and the other accused persons,
nor is there any financial transaction, bank trail, payment or other
evidence suggesting that the petitioner financed illicit trafficking or
harboured any offender. It is thus submitted that mere proximity of
the petitioner’s land, alleged availability of agricultural facilities or

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electricity, or agricultural dealings cannot substitute the statutory
requirements of conscious possession, knowledge, intentional
participation, conspiracy or financing. Learned counsel would
submit that the learned Court below has failed to distinguish
between mere suspicion and legally sufficient material, particularly
when the prosecution case itself contains discrepancies regarding
the ownership, possession and cultivation of the disputed land
and the role of the various accused persons. According to learned
counsel, the subsequent material collected during investigation
cannot retrospectively cure the absence of incriminating material
against the petitioner in the foundational documents dated
06.03.2026 and 07.03.2026. It is, therefore, submitted that even if
the entire prosecution material is accepted at its face value, it
does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged
against the petitioner under Sections 8, 18, 29 and 27-A of the
NDPS Act, and consequently the order dated 30.07.2026 taking
cognizance and the order dated 08.08.2026 framing charges,
having been passed without proper consideration of these
material circumstances, are liable to be quashed in exercise of the
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS, as
continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an
abuse of the process of law.
5. Learned State counsel, for the petitioner would submit that the
learned trial Court has committed a grave error in taking
cognizance and thereafter framing charges against the petitioner,

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as the very foundation of the prosecution case does not attribute
the alleged cultivation of opium to him. It is contended that the
secret information dated 06.03.2026 specifically named co-
accused Vikas Bishnoi as the person engaged in cultivating and
looking after the alleged opium crop, whereas the petitioner was
not named therein at all. Referring to the contemporaneous spot
panchnama, learned counsel would further submit that the alleged
cultivation was found in Khasra Nos.309 and 310, which,
according to the prosecution documents themselves, belonged to
Madhumati Tamrakar and Preetibala Tamrakar, and therefore the
land on which the alleged narcotic crop was found was not owned
by the petitioner. It is further argued that Vikas Bishnoi was
physically found present at the spot when the police party reached
there and the initial proceedings were directed against him,
whereas no narcotic substance was recovered from the person or
immediate possession of the petitioner. Learned counsel would
submit that even the memorandum statement of Vikas Bishnoi
does not specifically state that the petitioner himself cultivated the
alleged opium crop and, at the highest, the allegation against the
petitioner is that water, electricity or certain agricultural facilities
were allegedly made available from his adjoining agricultural
premises, which, by itself, cannot establish conscious possession,
knowledge or intentional participation in the cultivation of narcotic
substances. It is contended that there is no independent witness
or other material to show that the petitioner was ever seen

9
planting, tending, harvesting, collecting or possessing the alleged
opium crop. According to learned counsel, the case against the
petitioner was subsequently developed during investigation,
particularly on the basis of material and memorandum allegedly
recorded after the initial discovery, whereas the foundational
documents, including the secret information, spot proceedings
and search proceedings, do not attribute the subsequently alleged
role to him. Serious doubt has also been raised regarding the
chronology of the petitioner’s alleged memorandum, which is
stated to have been recorded on 10.03.2026 but bears the
signature of the Investigating Officer dated 12.03.2026, without
any satisfactory explanation. Learned counsel would further
submit that the articles subsequently seized from the petitioner’s
premises, including bank passbooks, CCTV cameras,
submersible pumps, sprinklers and other agricultural or electrical
equipment, are ordinary articles and neither constitute narcotic
substances nor independently establish conscious possession or
participation in the alleged cultivation. The statements of the
prosecution witnesses Ganesh Chandrakar and Hemchand Sahu,
as well as those of the landowners and other witnesses,
according to learned counsel, merely refer to the agricultural
arrangements and police proceedings and do not specifically
establish that the petitioner cultivated opium or knowingly
permitted such cultivation. It is also contended that no lease deed,
agreement, receipt, written authorization or other independent

10
documentary evidence has been produced to demonstrate that
the petitioner had taken the disputed land for the purpose of
cultivating opium. Learned counsel would further argue that the
essential ingredients of Sections 29 and 27-A of the NDPS Act are
wholly absent, as there is no independent material showing any
conspiracy between the petitioner and the other accused persons,
nor is there any financial transaction, bank trail, payment or other
evidence suggesting that the petitioner financed illicit trafficking or
harboured any offender. It is thus submitted that mere proximity of
the petitioner’s land, alleged availability of agricultural facilities or
electricity, or agricultural dealings cannot substitute the statutory
requirements of conscious possession, knowledge, intentional
participation, conspiracy or financing. Learned counsel would
submit that the learned Court below has failed to distinguish
between mere suspicion and legally sufficient material, particularly
when the prosecution case itself contains discrepancies regarding
the ownership, possession and cultivation of the disputed land
and the role of the various accused persons. According to learned
counsel, the subsequent material collected during investigation
cannot retrospectively cure the absence of incriminating material
against the petitioner in the foundational documents dated
06.03.2026 and 07.03.2026. It is, therefore, submitted that even if
the entire prosecution material is accepted at its face value, it
does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged
against the petitioner under Sections 8, 18, 29 and 27-A of the

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NDPS Act, and consequently the order dated 30.07.2026 taking
cognizance and the order dated 08.08.2026 framing charges,
having been passed without proper consideration of these
material circumstances, are liable to be quashed in exercise of the
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS, as
continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an
abuse of the process of law.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents appended with petition.
7. The legal position on the issue of quashing of criminal
proceedings is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a
complaint, FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly
and only in exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily
interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However,
where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint even if
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused, the FIR or the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise
of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of the B.N.S.S.).
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Rupan Deol Bajaj
v. K.P.S. Gill reported in (1995) SCC (Cri) 1059 , Rajesh Bajaj v.
State of NCT of Delhi reported in (1999) 3 SCC 259 and Medchl
Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E Ltd. & Ors

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reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 615 , the Supreme Court clearly held
that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of
the offence, Court should not quash the complaint. However, it
was held that if the allegations do not constitute any offence as
alleged and appear to be patently absurd and improbable, Court
should not hesitate to quash the complaint. The note of caution
was reiterated that while considering such petitions the Courts
should be very circumspect, conscious and careful. Thus, there is
no controversy about the legal proposition that in case a prima
facie case is made out, the FIR or the proceedings in
consequence thereof cannot be quashed.
9. In Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra,
2021 SCC OnLine SC 315 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
authoritatively settled the scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the
High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023). The Apex Court has held that the power to quash
criminal proceedings is required to be exercised sparingly, with
circumspection and only in the rarest of rare cases. It has been
categorically observed that while considering a prayer for
quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings, the High Court cannot
embark upon an enquiry into the reliability, genuineness or
otherwise of the allegations contained in the FIR, nor can it
appreciate the evidence or conduct a mini trial. The Court is only
required to examine whether the allegations, if taken at their face

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value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The
Supreme Court further emphasized that criminal proceedings
ought not to be scuttled at the threshold, that investigation into
cognizable offences should ordinarily be permitted to proceed
unhindered, and that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section
482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised with great caution and self-
restraint, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would
result in manifest miscarriage of justice.
10. Very recently, in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025,
decided on 02.09.2025) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated
the aforesaid principles and further held that while exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the
BNSS), the High Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of
fact or evaluate the evidentiary worth of the material collected
during investigation. Unless all these parameters are cumulatively
satisfied, the High Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction, leaving the parties to establish their
respective cases before the trial Court in accordance with law.
11. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, and upon
considering the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties as well as the material available on record, this
Court is of the considered opinion that no case for exercise of the
extraordinary and inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section
528 of the B.N.S.S. is made out. The submissions advanced on

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behalf of the petitioner essentially relate to the nature and
sufficiency of the evidence collected during investigation, the
alleged discrepancies regarding ownership and possession of the
land, the evidentiary value of the memorandum statements and
seizure proceedings, and the question as to whether the petitioner
had knowledge of or conscious participation in the alleged
cultivation of opium. All these issues involve disputed questions of
fact and appreciation of evidence, which cannot be undertaken in
proceedings seeking quashing of cognizance and charge. At this
stage, this Court is not required to examine whether the
prosecution will ultimately be able to prove the charges beyond
reasonable doubt, but only whether the material available on
record, taken at its face value, discloses a prima facie case
against the petitioner. The material collected during investigation
cannot be discarded or subjected to a meticulous examination at
this preliminary stage merely on the basis of the defence put forth
by the petitioner. The contention regarding the absence of
conscious possession, knowledge, conspiracy or financing, as
also the alleged contradictions and discrepancies in the
prosecution case, are matters which the petitioner would be at
liberty to raise and establish before the learned trial Court on the
basis of evidence adduced during trial. This Court, in exercise of
its inherent jurisdiction, cannot conduct a mini trial or record
findings on the probative value and admissibility of the material
relied upon by the prosecution.

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12. In view of the foregoing discussion and considering the limited
scope of interference under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S., this
Court finds that the material available on record cannot, at this
stage, be said to be so patently absurd, inherently improbable or
wholly insufficient as to warrant quashing of the criminal
proceedings. The impugned order taking cognizance and the
subsequent order framing charge do not suffer from any such
manifest illegality or perversity which calls for interference by this
Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The petitioner shall
have full opportunity to raise all permissible defences before the
learned trial Court during the course of trial, which shall consider
the matter independently and in accordance with law, without
being influenced by any observation made hereinabove.
13. Accordingly, the present petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby
dismissed . No order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha )
Judge Chief Justice
Manpreet