Tilak Raj vs Shikha Mathur
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 09.10.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 21.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010490832026
+ EX.F.A. 74/2026 & CM APPL. 70593/2026 (Stay)
TILAK RAJ .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Sanjiv Bahl, Sr. Adv. With
Mr. Vikrant Arora,
Advocate.
versus
SHIKHA MATHUR
.....Respondent
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
CM APPL. 70594/2026
1. The present Application, filed under Section 151 of the Code of
1
Civil Procedure, 1908 , seeks condonation of a delay of 15 days in
re-filing the above-captioned Execution First Appeal, being EX.F.A.
2
74/2026 .
2. By way of the present Application, it is stated that the present
Appeal, upon being returned with objections on 03.09.2026, was
although required to be re-filed by 10.09.2026, however the same
1
CPC
2
present Appeal
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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could be re-filed only on 25.09.2026, since the Appellant was unwell
and could not visit his counsel for the purpose of signing the requisite
documents.
3. For the sufficient reasons stated therein, the present Application
is allowed, and the delay of 15 days in re-filing the Appeal is
condoned.
4. Accordingly, the present Application stands disposed of.
EX.F.A. 74/2026
5. The present Appeal, filed under Section 96, read with Order
XXI Rule 58(4) of the CPC, by the Appellant, who is the Decree
Holder in the execution proceedings, seeks to assail the Order dated
3
19.05.2026 passed by the learned District Judge-14, Central
4
District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in Execution Case No.
5
691/2019 , titled “Tilak Raj v. Puneet & Ors.” .
6. By way of the Impugned Order, the learned Executing Court
sustained the objections preferred by the Respondent under Order
6
XXI Rule 58 read with Sections 47 and 151 of the CPC , and
vacated the order of attachment dated 13.04.2026 passed in respect of
property bearing No. A-2A/84, DDA Flats, Janakpuri, New Delhi-
7
110058 .
FACTUAL MATRIX:
7. The Appellant had, in the year 2003, instituted a Civil Suit, re-
8
numbered as CS No. 610986/2016 , inter alia , against one Sh. Puneet
3
Impugned Order
4
learned Executing Court
5
Execution Petition
6
Objections
7
Subject Property
8
Suit
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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Mathur, son of Sh. Balvir Singh, who was arrayed as Defendant No. 5
therein, for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 3,30,000/- along with interest,
alleging that he had been deprived of the said amount, through a
cheque wrongly debited from his bank account, by illegal and
fraudulent means.
9
8. By the Judgment and Decree dated 11.02.2019 , the learned
Additional District Judge-13, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts,
Delhi, decreed the Suit against Sh. Puneet Mathur and the legal
representatives of Defendant No. 7 for a sum of Rs. 3,95,450/-, along
with simple interest at the rate of 4% per annum on the sum of Rs.
3,30,000/- from 14.01.2003 till realisation.
9. Pursuant thereto, the Appellant filed the Execution Petition on
18.04.2019. During the pendency thereof, Sh. Puneet Mathur, who
was arrayed as Judgment Debtor No. 1 therein, passed away.
Consequently, Notice of the Execution Petition was sought to be
issued to his widow, Smt. Shipra Mathur, as his legal representative,
who, however, remained unserved.
10. The Appellant thereafter filed an Affidavit before the learned
Executing Court asserting that Smt. Shipra Mathur “still holds” the
Subject Property, where the deceased Judgment Debtor had resided
earlier. On the strength of the said Affidavit, the learned Executing
Court, vide Order dated 13.04.2026, directed the issuance of warrants
of attachment in respect of the Subject Property, and a prohibitory
order under Order XXI Rule 54 of the CPC came to be issued on
18.04.2026.
11. The Respondent, who is the sister of the deceased Judgment
Debtor, thereupon filed the Objections in the said Eviction Petition
9
Decree
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BHATIA
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against the said Attachment Order.
12. It was her case that the Subject Property had been allotted in
1971 by the Delhi Development Authority to her father, Sh. Balvir
10 11
Singh , who, by a registered Will dated 07.08.2007 , had
bequeathed the same to her, and that upon the demise of the Testator
in April, 2013, she had become its rightful legal owner. It was further
averred that the Will merely permitted the deceased Judgment Debtor
to construct a second floor out of his own resources and to reside
thereon with his family, without any right to sell the same, that no
such floor was ever constructed, and that the Subject Property
continues to consist only of the ground and the first floors.
13. In his Reply to the said Objections, the Appellant contended
that the Subject Property had been inherited by all the legal heirs of
the Testator, including the deceased Judgment Debtor, and that, in any
event, even under the Will, the second floor, or the roof, of the Subject
Property belonged to Smt. Shipra Mathur. It was further contended
that any clause in the Will restricting the right of the legatee to deal
with the property bequeathed to him was invalid.
14. By way of the Impugned Order, the learned Executing Court,
upon a perusal of the Will, held that the Subject Property had been
bequeathed to the Respondent, that the deceased Judgment Debtor had
been granted no more than a right to construct a second floor thereon,
and that there was no material to show that any such floor had been
constructed or had devolved upon Smt. Shipra Mathur.
15. The Objections were, accordingly, sustained and the attachment
of the Subject Property was vacated. The Appellant was directed to
10
Testator
11
Will
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BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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furnish the details of any other property of the Judgment Debtors.
Aggrieved thereby, the Appellant has preferred the present Appeal.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:
16. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant would
contend that the learned Executing Court erred in sustaining the
Objections and in vacating the attachment, without properly
appreciating the material on record. It would be submitted that Smt.
Shipra Mathur, being the widow and a Class-I legal heir of the
deceased Judgment Debtor, has stepped into his shoes and is entitled
to whatever right, title or interest he held in the Subject Property.
17. Learned counsel for the Appellant would submit that the
principal challenge to the Impugned Order rests upon the construction
of the Will itself. In this regard, learned counsel would draw the
attention of this Court to the concluding bequest therein, whereby the
Testator gave and bequeathed the “second floor of flat No. A-2A/84,
Janakpuri, New Delhi to my son Puneet Mathur” , to contend that the
second floor of the Subject Property stood exclusively bequeathed to
the deceased Judgment Debtor, and that his right thereto was neither
restricted to a mere right to construct nor contingent upon the
construction of the said floor.
18. Learned counsel for the Appellant, in order to substantiate the
aforesaid submission, would place reliance upon the decision of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Kaivelikkal Ambunhi v. H. Ganesh
12
Bhandary , and of the Full Bench of this Court in Maj. Gen.
13
Rajinder Singh Chowdhary v. S. Manjit Singh Chowdhary , to
submit that, in terms of Section 88 of the Indian Succession Act,
12
(1995) 5 SCC 444
13
2000 SCC OnLine Del 724 : AIR 2001 Del 15 (FB)
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BHATIA
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14
1925 , where two clauses of a Will are inconsistent, the later clause
prevails over the earlier, and that the concluding bequest in favour of
the deceased Judgment Debtor must, therefore, prevail over the
restriction contained in the preceding part of the Will.
19. Learned counsel for the Appellant would further submit that,
the Will having carved out a distinct interest in the second floor in
favour of the deceased Judgment Debtor, the learned Executing Court
could not have vacated the attachment in its entirety without
examining that interest, and erred in holding that no attachable interest
survived in favour of Smt. Shipra Mathur merely for want of evidence
of actual construction. It would also be submitted that nothing has
been brought on record by the Respondent to show that the second
floor has not been constructed.
20. Learned counsel for the Appellant would lastly submit that the
Impugned Order, if allowed to stand, would render the Decree
incapable of satisfaction and cause grave prejudice to the Appellant,
who has been pursuing the recovery of the decretal amount for a
considerable period of time.
21. No other submissions were advanced by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the Appellant.
ANALYSIS:
22. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the Appellant and, with his assistance, perused the material available
on record, including the record of the learned Executing Court placed
on record by the Appellant.
23. At the outset, it may be noticed that the present Appeal was
heard on the first date of its listing, at the stage of admission, with the
14
Succession Act
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BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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consent of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant,
and the Judgment was reserved upon such hearing, without notice
being issued to the Respondent.
24. This course was adopted since the controversy lies within a
narrow compass of the construction of the Will, which forms part of
the record of the learned Executing Court placed before this Court by
the Appellant himself, and upon the consequences of that construction
under the provisions of the CPC governing attachment in execution.
Since the determination of these questions does not depend upon any
disputed fact on which the version of the Respondent would be
required the matter was heard finally with the consent of the
Appellant.
The Nature of the Enquiry
25. Before adverting to the competing constructions of the Will, it
is necessary to identify the precise question which arises for
determination, in light of the statutory provisions under which the
attachment was made and the Objections were preferred.
26. The Decree was passed against the deceased Judgment Debtor
in his lifetime, and it is against his legal representative that the same is
now sought to be executed. In this regard, Section 50 of the CPC
assumes significance, which governs such execution, reads as under:
“ 50. Legal representative. —(1) Where a judgment-debtor dies
before the decree has been fully satisfied, the holder of the decree
may apply to the Court which passed it to execute the same against
the legal representative of the deceased.
(2) Where the decree is executed against such legal representative,
he shall be liable only to the extent of the property of the deceased
which has come to his hands and has not been duly disposed of;
and, for the purpose of ascertaining such liability, the Court
executing the decree may, of its own motion or on the application
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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of the decree-holder, compel such legal representative to produce
such accounts as it thinks fit.”
(Emphasis supplied)
27. It is a matter of record that Smt. Shipra Mathur, wife of the
deceased Judgment Debtor, was not a party to the Suit and is not a
judgment debtor in her own right. Therefore, as envisaged in Section
50 of the CPC, the Decree can be executed against her only in her
capacity as the legal representative of the deceased Judgment Debtor,
and only to the extent of the property of the deceased which has come
to her hands. Her own property, if any, is beyond the reach of the
Decree.
28. The attachment of the Subject Property could, therefore, have
been sustained only if the deceased Judgment Debtor held an interest
therein which, upon his demise, came to the hands of Smt. Shipra
Mathur. Moreover, even such an interest is not, by that circumstance
alone, liable to attachment. In this regard, Section 60(1) of the CPC
assumes relevance, which delineates the property liable to attachment
and sale in execution of a decree, reads, in so far as is relevant, as
under:
“ 60. Property liable to attachment and sale in execution of
decree. —(1) The following property is liable to attachment and
sale in execution of a decree, namely, lands, houses or other
buildings, goods, money, bank-notes, cheques, bills of exchange,
hundis, promissory notes, Government securities, bonds or other
securities for money, debts, shares in a corporation and, save as
hereinafter mentioned, all other saleable property, movable or
immovable, belonging to the judgment-debtor, or over which, or
the profits of which, he has a disposing power which he may
exercise for his own benefit, whether the same be held in the name
of the judgment-debtor or by another person in trust for him or on
his behalf: …”
(Emphasis supplied)
29. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions makes it abundantly
manifest that the attachment contemplated by the CPC is a step in aid
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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of the sale of the property attached, so that the decree may be satisfied
out of its proceeds. It is for this reason that the statute confines
attachment to property which is saleable, or over which the judgment
debtor has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own
benefit. A right which its holder cannot himself sell, and which he can
enjoy only in person, is not one which the executing court can sell on
his behalf.
30. It is in the light of these provisions that the Objections fell to be
adjudicated under Order XXI Rule 58 of the CPC, the relevant portion
whereof reads as under:
“ 58. Adjudication of claims to, or objections to attachment of,
property. —(1) Where any claim is preferred to, or any objection is
made to the attachment of, any property attached in execution of a
decree on the ground that such property is not liable to such
attachment, the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the claim or
objection in accordance with the provisions herein contained: …
(2) All questions (including questions relating to right, title or
interest in the property attached) arising between the parties to a
proceeding or their representatives under this rule and relevant to
the adjudication of the claim or objection, shall be determined by
the Court dealing with the claim or objection and not by a separate
suit.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Where any claim or objection has been adjudicated upon under
this rule, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be
subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it
were a decree.”
(Emphasis supplied)
31. The scope of the adjudication contemplated by the aforesaid
provision was explained by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in L.K.
15
Prabhu v. K.T. Mathew in the following terms:
“ 10.2. A significant change was introduced by the Amendment Act
104 of 1976. Order XXI Rule 58 was substituted to enlarge the
scope of adjudication of claims and objections. Earlier, a claimant
was required to institute a separate suit under Order XXI Rule 63 or
invoke Section 53 of the T.P. Act. The amended Rule now
15
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2577
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BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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mandates that all questions relating to right, title, or interest of the
property attached be determined in execution itself. …
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, the effect of the amended Rule 58 is that the Executing Court
shall adjudicate all questions relating to right, title, or interest of the
property attached between the parties to the claim proceedings, and
its determination has the force of a decree. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
32. The Objections preferred by the Respondent, which raised a
question of right, title and interest in the Subject Property, were thus
required to be determined by the learned Executing Court itself, and
the order made thereon, having the force of a decree, is amenable to
appeal. It is in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction so conferred that
the present Appeal has been preferred.
33. It is equally well settled that an attaching creditor is entitled to
attach only the right, title and interest of the judgment debtor in the
property attached, and nothing more. In L.K. Prabhu (supra) , the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court, relying upon its earlier decision in
Vannarakkal Kallalathil Sreedharan v. Chandramaath
16
Balakrishnan , reiterated the said principle in the following terms:
“ 17. It is well settled that attachment before judgment cannot
extend to properties which have already been alienated prior to the
institution of the suit. In Vannarakkal Kallalathil Sreedharan v.
Chandramaath Balakrishnan , this Court held that an agreement for
sale creates an obligation attached to the ownership of the property
and an attaching creditor is entitled to attach only the right, title,
and interest of the judgment debtor. … The following paragraphs
from the said judgment are relevant in this regard:
xxx xxx xxx
„ 6. There is a useful parallel from the decision of the
Calcutta High Court in Purna Chandra Basak v. Daulat
Ali Mollah , AIR 1973 Cal. 432 wherein it was observed
that the attaching creditor attaches only the right, title and
inter-est of the debtor and attachment cannot confer upon
him any higher right than the judgment-debtor had at the
date of attachment. …‟ ”
(Emphasis supplied)
16
(1990) 3 SCC 291
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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34. The attachment, thus, does not enlarge the interest of the
judgment debtor, nor does it confer upon the attaching creditor any
right greater than that which the judgment debtor himself possessed.
Whatever the Appellant could attach in the present case was,
therefore, no more than such interest as the deceased Judgment Debtor
held in the Subject Property and as came to the hands of his legal
representative.
35. The question which arises for determination in the present
Appeal is, thus, whether the deceased Judgment Debtor held, in the
Subject Property, an interest which was saleable and which, upon his
demise, came to the hands of Smt. Shipra Mathur. The plea of
intestate succession, though raised in the Reply before the learned
Executing Court, was not pressed before this Court, and the
Appellant‟s case on the merits rests entirely upon the Will. It is,
therefore, to the terms of the Will that this Court must now turn.
Terms of the Will
36. The Will records the circumstances of the Testator and of his
family at the time of its execution. The Testator was then 72 years of
age, his wife had predeceased him, and he had one son, namely, the
deceased Judgment Debtor, and two married daughters, one of whom
is the Respondent. The relevant recitals in the Will read as under:
“AND WHEREAS at present I have been residing with my
daughter Smt. Shikha and her daughter at Ground and First floor of
A-2A/84, DDA Flat, Janakpuri, New Delhi-110058, who have been
taking proper care of me by providing all kinds of facilities for the
last five years. … My son Puneet Mathur has been source of
trouble to me through out and has caused me great financial losses
despite my helping him from time to time. He is associated with
bad elements and there are civil and criminal cases pending against
him in the court of law. I am not satisfied with his conduct and
behaviour and his activities are detrimental to me as he was making
undesirable efforts to sell, alienate, transfer or making a deal in
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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respect of my only flat No. A-2A/84, Janakpuri, New Delhi to
some person misrepresenting himself in my name, in order to
facilitate illegally the disposal of my flat No. A-2A/84, Janakpuri,
New Delhi, he has fraudulently obtained duplicate papers from
Delhi Development Authority. The undesirable and uncalled for
activities have thus made him unbecoming of my son and as a
result thereof I disowned my son Puneet Mathur and his wife Smt.
Shipra from my properties particularly from A-2A/84, Janakpuri,
New Delhi-110058 by way of PUBLIC NOTICE published in the
Newspaper „VIRAAT VAIBHAV‟ dated 20.06.2007.”
(Emphasis supplied)
37. Having so recorded, the Testator proceeded to make the
following dispositions in respect of the Subject Property:
“AND WHEREAS I have the following immoveable property in
my name.
1) FLAT HOUSE NO.84, BLOCK NO.A-2A, DDA FLAT,
JANAKPURI, NEW DELHI-110058. Plot No.2A/84, DDA Single
Unit flat has provisions of three floors i.e. Ground, First and
Second Floor. At present ground and first floor have been
constructed but there is no construction in the second floor.
I wish and desire that as long as I am living, I shall be the
beneficial owner of the aforesaid house/flat held by me. After my
death the abovesaid property bearing House/Flat No.A-2A/84,
Janakpuri, New Delhi-110058, in my name shall devolve upon my
daughter Shikha Mathur. I declare that after my death the ground
and first floor of Flat No.A-2A/84, Janakpuri, New Delhi-110058,
in my name and also any other property immoveable to be acquired
in my name in future shall be bequeathed to my aforesaid daughter
Smt. Shikha Mathur. It is my wish and desire to allow my son
Puneet to construct IInd floor with his own resource and may live
thereon with his family members but he will have no right to sell
the same, as my son Puneet Mathur approached and assured that he
will mend his ways and he will not give any opportunity of any
complaint against him. In these circumstances, I hereby grant him
right to construct on the Second floor as per rules and regulations
of Delhi Development Authority but he will have no right to sell
the same to anybody else except to reside therewith his family
members.
AND WHEREAS I hereby give and bequeath my immoveable
property bearing No.A-2A/84, DDA Flat, Janakpuri, New Delhi-
110058, and any other property likely to be acquired in my name to
my aforesaid daughter Smt. Shikha Mathur, and second floor of flat
No.A-2A/84, Janakpuri, New Delhi to my son Puneet Mathur.”
(Emphasis supplied)
38. The controversy between the parties turns upon the last of the
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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aforesaid clauses. The Appellant reads the bequest of the “second
floor” to the deceased Judgment Debtor as an absolute and
unqualified bequest which, being the later clause, overrides the
restrictions contained in the preceding clause. The learned Executing
Court, on the other hand, read the two clauses together, and held that
the deceased Judgment Debtor had been granted no more than a right
to construct the second floor and to reside thereon. Which of the two
readings is correct depends, therefore, upon the principles which
govern the construction of Wills.
The Principles Governing the Construction of a Will
39. The cardinal rule in the construction of a Will is that the Court
must ascertain the intention of the testator, and that such intention is to
be gathered from the instrument read as a whole. The Succession Act
gives statutory expression to this rule in Sections 82, 87 and 88, which
read as under:
“ 82. Meaning of clause to be collected from entire Will. —The
meaning of any clause in a Will is to be collected from the entire
instrument, and all its parts are to be construed with reference to
each other.
xxx xxx xxx
87. Testator’s intention to be effectuated as far as possible. —
The intention of the testator shall not be set aside because it cannot
take effect to the full extent, but effect is to be given to it as far as
possible.
88. The last of two inconsistent clauses prevails. —Where two
clauses or gifts in a Will are irreconcilable, so that they cannot
possibly stand together, the last shall prevail.”
(Emphasis supplied)
40. Section 88 of the Succession Act, upon which the Appellant has
placed his principal reliance, is not, therefore, a rule of first resort. It is
a rule of last resort, which comes into play only when the Court,
having read the Will as a whole in the manner mandated by Section
82, finds that two clauses are so irreconcilable that they cannot
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BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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possibly stand together. The very decision in Kaivelikkal Ambunhi
(supra) , upon which the Appellant relies, makes this abundantly clear.
After observing that, in the case of a Will, a later clause prevails over
an inconsistent earlier clause, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court cautioned as
under:
“ 4. A Will may contain several clauses and the latter clause may be
inconsistent with the earlier clause. In such a situation, the last
intention of the testator is given effect to and it is on this basis that
the latter clause is held to prevail over the earlier clause. …
xxx xxx xxx
6. It may, however, be pointed out that this rule of interpretation
can be invoked only if different clauses cannot be reconciled. (See:
Rameshwar Bakhsh Singh v. Balraj Kuar .)”
(Emphasis supplied)
41. The Full Bench of this Court in Maj. Gen. Rajinder Singh
Chowdhary (supra) , also relied upon by the Appellant, having
surveyed the decisions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court on the subject,
culled out the governing principles in the following terms:
“ 5. … 2. „In construing the language of the will the court is entitled
to put itself into the testator's armchair and is bound to bear in kind
also other matters than merely the words used. It must consider the
surroundings circumstances, the position of the testator, his family
relationship the probability that he would use words in a particular
sense. But all this is solely as an aid to arriving at a right
construction of the will and to ascertain the meaning of its language
when used by that particular testator in that document.‟
3. „The true intention of the testator has to be gathered not by
attaching importance to isolated expressions but by reading the will
as a whole with all its provisions and ignoring none of them as
redundant or contradictory.‟
4. „The court must accept, if possible such construction as would
give to every expression some effect rather than that which would
render any of the expressions inoperative. The court will look at the
circumstances under which the testator makes his will, such as the
state of his property of his family and the like. Where apparently
conflicting dispositions can be reconciled by giving full effect to
every word used in a document, such a construction should be
accepted instead of a construction which would have the effect of
cutting down the clear meaning of the words used by the testator.
…‟
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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5. „To the extent that it is legally possible, effects should be given
to every disposition contained in the will unless the law prevents
effect being given to it. … a court of construction will proceed to
the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy so that effect could be given
as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the
will.‟
xxx xxx xxx
7. … This rule of interpretation can be invoked if different clauses
cannot be reconciled. (See Rameshwar v. Balraj , AIR 1935 PC
187). …”
(Emphasis supplied)
42. These principles were applied by a Division Bench of this Court
17
in Shakuntla v. Rajinder Singh Deswal . In that case, the testator
had, in one clause, bequeathed his estate to his wife as her “absolute
and exclusive” property, and had, in a later clause, provided that upon
her death his son would inherit the same. Rejecting the contention that
the bequest stopped at the earlier clause, this Court read the Will as a
whole, and held that the testator intended to confer only a limited
interest upon his wife, with a subsequent bequest in favour of his son.
In doing so, this Court observed as under:
“ 14. … A plain reading of the above provision makes it manifestly
clear that the meaning of any clause in a Will is required to be
understood in the context of the entire instrument and not in
isolation.
xxx xxx xxx
22. In light of the aforestated statutory provisions and the
observation of this Court upon the judgments relied upon by the
learned senior counsel representing the parties, the arguments of
learned senior counsel representing the Appellant that the bequest
qua the suit property will stop at Clause 4 of the Will, is untenable
and cannot be accepted in view of Section 82 of the Act, 1925. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
43. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid statutory provisions and
decisions would indicate that the Will must be read as a whole, and
the meaning of each clause must be collected from the entire
instrument. An expression is not to be read in isolation, and the Court
17
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must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which gives effect to
every disposition and renders none of them redundant. In doing so, the
Court is entitled to have regard to the circumstances of the testator and
of his family. It is only where two clauses, so read, are found to be
irreconcilable that the later clause prevails over the earlier.
Whether the Bequest in favour of the Deceased Judgment Debtor
was Absolute
44. The learned Executing Court, upon a reading of the Will,
construed the bequest in favour of the deceased Judgment Debtor in
the following terms:
“As per contents of the will, Flat No. A-2A/84, Janakpuri, New
Delhi shall devolve upon Shikha Mathur i.e. the objector and not
Shipra Mathur. Will further clarifies that after the death of the
testator, ground and first floor of the said property and also any
other immovable property shall bequeath upon Shikha Mathur.
There is also a recital that there are only two floors constructed in
the said property and there is no second floor, although right has
been granted to construct second floor to Punit Mathur (son of
testator and deceased husband of Shipra Mathur) and after
construction same shall go to Punit Mathur. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
45. This Court is of the considered view that, when tested on the
principles noticed hereinabove, the construction placed upon the Will
by the learned Executing Court is correct and, accordingly, the reading
propounded by the Appellant cannot be accepted.
46. The Will deals with the Subject Property in two successive
clauses. The first of them sets out the scheme of the Testator in detail.
It records that the Subject Property consisted of the ground and the
first floors and that there was no construction on the second floor. It
sets out explicitly that the Subject Property shall devolve upon the
Respondent, and then, grants a limited right to the deceased Judgment
Debtor. That right was to construct the second floor with his own
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BHATIA
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resources, in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Delhi
Development Authority, and to reside thereon with the members of his
family, with no right to sell the same to anybody. The second clause
proceeds to state that the “second floor” would be bequeathed to the
deceased Judgment Debtor.
47. This Court, is of the considered view that there is no
inconsistency between the two clauses, much less an irreconcilable
one. The alleged inconsistency would present itself only in the event
that the subsequent clause is read completely divorced from the
preceding and prefatory part of the will. To do so would be a folly.
The second clause cannot be read in isolation, separated from the
earlier part of the will, which is fairly detailed and explicit in the
limited right that it was granting to the deceased JD. The subsequent
bequest of the second floor cannot be read in a manner such that it
eclipses the preceding part of the will and be read as one conferring an
absolute bequest upon the Judgment Debtor. Evidently, the author of
the will was not desirous of doing so and the same is articulated
unambiguously and in considerable detail in the preceding part. To do
so would confer upon the deceased JD, a right which the author had
expressly stated he did not wish to give, viz. the power of alienation of
the second floor. This Court is of the view that the construction sought
to be accorded takes a hyper-technical approach which would
effectively negate the express desire of the author of the will. Such a
construction cannot be permitted. At best, it could be termed an
imperfect usage of the English language in the draftmanship.
48. The two clauses, when read in light of Section 82 of the
Succession Act, convey a single and coherent intention, namely, that
the Subject Property should go to the Respondent, and that the
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BHATIA
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deceased Judgment Debtor should have the right to construct a second
floor at his own cost and to reside thereon with his family, without
any right to sell it. Such a construction gives full effect to every word
used by the Testator, whereas the construction propounded by the
Appellant would render the carefully worded restrictions in the first
clause wholly otiose. That is precisely the kind of construction which,
as held by the Full Bench in Maj. Gen. Rajinder Singh Chowdhary
(supra) , the Court must avoid.
49. Further, the two clauses being capable of being reconciled,
there arises no occasion to invoke Section 88 of the Succession Act. In
Kaivelikkal Ambunhi (supra), it was held that the rule that the later
clause prevails can be invoked only if different clauses cannot be
reconciled. The decisions relied upon by the Appellant, far from
supporting his case, thus militate against it.
50. The construction which this Court has placed upon the Will is
reinforced when the Court places itself, as it is entitled to do, in the
“armchair of the Testator” . The Testator records that the deceased
Judgment Debtor had been a source of trouble to him throughout, that
he had caused him great financial losses, and that he had made efforts
to sell the very flat which forms the Subject Property by
misrepresenting himself to be the Testator and by fraudulently
obtaining duplicate papers from the Delhi Development Authority.
51. The Testator further records that, by reason of such conduct, he
had disowned the deceased Judgment Debtor and Smt. Shipra Mathur
from his properties, particularly from the Subject Property, by a public
notice published barely seven weeks before the execution of the Will.
He also records that it was the Respondent who had been residing
with him in the Subject Property and taking care of him for the
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BHATIA
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preceding five years. It was only upon the assurance of the deceased
Judgment Debtor that he would mend his ways that the Testator chose
to allow him to construct and reside upon the second floor.
52. It is inconceivable that a testator so circumstanced would have
intended to confer upon that very son an absolute and alienable estate
in a part of the very property which the son had attempted to sell
behind his back. The restriction against sale is not an incidental
condition attached to an absolute bequest. It is the very reason why the
bequest was framed in the manner in which it was. Therefore, to read
the Will as conferring upon the deceased Judgment Debtor an absolute
interest in the second floor would be to defeat the clearly expressed
intention of the Testator, and not to effectuate it.
53. For the same reason, the contention of the Appellant that the
restriction against sale is void cannot be accepted. The Full Bench in
Maj. Gen. Rajinder Singh Chowdhary (supra) , while noticing the
decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Gopala Menon v.
18
Sivaraman Nair , explained the said decision in the following terms:
“ 3. … In Gopala Menon's case (supra), the Supreme Court was
considering the effect of an absolute grant. Reading the will in its
toto, the Supreme Court observed that intention of the testator
which one can reasonably gather is that the testator wanted to
confer an absolute estate upon the legatee. … It is implicit when
absolute estate is conferred, that grantee is free to deal with and
dispose of the property in any manner. If an absolute grant is
burdened with a restriction on alienation, the grant is good and the
condition void.”
(Emphasis supplied)
54. The principle so stated presupposes the existence of an absolute
grant. It has no application where, as in the present case, the
instrument, read as a whole, does not confer an absolute estate at all,
but defines a limited right, of which the absence of a power of sale is
18
(1981) 3 SCC 586
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BHATIA
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an integral part. There is no absolute grant from which the restriction
can be severed, and the restriction, therefore, cannot be ignored as
repugnant.
55. This Court, accordingly, holds that the Will did not bequeath to
the deceased Judgment Debtor an absolute estate in the second floor
of the Subject Property, but conferred upon him only a right to
construct the said floor out of his own resources and to reside thereon
with the members of his family, without any right to sell the same.
Whether any Attachable Interest came to the Hands of Smt. Shipra
Mathur
56. The construction placed upon the Will does not, by itself,
conclude the controversy. The attachment can be sustained only if the
right conferred upon the deceased Judgment Debtor was one which
the law permits to be attached, and which, upon his demise, came to
the hands of Smt. Shipra Mathur within the meaning of Section 50(2)
of the CPC. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the nature of that
right, as well as the state of the Subject Property, on the touchstone of
Sections 50 and 60 of the CPC.
57. By the express terms of the Will, the right conferred upon the
deceased Judgment Debtor was incapable of being sold. Section 60(1)
of the CPC, as noticed hereinabove, renders liable to attachment only
such property as is saleable, or over which the judgment debtor has a
disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit. A right to
construct and to reside, which the holder thereof is expressly
forbidden to sell, answers neither description. The deceased Judgment
Debtor could not himself have sold the right, and the executing court
could not, therefore, have sold it in execution of the Decree against
him.
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BHATIA
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58. Furthermore, the right was, in its very nature, a personal right of
residence, conferred upon the deceased Judgment Debtor for himself
and the members of his family, and conditioned upon his constructing
the second floor out of his own resources. It did not carry with it any
right, title or interest in the Subject Property, which vested in the
Respondent.
59. The law treats such an interest as inalienable by its very nature.
Section 6(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, declares that an
interest in property restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally
cannot be transferred by him. A right which the law does not permit
its holder to transfer is, by the same token, not saleable property
within the meaning of Section 60(1) of the CPC, nor is such right a
property of the deceased Judgment Debtor which can be said to have
come to the hands of Smt. Shipra Mathur within the meaning of
Section 50(2) of the CPC, so as to be available for the satisfaction of
the Decree.
60. There is yet another and more fundamental difficulty in the way
of the Appellant. The Will itself records that, as on the date of its
execution, there was no construction on the second floor. The
Respondent, in her Objections, specifically averred that the second
floor was never constructed and that the Subject Property continues to
consist only of the ground and the first floors.
61. The Appellant, in his Reply, did no more than deny the said
averment. He did not assert, much less place any material to show,
that the second floor had ever been constructed by the deceased
Judgment Debtor, or at all. The affidavit on the basis of which the
attachment was obtained did not even advert to the second floor, and
proceeded instead on the footing that Smt. Shipra Mathur held the
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BHATIA
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Subject Property as a whole, which is not even the Appellant‟s case on
the construction of the Will. The learned Executing Court, in this
regard, held as under:
“… However, there is no evidence placed on record by Ld. Counsel
for JD that any such second floor stands constructed by Punit
Mathur and that after, his death, the same was inherited by JD
Shipra Mathur.”
(Emphasis supplied)
62. The submission of the Appellant that nothing was brought on
record by the Respondent to show that the second floor had not been
constructed proceeds upon a misconception as to where the burden
lay. It was the Appellant who sought the attachment of the Subject
Property as property in which the deceased Judgment Debtor had an
interest, and it was, therefore, for him to establish the existence of
such an interest. The recital in the Will, coupled with the specific
averment of the Respondent, was sufficient to shift any onus which
may have rested upon her, and the Appellant brought nothing on
record to discharge the burden which, in consequence, rested upon
him. The finding of the learned Executing Court extracted
hereinabove is, therefore, unexceptionable.
63. In the absence of any such construction, the “second floor”
bequeathed to the deceased Judgment Debtor remained, at the highest,
an unexercised permission to build and reside thereupon. There was
no existing structure, and no estate in any such structure, which could
have been the subject of attachment.
64. On a conspectus of the foregoing, this Court holds that the
deceased Judgment Debtor did not hold in the Subject Property any
interest which was saleable and which, upon his demise, came to the
hands of Smt. Shipra Mathur. The Subject Property was,
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BHATIA
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consequently, not liable to attachment in execution of the Decree,
either in its entirety or in part, and the contention that the learned
Executing Court ought to have retained the attachment to the extent of
the second floor must, therefore, fail. The learned Executing Court, in
arriving at the same conclusion, held as under:
“Accordingly, it stands established that Shipra Mathur has no right,
title or interest in the property bearing no. A-2A/84, Janakpuri,
New Delhi as the same has been bequeathed upon applicant/
objector Shikha Mathur vide a registered will dated 07.08.2007.
Hence, the assertion of Ld. Counsel for DH made by in his affidavit
dated 13.04.2026 that property bearing no. A-2A/84, Janakpuri,
New Delhi has devolved upon JD No. 1 Shipra Mathur does not
appear to be correct. Accordingly, the attachment order dated
13.04.2026 vide which the property bearing no. A-2A/84,
Janakpuri, New Delhi was attached stands vacated.”
(Emphasis supplied)
65. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered view that there is no infirmity in the aforesaid conclusion
which would warrant interference.
Decree rendered incapable of satisfaction
66. The submission of the Appellant that the Impugned Order
would render the Decree incapable of satisfaction also does not merit
acceptance. The hardship of a decree holder in realising the fruits of
his decree, however real, cannot justify the attachment of property
which is not liable to attachment. The learned Executing Court has, in
any event, directed the Appellant to furnish the details of any other
property of the Judgment Debtors, and the Appellant remains at
liberty to pursue his remedies in respect thereof in accordance with
law.
CONCLUSION:
67. The Decree under execution was passed against the deceased
Judgment Debtor, and can be executed against Smt. Shipra Mathur
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BHATIA
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only to the extent of such property of the deceased as has come to her
hands.
68. The Subject Property was bequeathed by the Testator to the
Respondent. The Will, read as a whole, conferred upon the deceased
Judgment Debtor no more than a personal right to construct a second
floor out of his own resources and to reside thereon with his family,
without any right to sell the same.
69. The two clauses of the Will relied upon by the Appellant are not
irreconcilable, and Section 88 of the Succession Act has no
application. The right so conferred was neither saleable nor exercised,
the second floor having never been constructed, and no attachable
interest in the Subject Property, therefore, coming to the hands of Smt.
Shipra Mathur.
70. The learned Executing Court was, therefore, right in sustaining
the Objections and in vacating the attachment of the Subject Property,
and this Court finds no infirmity in the Impugned Order which would
warrant interference in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
DECISION:
71. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present Appeal, being
devoid of merit, is dismissed and, accordingly, the Impugned Order
dated 19.05.2026 passed by the learned Executing Court is upheld.
72. It is clarified that nothing stated in this Judgment shall preclude
the Appellant from proceeding, in accordance with law, against any
other property of the Judgment Debtors, or against such property of
the deceased Judgment Debtor as may be shown to have come to the
hands of his legal representatives.
73. Accordingly, the present Petition, along with the pending
Application, stands disposed of in aforementioned terms.
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BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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74. There shall be no Order as to the Costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
NOVEMBER 21, 2026/ DJ
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:14:46