Gursher Singh Sandhu vs State Of Punjab And Others
- Court
- Punjab and Haryana High Court
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(1)
E HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
IN THE
B AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
H
CWP-878-2025 (O&M)
gh Sandhu
Gursher Sing
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Punj
ab & others
...Respondents
Sr.
No.
Parti
iculars
Details
1. The d
2. The d
3. The d
webs
4. Whet
prono
5. The d
judgm
date when the judgment is reserv
date when the judgment is prono
date when the judgment is upload
ved 25.08.2026
unced 01.09.2026
ded on the 02.09.2026
ite
ther only operative part of the ju
udgment is
Full
ounced
ounced or full judgment is prono
delay, if any, of the pronounceme
ment, and reasons thereof
ent of full N.A.
AMIT KUMAR
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NA
Present:
Mr. D.S.Patwalia, Senior Advoc
Mr. Bikramjit Singh Patwalia, M
Mr. Edward George Masih, Adv
cate, assisted by
Mr. Gaurav Jagota and
vocates, for the petitioner.
Mr. P.I.P. Singh, Addl. AG, Punj
Ms. Anisha, Mr. Amitoj Bir Sing
Mr. Gurvishwraj Singh, Advoca
jab, assisted by
gh, Ms. Sakshi Sehgal and
ates, for the respondents.
NAMIT KU
UMAR, J.
1.
The present petition has been
n filed by the petitioner under
r
Articles 226
of the Constitution of India, seek
king the following reliefs:
“i. a writ in the nature of Cer
rtiorari quashing the order dated
d
02.01.2025 (Annexure P-2
6) vide which the services of the
e
petitioner have been dism
missed from the post of DSP by
y
invoking the provisions/p
powers conferred under Article
e
311(2)(b) in a completely
illegal and arbitrary manner and
d
without taking into consi
ideration the fact that the said
d
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(2)
provision could not have b
been invoked, keeping in view the
e
fact that departmental/discip
iplinary proceedings already stood
d
initiated against the peti
itioner and also being in total
l
contravention of the provis
ions of law as settled including in
n
Union Of India And Anoth
her vs Tulsiram Patel And Others
s
reported as 1985 (2) SLR 5
576 and the said order of dismissal
l
also wrongly recorded that
t this Hon’ble Court in CWP-PIL-
-
93-2023 has already conclu
uded that the petitioner facilitated
d
recording of an interview
w of Lawrence Bishnoi which is
s
factually incorrect and the o
order being completely perverse to
o
the settled provisions of law
w.
ii. to issue an appropriate wr
rit, order or direction including a
a
writ in the nature of Manda
amus directing the Respondents to
o
comply with the provisions
s of Rule 8 of The Punjab Civil
l
Services (Punishment and
Appeal) Rules, 1970 as also the
e
procedure mandated under
r Rule 16.24 of the Punjab Police
e
Rules, 1934 and complyin
ng with the Principles of natural
l
justice as well specially k
keeping in view the fact that the
e
petitioner has repeatedly a
approached the Respondents vide
e
representation dated 15.
12.2024 (Annexure P-22) and
d
18.12.2024 (Annexure P-2
24) to grant him opportunity of
f
hearing as also to provide
documents so as to give effective
e
reply to the show cause n
notice as well as the Articles of
f
charges/charge sheet.
iii. to issue any other appropri
iate writ, order or direction which
h
this Hon'ble Court may de
eem fit and proper in the peculiar
r
facts and circumstances of t
the present case.”
Briefly stated, the facts of the ca
2.
ase, as have been pleaded in the
e
petition, are
that the petitioner initially joi
ined the Border Security Force
e
(BSF) as A
Assistant Commandant on 19.
11.2012 and served there till
l
17.06.2015.
During his tenure in BSF, h
he was deployed at the Indo-
-
Bangladesh B
Border from 17.12.2013 till 17.0
06.2015 and was also posted on
n
election duty
y in Jammu and Kashmir Assemb
bly Elections during November-
-
December, 2
014.
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(3)
Pursuant to an advertisement
3.
issued by the Punjab Public
c
Service Com
mmission (PPSC) in the year 20
013, the petitioner was selected
d
and appointe
ed to the post of Deputy Superin
ntendent of Police (DSP) in the
e
Punjab Polic
ce on the recommendation of
f the PPSC, vide order dated
d
16.05.2016 (
Annexure P-2). Upon his select
tion, the petitioner submitted his
s
charge report
t on 30.05.2016 for undergoing
basic training at PPA, Phillaur.
.
In the year
2018, he was transferred as D
DSP (Headquarters), Mohali. In
n
2019, he wa
as transferred as DSP, Sub Div
vision, Amloh and thereafter as
s
DSP, Mohali
i (City-1). Vide order dated 17.0
07.2022 (Annexure P-3), he was
s
transferred as
s DSP (Detective), SAS Nagar.
4.
According to the petitioner, afte
er the murder of Punjabi Singer,
,
namely, Sub
hdeep Singh Sidhu (known as
Sidhu Moosewala), a particular
r
gang (known
n as Lawrence Bishnoi) was proj
jected on social media as having
g
claimed resp
ponsibility for the murder. At
that point of time, Lawrence
e
Bishnoi was
lodged in Tihar Jail. Since he w
was required for investigation in
n
FIR No.103
dated 29.05.2022 registered at
Police Station City-1, Mansa, a
a
Special Inve
estigation Team (SIT) was
constituted, vide order dated
d
01.06.2022 (
(Annexure P-4) under the overa
all supervision of the Additional
l
Director Gen
neral of Police, Anti-Gangster Ta
ask Force (AGTF).
5.
The SIT, supervised by the th
en ADGP (AGTF), along with
h
Mansa Polic
ce brought Lawrence Bishnoi f
from Tihar Jail to Mansa and
d
thereafter ke
pt him in the custody at CIA S
Staff, Mohali (Camp at Kharar).
.
The petitione
er asserts that the entire security
y was supervised by the ADGP
P
(AGTF) and
d for the entire duration of aro
ound 6 months, the same was
s
supervised b
by them. According to the peti
itioner, he had no role either in
n
bringing Law
wrence Bishnoi to Punjab or in
n overseeing his stay while in
n
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(4)
CIA Staff, Mohali and he was n
custody at C
never an enquiring/investigating
g
officer in any
y case against Lawrence Bishnoi
i.
6.
It is further the case of the p
petitioner that when Lawrence
e
Bishnoi was
kept at CIA Staff, Kharar, a que
ery was raised by the Bureau of
f
Investigation
n as to why he had been kept the
ere in respect of cases pertaining
g
to other distr
ricts. In response thereto, the the
en ADGP (AGTF) stated to have
e
informed the
e authorities that, at the releva
ant time, the AGTF was newly
y
constituted a
and did not have an indepen
ndent interrogation centre and,
,
therefore, La
awrence Bishnoi was kept at CIA
A Kharar, which was considered
d
as a strategic
c and secure location close to the
headquarters of the AGTF.
7.
It is further the case of the petiti
ioner that he was posted as DSP
P
(Detective),
Mohali, after the death of Moo
sewala and after the transfer of
f
Lawrence Bi
ishnoi. In March, 2023, an inte
erview was telecasted by a news
s
channel, whe
erein Lawrence Bishnoi was in
nterviewed while he was in the
e
custody of Pu
unjab Police. The said interview
w was aired in March, 2023, but
t
the said inter
rview was stated to have been c
conducted much earlier. A two-
-
member Com
mmittee comprising of the then
Director General, STF and the
e
ADGP, Priso
ons, was constituted in March, 2
023, to enquire into the incident
t
and as to how
w the interview had taken place
e while he was in the custody of
f
the Punjab Po
olice.
8.
While the said investigation w
was going on, a public interest
t
litigation bea
aring CWP-PIL-93-2023 titled
‘Court on its own motion Vs.
.
State of Pun
njab & others’ came to be liste
ed pursuant to suo motu notice
e
taken by a
learned Single Judge of this
Court in CRM-M-44786-2023
regarding the
e use of mobile phones inside ja
ail premises by the inmates and
d
as to what st
teps are being taken to curb the
entry of such prohibited items.
.
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(5)
e proceedings, the issue as regar
During those
rds murder of Sidhu Moosewala
a
as well as int
terview of Lawrence Bishnoi, w
which was aired in March, 2023,
,
became a ma
atter of adjudication in the said P
PIL. In the said proceedings, an
n
order dated 2
21.12.2023 was passed by the Di
ivision bench after consideration
n
of the report
submitted by the Committee. Fr
rom the report, it transpired that,
,
in fact, not
one but two interviews had be
een conducted. The Committee
e
recommende
ed registration of FIRs in respe
ect of the two interviews. The
e
operative por
rtion of the order dated 21.12.20
23 reads as under:
“In view of the above, w
we deem it appropriate to issue
e
f
following directions:
i) The DGP, Punjab, i
is directed to immediately register
r
two FIRs with regar
rd to the conduct of two interviews
s
as recommended by
the Special Investigation Team in
n
the police station hav
ving State-wide jurisdiction.
ii) The investigation of
f the FIRs shall be carried out by
y
the Special Invest
tigation Team headed by Mr.
Prabodh Kumar, IPS
S, DG, Human Rights Commission.
The other members
s of the SIT would include Dr.
S.Rahul, IPS and Ms
Ms.Nilambari Vijay Jagadale, DIG,
Cyber Crime.
iii) The Head of the S
SIT would be at liberty to seek
k
assistance of any oth
her officer or of any other kind, on
n
his making a reques
st, the DGP, Punjab shall provide
e
all necessary help an
nd assistance to him. A copy of the
e
report dated 11.12.2
2023 and the relevant record shall
l
be handed over to th
he Head of the SIT. The SIT shall
l
conclude the invest
tigation expeditiously and file a
a
status report before
this Court within a period of two
o
months.
iv) The DGP, Punjab is f
further directed:
(a) to get the UR
RLs/weblinks/videos pertaining to
o
both t
the said interviews
s
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(6)
removed/block
ked/disable/restrict from all social
l
media platform
ms like Youtube etc. forthwith;
(b) To ensure th
at the Press channel, where the
e
said intervi
ew is hosted, removes the
e
URLs/weblink
ks/videos from all its news /social
l
media platform
ms with immediate effect;
(c) In case the s
said interviews are discovered by
y
police author
rities to be existing on any social
l
media platfor
rm in future, the same be get
t
removed with
immediate effect;
(d) to direct the
intermediary to preserve all the
e
information a
associated relating to the offending
g
content for u
use in investigation, in line with
h
Rule 3(1) (g) o
of the 2021 Rules;
(e) To direct the
e search engines Google Search,
Yahoo Search
h, Microsoft Bing to globally de-
-
index and der
reference from their search results
s
the afore-sai
id interviews and their related
d
contents as id
dentified by its web URL and image
e
URL.
(f) All the conce
erned intermediaries be informed
d
that noncom
mpliance with the foregoing
g
directions wo
uld make the non-complaint party
y
liable to forfe
eit the exemption, if any, available
e
to it general
lly under Section 79 (1) of the
e
I.T.Act and a
as specified by Rule 7 of 2021
1
Rules: and s
shall make such entity and its
s
officers liable
e for action as mandated by section
n
85 of the I.T.A
Act.
(g) The ADGP, P
Prisons, Punjab shall file a status
s
report with
regard to the timelines for
r
installation of
f jammers, CCTV cameras, nylon
n
mesh, X-ray
y body scanners etc. for
r
augmentation
of jail security.”
In compliance with the afore
9.
esaid order, the Punjab Police
e
registered FI
IR No.0001 dated 05.01.2024
at Police Station Punjab State
e
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(7)
Nagar, under Sections 384, 201
Crime, SAS
, 202, 506, 116, 120-B IPC and
d
Section 52-A
A(1) of the Prisons (Punjab Am
mendment) Act, 2011 and FIR
R
No.02 dated
06.01.2024.
10.
It is the case of the petitioner th
hat he was neither named in the
e
said FIR nor
r has been arrayed either as an a
accused or as a suspect till date.
.
Pursuant to t
the order dated 21.12.2023, a Sp
pecial Investigation Team (SIT)
)
was constitu
uted. Since, at that time, the
petitioner was posted as DSP
P
(Special Bran
nch & Criminal Intelligence), SA
AS Nagar, he was also called by
y
the SIT in co
onnection with the investigation
n. The petitioner duly appeared
d
before the SI
IT and responded to all the quer
ries put to him. Thereafter, vide
e
order dated 0
03.08.2024 (Annexure P-8), the
petitioner was transferred from
m
th
ence), SAS Nagar to DSP, 9
h
DSP (Specia
al Branch & Criminal Intellige
Battalion, Pu
unjab Armed Police, Amritsar.
. The petitioner joined at the
e
transferred p
place and requested for medical
leave for 14 days due to injury
y
and having b
been recommended bed rest fo
or two weeks by the PGIMER,
,
Chandigarh,
vide request dated 12.09.2024 (A
Annexure P-10).
11.
On the same very day i.e. 12.0
9.2024, an interim status report
t
was submitte
ed by the SIT, which stated that
t while conducting investigation
n
in FIR No.0
02 dated 06.01.2024, it had tran
nspired that interviewee was in
n
Central Jail,
Jaipur, when the interview was c
conducted and it was also stated
d
that the fi
irst interview was conducted
d on the night intervening
g
03/04.09.202
22 and the interviewee was in the
e premises of CIA Staff, Kharar.
.
Learned Adv
vocate General, Punjab, upon in
nstructions from the competent
t
authority, su
ubmitted that disciplinary action
n would be initiated against the
e
officers, who
o were In-charge of CIA Staff as
s well as the supervisory officers
s
in accordanc
e with law. The Court also opin
ned that “ We hope and trust that
t
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(8)
d not be confined to the lower
action would
level officials but extend to the
e
higher office
ers who had supervisory jurisd
diction over CIA Staff, Kharar
r
including the
e then SSP, who was the Head
of the District Police when the
e
interview wa
as conducted. ”
12.
In this background, the petitio
oner was issued a show cause
e
notice dated
19.09.2024 (Annexure P-11),
alleging that premises of CIA
A
Staff, Khara
ar fell within the jurisdiction o
of Police District SAS Nagar,
,
Mohali and t
that a dreaded gangster in police
e custody had been able to give
e
an interview,
, which pointed to a major brea
ak-down of command and to lax
x
standards of
discipline. It was alleged that th
he CIA Staff comes under direct
t
control of th
he Deputy Superintendent of Po
lice (Investigation), SAS Nagar
r
and that lack
k of adequate supervision on his
s part had allowed the interview
w
to happen, w
which has in turn severely d
dented the image of the State
e
Government.
. The petitioner was called u
upon to show cause as to why
y
disciplinary p
proceedings should not be initiat
ted against him and was given 7
7
days time to
submit his reply.
13.
The petitioner, in response to th
he aforesaid show cause notice,
,
submitted a d
detailed reply dated 25.09.2024
(Annexure P-12), wherein inter
r
alia it was st
tated that when Lawrence Bishn
noi was kept in the premises of
f
CIA Staff, K
Kharar, the inner security of Law
wrence Bishnoi was entrusted to
o
and supervis
sed by AGTF, which had dep
ployed SOG Commandos and
d
officers of A
AGTF for his inner security and t
the petitioner had no role to play
y
in supervisin
ng the inner security of Lawrence
e Bishnoi and the CIA was only
y
entrusted wit
th the security of the outer cord
don of the campus as well as for
r
ensuring his
security during transit, which th
he CIA carried out diligently and
d
meticulously
y.
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(9)
Meanwhile, after investigation i
14.
in FIR No.01 dated 05.01.2024,
,
a cancellatio
on report under Section 173
Cr.P.C. (Annexure P-13) was
s
prepared by
the police. In respect of issue
of investigation with regard to
o
mobile havin
ng been used in the interview
w of Lawrence Bishnoi, it was
s
concluded as
s under:
“Conclusion: During the investig
gation, from the above facts, this
s
f
fact has come to the notice th
at the interview of the accused
d
L
Lawrence Bishnoi got recorded
d on the intervening night of
f
03.09.2022 and 04.09.2022 is of t
the period of his in police custody
y
in C.I.A. Kharar, District S.A.S.
Nagar. In this, the negligence,
carelessness and irregularity of
the police officials towards their
r
duty has been found. In this regar
rd, it is being separately written to
o
the Government of Punjab for takin
ng action.
From the investigation of th
the case, a case under section 506
6
IPC is found to be made out again
nst the accused Lawrence Bishnoi.
This office is not liable for taking
action by the police. Thus, at this
s
stage of the case, the cancellation
report is liable to be prepared and
d
submitted in the Illaqa Court fo
for approval. For getting further
r
action taken against the accused
Lawrence Bishnoi under Section
n
506 IPC, it is directed to pursue th
he same in the Court.
It is also made clear th
hat since in continuation of the
e
interview, Lawrence Bishnoi has
s not committed any cognizable
e
offence, for this reason, no case u
under section 120-B IPC is made
e
out against any police official.
If any other evidence with r
regard to the mobile phone used by
y
L
Lawrence Bishnoi for the interview
w pertaining to this case, comes on
n
the file, then separate supplemen
tary report under section 173 (8)
)
Cr.P.C. will be submitted in the Ho
on'ble Court.
On the basis of the above in
nvestigation of the SIT, vide Rapat
t
N
No.11 dated 08.10.2024, the sectio
ons 384, 201, 202, 116, 120-B and
d
52-A (1) The Prisons (Punjab Am
endment) Act, 2011 are deleted in
n
the FIR. The cancellation report u
under section 173 Cr.P.C. has been
n
p
prepared against the accused L
awrence Bishnoi for the offence
e
under section 506 IPC, which is su
ubmitted for approval. If any other
r
evidence with regard to the mobile
e phone used by Lawrence Bishnoi
i
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(10)
for the interview pertaining to th
f
his case, comes on the file, then
n
separate supplementary report und
der section 173 (8) Cr.P.C. will be
e
submitted in the Hon'ble Court.
Sd/-
Station House Officer
Police station Punjab State Crime
-
r
e
Police station Phase-4 Mohali
i
r
”
e
District S.A.S. Nagar
Dated: 08.10.2024”
15.
Thereafter, the petitioner was is
ssued second show cause notice
dated 14.10.2
2024 (Annexure P-14), wherein
it was alleged that the petitioner
r
had facilitate
ed the recording of interview o
of Lawrence Bishnoi, by being
g
personally p
resent at the premises of CIA
Staff Kharar, during the night
t
intervening 0
03/04.09.2022, while also bein
ng in close and constant touch,
,
both telepho
onically and personally, with t
the interviewee Sh. Jagwinder
r
Patial of AB
BP Sanjha News Channel and t
the misconduct, negligence and
d
dereliction o
of duty on his part had severely
y dented the image of the State
e
Government
and his reply was sought within
n a period of 2 days. In response
e
thereto, the
petitioner submitted an int
terim reply dated 17.10.2024
4
(Annexure P
P-15) and requested the responde
ents for supply of the necessary
y
documents.
16.
While the petitioner was awaitin
ng for the necessary documents,
,
FIR No.33 d
dated 15.10.2024 under Section
ns 419, 465, 467, 468, 477 IPC
C
and Section
13(2) of the Prevention of Corru
uption Act, 1988, was registered
d
against the p
petitioner at Police Station Punja
ab State Crime, SAS Nagar, on
n
the allegation
n that he had misused his offici
ial position with an intention to
o
gain monetar
ry benefits by involving himself
in a disputed land and property.
17.
Subsequently, the petitioner, alo
ong with six other officials, was
s
placed under
r suspension, vide suspension ord
der dated 25.10.2024 (Annexure
e
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(11)
r Rule 4(1)(a) of the Punjab
P-16), under
Civil Services (Punishment &
&
Appeal) Rule
es, 1970. Thereafter, a charge-sh
heet dated 25.10.2024 (Annexure
e
P-17) was is
sued to the petitioner. The peti
tioner, however, asserts that the
e
respondents
merely pasted the covering lett
ter of the charge-sheet, without
t
the complete
e articles of charge/s, outside his
s residential premises i.e. House
e
No.3149, Sec
ctor 39, Chandigarh, which had
been allotted to him during his
s
posting at SA
AS Nagar (Mohali) instead of ef
ffecting service of the complete
e
charge-sheet
at his permanent residential a
address i.e. House No.99, Jyoti
i
Nagar, Jalan
ndhar, as per the current place
e of posting i.e. 9th Battalion,
,
Punjab Arme
ed Police, Amritsar. It is the ca
ase of the petitioner that the said
d
charge-sheet
was not received by the petition
ner though he received covering
g
letter of the
e said charge-sheet categorica
ally mentioning that article of
f
charge/s incl
luding memorandum is of 7 pag
ges, but only first 3 pages were
e
pasted. Ho
owever, he was shocked to
read an article in newspaper
r
‘Hindustan T
Times’, wherein it was stated th
hat the respondents had already
y
recommende
ed the dismissal of the petitione
r by invoking Article 311(2)(b)
)
of the Const
itution and the case has been fo
orwarded to the Chief Minister,
,
Punjab, for h
his approval. The petitioner im
mmediately submitted a detailed
d
representatio
on dated 15.12.2024 (Annexure
P-22) to respondents No.1 & 2,
,
which was re
eceived on 16.12.2024.
18.
On the same very day i.e. 16.1
12.2024, a statement was made
e
before the C
Court in CWP-PIL-93-2023, th
hat the State Government has
s
decided to di
ismiss the petitioner by invokin
ng powers under Article 311 (2)
)
of the Const
itution of India and the recomm
mendation has been made to the
e
PPSC in that
t regard for further action. It w
was also stated before the Court
t
that the depa
artmental action has been initiate
ed under Rule 10 of the All India
a
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(12)
les against the senior officers a
Services Rul
as well and also those officers
s
have been po
osted outside District Mohali an
nd that he shall submit a list of
f
proposed nam
mes, who would conduct the de
epartmental inquiry, in a sealed
d
cover to the C
Court on the next date of hearing
g.
19.
The petitioner, thereafter, sub
bmitted another representation
n
dated 18.12.2
2024 (Annexure P-24) to the C
Chairman, PPSC, Patiala, seeing
g
grant of fair
and reasonable opportunity to hi
im against the recommendations
s
made by the
e State Government to the PP
PSC, for the dismissal of the
e
petitioner wh
hile invoking provisions of Artic
cle 311(2)(b) of the Constitution.
.
On 18.12.20
024 (Annexure P-25), the afore
esaid PIL was again listed for
r
hearing befor
re this Court and the following r
elevant order was passed:
“xx xx
xx
Learned Advocate General
l, Punjab has filed an affidavit of
f
the Secretary, Department of Hom
me Affairs which is taken on record.
It is stated in the affidavit that
although an Inquiry Officer was
s
appointed, but they are willing to
o re-consider the matter. Learned
d
A
Advocate General, Punjab has sub
bmitted a panel of retired judges to
o
this Court in a sealed cover. After
going through the material placed
d
in sealed cover, the same is returne
ed back.
The Government shall co
onsider appointing Justice Rajiv
v
N
Narain Raina, Former Judge of th
is Court as the Inquiry Officer. He
e
shall be provided adequate securi
ity and infrastructure by the State
e
Government. The competent autho
ority may pass necessary order in
n
this regard expeditiously. Needl
less to mention that the Inquiry
y
Officer would be suitably remuner
ated.
Mr. Rakesh Kumar Nehra,
Senior Advocate is also appointed
d
as Amicus Curiae to assist the Co
ourt. A complete set of paper book
k
be given to him.
List on 16.01.2025.
The SIT shall submit its s
status report on the next date of
f
hearing.
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(13)
A photocopy of this order b
be placed on the files of connected
d
cases.”
20.
However, vide order dated 02
.01.2025 (Annexure P-26), the
e
petitioner wa
as dismissed from service while
invoking Clause 2(b) of Article
e
311 of the C
Constitution while dispensing wi
th the enquiry on the ground of
f
non cooperat
tive attitude of the petitioner.
It is the said order, which has
s
been challeng
ged in the present petition.
21.
It is further pleaded that even
after passing of the impugned
d
order of dism
missal on 02.01.2025 (Annexur
re P-26), the Presenting Officer
r
issued letter
dated 23.09.2025 (Annexure P-
-30), whereby the petitioner and
d
other eight
officers/officials of the Polic
ce Department against whom
m
departmental
l enquiry had been initiated, we
ere called upon to appear before
e
the Enquiry
Officer, namely, Mr. Justice Ra
ajiv Narain Raina, former Judge
e
of this Court
t, on 28.09.2025 at 11.30 AM. T
The said letter dated 23.09.2025
5
reads as unde
er:
“OFFICE OF TH
DIRECTOR GENERAL O
HE
OF POLICE
PUNJAB, CHANDIG
GARH
ADMINISTRATION
N WING
Secret Section-
-4
To
1. Additional Director
Task Force, SAS Nag
2. Additional Director
SAS Nagar.
3. Commissioner of Pol
4. Senior Superintenden
5. Commandant, 9th Ba
6. Commandant, 5th, IR
No.3507-12/Superintendent
Sub: CWP-PIL-93-2023 (O&M)
General of Police, Anti Gangster
gar.
r
General of Police, NRI, Punjab,
lice, Ludhiana.
nt of Police, SAS Nagar.
attalion, PAP, Amritsar.
RB, Amritsar.
t Chandigarh dated 23.09.2025
) and other (Court on its own
b & Ors.) (Regarding department
b Police Officials.
n
motion Vs. State of Punjab
proceedings against Punjab
t
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(14)
Vide State Governmen
nt's letter no. HOME-HM-
-
10ING/27/2024-2H1/375 dated
21.02.2025, Mr. Justice Rajiv
v
N
Narain Raina, Former Judge, Hi
igh Court has been appointed as
s
Inquiry Officer and the undersign
ed (Jaswinder Singh, Supdt./Gr-1,
Secret Section-4, CPO, Punjab) h
has been appointed as Presenting
g
Officer.
2. Regarding subject cited ab
bove, Inquiry Officer Mr. Justice
e
Rajiv Narain Raina, Former Ju
dge, High Court, Punjab Police
e
Officer Institute, Sector 32, Chan
ndigarh has instructed the below
w
mentioned officers/employee to ap
ppear in the meeting to be held on
n
28.09.2025 at 11.30 a.m;
1. Sh. Amandeep Singh Brar
SP/INV, SAS Nagar.
2. Sh. Ajinder Singh, the
ADCP/Hqrs, NRI, Punjab S
3. Sh. Gursher Singh Sandhu
4. Sh. Samar Vaneet, PPS the
now DSP/5th IRB, ASR (Un
5. Sub. Inspr. (LR) Jagatpa
suspension).
6. Sub. Inspr. (LR), Shaganjit
(Under Suspension)
7. Sub. Inspr. Reena, CIA
Suspension)
8. ASI Mukhtiar Singh, No.
Officer (Under Suspension)
9. HC (LR) Om Parkash, No
MHC CIA, Kharar, SAS Na
3. Therefore, you are re
r, the then ADCP/INV, Ldh., now
w
then SP/Hqrs, SAS Nagar now
SAS Nagar.
u, the then DSP (D) SAS Nagar
e then DSP/PBI/EOW, SAS Nagar
nder Suspension)
al Jangu, AGTF, Punjab (under
w
r
r
t Singh, No. 531/W, AGTF, Punjab
b
A, Kharar, SAS Nagar (Under
r
. 511/SAS Nagar the then Duty
y
)
o. 1131/SAS Nagar, the then Night
t
agar (under suspension).
equested to inform the said
d
officers/employees to appear befor
re the Inquiry Officer on fixed date
e
and time and the receipt of this lett
ter be supplied to this office.
Sd/-
Presenting Officer,
Director General of Police, Punjab
-
b
For D
N
No. /Superintendent Chandi
A copy of above is forwarde
and further necessary action:
1. Mr. Justice Rajiv Narain Ra
2. Sh. Ravi Kumar, IPS, AIG,
3. Superintendent/Secret Bran
igarh dated: 23.09.2025
ed to following for information
aina, Former Judge, High Court.
Counter Intelligence, Punjab.
nch, CPO, Punjab.
Sd/-
Presenting Officer,
irector General of Police, Punjab”
-
”
For Di
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(15)
Pursuant thereto, the petitioner
22.
submitted an application dated
d
11.10.2025 t
to Mr. Justice Rajiv Narain Rain
na, Former Judge of this Court,
,
through his c
counsel seeking a copy of the ch
harge-sheet. In response thereto,
,
as directed b
by the Enquiry Officer, namely,
Mr. Justice Rajiv Narain Raina,
,
former Judge
e of this Court, a copy of the ch
harge-sheet along with copies of
f
the Show Ca
ause Notices dated 19.09.2024 a
and 14.10.2024 were supplied to
o
the petitione
r, vide letter dated 13.10.2025
(Annexure P-31) issued by the
e
Assistant Ins
spector General of Police, Coun
nter Intelligence, Punjab and the
e
petitioner wa
as directed to file his reply by 0
01.11.2025 at 12:00 noon at the
e
Punjab Polic
ce Officers’ Mess, Sector 32, Ch
handigarh. The relevant extract
t
of the said le
tter dated 13.10.2025 (Annexure
e P-31) reads thus:
“2. You moved an applicati
ion on 11.10.2025 before Mr.
Justice Rajiv Narain Raina, Fo
ormer Judge of the High Court
t
and Enquiry Officer, through
your counsel Mr. Gursimran
n
Singh, seeking a copy of the ch
harge sheet. As directed by the
e
Enquiry Officer during the pro
ceedings held on 11.10.2025, a
a
copy of the charge sheet, along
g with copies of the Show Cause
e
N
Notices dated 19.09.2024 and 14
4.10.2024, is enclosed herewith.
You are directed to file your rep
ply by 01.11.2025 at 12:00 noon
n
at the Punjab Police Officers' M
Mess, Sector 32, Chandigarh.”
Consequently, the petitioner (th
23.
hrough virtual mode) along with
h
his counsel
appeared before the Enquiry
y Officer on 01.11.2025 and
d
submitted hi
s reply to the charge-sheet date
ed 01.11.2025 (Annexure P-32).
.
Thereafter,
the enquiry proceedings we
ere adjourned to 06.12.2025,
,
05.03.2026 &
& 14.03.2026 and the petitione
er appeared before the Enquiry
y
Officer even
n on these dates through virtu
ual mode, whereas his counsel
l
appeared phy
ysically.
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(16)
When the hearing of the instant
24.
t petition had taken place before
e
a Coordinate
e Bench of this Court on 10.04
4.2026, the following order was
s
passed:
“When confronted with t
the argument that departmental
l
p
proceedings are currently under
rway under the chairmanship of
f
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Raina
a (Retd.), and that dismissing the
e
p
petitioner from service midway th
hrough such proceedings is wholly
y
unjust, unfair, and unconstitution
nal particularly in light of Article
e
311(2) of the Constitution of Ind
dia, learned State counsel sought
t
time to obtain necessary instruc
ctions, citing lack of awareness
s
regarding the pendency of the dis
sciplinary proceedings against the
e
p
petitioner.
On his request, adjourned to
o 22.04.2026.”
Thereafter, the enquiry proceed
25.
dings were held on 03.05.2026
6
and after noti
icing that the petitioner has alrea
ady been dismissed from service
e
while invoki
ing the provisions of Article 31
11(2)(b) of the Constitution by
y
dispensing w
with enquiry as not reasonably
practical and consequently, the
e
enquiry proc
eedings with regard to the petitio
oner were closed by the Enquiry
y
Officer.
26.
Written statement on behalf of
respondents No.1, 2, 4 & 5 by
y
way of affid
davit of Mr. Parmdeep Singh, U
Under Secretary, Department of
f
Home Affair
rs, Punjab, has been filed, wher
ein the facts stated hereinabove
e
have not be
een disputed. However, with
regard to dispensing with the
e
enquiry, it ha
as been stated as under:
“8.
That the Special Investigation T
Team (SIT) constituted under the
e
directions of this Hon'ble Court i
in CWP-PIL-93-2023 (O&M) and
d
other connected cases titled as "
"COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION
N
V/S STATE OF PUNJAB AND OR
RS" had concluded that Petitioner
r
f
facilitated the recording of an inte
erview of the Lawrence Bishnoi by
y
a TV Channel while he was in cus
stody of CIA Staff, Kharar. Due to
o
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(17)
the gravity of the matter, the Petiti
ioner was placed under suspension
n
vide order dated 25.10.2024 and a
a charge sheet under rule 8 of the
e
Punjab Civil Services (Punishme
ent and Appeal) Rules, 1970 was
s
issued vide dated 25.10.2024.
9.
That, it was not reasonably pract
ticable to hold an Inquiry into the
e
charge-sheet against the Petitione
er due to non-cooperative attitude
e
of the officer and his unauthorize
ed absence from duty. Respondent
t
no. 4 had apprised of the fact that
Petitioner has evaded all attempts
s
to receive the charge-sheet. In th
he course of these efforts to serve
e
him, when Petitioner continued to
evade receiving charge-sheet, the
e
Commandant, 9th-Battalion, Punja
ab Armed Police (PAP), Amritsar,
arranged for the order to be
affixed at the doorstep of the
e
Petitioner's residence as a mean
ns of ensuring formal service in
n
compliance with procedural req
quirements. The detailed report
t
submitted by Commandant 9th B
Bn, PAP, Amritsar regarding the
e
efforts made to deliver the charge
e-sheet to Petitioner has also been
n
conveyed by the respondent no
o. 4 vide his officer Memo no.
7186/CB-3, dated 08.11.2024. I
It is further submitted that the
e
Petitioner, instead of cooperating
g in the departmental proceedings,
was deliberately obstructing the
departmental proceedings. It is
s
f
further submitted that after caref
ful consideration of the facts and
d
circumstances, the State Gove
ernment was satisfied that the
e
Petitioner has severely tarnished th
he image of the Punjab Police as a
a
result of his misconduct, neglige
ence and dereliction of the duty
y
during the occurrence of the interv
view of Lawrence Bishnoi, while in
n
custody of CIA Kharar. His failure
e to perform his duty properly was
s
a gross violation of the discipline
e and conduct rules of the Punjab
b
Police.
10.
That, for the reasons stated her
reinabove, Regular Departmental
l
Enquiry was dispensed on cogent m
material and regular departmental
l
enquiry has not dispensed with
solely on the 'Ipse dixit' of the
e
concerned competent punishing A
Authority. The condition precedent
t
was satisfied before the action un
nder Article 311 (2)(b) of second
d
p
proviso taken against the Petitione
er is that holding of enquiry is not
t
reasonably practicable in the op
opinion of a reasonable prudent
t
p
person taking a reasonable view of
f the prevailing situation.
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(18)
That it is also further submitted th
11.
hat the proper and due procedure
e
of law was followed and case o
of the Petitioner falls within the
e
p
purview of proviso (b) to Article 3
311(2) of the Constitution. Hence,
the Competent Authority has reco
orded the reasons in writing as to
o
why it was not practicably possibl
le to conduct regular departmental
l
enquiry. The Competent Authorit
ty after recording the reasons in
n
writing for dispensing with the enq
quiry also proceeded with an order
r
imposing the penalty. The reaso
ons recorded by the Competent
t
A
Authority are very clear, just a
and not vague and not just the
e
repetition of the language of th
e relevant rules. The Competent
t
A
Authority has followed the relevan
nt guidelines/instruction along with
h
relevant case laws and same
has been strictly adhered and
d
meticulous compliance of the same
e has been made.
12.
That it is further submitted that
special procedure as provided in
n
rule 13 (ii) of the Punjab Civil
Services (Punishment & Appeal)
)
Rules, 1970 has been followed wh
hich also provides that where the
e
p
punishing authority is satisfied th
he reasons to be recorded by it in
n
writing that it is not reasonably pr
racticable to hold an inquiry in the
e
manner provided in these rules. I
In this regard, the Punjab Public
c
Service Commission was also be
consulted before orders imposing
g
p
penalty. The respondent no. 3
3 vide letter dated 26.12.2024
4
(Annexure R-10) has also concurr
red with the proposal of the State
e
Government against the Petitioner
r and granted approval to dismiss
s
the Petitioner from Government S
Service under Article 311 (2)(b) of
f
the Constitution of India. Therefor
re, the process as prescribed in law
w
was followed before passing th
he dismissal order against the
e
Petitioner.”
27.
In nutshell, the stand of the resp
pondents is that the petitioner did
d
not coopera
ate in the departmental proce
eedings and was deliberately
y
obstructing th
he departmental proceedings and
d under these circumstances, the
e
State Govern
nment was satisfied that the petit
tioner has severely tarnished the
e
image of th
he Punjab Police as a result o
of misconduct, negligence and
d
dereliction o
f duty during occurrence of the
interview of Lawrence Bishnoi
i
while in cust
tody of CIA Staff Kharar and fo
or the aforementioned reasons, a
a
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(19)
artmental enquiry was dispense
regular depa
ed with on cogent material as
s
holding of en
nquiry against the petitioner is no
ot reasonable practicable.
28.
Replication has been filed by t
the petitioner controverting the
e
averments m
made in the written statement filed
d on behalf of respondents No.1,
,
2, 4 & 5.
29.
Learned senior counsel appea
aring for the petitioner, while
e
referring to
the provisions of Rule 8 o
of the Punjab Civil Services
s
(Punishment
and Appeal) Rules, 1970 (here
einafter referred to as the ‘1970
0
Rules’), as a
also the procedure prescribed u
under Rule 16.24 of the Punjab
b
Police Rules
, 1934 (hereinafter referred to a
as the ‘PPR’), contends that the
e
power of pun
nishment vested in the competen
nt authority is not unfettered, but
t
is circumscr
ribed by the safeguards emb
bodied in Article 311 of the
e
Constitution
of India and the provisions of t
the ‘1970 Rules’ and the ‘PPR’.
It is submitte
ed that dismissal from service c
constitutes a major penalty and,
,
therefore, or
rdinarily cannot be imposed
without conducting a regular
r
departmental
l inquiry in accordance wit
th the prescribed procedure.
.
According t
to learned senior counsel, dis
spensing with such inquiry is
s
permissible o
only in the exceptional circumst
tances specifically contemplated
d
under Article
e 311(2) of the Constitution an
nd the applicable service rules.
.
He, thus, co
ontended that the punishment
of ‘dismissal’ awarded to the
e
petitioner is
a ‘major penalty’ and the com
mpetent authority can award the
e
same after h
holding a regular departmental
inquiry. It is further contended
d
that Article 3
311(2) of the Constitution of Ind
dia contemplates that if a person
n
is a member
r of a civil service of the Union
n or all India Service or a Civil
l
Service of a
State or holds a civil post unde
er the Union or a State, he shall
l
not be dismi
issed or removed or reduced in
rank except after an inquiry in
n
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(20)
as been informed of the charg
which he ha
ges against him and has been
n
afforded reas
sonable opportunity of being h
heard. He further contends that
t
Clause (b) o
f second proviso provides that w
where the authority empowered
d
to remove a p
person is satisfied for some reas
son to be recorded in writing, to
o
the effect tha
at holding an inquiry is not ‘rea
asonably practicable’, the orders
s
can be passe
ed without adhering to the gen
neral principle contemplated by
y
Article 311(2
2) of the Constitution. It is forc
cefully contended that while the
e
petitioner wa
as placed under suspension, the
reasons as assigned of ‘evasion
n
of service an
nd non-cooperative attitude in
departmental proceedings’ are
e
flimsy. In a
absence of any convincing ma
aterial, exercise of such extra-
-
ordinary pow
wer ignoring the procedure presc
cribed under the above Rules is
s
not permissib
ble otherwise it would amount
to misuse of the power by the
e
competent au
uthority. Learned senior counsel
l further contends that impugned
d
order of dism
missal from service without cond
ducting a departmental inquiry is
s
also arbitrar
ry as the respondents, having
g already initiated disciplinary
y
proceedings
against the petitioner by issu
uing two show-cause notices,
,
followed by
suspension order and thereafter
r issued charge-sheet, could not
t
subsequently
y invoke Article 311(2)(b) of th
he Constitution to dispense with
h
the departme
ental enquiry. He submitted that
t the impugned order is contrary
y
to the law
particularly when no cogent,
contemporaneous and legally
y
sustainable r
reasons have been recorded to
o demonstrate that holding an
n
enquiry again
nst the petitioner had become no
ot reasonably practicable.
30.
Learned senior counsel further
r submitted that the decision to
o
dismiss the p
petitioner had, in fact, already be
een taken, as is evident from the
e
statement of
f the learned Advocate Genera
al recorded in the order dated
d
16.12.2024 p
passed in CWP-PIL-93-2023. H
He submitted that the finding of
f
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(21)
ents that the petitioner had deli
the responde
iberately evaded service of the
e
charge-sheet
and that, in such circumstance
es, holding an enquiry was not
t
reasonably p
practicable, is factually incor
rrect. According to him, the
e
respondents
were fully aware of the pet
itioner's permanent address at
t
Jalandhar, wh
here all other communications h
had admittedly been duly served,
,
whereas the c
charge-sheet was sent to his old
Chandigarh address after he had
d
already been
n transferred therefrom. He, thus
s, submitted that the invocation
n
of Article 3
11(2)(b) of the Constitution is
s contrary to the principles of
f
natural justic
ce and the law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
n
Union of Ind
dia v. Tulsiram Patel and Othe
ers, (1985) 3 SCC 398; Jaswant
t
Singh v. Sta
ate of Punjab and Ors., (1991)
1 SCC 362; Ex. Const.Chhote
e
Lal v. Union
n of India & Ors., (2000) 10 SC
CC 196; Sudesh Kumar v. State
e
of Haryana a
and Ors., (2005) 11 SCC 525; T
Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab
b
& others, (2
006) 13 SCC 581; Reena Rani
i v. State of Haryana & others,
,
(2012) 10 SC
CC 215 and Risal Singh v. Sta
ate of Haryana, (2014) 13 SCC
C
244 .
31.
Per contra, learned State couns
sel submitted that although the
e
petitioner wa
as initially served with two show
w-cause notices dated 19.09.2024
4
(Annexure P
P-11) and 14.10.2024 (Annexu
ure P-14), and was thereafter
r
placed unde
er suspension and issued a c
charge-sheet dated 25.10.2024
4
(Annexure P
P-17), but he failed to coo
operate with the disciplinary
y
proceedings
and deliberately evaded servic
ce of the charge-sheet. It was,
,
therefore, co
ontended that, keeping in view
w the gravity of the allegations
s
levelled aga
inst the petitioner and upon b
being satisfied that it was not
t
reasonably pr
racticable to hold a regular depa
artmental enquiry, the competent
t
authority wa
as empowered to invoke Article
e 311(2)(b) of the Constitution.
.
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(22)
te counsel further submitted that
Learned Stat
the satisfaction recorded by the
e
competent a
authority was based upon the
conduct of the petitioner and,
,
therefore, cou
uld not be termed arbitrary or wi
ithout jurisdiction. It was further
r
submitted tha
at the impugned order dated 02.
.01.2025, having been passed in
n
exercise of
the constitutional power unde
er Article 311(2)(b), does not
t
warrant inter
rference by this Court. In supp
port of his contentions, learned
d
State counse
el has placed reliance upon the
judgment of Hon’ble Supreme
e
Court in Tuls
siram Patel’s case (supra) .
32.
I have heard learned counsel fo
or the parties and have perused
d
the record wi
ith their able assistance.
33.
In the case at hand, since the or
rder of dismissal of the appellant
t
has been pas
sed in exercise of the power und
der clause (b) of second proviso
o
to Article 31
1(2) of Constitution of India, th
he said provision is relevant to
o
understand it
ts ambit and scope, hence, reprod
duced as under:
“
311. Dismissal, removal or r
reduction in rank of persons
s
employed in civil capacities
s under the Union or a State –
(1) No person who is a
a member of a civil service of the
e
Union or an all India servi
ice or a civil service of a State or
r
holds a civil post under
the Union or a State shall be
e
dismissed or removed by a
a authority subordinate to that by
y
which he was appointed.
(2) No such person as
aforesaid shall be dismissed or
r
removed or reduced in rank
k except after an inquiry in which
h
he has been informed of th
he charges against him and given
n
a reasonable opportunity o
of being heard in respect of those
e
charges ;
Provided that where it is
proposed after such inquiry, to
o
impose upon him any suc
ch penalty, such penalty may be
e
imposed on the basis of th
he evidence adduced during such
h
inquiry and it shall not be n
necessary to give such person any
y
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(23)
opportunity of making
representation on the penalty
y
proposed:
Provided further that this cl
lause shall not apply-
(a) where a pers
son is dismissed or removed or
r
reduced in rank on
the ground of conduct which has
s
led to his conviction
on a criminal charge; or
(b) where the au
uthority empowered to dismiss or
r
remove a person or
to reduce him in rank is satisfied
d
that for some reason
n, to be recorded by that authority
y
in writing, it is no
t reasonably practicable to hold
d
such inquiry ; or
(c) where the Pr
resident or the Governor, as the
e
case may be, is sat
tisfied that in the interest of the
e
security of the State
e, it is not expedient to hold such
h
inquiry.”
A plain reading of aforesaid pro
34.
ovisions of Article 311(2) of the
e
Constitution
incorporates a valuable safegu
uard available to a civil servant
t
against dism
missal, removal or reduction in
rank. No such penalty can be
e
imposed ordi
inarily except after holding an e
enquiry in which the delinquent
t
employee is
informed of the charges against
t him and afforded a reasonable
e
opportunity o
of being heard. As per first prov
viso thereto, in case an inquiry is
s
conducted fo
or the purpose of imposing pena
alty, it is not necessary to afford
d
an opportuni
ity at the stage of penalty. Cl
ause (b) of the second proviso
o
to Article 31
11(2) of the Constitution restri
icts the applicability of Article
e
311(2) in a s
specific situation: (i) if the appo
ointing authority is satisfied that
t
there should
be deviation from mandate of A
Article 311(2) because adherence
e
to the same
is not ‘reasonably practicable’;
and (ii) such reasons are to be
e
recorded in
writing. Similarly, when suc
ch power to deviate from the
e
applicable p
rocedure is to be exercised u
under clause (c) of the second
d
proviso, it m
ay be done so, only in the intere
st of ‘security of the State’ or ‘if
f
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(24)
edient to hold such inquiry’. Be
it is not expe
e that as it may, the present case
e
relates to c
clause (b) of the second pro
oviso to Article 311(2) of the
e
Constitution,
, therefore, the applicability of
the said provision needs to be
e
discussed in
the facts of this case.
35.
It is trite law that the decision of
f the appointing authority on the
e
issue of ‘reco
ording reasons in writing on its s
satisfaction as to why holding an
n
inquiry is no
ot reasonably practicable’ may
y be subject to judicial review
w
under Article
e 226 by the High Court. The Co
onstitution Bench of the Hon'ble
e
Supreme Co
urt in Tulsiram Patel’s case (s
(supra) , has reiterated the legal
l
position and
authoritatively explained the sc
ope and ambit of Article 311(2)
)
and the seco
nd proviso thereto. The Court h
has made it clear that the power
r
under Article
e 311(2)(b) is an exceptional p
power and cannot be exercised
d
arbitrarily or
merely for the purpose of avoid
ding a departmental enquiry. The
e
condition p
precedent for invoking Clau
se (b) is the existence of
f
circumstance
es which render the holding
of an enquiry not reasonably
y
practicable a
and the recording, in writing, of
f reasons for the satisfaction of
f
the disciplina
ary authority. It has been held a
as under:
“32. The arguments advanced
d on behalf of the government
t
servants on the pleasure doctrine
and the second proviso to Article
e
311 (2) may be sketched in broad o
outlined as under :
(1) The pleasure doctri
ine in England is a part of the
e
special prerogative of the
Crown and has been inherited by
y
India from England and
should, therefore, be construed
d
strictly, that is, strictly aga
ainst the Government and liberally
y
in favour of government ser
rvants.
(2) The second proviso w
which withdraws from government
t
servants the safeguards p
provided by clause (2) of Article
e
311 must be also similarly
y construed for, unless a liberal
l
construction were placed up
pon it, great hardship would result
t
to government servants as
they could be arbitrarily thrown
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(25)
out of employment and the
ey and their dependents would be
e
left without any means of su
ubsistence.
(3) There are several sta
ages before a government servant
t
can be dismissed or remo
oved or reduced in rank, namely,
serving upon him of a show
w cause notice or a charge-sheet,
giving him inspection of doc
cuments, examination of witnesses,
arguments and imposition
of penalty. An inquiry starts only
y
after a show cause notic
ce is issued and served upon a
a
government servant. A show
w cause notice is thus preparatory
y
to the holding of an inquiry
ry and even if the entire inquiry is
s
dispensed with, the giving o
of a show cause notice and asking
g
for the explanation of the
government servant with respect
t
there to are not excluded.
(4) It is not obligatory u
upon the disciplinary authority to
o
dispense with the whole of
f the inquiry. Depending upon the
e
circumstances of the case
e, the disciplinary authority can
n
dispense with only a part of
f the inquiry.
(5) Imposition of penalty
ty is not a part of the inquiry and
d
once an inquiry is dispens
sed with, whether in whole or in
n
part, it is obligatory upon th
he disciplinary authority to give an
n
opportunity to the gov
vernment servant to make a
a
representation with respec
ct to the penalty proposed to be
e
imposed upon him.
(6) Article 311 is subje
ect to Article 14. Principles of
f
natural justice and the au
udi alteram partem rule are part
t
of Article 14 and, therefore
e, a show cause notice asking for
r
the explanation of the gove
ernment servant with respect to the
e
charges against him as al
lso a notice to show cause with
h
respect to the proposed p
penalty are required to be given
n
by Article 14 and the not g
giving of such notices or either of
f
them renders the order of d
dismissal, removal or reduction in
n
rank invalid.
33. The submissions on behalf
f of the Union of India can be thus
s
summarized :
(1) The second proviso m
must be construed according to its
s
terms. It is unambiguous
and does not admit of any such
h
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(26)
interpretation as canvassed
d for on behalf of the government
t
servants.
(2) Where under the sec
cond proviso, clause (2) of Article
e
311 is made inapplicable, t
there is no scope for holding any
y
partial inquiry.
(3) In any event, the ver
ry contents of the three clauses of
f
the second proviso show
that it is not necessary or not
t
practicable or not expedien
nt that any partial inquiry could be
e
or should be held, dependin
ng upon which clause applies.
(4) Article 14 does not gov
vern or control Article 311. The
e
Constitution must be
read as a whole. Article
e
311(2) embodies the princip
ples of natural justice including the
e
audi alteram partem rule.
It thus expressly states what is
s
required under Article 14
as a result of the interpretation
n
placed upon it by recent d
decisions of this Court. Once the
e
application of clause(2)
is expressly excluded by the
e
Constitution itself, there c
can be no question of making
g
applicable what has been
so excluded by seeking recourse
e
to Article 14.
(5) Consideration of
sympathy for the government
t
servants who may be dism
missed or removed or reduced in
n
rank are irrelevant to the c
construction of the second proviso.
The doctrine of tenure at
t pleasure in Article 310 and the
e
safeguards given to a gove
ernment servant under clauses (1)
)
and (2) of Article 311 as als
so the withdrawal of the safeguard
d
under clause (2) by the se
econd proviso are all enacted in
n
public interest and where pu
ublic interest conflicts with private
e
interest, the latter must yield
d to the former.
The Ple
easure Doctrine:
34. The concept of civil servic
ce is not now or of recent origin.
Governments - whether monarchia
al, dictatorial or republican - have
e
to function; and for carrying on
the administration and the varied
d
f
functions of the government a larg
ge number of persons are required
d
and have always been required, w
whether they are constituted in the
e
f
form of a civil service or not. E
Every kingdom and country of the
e
world throughout history had a g
group of persons who helped the
e
ruler to administer the land, whe
ther according to modern notions
s
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&M)
(27)
we may call that group a civil
service or not, because it is not
t
p
possible for one man by himself to
rule and govern the land and look
k
after and supervise all the deta
ails of administration. As it was
s
throughout history, so it has been i
in England and in India.
xx
xx xx
The Second P
Proviso to Article 311(2):
60. Clause (2) of Article 311 giv
ves a constitutional mandate to the
e
p
principles of natural justice an
d audi alteram partem rule by
y
p
providing that a person employed i
in a civil capacity under the Union
n
or a State shall not be dismissed o
r removed from service or reduced
d
in rank until after an inquiry in w
which he has been informed of the
e
charges against him and has been
given a reasonable opportunity of
f
being heard in respect of those ch
harges. To this extent, the pleasure
e
doctrine enacted in Article 310
0(1) is abridged because Article
e
311(2) is a express provision of
the Constitution. This safeguard
d
p
provided for a government serva
nt by clause (2) of Article 311 is,
however, taken away when the
second proviso to that clause
e
becomes applicable. The safeguar
rd provided by clause(1) of Article
e
311, however, remains intact and
d continues to be available to the
e
government servant. The second p
proviso to Article 311(2) becomes
s
applicable in the three cases ment
tioned in clauses (a) to (c) of that
t
p
proviso. These cases are:-
(a) where a person is di
ismissed or removed or reduced in
n
rank on the ground of condu
duct which has led to his conviction
n
on a criminal charge; or
(b) where the authority e
empowered to dismiss or remove a
a
person or to reduce him i
in rank is satisfied that for some
e
reason, to be recorded by
that authority in writing, it is not
t
reasonably practicable to ho
old such inquiry; and
(c) where the President
or the Governor, as the case may
y
be, is satisfied that in the in
nterest of the security of the State it
t
is not expedient to hold such
h inquiry.
The Construction to be placed u
upon the second proviso and the
e
scope and effect of that proviso w
were much debated at the Bar. In
n
H
Hira Lal Rattan Lal etc. v. State
e of U.P. & Anr., [1973] 2 S.C.R.
502 this Court observed (at page 5
512) ;
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"In construing a statutory p
provision, the first and the foremost
t
rule of construction is the
literary construction. All that we
e
have to see at the very outse
et is what does that provision say?
?
If the provision is unambigu
uous and if from that provision, the
e
legislative intent is clear, w
we need not call into aid the other
r
rules of construction of
f statutes. The other rules of
f
construction of statutes ar
re called into aid only when the
e
legislature intention is not
t clear. Ordinarily a proviso to a
a
section is intended to take
out a part of the main section for
r
special treatment. It is not
t expected to enlarge the scope of
f
the main section. But cases
s have arisen in which this Court
t
has held that despite the
e fact that a provision is called
d
proviso, it is really a sepa
arate provision and the so called
d
proviso has substantially al
tered the main section."
In Commissioner of Income Tax
x, Madras v. Madurai Mills Co.
Ltd., [1973] 3 S.C.R. 662 , this Cou
urt said (at page 669):
L
"A proviso cannot be const
trued as enlarging the scope of an
n
enactment when it can b
be fairly and properly construed
d
without attributing to it tha
t effect. Further, if the language of
f
the enacting part of the stat
tute is plain and unambiguous and
d
does not contain the provis
sions which are said to occur in it,
one cannot derive those p
provisions by implication from a
a
proviso."
61. The language of the second
d proviso is plan and unambiguous.
The key-words in the second pr
roviso are "this clause shall not
t
apply". By "this clause" is meant c
clause(2). As clause(2) requires an
n
inquiry to be held against a gove
ernment servant, the only meaning
g
attributable to these words is tha
at this inquiry shall not be held.
There is no scope for any ambigu
uity in these words and there is no
o
reason to given them any mean
ing different from the plain and
d
ordinary meaning which they be
ear. The resultant effect of these
e
words is that when a situation env
visaged in any of the three clauses
s
of the proviso arises and that
clause becomes applicable, the
e
safeguard provided to a governme
ent servant by clause (2) is taken
n
away. As pointed out earlier, this
s provision is as much in public
c
interest and for public good and
d a matter of public policy as the
e
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(29)
pleasure doctrine and the safegu
p
uards with respect to security of
f
tenure contained in clauses (1) and
d (2) of Article 311.
xx
xx xx
129. The next contention was
that even if it is not reasonably
y
p
practicable to hold an inquiry, a g
government servant can be placed
d
under suspension until the situ
uation improves and it becomes
s
p
possible to hold the inquiry. T
This contention also cannot be
e
accepted. Very often a situation
which makes it not reasonably
y
p
practicable to hold an inquiry is
of the creation of the concerned
d
government servant himself or o
of himself acting in concert with
h
others or of his associates. It can
n even be that he himself is not a
a
p
party to bringing about that situ
uation. In all such cases neither
r
p
public interest nor public good re
equires that salary or subsistence
e
allowance should be continued
to be paid out of the public
c
exchequer to the concerned gover
rnment servant. It should also be
e
borne in mind that in the case of
f a serious situation which renders
s
the holding of an inquiry not rea
asonably practicable, it would be
e
difficult to foresee how long th
he situation will last and when
n
normalcy would return or be rest
tored. It is impossible to draw the
e
line as to the period of time f
for which the suspension should
d
continue and on the expiry of th
hat period action should be taken
n
under clause (b) of the second pro
oviso. Further, the exigencies of a
a
situation may require that prom
mpt action should be taken and
d
suspending the government serv
vant cannot serve the purpose.
Sometimes not taking prompt a
action may result in the trouble
e
spreading and the situation wo
orsening and at times becoming
g
uncontrolable. Not taking prompt
action may also be construed by
y
the trouble- makers and agitators
as sign of weakness on the part of
f
the authorities and thus encourage
e them to step up the tempo of their
r
activities or agitation. It is true th
hat when prompt action is taken in
n
order to prevent this happening, th
here is an element of deterrence in
n
it but that is an unavoidable and n
necessary concomitance of such an
n
action resulting from a situation w
which is not of the creation of the
e
authorities. After all, clause (b)
is not meant to be applied in
n
ordinary, normal situations but
in such situations where is not
t
reasonably practicable to hold an
inquiry.
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(30)
130 The condition precedent fo
or the application of clause (b) is
s
the satisfaction of the disciplinary
authority that "it is not reasonably
y
p
practicable to hold" the inquiry co
ontemplated by clause (2) of Article
e
311. What is pertinent to note i
is that the words used are "not
t
reasonably practicable" and not
"impracticable". According to the
e
Oxford English Dictionary "pract
ticable" means "Capable of being
g
p
put into practice, carried out in a
action, effected, accomplished, or
r
done; feasible". Webster's Third
d New International Dictionary
y
defines the word "practicable" in
nter alia as meaning "possible to
o
p
practice or perform: capable of
being put into practice, done or
r
accomplished : feasible". Furthe
er, the words used are not "not
t
p
practicable" but "not reasonably p
practicable". Webster's Third New
w
International Dictionary defines
the word "reasonably" as "in a
a
reasonable manner : to a fairly s
sufficient extent". Thus, whether it
t
was practicable to hold the inqu
uiry or not must be judged in the
e
context of whether it was reasonab
bly practicable to do so. It is not a
a
total or absolute impracticability
which is required by clause (b).
What is requisite is that the holdin
ng of the inquiry is not practicable
e
in the opinion of a reasonable ma
an taking a reasonable view of the
e
p
prevailing situation. It is not po
ssible to enumerate the cases in
n
which it would not be reasonably p
practicable to hold the inquiry, but
t
some instances by way of illustr
ration may, however, be given. It
t
would not be reasonably practica
able to hold an inquiry where the
e
government servant, particularly
y through or together with his
s
associates, so terrorizes, threatens
s or intimidate witnesses who are
e
going to given evidence against
him with fear of reprisal as to
o
p
prevent them from doing so or w
where the government servant by
y
himself or together with or throug
gh other threatens, intimidates and
d
terrorizes the officer who is the di
isciplinary authority or member of
f
his family so that he is afraid to
hold the inquiry or direct it to be
e
held. It would also not be reasona
bly practicable to hold the inquiry
y
where an atmosphere of violenc
e or of general indiscipline and
d
insubordination prevails, and it is
immaterial whether the concerned
d
government servant is or is not a
a party to bringing about such an
n
atmosphere. In this connection, w
e must bear in mind that numbers
s
coerce and terrify while an indi
ividual may not. The reasonable
e
p
practicability of holding an inquir
ry is a matter of assessment to be
e
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
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(31)
made by the disciplinary authorit
ty. Such authority is generally on
n
the spot and knows what is happen
ning. It is because the disciplinary
y
authority is the best judge of this th
hat clause (3) of Article 311 makes
s
the decision of the disciplinary a
authority on this question final. A
A
disciplinary authority is not expec
cted to dispense with a disciplinary
y
inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or ou
ut of ulterior motives or merely in
n
order to avoid the holding of an in
nquiry or because the Department's
s
case against the government ser
rvant is weak and must fail. The
e
f
finality given to the decision of th
he disciplinary authority by Article
e
311(3) is not binding upon the co
urt so far as its power of judicial
l
review is concerned and in such a
case the court will strike down the
e
order dispensing with the inqui
iry as also the order imposing
g
p
penalty. The case of Arjun Chaub
bey v. Union of India and others,
[1984] 3 S.C.R. 302, is an inst
tance in point. In that case, the
e
appellant was working as a senio
or clerk in the office of the Chief
f
Commercial Superintendent, No
orthern Railway, Varanasi. The
e
Senior Commercial Officer wrote
e a letter to the appellant calling
g
upon him to submit his explanatio
n with regard to twelve charges of
f
gross indiscipline mostly relating
to the Deputy Chief Commercial
l
Superintendent. The appellant sub
bmitted his explanation and on the
e
very next day the Deputy Chief Co
ommercial Superintendent served a
a
second notice on the appellant sa
aying that his explanation was not
t
convincing and that another chanc
ce was being given to him to offer
r
his explanation with respect to
o those charges. The appellant
t
submitted his further explanation
n but on the very next day the
e
D
Deputy Chief Commercial Sup
uperintendent passed an order
r
dismissing him on the ground tha
at he was not fit to be retained in
n
service. This Court struck down th
he order holding that seven out of
f
twelve charges related to the co
onduct of the appellant with the
e
D
Deputy Chief Commercial Superin
ntendent who was the disciplinary
y
authority and that if an inquiry we
ere to be held, the principal witness
s
f
for the Department would have be
een the Deputy Chief Commercial
l
Superintendent himself, resulting i
in the same person being the main
n
accuser, the chief witness and also
the judge of the matter.
xx
xx xx
133. The second condition nece
essary for the valid application of
f
clause (b) of the second proviso
is that the disciplinary authority
y
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(32)
should record in writing its reason
n for its satisfaction that it was not
t
reasonably practicable to hold th
he inquiry contemplated by Article
e
311(2). This is a Constitutional ob
bligation and if such reason is not
t
recorded in writing, the order dis
spensing with the inquiry and the
e
order of penalty following there
reupon would both be void and
d
unconstitutional.”
In Jaswant Singh’s case (supr
36.
ra) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court
t
has held tha
at two conditions must necessa
arily be satisfied before action
n
under Article
e 311(2) (b) can be sustained: fi
first, there must exist a situation
n
which render
rs the holding of an enquiry “n
not reasonably practicable”; and
d
secondly, th
he disciplinary authority must
record in writing the reasons
s
supporting it
s satisfaction. It has been held as
s under:
“2. The appellant was placed u
under suspension on April 19, 1978
8
on the ground that he had absente
ed himself from duty to attend the
e
A
Annual Nirankari Samagam held
on April 13,1978. The allegation
n
was enquired into through the conc
cerned Assistant Superintendent of
f
Police. As nothing objectionable w
was found he was exonerated and
d
was ordered to be taken back in s
service with effect from the date of
f
his suspension. Thereafter, two
o departmental enquiries were
e
initiated. against him. The outco
ome of the first inquiry was his
s
reversion to the lower post of Cons
stable: the second inquiry resulted
d
in his dismissal from service. Both
these orders of April 27, 1979 and
d
October 12, 1979 respectively, p
assed by ASP/GRP, Patiala were
e
challenged by two separate app
peals. Both these appeals were
e
dismissed by the third respondent
by his orders dated March 18 and
d
19, 1980. The appellant pre
eferred two separate Revision
n
A
Applications to the Inspector Gene
eral of Police. Punjab which were
e
allowed on October 13, 1980 an
nd both the cases were remanded
d
with a direction to re-consider t
the inquiry report and pass fresh
h
orders. The ASP/GRP was direct
ted to reinstate the appellant and
d
then issue fresh show cause noti
ices. After the above orders were
e
p
passed the appellant rejoined dutie
es as Head Constable on March 5,
1981. The third respondent howe
ver, placed him under suspension
n
f
forthwith. Thereafter, the appella
ant sought an interview with the
e
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(33)
Director General/Inspector Gener
D
ral of Police, Punjab by his two
o
letters dated March 23 and 27, 19
981 addressed to respondent No. 3.
Since respondent No. 3 refused p
permission the appellant claims to
o
have written a letter dated March
24, 1981 to the DG/IGP informing
g
him about the objectionable act
tivities of respondent No. 3. the
e
receipt of this letter by the office
of DG/IGP is, however, disputed
d
although the appellant has prod
duced an acknowledgement dated
d
March 27, 1981 evidencing the rec
ceipt thereof. Be that as it may, the
e
f
fact remains that after the rem
mand orders were passed in the
e
appellant's two Revision Applicat
tions, the third respondent issued
d
two separate notice, both dated
April 4, 1981, calling upon the
e
appellant to show cause within 10
0 days from receipt thereof why he
e
should not be dismissed from ser
rvice. Before the service of these
e
show cause notices an incident
occurred at about 11.00 a.m. on
n
A
April 6, 1981 in GRP Lines, Pati
iala, where the appellant resided.
The allegation is that on that dat
te at the said time and place S.I.,
N
Niranjan Singh, A.S.I., Harmel Sin
ngh and A.S.I., Ram Prakash were
e
in the verandah of barrack No. 8
8. In their full view the appellant
t
appeared in the verandah with a
knife in his left hand and tried to
o
p
plunge the same into his chest w
with a view to committing suicide.
S.I., Niranjan Singh, acting on
n impulse, gave a push to the
e
appellant's left but in the process
s the blade of the knife caused an
n
injury to the appellant on his rig
ght arm and his shirt was blood
d
stained. The appellant was charg
ge-sheeted u/s 309 I.P.C. and was
s
sent to the hospital for treatment.
It is alleged that while he was in
n
hospital the two show cause notic
ces were served on him on April 6,
1981 at about 10.00 p.m. Even tho
ough 10 days time was allowed to
o
him to show cause, the third respo
ondent who was biased against him
m
p
passed the impugned order of d
dismissal on April 7, 1981. The
e
appellant contends that the third
d respondent's action was clearly
y
mala fide and actuated by ulterio
or motives. The appellant further
r
contends that there was no just
tification for dispensing with the
e
enquiry contemplated by Article
311(2) and the ground given in
n
p
paragraph 3 of the impugned orde
er is wholly imaginary. He further
r
contends that the impugned order
of April 7, 1981 was not actually
y
served on him but his signature wa
as obtained on some piece of paper
r
while he was in hospital. Accordin
ng to him, after he was discharged
d
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(34)
from the hospital he applied for a c
f
copy of the impugned order but the
e
third respondent failed to furn
nish the same to him. Similar
r
applications were also addressed
to the DG/ IGP from time to time
e
but he did not receive any reply t
to his letters and reminders. Since
e
the period of limitation for filing
an appeal was likely to expire he
e
p
preferred his appeal without bei
ing aware of the contents of the
e
impugned order. This appeal was
s dismissed by the DG/IGP by his
s
order dated January 29, 1982. He
then filed a Civil Suit in the Court
t
of the learned Senior Sub-Judge,
, Patiala, wherein he applied for
r
p
production of documents and secu
ured an order for the production of
f
a copy of the impugned dismissal
order dated April 7, 1981. After a
a
copy of the impugned order was
s produced he preferred another
r
departmental appeal but that too
o was dismissed on February 5,
1982. After he failed to pursuade t
the Appellate Authority to look into
o
his grievances he filed the Writ Pe
etition which has given rise to this
s
appeal. The department's case fo
und in the counter is that on the
e
night of April 5/6, 1981. The Lin
nes Officer had gone to check the
e
p
presence of the appellant in his q
quarter when the latter bolted the
e
door from inside and threatened t
the Lines Officer and then filed a
a
f
false case that the Lines Officer h
had broken his window panes and
d
had thrown stones in his room. On
n inquiry the complaint was found
d
to be baseless. Thereafter, on Apri
il 6, 1981, at about 11.00 a.m. the
e
appellant attempted to commit suic
cide.
xx xx
xx
4. Article 310 of our Constitu
ution which engrafts the pleasure
e
doctrine of the English common
law is, however, qualified by the
e
opening words 'except as express
sly provided by this Constitution'.
A
Article 311 is one such express p
provision. According to Clause (1)
)
thereof, a person who is a mem
mber of a civil service cannot be
e
dismissed or removed from servic
ce by an authority subordinate to
o
that by which he was appointed.
Clause (2) next provides that no
o
such person shall be dismissed or r
removed or reduced in rank except
t
after an inquiry in which he ha
as been informed of the charges
s
against him and given a reasonab
ble opportunity of being heard in
n
respect of those charges. Then com
mes the first proviso with which we
e
are not concerned. The second pro
oviso has three clauses but we are
e
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(35)
concerned with Clause (b) only. C
Clause (b) of that second proviso
o
reads as under:
“Provided further that this
clause shall not apply-
x x
x
(b) where the authority e
empowered to dismiss or remove a
a
person or to reduce him i
in rank is satisfied that for some
e
reason, to be recorded by
that authority in writing, it is not
t
reasonably practicable to h
old such inquiry.”
Thus the English doctrine incorp
rporated in Article 310 which is
s
qualified by the opening words "ex
xcept as expressly provided by this
s
Constitution" is subject to Articl
le 311(1) and (2) which contains
s
safeguards against termination fr
rom service. However, the second
d
p
proviso to Article 311(2) is again
in the nature of an exception and
d
lays down that in cases catalogued
d in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof
f
the requirement of an inquiry can
n be dispensed with. The scope of
f
A
Articles 310 and 311 of the Consti
itution was examined by this Court
t
in Union of India and Anr. v. Tul
lsi Ram Patel and Ors. [1985] Su.
2 SCR 131 wherein by majority
y this Court held that once the
e
requirements of the relevant cla
ause of the second proviso are
e
satisfied, the services of a civil s
servant can be terminated without
t
f
following the audi alteram partem
m rule. It was held that since the
e
requirement of Article 311(2) was
s expressly excluded by the second
d
p
proviso, there was no question of
f introducing the same by the back
k
door. On this line of reasoning,
the majority held that Divisonal
l
Personnel Officer, Southern
Railway & another Vs.
6) 1 SCR 783 , was not correctly
y
T.R.Chellappan & others, (1976)
decided. It, therefore, took the view
w that it is not necessary to offer a
a
hearing to the civil servant ev
ven on the limited question of
f
p
punishment. Insofar as Clause (b)
) is concerned this Court pointed
d
out that two conditions must be sa
atisfied to sustain any action taken
n
thereunder. These are (i) there mu
ust exist a situation which renders
s
holding of any inquiry "not reas
sonably practicable" and (ii) the
e
disciplinary authority must record
d in writing its reasons in support
t
of its satisfaction. Of course the
e question of practicability would
d
depend on the existing fact-si
ituation and other surrounding
g
circumstances, that is to say, t
that the question of reasonable
e
p
practicability must be judged in
n the light of the circumstances
s
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(36)
prevailing at the date of the passi
p
ing of the order. Although Clause
e
(3) of that Article makes the decisi
ion of the disciplinary authority in
n
this behalf final such finality can c
certainly be tested in a court of law
w
and interfered with if the action is
found to be arbitrary or mala fide
e
or motivated by extraneous con
nsiderations or merely a ruse to
o
dispense with the inquity. Also s
see: Satyavir Singh Vs. Union of
f
SCC 252 ; Shivaji Atmaji Sawant
I
India (UOI) & others, (1985) 4 S
t
Others, (1986) 2 SCC 112 , and
d
Vs. State of Maharashtra and
lkramuddin Ahmed Borah v. Su
uperintendent of Police, Darrang
g
and Ors. [1988] Su. SCC 663 .
5. The impugned order of A
April 7, 1981 itself contains the
e
reasons for dispensing with the
inquiry contemplated by Article
e
311(2) of the Constitution. Paragr
raph 3 of the said order, which we
e
have extracted earlier, gives t
two reasons in support of the
e
satisfaction that it was not rea
asonably practicable to hold a
a
departmental enquiry against th
he appellant. These are (i) the
e
appellant has thrown threats that
t he with the help of other police
e
employees will not allow holdin
ng of any departmental enquiry
y
against him and (ii) he and his as
ssociates will not hesitate to cause
e
p
physical injury to the witnesses as
s well as the enquiry officer. Now
w
as stated earlier after the two Revi
ision Applications were allowed on
n
October 13, 1980. the appellant
t had re-joined service as Head
d
Constable on March 5, 1981 but
he was immediately placed under
r
suspension. Thereafter, two show
cause notices dated April 4, 1981
were issued against him calling up
pon him to reply thereto within 10
0
days after the receipt thereof. Befo
fore the service of these notices the
e
incident of alleged attempt to co
ommit suicide took place on the
e
morning of April 6, 1981 at abou
ut 11.00 a.m. In that incident the
e
appellant sustained an injury on h
his right arm with a knife. He was,
therefore, hospitalised and while
he was in hospital the two show
w
cause notices were served on him
m at about 10.00 p.m. on April 6,
1981. Before the appellant coul
ld reply to the said show cause
e
notices the third respondent passe
ed the impugned order on the very
y
next day i.e. April 7, 1981. Now t
the earlier departmental enquiries
s
were duly conducted against the ap
ppellant and there is no allegation
n
that the department had found any
y difficulty in examining witnesses
s
in the said inquiries. After the Re
evision Applications were allowed
d
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(37)
the show cause notices were issue
ed and 10 days time was given to
o
the appellant to put in his replies
s thereto. We, therefore, enquired
d
f
from the learned Counsel for th
he respondents to point out what
t
impelled respondent No. 3 to take
a decision that it was necessary to
o
f
forthwith terminate the services of
f the appellant without holding an
n
inquiry as required by Article 311
1(2). The learned Counsel for the
e
respondents could only point out C
Clause (iv)(a) of sub-para 29(A) of
f
the counter which reads as under:
“The order dated 7.4.81
was passed as the petitioner's
s
activities were objectionab
ble. He was instigating his fellow
w
police officials to cause in
ndiscipline, show insubordination
n
and exhibit disloyalty, spre
eading discontentment and hatred,
etc. and his retention in serv
vice was adjudged harmful.”
This is no more than a mere rep
production of paragraph 3 of the
e
impugned order. Our attention
was not drawn to any material
l
existing on the date of the imp
pugned order in support of the
e
allegation contained in paragraph
h 3 thereof that the appellant had
d
thrown threats that he and his com
mpanions will not allow holding of
f
any departmental enquiry agains
st him and that they would not
t
hesitate to cause physical injury
y to the witnesses as well as the
e
enquiry officer if any such attemp
pt was made. It was incumbent on
n
the respondents to disclose to the
Court the material in existence at
t
the date of the passing of the im
mpugned order in support of the
e
subjective satisfaction recorded
d by respondent No. 3 in the
e
impugned order. Clause (b) of the
e second proviso to Article 311(2)
)
can be invoked only when the auth
hority is satisfied from the material
l
p
placed before him that it is not
reasonably practicable to hold a
a
departmental enquiry. This is clea
ar from the following observation
n
at p. 270 of Tulsi Ram's case:
“A disciplinary authority is
is not expected to dispense with a
a
disciplinary authority lightl
ly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior
r
motives or merely in order
to avoid the holding of an inquiry
y
or because the Departmen
nt's case against the government
t
servant is weak and must fa
ail.”
The decision to dispense with th
the departmental enquiry cannot,
therefore, be rested solely on
the ipse dixit of the concerned
d
authority. When the satisfaction
n of the concerned authority is
s
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(38)
questioned in a court of law, it is
s incumbent on those who support
t
the order to show that the satisfac
ction is based on certain objective
e
f
facts and is not the outcome of the
e whim or caprice of the concerned
d
officer. In the counter filed by the
e third respondent it is contended
d
that the appellant, instead of rep
plying to the show cause notices,
instigated his fellow police officia
als to disobey the superiors. It is
s
also said that he threw threats t
to beat up the witnesses and the
e
Inquiry Officer if any departmenta
al inquiry was held against him. No
o
p
particulars are given. Besides it
is difficult to understand how he
e
could have given threats, etc., w
when he was in hospital. It is not
t
shown on what material the third r
respondent came to the conclusion
n
that the appellant had thrown thr
reats as alleged in paragraph 3 of
f
the impugned order. On a close s
scrutiny of the impugned order it
t
seems the satisfaction was base
ed on the ground that he was
s
instigating his colleagues and w
was holding meetings with other
r
p
police officials with a view to spr
reading hatred and dissatisfaction
n
towards his superiors. This alle
egation is based on his alleged
d
activities at Jullundur on April
3, 1981 reported by SHO/GRP,
Jullundur. That report is not forth
hcoming. It is no one's contention
n
that the said SHO was threatened
d. The third respondent's counter
r
also does not reveal if he had
d verified the correctness of the
e
information. To put it tersely the s
subjective satisfaction recorded in
n
p
paragraph 3 of the impugned
order is not fortified by any
y
independent material to justify th
he dispensing with of the inquiry
y
envisaged by Article 311(2) of the
e Constitution. We are, therefore,
of the opinion that on this short g
ground alone the impugned order
r
cannot be sustained.”
37.
It is relevant to note that appl
lying the judgment of Tulsiram
m
Patel ’s case
(supra), various cases have
been decided by the Hon’ble
e
Supreme Cou
urt indicating what may be a su
ufficient reason and how and in
n
what circum
mstances holding a department
tal enquiry is not reasonably
y
practicable, a
and the scope of judicial review
in such cases. In Ex. Constable
e
s case (supra) the Court held as th
hus:
Chhote Lal’s
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(39)
“2. The appellant who was a C
Constable has been dismissed from
m
service by the departmental autho
ority without holding any inquiry
y
and exercising power under Artic
cle 311(2), second proviso, clause
e
(b) of the Constitution of India. H
Having failed in his attempt to get
t
the order of the departmental a
authority annulled in appeal, the
e
appellant approached the Central
Administrative Tribunal (for short
t
"the Tribunal") mainly conten
nding that in the facts and
d
circumstances of the present case,
, dispensation of an inquiry is not
t
j
justified. The Tribunal having
dismissed his application, the
e
appellant approached the High Co
ourt by way of a writ petition and
d
the High Court having dismissed h
his writ petition, the appellant is in
n
appeal before this Court.
3. Mr Yadav, learned couns
sel appearing for the appellant
t
contends that though the employer
r has the power to dispense with an
n
inquiry under Article 311(2), se
econd proviso, clause (b) of the
e
Constitution but the conditions pr
recedent for exercising that power
r
have now been indicated in severa
al decisions of this Court and in the
e
p
present case, those conditions prec
cedent cannot be said to have been
n
satisfied. Mr. Choudhary, the lear
rned Senior Counsel appearing for
r
the respondents, on the other ha
and, contended that the appellant
t
himself being a Police Consta
able could have influenced the
e
witnesses who would have come i
in the departmental inquiry and if
f
on that ground the departmental
authorities apprehended that the
e
inquiry would not be reasonable a
and fair, the conclusion cannot be
e
interfered with.
4. Having examined the riva
al contentions of the parties and
d
bearing in mind the law laid do
own by this Court indicating the
e
circumstances under which the inq
quiry under Article 311(2), second
d
p
proviso, clause (b) of the Constit
tution can be dispensed with and
d
applying the same to the facts an
nd circumstances and the reasons
s
advanced by the authorities in arr
riving at the decision, we have no
o
hesitation to come to the conclusi
ion that the order dispensing with
h
the departmental inquiry is no
ot in accordance with law and
d
necessarily the order of dism
issal cannot be sustained. We
e
accordingly set aside the order
of dismissal passed against the
e
appellant and permit the departme
ental authority to hold an inquiry if
f
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(40)
so desired, in accordance with law
w and come to the conclusion in the
e
said proceeding.
5. Normally, an order of di
ismissal on being set aside, the
e
employee can claim back wages, b
but in this case we are not inclined
d
to grant back wages to the employ
yee concerned, more so, in view of
f
”
the nature of charges against him.
38.
In the case of Tarsem Singh
h’s case (supra), the Hon’ble
e
Supreme Co
ourt has observed that the p
power of dispensing with the
e
constitutiona
al remedy of a delinquent, shou
uld not be exercised lightly or
r
arbitrarily, o
or out of ulterior motive with
the intent to avoid holding an
n
enquiry. In th
he said case, it has been observed
d as thus:
“10. It is now a well-settled prin
nciple of law that a constitutional
l
right conferred upon a delinquent
t cannot be dispensed with lightly
y
or arbitrarily or out of ulterior m
motive or merely in order to avoid
d
the holding of an enquiry. The lea
arned counsel appearing on behalf
f
of the appellant has taken us th
hrough certain documents for the
e
p
purpose of showing that ultimate
ely the police on investigation did
d
not find any case against the app
pellant in respect of the purported
d
FIR lodged against him under Sec
ction 377 IPC. However, it may not
t
be necessary for us to go into the s
said question.
xx
xx xx
14. In view of the fact that no
material had been placed by the
e
respondents herein to satisfy the
e Court that it was necessary to
o
dispense with a formal enquiry in
n terms of proviso (b) appended to
o
Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Co
Constitution of India, we are of the
e
opinion that the impugned orders
cannot be sustained and they are
e
set aside accordingly. The appella
ant is directed to be reinstated in
n
service. However, in view of our
aforementioned findings, it would
d
be open to the respondents to initia
ate a departmental enquiry against
t
……..”
the appellant if they so desire………
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(41)
In Risal Singh’s case (supra)
39.
) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court
t
emphasised t
that, while assigning the reason
in writing, it is imperative that
t
such reason
must be plausible and based o
on definite material. In the said
d
case, the Cou
urt relied upon on the judgment
of Tulsiram Patel’s case (supra)
)
and conclude
ed as under:
“10. Tested on the touchstone
of the aforesaid authorities, the
e
irresistible conclusion is that the o
order passed by the Superintendent
t
of Police dispensing with the inqu
uiry is totally unsustainable and is
s
hereby annulled. As the foundatio
on founders, the order of the High
h
Court giving the stamp of appro
val to the ultimate order without
t
addressing the lis from a proper p
perspective is also indefensible and
d
resultantly, the order of dismis
ssal passed by the disciplinary
y
authority has to pave the path of ex
xtinction.
11. Consequently, we allow th
e appeal and set aside the order
r
p
passed by the High Court and tha
t of the disciplinary authority. The
e
appellant shall be deemed to
be in service till the date of
f
superannuation. As he has attained
d the age of superannuation in the
e
meantime, he shall be entitled to
o all consequential benefits. The
e
arrears shall be computed and pai
id to the appellant within a period
d
of three months hence. Needless
to say, the respondents are not
t
p
precluded from initiating any disc
iplinary proceedings, if advised in
n
law. As the lis has been pending be
efore the Court, the period that has
s
been spent in Court shall be exclu
uded for the purpose of limitation
n
f
for initiating the disciplinary proc
ceedings as per rules. However, we
e
may hasten to clarify that our o
observations herein should not be
e
construed as a mandate to the au
thorities to initiate the proceeding
g
against the appellant. We may fur
rther proceed to add that the State
e
Government shall conduct itself a
as a model employer and act with
h
the objectivity which is expected f
from it. There shall be no order as
s
to costs.”
In Hari Niwas Gupta v. State
40.
of Bihar & another, 2020 (3)
)
SCC 153 , it h
has been held as under:
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(42)
“11. Striking down and setting
th
aside the earlier order dated 12
h
February, 2014 under clause (b)
) of the second proviso to Article
e
311(2) for failure to record re
easons for dispensing with the
e
departmental inquiry annuls the e
earlier order, which ceases to exist
t
and stands obliterated, but does n
not adjudicate on the merits of the
e
allegations so as to attract the bar
r of res judicata. Conscious of the
e
seriousness of the allegations and
d the reason for allowing the writ
t
p
petition, the Division Bench was
justified in not barring the High
h
Court from fresh application of mi
ind and from invoking clause (b) of
f
the second proviso to Article 31
11(2) if required and justified in
n
accordance with law. The express
ion ‘at appropriate stage’ used by
y
the Division Bench is not a dire
ection for initiation of a regular
r
departmental inquiry nor does it p
prohibit recourse to clause (b) to
o
the second proviso of Article
311(2) of the Constitution in
n
accordance with law. We do not
see such fetters and restrictions
s
p
placed on the High Court by the D
Division Bench.
xx
xx xx
15. The observations in our o
opinion are being misread as the
e
afore-quoted portion refers to t
the legal position that normally
y
departmental inquiry should be h
held. It also refers to the scenario
o
where a departmental inquiry can
nnot be conducted that is, “when
n
conducting of departmental enquir
ry was turning out to be a difficult
t
task”, in which case a “decision c
could have been taken to dispense
e
with the enquiry; by recording spe
ecific reasons”. It is observed that
t
the principles laid down in Tulsira
am Patel (supra) and Tarsem Singh
h
(supra) have to be kept in mind. Ap
ppropriate in this regard, would be
e
a reference to the following obser
rvations in Tulsiram Patel (supra),
which read:
“130. The condition preced
dent for the application of clause
e
(b) is the satisfaction of the
e disciplinary authority that “it is
s
not reasonably practicable
to hold” the inquiry contemplated
d
by clause (2) of Article 311
1. What is pertinent to note is that
t
the words used are “not
reasonably practicable” and not
t
“impracticable”. According
g to the Oxford English Dictionary
y
“practicable” means “Cap
pable of being put into practice,
carried out in action, ef
ffected, accomplished, or done;
;
feasible”. Webster’s Third
d New International Dictionary
y
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(43)
defines the word “pract
ticable” inter alia as meaning
g
“possible to practice or pe
erform: capable of being put into
o
practice, done or accomplis
shed: feasible”. Further, the words
s
used are not “not pra
acticable” but “not reasonably
y
practicable”. Webster’s Th
hird New International Dictionary
y
defines the word “reasonab
bly” as “in a reasonable manner:
:
to a fairly sufficient extent”
”. Thus, whether it was practicable
e
to hold the inquiry or not
must be judged in the context of
f
whether it was reasonably
practicable to do so. It is not a
a
total or absolute impractica
ability which is required by clause
e
(b). What is requisite is tha
at the holding of the inquiry is not
t
practicable in the opinion
n of a reasonable man taking a
a
reasonable view of the preva
ailing situation.”
Thus, the authorities to invoke th
he power under clause (b) to the
e
second proviso of Article 311(2)
to dispense with a departmental
l
inquiry must record a finding t
that such an inquiry cannot be
e
conducted and record specific reas
sons for the same. In this case, the
e
D
Division Bench had recorded the c
contention of the respondent- High
h
Court as the disciplinary authori
ity that it would be impossible to
o
assimilate, collect and produce di
irect evidence and material as the
e
acts and misdeeds were in anoth
her country. The Division Bench
h
having found that reasons had not
been recorded for dispensing with
h
the inquiry, has neither accepted n
nor rejected this contention of the
e
High Court. It will not be approp
priate and correct to interpret the
e
decision of the Division Bench by
reading one or more sentences of
f
a paragraph in isolation. The en
ntire judgment has to be read to
o
understand the ratio and finding a
and the observations must be read
d
in the context in which they have b
been made.
xx
xx xx
19. During the course of hear
ring before us, it was pointed out
t
that the Full Court had subsequen
ntly again recommended dismissal
l
of the judicial officers dispensing
g with the departmental inquiry in
n
the exercise of power under cl
lause (b) of the second proviso
o
th
on vide recommendation dated 13
h
to Article 311(2) of the Constitutio
A
August 2015. However, the ma
atter is pending with the State
e
Government and we were inform
med that no final order has been
n
p
passed in view of the stay order d
dated 11th September 2015 passed
d
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(44)
by this Court. It was also initially
urged and argued that the order of
f
dismissal under clause (b) of the s
second proviso to Article 311(2) of
f
the Constitution cannot be pass
sed against the officer who has
s
retired. We were informed that the
other two officers had also retired
d
during the pendency of the prese
ent appeals. Therefore, at best the
e
p
pensionary and retirement benefits
ts can be forfeited and denied, but
t
an order of dismissal from ser
rvice by invoking powers under
r
clause(b) of the second proviso t
to Article 311(2) cannot be passed
d
against the appellants - judicial o
officers. Subsequently, the counsel
l
f
for the appellants - judicial office
rs did not press this contention as
s
the matter is still pending before t
the State authorities, and the final
l
order is yet to be passed. A
challenge cannot be made in
n
anticipation. Further, this challeng
ge was also not the subject matter
r
of the writ petitions in which the
e impugned order was passed and
d
would constitute an entirely new
cause of action. Counsels for the
e
appellants - judicial officers have
e, accordingly, reserved their right
t
to challenge the order if, and as an
nd when it is passed. In view of the
e
aforesaid position, we would no
ot go into the merits of the said
d
contention and leave the issue
open. It is equally open to the
e
respondents, that is, the State o
of Bihar and the High Court to
o
examine this contention.
20. Recording the aforesaid, th
he appeals are dismissed and the
e
stay order is vacated, albeit we cla
arify that the respondents, in terms
s
of the judgment passed by the Div
vision Bench, would be required to
o
p
proceed in accordance with law
w. We also clarify that we have
e
expressed no opinion on the merit
ts of the allegations made against
t
the three judicial officers. There wo
ould be no order as to costs.”
In view of the settled propositi
41.
ion of law, as discussed above,
,
and on overa
all analysis of the intent of Artic
cle 311(2) of the Constitution, it
t
is vivid that
an employee can only be dism
missed or removed or reduced in
n
rank after an
n inquiry by supplying the cha
arges against him and giving a
a
reasonable op
pportunity of being heard in res
spect of those charges, however,
,
the applicabi
ility of the exceptional proviso
of clause (b) of second proviso
o
to Article 311
1 (2) of Constitution of India is r
restricted to a situation, wherein
n
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(45)
he delinquent led to his convictio
conduct of th
on of criminal charges or where
e
the authority
y empowered who dismissed,
removed or reduced in rank,
,
records reas
son in writing upon satisfacti
ion that it is not ‘reasonably
y
practicable’ t
to hold an enquiry against him.
The disciplinary authority must
t
not dispense
e with an enquiry merely on
n the basis of its subjective
e
satisfaction
or by mechanically reproduc
cing the language of Article
e
311(2)(b) of
f the Constitution. The reasons
must demonstrate the existence
e
of circumsta
ances which genuinely render
r the holding of the enquiry
y
impracticable
e. Ordinarily, circumstances suc
ch as witnesses being unwilling
g
to depose on
n account of threats, intimidati
ion or coercion may constitute
e
relevant cons
siderations. However, the mere s
seriousness of the allegations or
r
the possibilit
ty that the delinquent employee
e may not cooperate cannot, by
y
itself, satisfy
y the constitutional requirement.
The wording as used in clause
e
(b) of the s
second proviso indicates the s
satisfaction of the Disciplinary
y
Authority by
y using the word “it is not reas
sonably practicable to hold” the
e
inquiry cont
emplated by clause (2) of Arti
cle 311. The Hon’ble Supreme
e
Court empha
asized the meaning of “not reason
nably practicable” as juxtaposed
d
against not “
“impracticable”. The Hon’ble S
Supreme Court clarified that the
e
disciplinary
authority is not expected to
dispense with a departmental
l
inquiry lightl
ly or arbitrarily or out of ulterio
or motives or merely in order to
o
avoid the hol
lding of an inquiry or because th
he Department’s case against the
e
government s
servant is weak and may fail. Fu
urther, the Court emphasised the
e
words used
in clause (b) of second proviso
o that the disciplinary authority
y
should recor
rd its reasons in writing for i
its satisfaction that holding an
n
inquiry is no
ot reasonably practicable. In case
e, such reason is not recorded in
n
writing or no
ot valid and justifiable, the order
dispensing with the inquiry and
d
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(46)
penalty flowing therefrom woul
the order of
ld be void and unconstitutional.
.
In that situat
tion, it remains always open to t
the Court to take the case out of
f
purview of th
hat clause and the order of penalt
ty would stand invalidated.
42.
This Court has also noticed the
e manner in which the State of
f
Punjab has in
nvoked Article 311(2)(b) of the
e Constitution in a large number
r
of cases. In
CWP-13285-2022 titled ‘Ex. Co
onstable Vikas No.950/FZR Vs.
jab & others’ this Court, vide or
rder dated 04.07.2022, observed
d
State of Punj
as under:
“xx
xx xx
This Court has noticed whi
ile dealing with the current roster,
that a large number of writ peti
itions are being filed against the
e
order of dismissal invoking Articl
le 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of
f
India. The competent authorities a
are ignoring the law as settled by
y
the Supreme Court regarding dism
missal of an employee under Article
e
311(2)(b) of the Constitution of In
ndia, which leads to the impugned
d
orders being set aside.
It might be appropriate for
the State Governments to look into
o
this issue and apprise the compet
tent authorities about the relevant
t
case law pertaining to invoking Ar
rticle 311(2)(b) of the Constitution
n
of India at the time of seeking to s
summarily dismiss the Government
t
employees.
Let a copy of this order be
conveyed to the Chief Secretaries
s
of the States of Punjab and Ha
ryana as well as the Advisor to
o
”
A
Administrator, U.T., Chandigarh.”
In compliance of said directio
43.
ons, the office of the Director
r
General of P
Police, Punjab, Chandigarh, issu
ued guidelines/instructions dated
d
02.09.2022, w
which reads thus:
“Subject:- Guidelines/Instructio
of the Hon'ble Pun
pertaining to invok
Constitution of India
employee/official.
Memo
ons for compliance of the Orders
s
njab and Haryana High Court,
king Article 311 (2) (B) of the
a in cases involving dismissal of an
e
n
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(47)
1. In this regard, the Hon'ble
Punjab and Haryana High Court
t
has issued directions in the Civil
Writ Petition 13285 of 2022 titled
d
as Ex Constable Vikas No. 950/FZ
FZR Vs State of Punjab and others
s
on 04.07.2022 that:-
"xx xx
xx"
2. That in compliance with
the aforesaid directions of the
e
Hon'ble High Court, this office is
issuing guidelines/instructions for
r
the basic understanding of the Art
ticle 311 (2) (b) while invoking the
e
same in cases of dismissal, remo
oval or reduction in rank of the
e
employee/official. It has been se
en in many cases that the order
r
p
passed by the Competent Authorit
ties under Article 311 (2) (b) have
e
f
failed in the Hon'ble Courts and t
the Hon'ble Courts have set aside
e
such dismissal order of the person
nels time and again and reinstated
d
them in service. The Hon'ble Cour
rts have also observed in numerous
s
cases that decision to dispense wit
th the departmental enquiry cannot
t
be rested solely on the ipse dixit
of the concerned authorities. It is
s
well settled proposition of law tha
at due reasons are necessary to be
e
recorded in writing as to why it
t was not practicably possible to
o
conduct an enquiry.
3. That the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India and Hon'ble High
h
Courts, in catena of judgments h
have specifically made clear that
t
order of dismissal is not to be pass
sed in a mechanical manner. It has
s
also been held that only in cases
where disciplinary authorities are
e
satisfied on the basis of material a
available on file that the case is of
f
such a nature that it is not practica
able possible to hold an enquiry in
n
view of threat, inducement, affiliat
tion with criminals etc. that article
e
311(2) (b) of Constitution of India,
, is to be invoked.
4. That the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India and High Courts
s
have delivered various judgments
s on the interpretations of Article
e
311 (2) (b). Few are mentioned he
ere and are required to be followed
d
in letter and spirit while dealing
in cases involving Article 311 (2)
)
(b) of the Constitution of India.
1. The Hon'ble Suprem
e Court of India in Union of India
a
Vs Tulsi Ram Pa
atel & others, judgment dated
d
11.07.1985 is well
traversed and has clarified the
e
constitutional provis
ions as embodied in Article 311(2)
)
of the Constitution.
The judgment is detailed and is a
a
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CWP-878-2025 (O&M)
(48)
settled law pertaini
ing to matters involving article
e
311(2)(b) of the Cons
stitution of India.
2. In CWP No.15903 t
titled as Dinesh Singh Vs State of
f
Punjab & others de
ecided on 30.08.2016, the Hon'ble
e
Court has held "Co
onstitution of India, 1950 Article
e
311 (2) due reasons
are necessary to be recorded as to
o
why it was not pra
acticably possible to conduct an
n
enquiry or how it w
was not convenient to authority or
r
inquiry officer to co
onduct an enquiry-said provisions
s
are attracted by e
exercising extraordinary powers
s
under extraordinar
ry circumstances- absence of
f
extraordinary circum
mstances while invoking provisions
s
of article 311 (2) (b)
can be termed as misuse of power
r
and as such, action
of the authority is not sustainable
e
in the eyes of law.
3. The Hon'ble Punjab
b & Haryana High Court in CWP
P
No. 10423 of 2020
titled Sarabjit Singh Vs State of
f
Punjab & others h
has held that authority chose to
o
dismiss petitioner w
without holding Inquiry- careful
l
reading of the impug
gned order shows that there is total
l
absence of reasons
in this regard- mere observation
n
that departmental
enquiry at this stage does not
t
appear to be justified
d is not sufficient to invoke powers
s
under clause (b) of th
he 2nd proviso to article 311(2) of
f
the Constitution of I
India. Petitioner directly to be re-
-
instated.
5. It should also be ensured
that recording in writing of the
e
reasons for dispensing with the
enquiry must precede an order
r
imposing the penalty. Legally spe
eaking the reasons for dispensing
g
with the enquiry need not find pla
ace in the final order itself though
h
they should be recorded separate
ely in the relevant file. In spite of
f
this legal position, it would be
of advantage to incorporate the
e
reasons which lead the disciplinar
ry authority to the conclusion that
t
it was not reasonably practicable t
to hold an enquiry. The reasons so
o
given should not be vague or they
y should not be just a repetition of
f
the language of the relevant rules.
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(49)
6. That the aforementioned
guidelines/instructions and the
e
relevant detailed case laws are to
o be examined and followed by the
e
concerned disciplinary authority
while invoking article 311(2)(b)
)
Constitution of India. These g
guidelines/instructions alongwith
h
relevant case laws are to be stric
ctly adhered and their meticulous
s
compliance is to be ensured.”
44.
It has also been noticed by this C
Court that, in a number of cases,
,
Police Office
ers/Officials have been dismisse
ed from service by invoking the
e
provisions o
f Article 311(2)(b) of the Con
nstitution merely on account of
f
registration o
of an FIR against them. In the p
present case, despite issuance of
f
two show-ca
ause notices dated 19.09.2024 (A
Annexure P-11) and 14.10.2024
4
(Annexure P
P-14) proposing initiation of de
epartmental proceedings against
t
the petitione
er; followed by his suspension
n, vide order dated 25.10.2024
4
(Annexure P
-16) and issuance of a charge-sh
heet dated 25.10.2024 (Annexure
e
P-17), the r
respondents proceeded to dism
miss the petitioner by invoking
g
Article 311(2
2)(b) of the Constitution and di
ispensing with the holding of a
a
regular depar
rtmental enquiry.
45.
The stand taken up by the resp
ondents for dispensing with the
e
enquiry essen
ntially rests upon the alleged no
on-cooperation of the petitioner
r
and his alleg
ged failure to receive the charge
e-sheet. Even assuming, for the
e
sake of argu
ument, that the petitioner had
initially failed to receive the
e
complete cha
arge-sheet, such conduct, by itse
elf, could not justify dispensing
g
with the en
nquiry under Article 311(2)(
(b) of the Constitution. The
e
disciplinary
authority has adequate remedie
es under the applicable service
e
rules if a del
linquent employee, after due se
ervice, fails to participate in the
e
departmental
l proceedings. The employee c
cannot frustrate a departmental
l
enquiry mere
ely by remaining absent or dec
lining to participate. Subject to
o
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I attest to the accuracy and
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(50)
le rules, the enquiry can proceed
the applicabl
d ex parte . Therefore, mere non-
-
cooperation o
or absence of the delinquent em
mployee, cannot be elevated to a
a
circumstance
e rendering the holding of
f an enquiry constitutionally
y
impracticable
e. Mere recital in the order th
hat an inquiry is not reasonably
y
practicable w
would not, by itself, be sufficient
t. The competent authority must
t
demonstrate
a real and proximate nexu
us between the circumstances
s
prevailing at
the relevant time and the inabili
ity to hold departmental enquiry.
46.
In the present case, the conduc
t of the petitioner, as borne out
t
from the rec
cord, assumes considerable sign
nificance. The first show-cause
e
notice was i
issued to him on 19.09.2024
(Annexure P-11), to which he
e
submitted hi
is reply on 25.09.2024 (Annexu
ure P-12). Thereafter, a second
d
show-cause n
notice was issued on 14.10.2024
4 (Annexure P-14), to which the
e
petitioner sub
bmitted an interim reply dated 1
7.10.2024 (Annexure P-15) and
d
also sought s
supply of the necessary docume
ents to enable him to furnish an
n
effective resp
ponse. Subsequently, he was pla
ced under suspension vide order
r
dated 25.10.
.2024 (Annexure P-16) and a
charge-sheet dated 25.10.2024
4
(Annexure P
P-17) was also issued to him on
the same day. Thus, the record
d
does not sho
ow any instance where the petit
tioner had disappeared from the
e
proceedings
or had rendered himself c
ompletely unavailable to the
e
department.
On the contrary, the record
reveals that the petitioner had
d
participated i
in the proceedings at the initial
stage, had submitted replies to
o
the show-cau
use notices and had sought docum
ments for furnishing an effective
e
response.
In such circumstances, the s
subsequent allegation of non-
-
cooperation
was required to be examined b
before the extraordinary power
r
under Article
e 311(2)(b) could be invoked.
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(51)
In the present case, there is no a
47.
allegation that the petitioner had
d
threatened or
r intimidated the witnesses. The
ere is no material placed before
e
this Court to
o show that any witness had exp
pressed unwillingness to depose
e
against the p
petitioner on account of any th
hreat or coercion attributable to
o
him. There is
s also no material to suggest tha
at the petitioner had attempted to
o
tamper with
evidence or interfere with th
he functioning of the Enquiry
y
Officer. The
e respondents have not identifi
ied any particular witness who
o
could not be
examined on account of any con
nduct of the petitioner.
48.
The learned State counsel has p
placed wholesome reliance upon
n
the report d
dated 09.10.2024 (Annexure R
R-3) submitted by the Special
l
Investigation
n Team (SIT), headed by Shri P
Prabodh Kumar, IPS, Spl. DGP,
,
Punjab State
Human Rights Commission and
d Head, SIT, wherein the role of
f
each of th
he delinquent officers/officia
als has been noticed and
d
recommenda
ations to the following effect hav
ve been made:
“
Recommendations:
Based on the aforesaid facts
s revealed during the investigation
of FIR No.01/2024 of Police Statio
on State Crime, SAS Nagar, the
following recommendations are ma
ade:
1. Appropriate depart
tmental action may be initiated
d
against the afore
mentioned and named police
e
officers, regarding
g their misconduct, negligence,
,
and dereliction o
of their duties, while being
g
entrusted with th
he safe custody of accused
d
Lawrence Bishnoi a
at the premises of CIA, Kharar,
,
during the night int
tervening 03/04.09.2022.
2. Appropriate action m
may also be taken to address the
e
systemic failures and
d shortcomings in the functioning
g
of AGTF, as thrown
n up during the investigation and
d
highlighted in this N
ote.
3. Regarding the role an
nd conduct of Sh. Jagwinder Patial
l
as revealed during in
nvestigation, a view may be taken
n
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(52)
for initiating action
as deemed fit by the competent
t
authority.
Sd/-
(Nilambari Vijay Jagdale, IPS)
DIG Ropar Range-cum-
Member, SIT Ri
Sd/-
(Prabodh Kumar, IPS)
Spl/DGP Punjab State Human
ights Commission and Head, SIT”
49.
The said report can only be con
nsidered akin to the preliminary
y
enquiry rep
port particularly the same
also concludes with the
e
recommenda
ations that appropriate departm
mental action may be initiated
d
against the
named police officers/offic
cials regarding their alleged
d
misconduct,
negligence and dereliction of the
eir duties. The said report could
d
not, by itself
f, constitute conclusive proof or
substantive evidence warranting
g
the dismissal
l of the petitioner from service b
by invoking Article 311(2)(b) of
f
the Constitut
tion, particularly when he had n
not been afforded an opportunity
y
of participati
ng in a regular departmental enq
quiry. The very nature of the SIT
T
report, there
efore, could not dispense with
h the requirement of a regular
r
departmental
l enquiry, unless the comp
etent authority independently
y
recorded a v
valid and sustainable satisfaction
n that holding such an enquiry
y
was not reas
onably practicable, as contempl
lated under Article 311(2)(b) of
f
the Constitut
tion.
50.
There is yet another circumstan
nce which renders the action of
f
the responde
ents unsustainable. The Enquiry
y Officer, namely, Mr. Justice
e
Rajiv Narain
n Raina, former Judge of this Co
ourt, was appointed to conduct a
a
joint departm
mental enquiry against nine offi
icers/officials arising out of the
e
same occurre
ence, namely, (i) Sh. Vivek She
eel Soni, IPS, SSP, SAS Nagar;
;
(ii) Sh. Sam
mar Vaneet, PPS, the then DSP
P, PBI/EOW, SAS Nagar; (iii)
)
Inspector Shi
iv Kumar, the then In-charge, CI
IA, Kharar, SAS Nagar; (iv) Sub
b
Inspector Re
eena, CIA, Kharar, SAS Nagar;
(v) Sub Inspector (LR) Jagatpal
l
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CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(53)
F, Punjab; (vi) Sub Inspector (LR
Jangu, AGTF
R) Shaganjit Singh, No. 531/W,
,
AGTF, Punj
jab; (vii) ASI Mukhtiar Singh,
, No. 511/SAS, the then Duty
y
Officer; (viii)
i) HC (LR) Om Prakash, No. 1
131/SAS Nagar, the then Night
t
MHC, CIA K
Kharar, SAS Nagar; and (ix) Sh
h. Amandeep Singh Brar, PPS,
,
ADCP, Inve
estigation, Ludhiana, the then S
SP (Investigation), SAS Nagar,
,
Mohali. The
e departmental enquiry again
nst these officers/officials is
s
continuing.
If the circumstances were suc
ch that holding an enquiry was
s
genuinely im
mpracticable, the respondents we
ere required to explain how the
e
same circum
mstances ceased to operate qua t
the other delinquent officers. If
f
the enquiry c
could be conducted against the
other officers in respect of the
e
same occurr
rence, the respondents were r
required to demonstrate some
e
additional ci
ircumstance peculiar to the peti
itioner which made an enquiry
y
against him i
impracticable. No such circumsta
ance has been shown.
51.
At this juncture, the subsequen
nt conduct of the petitioner also
o
assumes sign
nificance. Even after passing of t
the impugned order of dismissal
l
dated 02.01.2
2025 (Annexure P-26), the Prese
enting Officer issued letter dated
d
23.09.2025 (
(Annexure P-30), calling upon th
he petitioner and the other eight
t
officers/offic
cials of the Police Department,
against whom the departmental
l
enquiry had b
been initiated, to appear before t
the Enquiry Officer, namely, Mr.
.
Justice Rajiv
v Narain Raina, former Judge o
of this Court, on 28.09.2025 at
t
11.30 a.m. Pu
ursuant thereto, the petitioner, th
hrough his counsel, submitted an
n
application
dated 11.10.2025 seeking a
copy of the charge-sheet. In
n
response, a c
copy of the charge-sheet, along
with copies of the show-cause
e
notices dated
d 19.09.2024 and 14.10.2024, w
was supplied to him vide letter
r
dated 13.10.2
2025 (Annexure P-31), and he w
was directed to submit his reply
y
by 01.11.202
25. Thereafter, the petitioner, al
long with his counsel, appeared
d
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(54)
Enquiry Officer through virtu
before the
ual mode on 01.11.2025 and
d
submitted hi
s reply dated 01.11.2025 to the
e charge-sheet (Annexure P-32).
.
The enquiry
y proceedings were thereaft
er adjourned to 06.12.2025,
,
05.03.2026 a
and 14.03.2026, on which date
es also the petitioner appeared
d
before the En
nquiry Officer through virtual m
mode, while his counsel appeared
d
physically. It
t was only on 03.05.2026 that th
he proceedings qua the petitioner
r
were closed,
after noticing that he had alrea
ady been dismissed from service
e
by invoking
Article 311(2)(b) of the Constit
tution. The subsequent conduct
t
of the petiti
ioner is wholly inconsistent w
with the assertion that he was
s
unwilling to
participate in, much less obstruc
ct, the departmental proceedings
s
to such an ex
xtent that it was not reasonably
y practicable to hold an enquiry
y
against him.
On the contrary, his conduct de
emonstrates that, when afforded
d
an opportun
nity to participate in the proce
eedings and supplied with the
e
requisite doc
cuments, he appeared before the
e Enquiry Officer and submitted
d
his reply to th
he charge-sheet. Thus, the subse
equent course of the proceedings
s
materially be
elies the very basis on which th
he respondents sought to invoke
e
the extraordin
nary power under Article 311(2)
)(b) of the Constitution.
52.
The aforesaid sequence of even
nts demonstrates that there was,
,
in fact, no im
mpediment in conducting the de
epartmental enquiry against the
e
petitioner, p
particularly when the petitione
er actually participated in the
e
enquiry proc
ceedings and continued to do so
o on subsequent dates. In such
h
circumstance
es, the respondents cannot, on
n the one hand, contend that
t
holding an en
nquiry against the petitioner was
s not reasonably practicable and,
,
on the other
hand, themselves proceed with
the very same enquiry after his
s
dismissal.
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(55)
The differential treatment assu
53.
umes significance because the
e
same set of a
allegations and the same occurre
ence constitute the foundation of
f
the proceedi
ings against the petitioner as
well as the other delinquent
t
officials. In t
the absence of any distinguishin
ng circumstance peculiar to the
e
petitioner, th
he invocation of Article 311(2)
(b) only against the petitioner
r
cannot be sus
stained.
54.
It is also apt to state here tha
at the State Government itself,
,
through the g
guidelines/instructions dated 02.
09.2022, issued by the office of
f
the Director
General of Police, Punjab, h
had drawn the attention of the
e
competent au
uthorities to the settled legal po
osition that orders under Article
e
311(2)(b) of
f the Constitution should not be
e passed mechanically and that
t
reasons for
dispensing with the enquiry m
must be supported by material
l
available on
record. The said guidelines spec
cifically caution that the decision
n
to dispense w
with a departmental enquiry ca
annot rest merely upon the ipse
e
dixit of the c
competent authority and that the
e reasons must not be vague or
r
merely repro
duction of the language of the re
elevant constitutional provision.
55.
The gravity of the allegations
levelled against the petitioner
r
may undoub
btedly furnish sufficient justifi
ication for placing him under
r
suspension a
nd initiating disciplinary procee
dings. However, the seriousness
s
of the alleg
gations, by itself, cannot be t
treated as a substitute for the
e
constitutiona
al requirement embodied in Artic
cle 311(2)(b) of the Constitution.
.
The question
n before this Court is not whet
ther the allegations against the
e
petitioner are
e grave or serious, but whether
r, on the date of passing of the
e
impugned o
order dated 02.01.2025 (An
nnexure P-26), there existed
d
circumstance
es rendering the holding of
a departmental enquiry not
t
reasonably p
practicable. The respondents
were, therefore, required to
o
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(56)
some additional and peculiar c
demonstrate
circumstance, attributable to the
e
petitioner, w
which made it impracticable to
conduct a regular departmental
l
enquiry agai
inst him. In the absence of any
y such circumstance, the mere
e
gravity of th
he allegations could not justify
fy dispensing with the enquiry
y
contemplated
d under Article 311(2) of the
Constitution. The respondents
s
have failed to
o establish the existence of any s
such circumstance.
56.
While considering the provision
ns of Article 311(2)(b) vis-à-vis
s
Punjab Polic
ce Rules, 1934, a Coordinate Be
nch in Baljinder Singh v. State
e
& others , ( CWP-8612-2021 dec
cided on 13.05.2024 ), observed
d
of Punjab &
as under:
“3. Mr. Anupam Bhardwaj, A
Advocate submits that there was
s
no occasion to dispense with m
mandatory inquiry contemplated
d
by Article 311 of Constitution o
of India read with Rule 16.24 of
f
the 1934 Rules. The respond
dents acting in a mechanical
l
manner dispensed with inquiry
y and dismissed the petitioner
r
f
from service. The co-accused w
was initially suspended and he
e
has been re-instated.
4. Per contra, Mr. Pawan
Kumar, DAG, Punjab submits
s
that petitioner accepted illegal
l gratification from accused in
n
aforementioned FIRs, thus, it w
was indispensable to dismiss him
m
f
from service. It was not possib
ble to conduct inquiry, thus, he
e
was dismissed without conductin
ng inquiry.
xx xx
xx
8. The reason advanced by
SSP for dispensing with inquiry
y
is not the actual reason bec
cause same reason has been
n
advanced in every case where
e there is FIR against serving
g
p
police officer. The respondent
t can dispense with inquiry if
f
actually it is not practicable to
hold inquiry. Mere writing one
e
line in the impugned order tha
at it is not practicable to hold
d
inquiry is not compliance of ma
andate of either Constitution of
f
I
India or Rule 16.24 of the Punja
ab Police Rules. The respondent
t
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(57)
instead of straight away dismiss
sing the petitioner could put him
m
under suspension and thereafte
er conduct inquiry. This course
e
was adopted in the case of c
co-accused, thus, there was no
o
reason to adopt different cours
e in the case of petitioner. It is
s
interesting to note that FIR
R was registered against the
e
p
petitioner as well as HC Jatind
der Singh and he has been re-
-
instated before awaiting conclus
sion of criminal proceedings.
9. In the wake of above disc
cussion and findings, this Court
t
is of the considered opinion
that respondents without any
y
logical reason dispensed w
with mandatory inquiry. The
e
impugned orders deserve to be
e set aside and accordingly set
t
aside.
It is made clear that petit
tioner, as conceded, shall not be
e
entitled to back wages. The res
spondent shall be free either to
o
conduct departmental inquiry
after following due procedure
e
p
prescribed by Punjab Police Ru
ules or take appropriate decision
n
after conclusion of criminal pro
ceedings.”
57.
In Rakesh Kumar v. State of P
Punjab & others , ( CWP-14712-
-
d on 25.04.2022 ), this Court obse
erved as under:
2017 decided
“8. The petitioners were appoin
nted as Constables with the Punjab
b
Police and were dismissed from s
service by invoking Article 311(2)
)
(b) of the Constitution of India
as FIR No.74 dated 25.07.2014,
under Section 384 of the IPC and
Section 7 and 8 of the Prevention
n
of Corruption Act, 1988 came to
o be registered against them. The
e
date of dismissal is the same date
e as the date of registration of the
e
FIR. While dismissing a governm
ment servant under Article 311 (2)
)
(b), the appropriate disciplinary a
authority has to record reasons in
n
writing that it does not consider it
t reasonably practicable to give to
o
the person an opportunity of show
wing cause. The satisfaction under
r
this clause has to be of the discipl
linary authority that has the power
r
to dismiss, remove or reduce the
Government servant in rank. As a
a
check against an arbitrary use of t
this exception, it has been provided
d
that the reasons for which the c
ompetent authority decides to do
o
away with the prescribed proced
dure must be recorded in writing
g
setting out why it would not be pra
acticable.
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(58)
9. On perusal of impugned or
rder of termination, it is apparent
t
that no reasons whatsoever have
been recorded to show as to how
w
the provisions of Article 311 (2) (
(b) have been attracted. A reading
g
of the impugned order would show
w that the reason for dispensing of
f
holding a regular enquiry is that a
a finding is given that no witness is
s
likely to come forth to depose and
d that the petitioner has a criminal
l
mentality, but there is no material
available to support this ground.
xx xx
xx
11. The law is this regard is n
no longer res intergra, as can be
e
noticed from the judgements as cit
ted above. Therefore the impugned
d
orders would not be sustainable.
12. Another reason for setting a
aside the impugned orders is that a
a
co-accused in the FIR, who was
also dismissed by the authorities
s
while dispensing with regular enq
quiry, had filed an appeal before
e
the Additional Chief Secretary Go
overnment of Punjab, Department
t
of Home Affairs and Justice an
nd the said appeal was allowed
d
holding that it was not fair to dism
miss the appellant with hearing and
d
that departmental proceedings w
were liable to be initiated. The
e
appellant Harjap Singh stood rein
nstated and the period from date of
f
dismissal till reinstatement was to
o be treated as Non Duty Period.
The petitioners who are similarly s
situated as said Harjap Singh, too
o
should be given an opportunity of h
hearing.
13. Consequently the writ petition
ns are allowed and the impugned
d
order dismissing the petitioners fr
rom service vide order 25.07.2014
4
(Annexure P-3) and the orders pas
ssed on the statutory appeal dated
d
02.03.2016 (Annexure P-6), by r
respondent No.4 and order dated
d
16.04.2016 (Annexure P-8) passe
d by respondent No.3 in revision,
are set aside leaving it open to the
e department to take departmental
l
action against the petitioners in ac
ccordance with law, if needed.”
The power under Article 31
58.
11(2)(b) cannot, therefore, be
e
invoked mer
rely because the disciplinary
authority apprehends that the
e
delinquent em
mployee may not cooperate wi
th the proceedings. There must
t
exist some o
objective circumstance which m
makes a fair enquiry genuinely
y
impracticable
e. Circumstances, such as, threa
ats, intimidation or coercion of
f
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(59)
nterference with the Enquiry Offi
witnesses, in
icer, or tampering with evidence
e
may ordinari
ily furnish a valid basis. Howe
ever, no such circumstance has
s
been demons
strated in the present case.
59.
Learned senior counsel has als
o assailed the impugned action
n
on the groun
nd that the decision to dismiss th
he petitioner had, in fact, already
y
been taken e
ven before the impugned order
dated 02.01.2025 (Annexure P-
-
26) came to
be passed. In support of the sai
id contention, reliance has been
n
placed upon
the statement of the learned Ad
dvocate General recorded in the
e
order dated
16.12.2024 passed in CWP
-PIL-93-2023. Learned senior
r
counsel has
further placed reliance upon
the judgment of the Hon’ble
e
Supreme Co
urt in Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd.
d. v. Union of India, (2010) 13
3
SCC 427 , w
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, while emphasizing the
e
requirement
of fairness in proceedings havi
ing civil consequences, held as
s
under:
“28. It is no doubt true that at th
he stage of show cause, the person
n
proceeded against must be told th
he charges against him so that he
e
can take his defence and prove h
his innocence. It is obvious that at
t
that stage the authority issuing the
e charge- sheet, cannot, instead of
f
telling him the charges, confront h
him with definite conclusions of his
s
alleged guilt. If that is done, as has
s been done in this instant case, the
e
entire proceeding initiated by the
show cause notice gets vitiated by
y
unfairness and bias and the subse
equent proceeding become an idle
e
ceremony.
29. Justice is rooted in confid
dence and justice is the goal of a
a
quasi-judicial proceeding also. If t
the functioning of a quasi- judicial
l
authority has to inspire confidence
e in the minds of those subjected to
o
its jurisdiction, such authority m
must act with utmost fairness. Its
s
fairness is obviously to be mani
ifested by the language in which
h
charges are couched and conveyed
d to the person proceeded against.
.
In the instant case from the unde
erlined portion of the show cause
e
notice it is clear that the third resp
pondent has demonstrated a totally
y
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(60)
close mind at the stage of show
cause notice itself. Such a close
e
mind is inconsistent with the sch
heme of Rule 43 which is set out
t
below. The aforesaid rule has been
n framed in exercise of the power
r
conferred under Section 33 o
f the Marine Products Export
t
Development Authority Act, 1972
and as such that Rule is statutory
y
in nature.
xx
xx xx
31. It is of course true that the
show cause notice cannot be read
d
hyper-technically and it is well sett
tled that it is to be read reasonably.
.
But one thing is clear that while
reading a show-cause notice the
e
person who is subject to it must ge
et an impression that he will get an
n
effective opportunity to rebut the
allegations contained in the show
w
cause notice and prove his innocen
nce. If on a reasonable reading of a
a
show-cause notice a person of or
rdinary prudence gets the feeling
g
that his reply to the show cause n
notice will be an empty ceremony
y
and he will merely knock his head
d against the impenetrable wall of
f
prejudged opinion, such a show c
cause notice does not commence a
a
fair procedure especially when
it is issued in a quasi- judicial
l
proceeding under a statutory regu
ulation which promises to give the
e
person proceeded against a reasona
able opportunity of defence.
32. Therefore, while issuing a
show-cause notice, the authorities
s
must take care to manifestly keep
p an open mind as they are to act
t
fairly in adjudging the guilt or o
therwise of the person proceeded
d
against and specially when he has
s the power to take a punitive step
p
against the person after giving him
m a show cause notice.
33. The principle that justice m
must not only be done but it must
t
eminently appear to be done as w
well is equally applicable to quasi
i
j
judicial proceeding if such a proce
eeding has to inspire confidence in
n
the mind of those who are subject t
to it.
34. A somewhat similar observ
vation was made by this Court in
n
the case of Kumaon Mandal Vikas
s Nigam Limited v. Girja Shankar
r
Pant & others, (2001) 1 SCC 182.
In that case, this court was dealing
g
with a show cause notice cum ch
harge-sheet issued to an employee.
.
While dealing with the same, this
s Court in paragraph 25 (page 198
8
of the report) by referring to the l
language in the show cause notice
e
observed as follows:
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(61)
"25. Upon consideration
of the language in the show-cause
e
notice-cum-charge-sheet, it
has been very strongly contended
d
that it is clear that the Offic
er concerned has a mindset even at
t
the stage of framing of ch
harges and we also do find some
e
justification in such a subm
mission since the chain is otherwise
e
complete."”
60.
Bearing in mind the aforesaid
principles, the facts where the
e
respondents h
have sought to justify the invoca
ation of Article 311(2)(b) of the
e
Constitution
on the premise that the petit
tioner had deliberately evaded
d
service of t
the charge-sheet and, consequ
uently, it was not reasonably
y
practicable to
o hold a departmental enquiry ag
gainst him, give rise to a serious
s
doubt as to w
whether the decision-making pro
ocess was, in fact, fair, objective
e
and uninfluen
nced by any prior determination
n of the outcome. If the decision
n
to dismiss th
he petitioner had already been ta
aken before the impugned order
r
came to be
passed, the subsequent invocat
ion of Article 311(2)(b) of the
e
Constitution
cannot be permitted to opera
ate as a mere justification for
r
dispensing w
with the departmental enquir
ry. Even otherwise, the very
y
foundation o
f the respondents’ conclusion tha
at the petitioner had deliberately
y
evaded servi
ice of the charge-sheet is rende
ered doubtful by the manner in
n
which the c
harge-sheet was sought to be
served. The respondents were
e
aware of th
he petitioner's permanent addre
ess at Jalandhar and that the
e
communicati
ions preceding the issuance of t
the charge-sheet had been duly
y
served upon
him. Despite being in posses
ssion of his correct and known
n
address, the
charge-sheet dated 25.10.2024
was sent to the petitioner's old
d
address at Ch
handigarh, from where he had a
already been transferred. In such
h
circumstance
es, the mere fact that the charge-
-sheet could not be served at the
e
said address
could not, by itself, furnish any
basis for recording a conclusion
n
that the pet
titioner had deliberately evade
ed service or had refused to
o
VIMAL KUMAR
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I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(62)
n the disciplinary proceedings.
participate in
Nothing has been placed on
n
record to de
emonstrate that any genuine at
ttempt was made to serve the
e
charge-sheet
upon the petitioner at his
known permanent address at
t
Jalandhar or
r through any other mode avail
lable in law. There is also no
o
material to s
suggest that the petitioner had c
created a situation in which the
e
holding of a
departmental enquiry had becom
me impracticable. Non-service of
f
the charge-sh
heet at an address from which
the petitioner had already been
n
transferred ca
annot be equated with deliberate
e evasion of service, particularly
y
when the res
spondents themselves were awar
re of his correct address and set
t
the disciplina
ary machinery in motion by iss
suing show-cause notices dated
d
19.09.2024 (
(Annexure P-11) and 14.10.202
24 (Annexure P-14), as well as
s
charge-sheet
dated 25.10.2024 (Annexure P
-17). Once the department had
d
considered i
it feasible to initiate and proc
ceed with regular disciplinary
y
proceedings,
the subsequent decision to aba
andon that course and resort to
o
Article 311(2
2)(b) of the Constitution require
ed the existence of a subsequent
t
or newly aris
sen circumstance making the enq
quiry not reasonably practicable.
.
The impugn
ned order does not demonstra
ate the existence of any such
h
circumstance
e.
61.
Consequently, this Court has n
no hesitation in holding that the
e
satisfaction r
recorded by the competent aut
thority for dispensing with the
e
departmental
l enquiry does not meet the co
onstitutional standard prescribed
d
under Articl
le 311(2)(b) of the Constitutio
on. The impugned order dated
d
02.01.2025 (
(Annexure P-26), whereby the
petitioner has been dismissed
d
from service
e by dispensing with the reg
gular departmental enquiry, is
s
accordingly l
liable to be set aside.
VIMAL KUMAR
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I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-878-2025 (O&
&M)
(63)
As a result, the present writ pet
62.
tition is allowed. The impugned
d
order dated
02.01.2025 (Annexure P-26
6) is hereby quashed. The
e
respondents
are hereby directed to reinstate t
the petitioner in service with all
l
consequentia
al benefits.
63.
However, the setting aside o
of the impugned order dated
d
02.01.2025 (A
Annexure P-26) and direction fo
or reinstatement shall be without
t
prejudice to t
the right of the respondents to ta
ake recourse in accordance with
h
law, by con
ntinuing with the departmental
l enquiry, which was pending
g
against petit
tioner and other officers/officia
als before the Enquiry Officer,
,
namely, Mr. J
Justice Rajiv Narain Raina, form
mer Judge of this Court.
64.
Pending application(s), if any, al
lso stands disposed of.
01.09.2026
(NAMIT KUMAR)
JUDGE
Vimal/Manoj
Whether speaking/reasoned:
Whether reportable:
Yes/No
Yes/No
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.09.02 15:13
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authenticity of this order/judgment.