The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Yaqoob Khan

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:32775
1 WA-3543-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
&
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE ANURADHA SHUKLA
th
ON THE 27 OF OCTOBER, 2026
WRIT APPEAL No. 3543 of 2026
CNR No.: MPHC030270502026
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANR
Versus
YAQOOB KHAN
Appearance:
Shri Manish Saxena - Govt. Advocate for the appellants/State.
Shri Swarnjeet Swarnkar - Advocate for the respondent/State.
ORDER
Per: Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
This writ appeal under Section 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha
Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, has been filed
against the order dated 31.03.2026 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P.
No. 1542/2011.
2. Heard on I.A. No.14010/2026. This is an application for
condonation of delay of 88 days in filing the present writ appeal.
3. It is submitted by counsel for the appellant that after the writ
petition was allowed, the OIC could not trace out the record for the reason
that the address, which was mentioned in the cause title, was misleading and
thus the delay has occurred.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SANJEEV
KUMAR PHANSE
Signing time: 10/27/2026
4:56:46 PM

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4. Considered the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant.

5. In the Writ Petition, the return was filed by the State. Once the
return was filed, then it has to be presumed that it was based on the record of
the case and if it is the stand of the State that the return was filed without
looking into the record, then it is worst. Thus, the ground, which has been
raised by the OIC for seeking condonation of delay, is false even to his own
knowledge. The State is the custodian of the record and if the State was not
keeping the record in proper custody, then it is for the State to correct its
house.
6. It is submitted by counsel for the appellant that this case is a very
serious one, therefore, this Court should condone the delay.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Ramkumar
Choudhary decided on 29/11/2024 i n SLP (C) Diary No. 48636/2024 has
held as under:-
"6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay
occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the
State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach
in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/ applications/
appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials
in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss
will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one
such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in
preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the
officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government
lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the
machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of
cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the
officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are
responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the
loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be
followed by all the States scrupulously."
(Emphasis supplied)
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SANJEEV
KUMAR PHANSE
Signing time: 10/27/2026
4:56:46 PM

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8. It is not for the Court to consider as to whether the case is a serious

one or not because the Court is not expected to run the Government. If the
case is so serious, then why the State did not take any action against the
officer who is responsible for delay has not been explained. Furthermore,
Supreme Court in the case of State of Odisha and Others Vs. Managing
Committee of Namatara Girls High School, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine
SC 191, has held as under:
"13. However, since there is a long line of decisions of this Court
propounding the law that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed
by the legislature in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is
adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful
manner which subserves the ends of justice and in view of the
submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have considered it appropriate to
consider the matter in some depth.
14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land Acquisition,
Anantnag v. Mst Katiji9, a coordinate Bench noting that the justifiably
liberal approach which this Court has been adopting in matters
instituted before it is not being followed by the courts lower in the
hierarchy, mandated that a justice oriented approach is indeed called
for when a ‘State’ seeks condonation of delay as distinguished from ‘a
private party’.
15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon'ble Justice M.N.
Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate Bench in G. Ramegowda
v. Land Acquisition Officer10 had referred to Katiji (supra) in
paragraph 14 and quoted the following passage therefrom:
“When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted
against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay …
It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of
its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it
is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”
Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it was held as under:
15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet
another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals
brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is
individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers
is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and
institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of
decisions of private individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private
citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any
other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SANJEEV
KUMAR PHANSE
Signing time: 10/27/2026
4:56:46 PM

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its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to
the matter where Government makes out a case where public
interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad
faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers
were clearly at cross-purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes
“sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be
somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go
into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the government.
Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as
they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the
process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is,
therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear
responsibility of Government must have “a little play at the
joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental
functioning — of course, within reasonable limits — is
necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered
unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
government and private parties on the same footing in all
respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of
governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the
decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the
conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the
Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases
where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to
Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. …
16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were consistently
followed by this Court until adoption of a different and seemingly
strict approach while dealing with applications for condonation of
delay during the last decade and a half became discernible starting with
the decision in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited11,
where a delay of 427 days in filing the relevant special leave petition
was not condoned. University of Delhi v. Union of India12 is another
decision (of a three-Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of 916
days was not condoned. While upholding the decision of the relevant
high court under challenge refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days
in presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 by the heirs of a deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in
Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA)13 very recently reiterated
that the law of limitation is founded on public policy, the object is that
a legal remedy is put to an end so that no litigation remains pending
for an indefinite period. It was also held, departing from the earlier
view, that the merits of the case cannot be considered at the stage of
considering the application for condonation of delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union
of India14 authoring the judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the
view taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other
decisions following the same while not interfering with an order of
condonation of delay passed by the relevant high court. However, it
was observed that a distinction ought to be drawn between an

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SANJEEV
KUMAR PHANSE
Signing time: 10/27/2026
4:56:46 PM

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‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered as cause for
condonation of delay. It was also emphasized that a different approach
has to be adopted while this Court is considering an application for
condonation of delay in presentation of an appeal/application and
when it sits in appeal over a discretionary order of the high court
granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former,
whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the
latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of
grant of the prayer for condonation has to be examined.
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the
decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) adopting a
liberal approach is the exasperation and consequent lament expressed
by none other than Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of
authoring a brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v.
Amateur Riders Club, Bombay15 and admonishing officers of the
“revenue” in not acting with promptitude. This order was made within
six years of the decision in Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better
than quoting the same in its entirety hereunder:

1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior counsel
for the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is
delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this Court
has been making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to
public interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government
being lost on the point of limitation. Such observations have
been made for over a few years in the past. But there seems to be
no conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present
petition which is filed in November 1993. The explanation for
the delay, had better be set out in petitioner's own words:
“(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition
drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for
approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case
file. (h) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-
on-Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the
Board on September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP
was not approved by the Board. The Board after approving
the draft SLP sent this file to CAS on October 1, 1993.”
3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially
acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier
observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we
hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be no
visible support for this optimism. There is a point beyond which
even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is
Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic
indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds
everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true
that Government should not be treated as any other private
litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to
present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are
institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial
red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SANJEEV
KUMAR PHANSE
Signing time: 10/27/2026
4:56:46 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:32775
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latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely
serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in
protecting its common interests. The affidavit is again one of the
stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that
the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need
for promptitude even where it affects its own interest.
4. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly,
dismissed. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as
barred by time.

(emphasis in original)
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur Riders (supra), one
after the other, leaves none in doubt that it did not take much time for
this Court to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid
down in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much
optimism that matters would improve. Their Lordships, however,
found no visible support for such optimism and the Court's patience
having been tested to the extreme limit, held that there is a point
beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant
labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the
Government."
9. Thus, it is clear that while considering the case of limitation, the
Court is not required to go into the merits of the case. Considering the
totality of facts and circumstances, coupled with the fact that the reasons,
which have been assigned by the OIC for condonation of delay, are self
imaginary and false even to his own knowledge, no case is made out for
condonation of delay of 88 days. Accordingly, I.A.No.14010/2026, which is
an application for delay, is hereby rejected. The appeal is
accordingly dismissed as barred by time. If the State has suffered any
financial loss, then it shall be recovered from the OIC, who is responsible for
non filing of the appeal within time.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
(ANURADHA SHUKLA)
JUDGE
JUDGE
SP
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SANJEEV
KUMAR PHANSE
Signing time: 10/27/2026
4:56:46 PM