JRIANG SINGH PHANBUH (SINCE DECEASED) SUBSTITUTED BY SHRI APSHAI SING NEHLANG KHARPURI AND 3 ORS. vs SAIHUNLANG PHANBUH AND ANR.

2026:MLHC:967


Serial No.01
Regular List

HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG


Date of Hearing : 24.07.2026
CRP No.30 of 2025 Date of Decision : 02.09.2026

Jriang Singh Phanbuh (Since deceased)
Substituted by:


1. Shri Apshai Sing Nehlang Kharpuri,
Son of (L) Jriang Singh Phanbuh
Resident of Lachumiere, Shillong-
793001, East Khasi Hills District,
Meghalaya.


2. Smt. Buhphanglin Nehlang Kharpuri
Daughter of (L) Jriang Singh Phanbuh
Resident of Lachumiere, Shillong-
793001, East Khasi Hills District,
Meghalaya.


3. Shri Kyntonlang Nehlang Kharpuri,
Son of (L) Jriang Singh Phanbuh
Resident of Lachumiere, Shillong-
793001, East Khasi Hills District,
Meghalaya.


4. Shri Kindonlang Nehlang Kharpuri,
Son of (L) Jriang Singh Phanbuh
Resident of Lachumiere, Shillong-
793001, East Khasi Hills District,
Meghalaya
….. Petitioners
-VERSUS


1. Smti. Saihunlang Phanbuh
Daughter of (L) T.H. Rangad
Resident of Umsohsun, Shillong,

1 11
Page of

2026:MLHC:967


East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya.


2. Smti. Jopsimon Phanbuh
Daughter of (L) T.H. Rangad
Resident of Umsohsun, Shillong,
East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya.
…..Respondents


Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Bhattacharjee, Judge

Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. P. Nongbri, Adv.
Ms. T. Stunga, Adv.

For the Respondent(s) : Mr. D. Thabah, Adv.


Judgment and Order


1. By this civil revision petition, the petitioners have challenged the order
dated 10.11.2025 passed by the Judge, District Council Court, Shillong in
Misc.Case No. 136 of 2024 arising out of Misc.Civil Appeal No. 9 of 2024 by
which the prayer for condonation of delay of 215 days in preferring the appeal
was allowed.

2. This case was heard along with CRP No. 31 of 2025 preferred against
another order dated 10.11.2025 passed by the Judge, District Council Court,
Shillong in Misc.Case No. 139 of 2024 arising out of Misc.Civil Appeal No.
10 of 2024 by which the prayer for condonation of delay of 294 days in
preferring the appeal against the order dated 09.06.2023 of the Trial Court was
allowed.

3. The brief facts of the case are that the respondents as plaintiffs instituted
Title Suit No. 10 of 2022 against the father of the petitioners (now deceased)
in the Court of the Subordinate District Council Court, Shillong praying inter
alia for dpeclaration of right, title and interest over a plot of land known as
2 11
Page of

2026:MLHC:967


Wahlakhiat situated at Nongkhlaw Syiemship, Eastern West Khasi Hills
District. The said title suit was presented along with an application for grant
of injunction registered as Misc.Case No. 51 of 2022. The petitioners
contested the suit and filed their written statement and show-cause. The
learned Trial Court by order dated 09.06.2023 disposed of the injunction
application by directing the parties to maintain status quo . Subsequently, the
petitioners filed Misc.Case No. 119 of 2023 and Application No. 52 of 2024
alleging violation of status quo by the respondents. The learned Trial Court
vide orders dated 30.01.2024 and 09.01.2024 (sic 09.02.2024) directed the
respondents to strictly maintain status quo and to file show-cause to the
allegation of violation made in the applications. It is only after that, on
03.09.2024 respondents filed Misc.Civil Appeal No. 9 of 2024 before the
Judge, District Council Court, Shillong challenging the order dated
30.01.2024. The appeal was accompanied by an application for condonation
of delay of 215 days registered as Misc.Case No. 136 of 2024. The petitioners
filed their objection against the prayer for condonation of delay. The learned
Appellate Court after hearing the parties by impugned order dated 10.11.2025
condoned the delay. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have filed this instant
civil revision petition against the impugned order dated 10.11.2025 passed in
Misc.Case No. 136 of 2024.

4. Assailing the impugned order, Mr. P. Nongbri, learned counsel for the
petitioners submits that the learned Appellate Court erred in condoning the
delay without there being any cogent or satisfactory explanation by the
respondents. He submits that the learned Appellate Court condoned the delay
on the ground that the respondents should not be punished for the fault of their
lawyer without properly examining the materials on record and the reasons
and justifications shown by the respondents. He submits that inability,
carelessness and negligence of the lawyer cannot be a ground to condone long
and inordinate delay as a litigant is duty bound to remain vigilant and careful
3 11
Page of

2026:MLHC:967


about his rights. He supports the contention by placing reliance on Rajneesh
Kumar & Anr. V. Ved Prakash, (2024) 12 SCC 336. He submits that though
the learned Appellate Court apparently acted on the basis of some medical
certificates concerning the lawyer of the respondents, the same were not
scrutinized by the Court to find out the extent of ailment and the period of
suffering. Further, by relying on the propositions of law laid down in
Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. V. Karnataka Housing Board and Others, (2025)
SCC OnLine SC 1969 , the learned counsel submits that the Appellate Court
could not have allowed the prayer for condonation of delay in absence of any
explanation by the respondents as to why the appeal could not be preferred
within the stipulated period of 60 days as the law requires that delay in the
filing has to be explained for both the prescribed period of limitation as well
as the period after the expiry of limitation.

5. The learned counsel next submits that the learned Appellate Court
failed to appreciate that there was no ground to demonstrate that the delay was
unavoidable or beyond the control of the respondents and proceeded
mechanically to condone delay of 294 days while the prayer was for
condonation of delay of 215 days. He further submits that the plea of the
respondents that their advocate was unwell is far from truth as the relevant
order sheet reveals that they were present through their appointed counsel
before the Trial Court on several dates after passing of the impugned order
dated 30.01.2024 and took part in the proceedings from 16.02.2024 onwards
till 03.09.2024. Even a list of witnesses, he contends, was filed on 07.06.2024
by the appointed advocate of the respondents before the Trial Court. He
submits that when it is apparent that there was a gross negligence on the part
of the respondents to present the appeal in time, prayer for condonation of
delay could not have been granted. He, thus, submits that the impugned order
is not tenable in the eye of law and liable to be set aside and quashed. In
support of his contention, he places reliance on the decisions of Majji
4 11
Page of

2026:MLHC:967


Sannemma Alias Sanyasirao V. Reddy Sridevi and other, (2021) 18 SCC 384,
Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by Legal Representatives and others V. Special
Duty Collector , (2024) 12 SCC 336 and Postmaster General and Others V.
Living Media India Limited and Another, (2012) 3 SCC 563.

6. On the other hand, Mr. D. Thabah, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents, supports the impugned order and submits that there is no
illegality or infirmity in the decision of the Appellate Court. He submits that
condonation of delay in filing appeal is a matter of discretionary power of the
concerned Court and exercise of such discretion requires no interference
unless found to be perverse or suffers from jurisdictional error. He submits
that the respondents had appointed an advocate to look after their case and
was totally dependent on the advocate as they were not acquainted with the
complexities of law. The delay in preferring the appeal, he submits, was due
to illness of the advocate of the respondents and it is a settled law that inaction
or inability of the lawyer should not make a party suffer. He supports the
contention by placing reliance on the decision of Rafiq & anr. V. Munshilal
& anr., (1981) 2 SCC 788. He submits that the contention of the petitioners
that the counsel for the respondents appeared before the Trial Court after the
passing of the impugned order is not supported by any pleadings and hence
requires no consideration by this Court. He submits that the plea of sickness
of the advocate was well supported by production of the medical prescriptions
dated 19.02.2024, 16.03.2024 and 27.07.2024 and, hence, constituted
sufficient ground for condoning the delay.

7. The learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the
impugned order is a reasoned order passed after application of judicious mind
and, as such, cannot be termed as a casual order. He submits that the juniors
of the appointed advocate of the respondents appeared before the Trial Court
and the list of witnesses submitted before the Court on 07.06.2024 was only
signed by the appointed advocate. He submits that the appeal was filed on
5 11
Page of

2026:MLHC:967


03.09.2024 immediately after the advocate had a little recovery from illness
without any further delay. He submits that the prayer for condonation of delay
requires liberal approach by courts and supports his contention by placing
reliance on the decisions of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & anr. V.
Mst. Kataji & ors., (1987) 2 SCC 107 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Giga
Ram, (2002) 10 SCC 176 . By referring to Section 12(2) of The Limitation Act,
1963 and the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mukesh Ramdevji
Agarwal & anr. V. Balmukund Dhruvanarayan Lohiya (HUF) & ors., SLP
(C) No. 24862/2019 , he submits that time required for obtaining certified copy
is excluded and the Courts are obliged to compute the limitation on the basis
of the endorsement contained in the certified copy. He submits that mention
of 294 days instead of 215 days in the impugned order is a typographical error
as the Appellate Court was dealing with another matter involving condonation
of delay which is subject matter of challenge in CRP No. 31 of 2025 before
this Court. Such typographical error, according to him, can be corrected u/s
152 CPC and has no bearing on the merits of the decision rendered. He,
therefore, submits that there is no merit in the present revision petition and the
same is liable to be dismissed.

8. Upon hearing the submissions of the rival parties and on perusal of the
materials on record, it is clear that the order dated 09.06.2023 was passed by
the Subordinate District Council Court, Shillong in Misc.Case No. 15 of 2022
filed by the respondents seeking grant of injunction against the petitioners.
Although, the order dated 09.06.2023 was passed directing the parties to
maintain status quo , no immediate appeal was preferred against the order by
any of the parties including the respondents.

9. Afterwards, the petitioners herein filed Misc.Case No. 119 of 2023 on
06.12.2023 and Application No. 52 of 2024 on 30.01.2024 before the Trial
Court alleging violation of the status quo order dated 09.06.2023 by the
respondents. The learned Trial Court by orders dated 30.01.2024 and
6 11
Page of

2026:MLHC:967


09.01.2024 (sic 09.02.2024) directed the respondents to strictly maintain
status quo and to file show-cause against the allegation of violation of status
quo . Although, the record of the Trial Court is not available before this Court,
the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondents
appeared before the Trial Court after passing of the impugned order dated
30.01.2024 and took part in the proceedings on different dates from
16.02.2024 onwards till 03.09.2024 has not been disputed by the learned
counsel for the respondents. The only contention raised on behalf of the
respondents in this regard is that the junior of the appointed counsel of the
respondents appeared before the Trial Court and the list of witnesses
submitted on 07.06.2024 was only signed by the appointed counsel. Be that
as it may, since the respondents were represented before the Trial Court after
passing of the impugned order dated 30.01.2024, it cannot be said that the
respondents had no knowledge of the order.

10. In the above backdrop, it was necessary on the part of the learned
Appellate Court to judge the veracity of the plea of illness/inability of the
lawyer of the respondents and to scrutinize the medical certificates submitted
in support of the plea. Nevertheless, the learned Appellate Court in the
impugned order held that no doubt there were lapses on the part of the
respondents’ counsel, however, the reason of delay based upon the sickness
of the respondents’ counsel should not be totally ignored. Further, the Court
was of the opinion that the respondents had appointed the counsel to handle
their case, so it was the duty of the counsel to inform the client about the steps
and status of the case. On the basis of the above observation, the prayer for
condonation of delay was allowed.

11. The Apex Court in the case of Rafiq & anr. (supra) while dealing with
a matter where an application sworn on 29.10.1980 was not presented to the
Court till 12.11.1980 without satisfactory explanation, held that contesting
parties should not suffer for lapses on the part of their counsel. However, in
7 11
Page of

2026:MLHC:967


the case of Rajneesh Kumar and Another (supra) at paragraph 10 it was
observed: -
It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the
“
head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in
the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency
on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence
and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court.
Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was
careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to
condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to
be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant
about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at
his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to
throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby
disown him at any time and seek relief.”

What appears from the above is that the period of delay is a relevant
factor for consideration of prayer for condonation of delay on the ground of
inability, lapses or inaction on the part of the lawyer of the party. Inability of
lawyer, by itself, cannot be a ground for condoning long and inordinate delay
as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and the judicial
proceedings initiated at his instance.


12. In the present case, the delay is not for a period for few days. The delay
is for a period of 215 days i.e. about 7 (seven) months. Thus, condonation of
delay for the entire period by the learned Appellate Court without taking into
consideration the record of the Trial Court was not proper. It is not a case
where a plea was raised that the respondents were simple ignorant villagers or
uneducated having no knowledge of the court’s procedure. Therefore, the
respondents had a duty to be vigilant of their own rights and were expected to
be equally vigilant about the order passed in the title suit and the connected
miscellaneous applications initiated at their instance. Putting the entire blame
on the advocate and trying to make it out as if the respondents were totally
unaware of the nature or significance of the order passed is a theory which
cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted. The Apex Court in
8 11
Page of

2026:MLHC:967


Salil Dutta V. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185 , held that the
observation made in Rafiq & anr. (supra) must not be understood as an
absolute proposition.

13. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag & anr. (supra) wherein it was observed that courts
should adopt a liberal and justice-oriented approach was rendered in the
context of condonation of delay of only 4 days in filing the appeal. Whereas,
in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. (supra) , the Apex Court observed as
under: -
“126. Courts must not condone gross negligence,
deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would
undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and
destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.

127. The expression “sufficient cause” must be construed
in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving
the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by
sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious
appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable
diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona
fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct,
courts have leaned toward condonation. Where negligence, want
of good faith, or a causal approach is discernible, condonation
has been refused.”



In the same case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while observing that
length of the delay may be instructive but not determinative held: -

“132. This is not to say that the length of delay is irrelevant. A
long delay naturally casts a heavier burden on the applicant
to furnish cogent, credible, and convincing explanations.
The proof required becomes stricter in proportion to the
delay. The longer the time elapsed, the stronger the
justification that must be put forth. Hence, length is
instructive in determining the degree of scrutiny, but it is not
determinative of the outcome.”


14. Coming to the matter in hand, as has been observed above, it appears
that the respondents did not raise any grievance against the order dated
9 11
Page of

2026:MLHC:967


09.06.2023 and the impugned order dated 30.01.2024 immediately after
passing of the orders and were taking part in the day-to-day proceedings of
the Title Suit No. 10 of 2022 and the connected Miscellaneous Applications.
It was only on 03.09.2024 the respondents preferred two separate appeals
against the orders dated 09.06.2023 and 30.01.2024 along with the
applications for condonation of delay. The only ground cited in the application
for condonation of delay was that the counsel for the respondents was not
keeping well as his previous ailment had relapsed and that the respondents
should not suffer for the fault of their counsel. The learned Appellate Court
also appears to have accepted the plea of the respondents without looking into
the records of the Trial Court and without taking notice of the fact that a list
of witnesses came to be filed under the signature of the appointed advocate of
the respondents on 07.06.2024 before the Trial Court. Furthermore, there is
nothing on record to show that the respondents’ counsel was bedridden or was
totally incapacitated because of his ailment during the period of delay. Hence,
the approach of the learned Appellate Court in allowing the prayer for
condonation of delay was not proper.

Furthermore, the law laid down in the decision of Shivamma (Dead) by
15.
Lrs. (supra) , requires that in case of delay in filing of an appeal or application,
explanation has to be given for the prescribed period of limitation as well as
the period after the expiry of limitation, up to the date of actual filing. The
relevant part of the decision reads as under: -
“ 40. As such, under section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the
purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an appeal
or application, as the case may be, beyond the stipulated
period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be explained
by demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient cause” that
resulted in such delay for both the prescribed period of
limitation as-well as the period after the expiry of limitation,
up to actual date of filing of such appeal or application, as the
case may be, or to put it simply, explanation has to be given
for the entire duration from the date when the clock of
limitation began to tick, up until the date of actual filing, for
10 11
Page of

2026:MLHC:967


seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of the
Limitation Act.”


16. It is undisputed that the respondents in their application seeking
condonation of delay did not assign any reason for not preferring the appeal
within the stipulated time prescribed by law. No explanation was also offered
in the argument made on their behalf as to what prevented the respondents
from filing the appeal within the period prescribed by law. In absence of such
explanation, it was not appropriate for the learned Appellate Court to condone
the delay for a period of almost 7 (seven) months. Hence, the impugned order
cannot be rendered valid in the eye of law.

17. That apart, in absence of any assertion that the respondents are
uneducated simple villagers, the conduct of the respondents in remaining
silent for about 7 (seven) months projects gross negligence, deliberate inaction
and casual indifference, more particularly, because of the fact that the Title
Suit No. 10 of 2022 was instituted by them and the status quo order dated
09.06.2023 in Misc.Case No.51 of 2022 was passed at their instance.

18. In the view of the discussions made above, the impugned order dated
10.11.2025 passed in Misc.Case No. 136 of 2024 cannot be sustainable in law
and is hereby set aside and quashed. Resultantly, the Misc.Civil Appeal No. 9
of 2024 pending before the Judge, District Council Court, Shillong also stands

quashed.

19. The revision petition stands allowed.

Judge

Meghalaya
02.09.2026
“ Abhinandan,PS ”
Signature Not Verified
11 11
Page of

Digitally signed by
ABHINANDAN KUMAR
Date: 2026.09.02 16:21:40 IST