STATE vs BIDYUT KU PANIGRAHI

THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLLP No.2 of 2012

CNR No.ODHC010059742012
(In the matter of an application under Section 378 (1) & (3) of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 )

State of Orissa (G.A. Department) Petitioner
…….

-Versus-
Bidyut Kumar Panigrahi Opposite Party
…….

For the Petitioner : Mr. Sangram Das, SC (Vigilance)

For the Opposite Party : Mr. Suraj Mohanty, Advocate

CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

Date of Hearing: 17.09.2026 : Date of Judgment: 31.10.2026

S.S. Mishra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of
acquittal dated 26.03.2011 passed by the learned Additional Special
Judge (Vigilance), Bhubaneswar in T.R. No.146 of 2006, arising out of
Bhubaneswar Vigilance P.S. Case No.5 of 2004, whereby the respondent

was acquitted of the charges under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read
with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

2. Heard Mr. Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel (Vigilance) for
the petitioner and Mr. Suraj Mohanty, learned counsel for the opposite-
party.
3. The prosecution case is that the respondent, while serving as
Assistant Engineer (S.D.O.), Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Sub-
Division, Khurda, was entrusted with processing the bills submitted by
contractor Rabindra Kumar Das after completion of two tube-well works
executed under agreements entered into with the Executive Engineer,
R.W.S.S. Division, Bhubaneswar. It was alleged that the respondent
demanded illegal gratification of Rs.20,000/- for approving and passing
the contractor's bills and, after negotiation, agreed to accept Rs.10,000/-.
Unable to withstand the alleged illegal demand, the
complainant approached the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance,
Bhubaneswar Division, and lodged a written report. A trap was
organized on 12.03.2004 after demonstration of phenolphthalein powder
and sodium carbonate solution to the complainant and independent

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witnesses. The tainted currency notes amounting to Rs.10,000/- were
treated with phenolphthalein powder and handed over to the complainant
with instructions to pay the amount only upon demand by the
respondent.
4. According to the prosecution, the complainant met the respondent
near the portico of his residence at Khurda and paid the tainted money.
Immediately thereafter, the vigilance officials entered the spot, recovered
the tainted currency notes from the respondent, conducted hand-wash
tests, which yielded positive chemical reaction, and prepared the
detection report. After completion of investigation and obtaining
sanction for prosecution, charge-sheet was submitted for offences
punishable under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
5. During trial, the prosecution examined twelve witnesses, including
the complainant, independent trap witnesses, chemical examiner,
sanctioning authority, trap laying officer and investigating officer. The
defence examined two witnesses and produced documentary evidence in
support of its plea.

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6. Upon appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court acquitted
the respondent after holding that although acceptance of Rs.10,000/-
stood admitted, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the amount constituted illegal gratification. The trial Court
accepted the defence plea as highly probable after finding that the
complainant had prior enmity with the respondent, documentary
evidence supported earlier purchase of tender papers, the respondent had
consistently explained from the very inception that the money
represented tender dues, there existed supporting civil litigation
regarding repayment of tender money, and suspicious circumstances
surrounded the alleged submission of the complainant's bills.
Consequently, the respondent was acquitted under Section 248(1)
Cr.P.C. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein
for ready reference:-
“ 12. I have carefully gone through the evidence led
by the prosecution as well as defence. I find
sufficient circumstances throwing cloud about
execution of agreement and undertaking the work
by the informant in question. Similarly, I find
suspicious circumstances about submission of the
bills before the accused so as to get any official
favour from him by the complainant. On analysing

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the defence evidence in such background, the plea
of the defence that the money was accepted by the
accused towards the dues of the tender paper,
appears highly probable, on consideration of the
admitted enmity between the accused and the
complainant.
13. In the result, I hold that the prosecution has
miserably failed to bring home the charges
U/s.13(1)(d) read with section 13(2)/7 of
Prevention of Corruption Act,1988 and as such the
accused is acquitted from the alleged offences
under the provisions of Section 248(1) Cr.P.C.
Since he is on bail, he be discharged from the bail
bond.
”

7. The Petitioner-State has assailed the judgment of acquittal by
contending that the learned trial Court committed a serious error in
accepting the defence plea that the opposite-party had received the
amount towards tender dues. It was urged that while the opposite-party
initially claimed that the amount represented tender money, he
subsequently attempted to develop an entirely different defence through
the evidence of defence witnesses by asserting that the complainant had
purchased tender papers with money borrowed from other contractors
and that the opposite-party had retained the complainant's tender papers
until repayment of such loan. According to the Petitioner, such a
defence is inherently illegal and wholly unacceptable, as no public

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servant is authorized to retain tender papers or act as an intermediary
for recovery of private loans between contractors. It is further
contended that when the opposite-party failed to substantiate his
original explanation with credible evidence, the trial Court ought to
have rejected the defence as highly improbable instead of treating it as
sufficient to create reasonable doubt.
8. The petitioner further submitted that the trial Court failed to
properly appreciate the overwhelming prosecution evidence, including
the FIR, preparation report, detection report, chemical examination
report and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, all of which
consistently established recovery of the tainted G.C. notes from the
respondent and the positive chemical reaction during the trap
proceedings. It was argued that once recovery of the tainted currency
from the respondent stood established, the statutory presumption under
the Prevention of Corruption Act operated against him, thereby shifting
the burden upon him to rebut the presumption through cogent and
convincing evidence, which he failed to do. The petitioner also
contends that the trial Court placed undue reliance upon the hostile

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portions of the evidence of P.W.2, the accompanying witness, and upon
the defence evidence, while ignoring the consistent prosecution
evidence regarding demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, and
that such improper appreciation of evidence has resulted in an
erroneous order of acquittal warranting interference by this Court.
9. This Court has carefully examined the judgment passed by the
learned trial Court, the reasons assigned therein, and the evidence
adduced by both the prosecution and the defence during trial. This
Court has also considered the grounds urged in the present appeal
and heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-State as
well as the learned counsel for the respondent at length. The rival
submissions have been duly considered in the light of the materials
available on record.
10. Before interfering with an order of acquittal, this Court is also
required to bear in mind the well-settled principles governing an
appeal against acquittal. In Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v.
State of Karnataka & Ors. , reported in 2026 INSC 67 , the Hon'ble

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Supreme Court has reiterated that where two reasonable conclusions
are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial
Court. It has further been held that if the view taken by the trial
Court is a possible view based on the evidence available on record,
the appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal merely
because another view is also possible. Interference is warranted only
when the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is
based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where
compelling and substantial reasons exist showing that the acquittal is
clearly unreasonable. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced herein for ready reference:-
“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this
Court, it can be said that if two reasonable
conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the
Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible. The following principles have to be kept in
mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the
appeals against an order of acquittal:

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(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;
(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission
to consider the material evidence on record;
(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when
there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing
so. If the ord er is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a
compelling reason for interference.
(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to
consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a
possible view which could have been taken on the basis of
the evidence on record;
(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and
(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion
was possible.
”

Equally, in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka , reported in
2024 INSC 104 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the
presumption of innocence, which every accused enjoys during trial, gets
strengthened and concretized once the trial culminates in an order of
acquittal. Consequently, while exercising appellate jurisdiction against
an acquittal, a higher threshold is required to rebut such reinforced
presumption. Unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are

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manifestly unsustainable or perverse, the appellate Court ought to
exercise great restraint in upsetting the acquittal. It was held thus:-
“24. We may firstly discuss the position of law
regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal
appeal. For, that is the foundation of this
challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven
guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of
the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the
case ends in acquittal. The presumption of
innocence gets concretized when the case ends in
acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on
appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that
the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets
strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to

rebut the same in appeal.”

11.
The appellate jurisdiction against an order of acquittal is,
therefore, not intended to facilitate a fresh substitution of the opinion of
the trial Court merely because a different view on the evidence is
conceivable. As reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulasareddi
@ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra) , the
appellate Court must first satisfy itself that the judgment of acquittal is
vitiated by patent perversity, misreading or non-consideration of material
evidence, or is so unreasonable that no prudent person could have

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arrived at such a conclusion. Equally, as held in Mallappa & Ors. v.
State of Karnataka (supra)
, the reinforced presumption of innocence
following an acquittal places a higher threshold upon the appellate Court
before upsetting the findings recorded by the trial Court. Thus, unless the
conclusions reached by the trial Court are wholly unsustainable on the
evidence available on record, judicial restraint rather than substitution of
views remains the governing principle in an appeal against acquittal.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this
Court finds that the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court
cannot be said to be either perverse or wholly unreasonable. Merely
because another view may also be possible, the same cannot furnish a
ground to reverse the acquittal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

12. At this distant point in time, the absence of compelling and
substantial reasons warranting interference, reversal of the acquittal
would itself occasion serious prejudice and would be a travesty of
justice. At this belated stage, presumption of innocence prevailed in
favour of the opposite party for more than 15 years, as he was acquitted

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by the Court below. Reversing such presumption at this stage would not
only be harsh, but it would be against the cardinal principle of
reformatory criminal jurisprudence. This Court, therefore, finds no legal
or factual justification to unsettle the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal
passed by the learned trial Court. In view of the aforementioned, this
Court is not inclined to grant leave against the judgment of acquittal
impugned herein.
13. Accordingly, the CRLLP stands dismissed.

(S.S. Mishra)
Judge


The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
st
Dated the 31 October, 2026/Ashok
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB
MOHAPATRA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 05-Nov-2026 19:59:15

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