NIRMLA THAPA AND ANR vs AKSHAY THAPA

Court
High Court of Himachal Pradesh

2026:HHC:31518
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
High Court of H.P.
               CMPMO No.  : 729 of 2025
Reserved On   : 13.07.2026
                                Decided On    : 30.07.2026
Uploaded On  : 30.07.2026
Nirmala Thapa & Anr. …Petitioners
      Versus
Akshay Thapa  …Respondent
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
1  
Whether approved for reporting?
For the petitioners     :    Mr.   R.K.   Gautam,   Senior  
Advocate, with Mr. Sahil Dixit, 
Advocate.
For the respondent : Mr.   Ajay   Sharma,   Senior  
Advocate, with Mr. Tarun K.  
Brakta, Advocate. 
 
Virender Singh, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the
order dated 02.06.2025, passed by the Court of learned
District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra,
H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the first appellate Court’),
in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 04­D/XIV/2024, titled as “Akshay
Thapa Versus Nirmla Thapa & Anr.”.
1
Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. By way of order dated 02.06.2025, the learned
High Court of H.P.
first appellate Court has allowed the appeal preferred by
the   respondent   Akshay   Thapa,   which,   he   had   preferred
against the order dated 20.01.2024, passed by the Court of
learned   Civil   Judge,   Court   No.   1   Dharamshala,   District
Kangra, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’), in
CMA No. 20/D/2022 (application under Order 39 Rules 1
and 2 CPC), filed in Civil Suit No. 20/D/2022, titled as
‘Akshay Thapa Versus Nirmla Thapa & Anr.’.
3. By way of order dated 20.01.2024, the learned
trial Court has dismissed the application under Order 39,
Rules 1 and 2 CPC, filed by the respondent, in the above
titled case.  
4. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the
present   lis,   are,   hereinafter   referred   to,   in   the   same
manner, as were, referred to, by the learned trial Court.
5. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present
petition before this Court, may be summed up, as under:­
5.1 Plaintiff Akshay Thapa has filed a suit under
Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, for cancellation of the
Family Settlement Deed dated 15.02.2021 and for setting
aside Mutation No. 2349 of inheritance dated 12.11.2020
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and   Mutation   No.   2377   dated   25.02.2021   attested   and
High Court of H.P.
sanctioned on the basis of family settlement deed and to
cancel the Will dated 15.02.2019, which was registered on
15.02.2021,   qua   the   land   comprising   Khata   No.   228,
Khatauni No. 400, Khasra Nos. 1686/358 and 360 (Kitas
2)   measuring   00­09­87   hectares,   situated   at   Mohal
Sidhpur, Mauza Khaniyara, Tehsil Dharamshala, District
Kangra, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit land’), by
declaring the family settlement deed and Will as null, void,
ineffective, non est and not binding upon the rights of the
plaintiff.  In addition to this, he has also sought the decree
for   permanent   prohibitory   injunction,   restraining   the
defendants not to alienate the suit land, and not to create
any third party right, changing the nature and possession
of the suit land, in any manner.
5.2 The said suit has been filed, on the ground,
that the father of the plaintiff, namely, Sh. Birender Singh
Thapa, son of Sh. Garv Singh, son of Sh. Kishan Veer, was
owner of the suit land, whereas plaintiff and defendant No.
2 are real brothers and defendant No. 1 is their mother.
The suit land was self acquired property of Sh. Birender
Singh Thapa, upon which, he had raised construction of
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double storeyed house.  All these facts have been pleaded
High Court of H.P.
to demonstrate that defendant No. 1 has no vested right in
the suit land.
5.3 It is the further case of the plaintiff that his
father had executed the Will dated 13.11.2018 in favour of
defendant No. 1, with the condition that she will be the
owner of the suit land, during her life time, however, in the
Will dated 13.11.2018, it was made clear that after the
death of defendant No. 1, the suit land will become the
property of plaintiff and defendant No. 2, in equal shares.
The   testator,   during   his   life   time,   also   divided   the
residential   house   by   allotting   the   ground   floor   to   the
plaintiff   with   equal   share   in   the   vacant   land.     The
predecessor­in­interest   of   the   parties,   expired   on
20.01.2020
5.4 It   is   the   further   case   of   the   plaintiff   that
defendant No. 2, by applying the influence upon defendant
No.   1,   got   executed   the   Will   dated   15.09.2019,   in   his
favour, during the life time of Sh. Birender Singh Thapa
and the said Will was got registered on 15.02.2021, i.e.
after two years of its execution.  At the time of registration
of this Will, no notice was given to the plaintiff and the Will
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was   wrongly   registered   in   his   absence.     At   the   time   of
High Court of H.P.
registration of the Will, the Registration Authorities have
not   taken   into   consideration   that   the   Will   is   dated
15.02.2019 and at that point of time, defendant No. 1 has
no right, title and interest in the suit land.
5.5 Highly relying upon the Will dated 13.11.2018,
by virtue of which, the Will, in favour of defendant No. 1,
was for enjoying the suit land, during her life time without
any right of alienation, a prayer has been made to grant
the relief, as claimed.
5.6 Along with the suit, an application under Order
39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC has also been filed by the plaintiff.
6. When   put   to   notice,   the   suit,   as   well   as,
application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC have been
contested by the defendants.
6.1 Defendant No. 1 has filed her separate written
statement, by taking preliminary objections that the suit is
not maintainable, suit is malafide and the plaintiff has not
approached this Court with clean hands, suit has been
filed just to harass the defendants, suit is premature, as
the plaintiff has no right to challenge the registered Will
dated 15.02.2021, during the life time of defendant No. 1.
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The registered Will dated 15.02.2021, is a sacred document
High Court of H.P.
and the executor of the said Will is defendant No. 1 herself,
suit is not properly valued for the purpose of Court fees
and jurisdiction, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction, as the
plaintiff has not challenged mutation No. 2349, the plaintiff
is  estopped  by  his  own  act,  conduct,  acquiescence  and
silence;   and   plaintiff   has   no   cause   of   action   and   locus
standi to file the present suit.
6.2 On merits, the factual position, qua the fact,
that defendant No. 1 had inherited the suit land from her
husband, vide registered Will dated 13.11.2018, which has
not been disputed.   However, she had become absolute
owner in possession of the suit land.  She had served her
husband during his life time, whereas, the plaintiff was
living outside since 1993.  It was only defendant No. 2, who
was   serving   his   parents.     The   execution   of   Will   in   her
favour   has   been   admitted,   but   no   condition   has   been
imposed in the said Will.  Reasserting the fact that she had
inherited the suit land as absolute owner, a prayer has
been made that the Will does not prescribe a restricted
estate in favour of defendant No. 1.  It has been asserted
that the suit land was given to defendant No. 1 in lieu of
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her   pre­existing   right   of   maintenance.     She   has   also
High Court of H.P.
asserted that she had executed the Will dated 15.02.2021,
in favour of defendant No. 2.
7. Similar stand has been taken by defendant No.
2.
8. Plaintiff   filed   the   replication,   denying   the
preliminary   objections,   as   well   as,   the   contents   of   the
written statement.
9. The   learned   trial   Court,   vide   order   dated
20.01.2024, has dismissed the application, by holding that
the plaintiff has miserably failed to establish the prima
facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss.
10. The   said   findings   have   been   assailed   by   the
plaintiff, by way of Civil Misc. Appeal, before the learned
first appellate Court.   The learned first appellate Court,
vide order dated 02.06.2025, has allowed the appeal and
set aside the order passed by learned trial Court and the
application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C., has been
allowed,   restraining   the   defendants   from   alienating   and
changing the nature of the suit land, during the pendency
of the lis.
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11. Feeling   aggrieved   from   the   order,   dated
High Court of H.P.
02.06.2025,   present   petition   has   been   filed,   before   this
Court.  
12. On the basis of the grounds of appeal, a prayer
has been made to allow the petition, by setting aside the
order passed by the learned First Appellate Court.
13.  The learned First Appellate Court, has ordered
the parties to maintain status quo, as referred to above,
whereas,   learned   trial   Court,   in   the   present   case   has
dismissed the application, under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2
CPC.
14.  In this  factual  background,  this  Court,  while
exercising the supervisory powers, has to consider the fact,
whether the learned trial Court, has rightly exercised, the
jurisdiction vested in it, or exceeded its jurisdiction, under
Order 43, Rule 1, of CPC.  
15.  Hon’ble   Supreme   Court,   in   case,   titled   as
Ramakant   Ambalal   Choksi   versus   Harish   Ambalal
Choksi   and   others ,  reported   in   2024   INSC   913 ,   has
elaborately discussed the powers of the learned Appellate
Courts,   under   Order   43   Rule   1   of   CPC.     Relevant
paragraphs 20 to 32 are reproduced as under:­
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20. Order 43 of the CPC specifies the orders
against which an appeal lies. SubRule (r) of
Rule   1   of   the   said   order   provides   that   an
appeal would lie against an order made under
Rules 1, 2, 2A, 4 and 10 of Order 39 of the
CPC respectively. 
High Court of H.P.
21.  The  law   in  relation   to  the   scope  of   an
appeal against grant or non­grant of interim
injunction   was   laid   down   by   this   Court   in
Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd. reported in
1990 Supp SCC 727. Antox brought an action
of passing off against Wander with respect to
the mark Cal­De­Ce. The trial court declined
Antox’s   plea   for   an   interim   injunction,
however, on appeal the High Court reversed
the   findings   of   the   trial   judge.   This   Court,
upon   due   consideration   of   the   matter,   took
notice of two egregious errors said to have
been committed by the High Court: 
a. First, as regards the scope and nature of
the appeals before it and the limitations on
the powers of the appellate court to substitute
its   own   discretion   in   an   appeal   preferred
against a discretionary order; and 
b. Secondly, the weakness in ratiocination as
to the quality of Antox’s alleged user of the
trademark on which the passing off action is
founded. 
22. With regards to (a), this Court held thus: 
“  In such appeals, the appellate court will not
interfere with the exercise of discretion of the
court of the first instance and substitute its
own   discretion,   except   where   the   discretion
has   been   shown   to   have   been   exercised
arbitrarily   or   capriciously   or   perversely,   or
where   the   court   had   ignored   the   settled
principles of law regulating grant or refusal of
interlocutory injunctions … the appellate court
will   not   reassess   the   material   and   seek   to
reach   a   conclusion   different   from   the   one
reached by the court below … If the discretion
has   been   exercised   by   the   trial   court
reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact
that the appellate court would have taken a
different   view   may   not   justify   interference
with the trial court’s exercise of discretion.” 
23.  This Court,   while arriving  at  the above
findings,   relied   on   its   earlier   judgment   in
Printers (Mysore) v Pothan Joseph reported in
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(1960) SCC Online SC 62 where it was held
thus: 
“[...] as has been observed by Viscount Simon
LC in Charles Osenton & Co v Johnston – the
law as to reversal by a court of appeal of an
order made by a judge below in the exercise
of his/her discretion is well established, and
any difficulty that arises is due only to the
application   of   well­settled   principles   in   an
individual case.” 
High Court of H.P.
24.   It   is   pertinent   to   note   that   in   Printers
(supra)   this   Court   had   held   that   ignoring
relevant facts is also a ground for interfering
with the discretion exercised by the trial court.
Furthermore,   Viscount   Simon   LC   in   Charles
Osenton & Co v Johnston reported in 1942
A.C. 130, after stating the above, went on to
quote   Lord   Wright’s   decision   in   Evans   v.
Bartlam reported in 1937 A.C. 473: 
“It is clear that the court of appeal should not
interfere with the discretion of a judge acting
within   his   jurisdiction   unless   the   court   is
clearly satisfied that he was wrong. But the
court is not entitled simply to say that if the
judge had jurisdiction and had all the facts
before him, the court of appeal cannot review
his   order   unless   he   is   shown   to   have   14
applied a wrong principle. The court must, if
necessary, examine anew the relevant facts
and   circumstances   in   order   to   exercise   a
discretion   by   way   of   review   which   may
reverse or vary the order.” 
25. In Evans (supra) case, Lord Wright made
it   clear   that   while   adjudicating   upon   the
discretion   exercised   by   the   trial   court,   the
appellate court is obliged to consider the case
put forward by the appellant in favour of its
argument   that   the   trial   court   exercised   its
discretion   arbitrarily   or   incorrectly   in   the
circumstances. 
26. What flows from a plain reading of the
decisions   in   Evans   (supra)   and   Charles
Osenton   (supra)   is   that   an   appellate   court,
even   while   deciding   an   appeal   against   a
discretionary   order   granting   an   interim
injunction,   has   to:   a.   Examine   whether   the
discretion   has   been   properly   exercised,   i.e.
examine whether the discretion exercised is
not   arbitrary,   capricious   or   contrary   to   the
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principles of law; and b. In addition to the
above, an appellate court may in a given case
have   to   adjudicate   on   facts   even   in   such
discretionary orders. 
High Court of H.P.
27. The principles of law explained by this
Court   in   Wander’s   (supra)   have   been
reiterated   in   a   number   of   subsequent
decisions   of   this   Court.   However,   over   a
period of time the test laid down by this Court
as regards the scope of interference has been
made more stringent. The emphasis is now
more on perversity rather than a mere error of
fact  or  law  in the  order   granting  injunction
pending the final adjudication of the suit. 
28.   In   Neon   Laboratories   Ltd.   v.   Medical
Technologies   Ltd.   reported   in   (2016)  2   SCC
672 this Court held that the Appellate Court
should   not   flimsily,   whimsically   or   lightly
interfere   in   the   exercise   of   discretion   by   a
subordinate   court   unless   such   exercise   is
palpably perverse.  Perversity can pertain to
the understanding of law or the appreciation
of pleadings or evidence. In other words, the
Court took the view that to interfere against
an   order   granting   or   declining   to   grant   a
temporary   injunction,   perversity   has   to   be
demonstrated in the finding of the trial court. 
29.   In   Mohd.   Mehtab   Khan   v.   Khushnuma
Ibrahim Khan reported in (2013) 9 SCC 221
this Court emphasised on the principles laid
down in Wander (supra) and observed that
while the view taken by the appellate court
may be an equally possible view, the mere
possibility   of   taking   such   a   view   must   not
form the basis for setting aside the decision
arrived at by the trial court in exercise of its
discretion   under   Order   39   of   the   CPC.   The
basis   for   substituting   the   view   of   the   trial
court   should   be   malafides,   capriciousness,
arbitrariness or perversity in the order of the
trial   court.   The   relevant   observations   are
extracted below: 
“20.  In   a   situation   where   the   learned   trial
court   on   a   consideration   of   the   respective
cases of the parties and the documents laid
before it was of the view that the entitlement
of   the   plaintiffs   to   an   order   of   interim
mandatory  injunction was in serious doubt,
the Appellate Court could not have interfered
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with the exercise of discretion by the learned
Trial Judge unless such exercise was found to
be   palpably   incorrect   or   untenable.   The
reasons that weighed with the learned Trial
Judge, as already noticed, according to us, do
not   indicate   that   the   view   taken   is   not   a
possible view. The Appellate Court, therefore,
should not have substituted its views in the
matter merely on the ground that in its opinion
the   facts   of   the   case   call   for   a   different
conclusion. Such an exercise is not the correct
parameter   for   exercise   of   jurisdiction   while
hearing   an   appeal   against   a   discretionary
order.  While we must not be understood to
have said that the Appellate Court was wrong
in   its   conclusions   what   is   sought   to   be
emphasized is that as long as the 16 view of
the   trial   court   was   a   possible   view   the
Appellate   Court   should   not   have   interfered
with the same following the virtually settled
principles of law in this regard as laid down
by this Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P)
Ltd.” 
High Court of H.P.
    (Emphasis supplied) 
30. This Court in Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. v.
Shyam Steel Industries Ltd. reported in (2023)
1 SCC 634 observed that the hierarchy of the
trial court and the appellate court exists so
that   the   trial   court   exercises   its   discretion
upon   the   settled   principles   of   law.   An
appellate court, after the findings of the trial
court   are   recorded,   has   an   advantage   of
appreciating the view taken by the trial judge
and examining the correctness or otherwise
thereof   within   the   limited   area   available.   It
further   observed   that   if   the   appellate   court
itself   decides   the   matters   required   to   be
decided by the trial court, there would be no
necessity to have the hierarchy of courts. 
31. This Court in Monsanto Technology LLC v.
Nuziveedu   Seeds   Ltd.   reported   in   (2019)   3
SCC 381, observed that the appellate court
should not usurp the jurisdiction of the Single
Judge to decide as to whether the tests of
prima facie case, balance of convenience and
irreparable injury are made out in the case or
not. 
32. The appellate court in an appeal from an
interlocutory   order   granting   or   declining   to
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13 2026:HHC:31518
grant   interim   injunction   is   only   required   to
adjudicate the validity of such order applying
the well settled principles governing the scope
of jurisdiction of appellate court under Order
43 of the CPC which have been reiterated in
various   other   decisions   of   this   Court.   The
appellate   court   should   17   not   assume
unlimited   jurisdiction   and   should   guide   its
powers within the contours laid down in the
Wander (supra) case.”
High Court of H.P.
     (Self emphasis supplied)
16. Judging   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the
present case, in light of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme
Court, there is no legal hesitation, for this Court to hold
that the learned first appellate Court, has acted like a trial
Court and has considered the entire case de novo, instead
of recording the findings, upon which, it can be said that
the  order passed by the learned trial Court is perverse.
17. The term ‘perverse’ has also been discussed by
the   Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in  ‘ Arulvelu   and   Another
Versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor and
’, reported in  
Another (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases
206 . Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment
are reproduced, as under:­ 
“22. We have carefully perused the judgment of
the trial court and the impugned judgment of the
High   Court.   The   trial   court   very   minutely
examined the entire evidence and all documents
and exhibits on record. The trial court's analysis
of evidence also seems to be correct. The trial
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court has not deviated from the normal norms or
methods of evaluation of the  evidence. By no
stretch   of   imagination,   we   can   hold   that   the
judgment   of   the   trial   court   is   based   on   no
evidence   or   evidence   which   is   thoroughly
unreliable and no reasonable person would act
upon it and consequently the judgment of the
trial court is perverse.
High Court of H.P.
23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that
the discussion and appreciation of the evidence
of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic
as   to   suffer   from   the   vice   of   irrationality
incurring the blame of being perverse and the
findings rendered by the trial court are against
the weight of evidence. The law is well settled
that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the
judgment   of   the   trial   court   is   perverse,   the
Appellate   Court   would   not   be   justified   in
substituting   its   own   view   and   reverse   the
judgment of acquittal.
24.   The   expression   `perverse'   has   been   dealt
with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead)
through   LRs.   &  Others   v.   Hanuman   Prasad
(Dead )   through   LRs.   &   Others,   this   Court
observed that the expression `perverse' means
that the findings of the subordinate authority are
not supported by the evidence brought on record
or they are against the law or suffer from the
vice of procedural irregularity.
25. In  Parry's   (Calcutta   )   Employees'   Union   v.
Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others , the Court observed
that `perverse finding' means a finding which is
not only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence itself. In  Triveni
Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central Excise,
Cochin , the Court  observed  that  this is not  a
case where it can be said that the findings of the
authorities   are   based   on   no   evidence   or   that
they are so perverse that no reasonable person
would have arrived at those findings.
26. In  M.   S.   Narayanagouda   v.   Girijamma   &
Another ,   the   Court   observed   that   any   order
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15 2026:HHC:31518
made in conscious violation of pleading and law
is   a   perverse   order.   In   Moffett   v.   Gough,   the
Court   observed   that   a   perverse   verdict   may
probably   be   defined   as   one   that   is   not   only
against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the
Court   defined   `perverse'   as   turned   the   wrong
way, not right; distorted from the right; turned
away or deviating from what is right, proper,
correct etc.
High Court of H.P.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined
by various dictionaries in the following manner:
1.   Oxford   Advanced   Learner's
Dictionary   of   Current   English   Sixth
Edition 
Perverse:   Showing   deliberate
determination to behave in a way that
most   people   think   is   wrong,
unacceptable or unreasonable.
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary
English –
International Edition 
Perverse:   Deliberately   departing   from
what is normal and reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English
­ 1998 Edition 
Perverse: Law (of a verdict) against the
weight of evidence or the direction of the
judge on a point of law.
4.   New   Webster's   Dictionary   of   the
English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic
Edition) 
Perverse:   Purposely   deviating   from
accepted   or   expected   behavior   or
opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn;
cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words
& Phrases, Fourth Edition 
Perverse:   A   perverse   verdict   may
probably be defined as one that is not
only against the weight of evidence but
is altogether against the evidence.
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28. In  Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of
U.P. , the Court observed thus:
High Court of H.P.
"8. … We are of the opinion that the trial
court   was   quite   justified   in   acquitting
the   appellants   of   the   charges   as   the
view taken by it was reasonable  one
and   the   order   of   acquittal   cannot   be
said  to  be perverse. It  is well  settled
that   appellate   court would   not   be
justified in interfering with the order of
acquittal unless the same is found to be
perverse. In the present case, the High
Court   has   committed   an   error   in
interfering with the order of acquittal of
the   appellants   recorded   by   the   trial
court as the same did not suffer from
the vice of perversity."
29. In  Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of
Police & Others , the Court while dealing with
the   scope   of  Articles   32  and  226  of   the
Constitution observed as under:
"9.   Normally   the   High   Court   and   this
Court   would   not   interfere   with   the
findings of fact recorded at the domestic
enquiry but  if  the  finding  of  "guilt" is
based   on  no  evidence,  it  would   be  a
perverse   finding   and   would   be
amenable to judicial scrutiny.
10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to
be   maintained   between   the   decisions
which are perverse and those which are
not. If  a  decision is arrived  at  on no
evidence   or   evidence   which   is
thoroughly   unreliable   and   no
reasonable   person   would   act   upon   it,
the   order   would   be   perverse.   But   if
there is some evidence on record which
is acceptable and which could be relied
upon,   howsoever   compendious   it   may
be, the conclusions would not be treated
as perverse and the findings would not
be interfered with."
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17 2026:HHC:31518
30.   The   meaning   of   `perverse'   has   been
examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation
Officer­cum­   Assessing   Authority,   Karnal   &
Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992,
this Court observed as under:
High Court of H.P.
"7. In the present case, the stage at and
the points on which the challenge to the
assessment   in   judicial   review   was
raised   and   entertained   was   not
appropriate.   In   our   opinion,   the   High
Court was in error in constituting itself
into   a   court   of   appeal   against   the
assessment. While it was open to the
respondent to have raised and for the
High Court to have considered whether
the   denial   of   relief   under   the   proviso
to  Section   39(5)  was   proper   or   not,   it
was   not   open   to   the   High   Court   re­
appreciate   the   primary   or   perceptive
facts which were otherwise within the
domain   of   the   fact­finding   authority
under the statute. The question whether
the transactions were or were not sales
exigible   to   sales   tax   constituted   an
exercise   in   recording   secondary   or
inferential facts based on primary facts
found by the statutory authorities. But
what was assailed in review was, in
substance,   the   correctness   ­   as
distinguished   from   the   legal
permissibility   ­   of   the   primary   or
perceptive   facts   themselves.   It   is,   no
doubt, true that if a finding of fact is
arrived   at   by   ignoring   or   excluding
relevant   material   or   by   taking   into
consideration   irrelevant   material   or   if
the finding so outrageously defies logic
as to suffer from the vice of irrationality
incurring the blame of being perverse,
then, the finding is rendered infirm in
law."
The   term   “perverse”   has   duly
been elaborated by the Hon’ble
Supreme   Court   in   ‘ Arulvelu
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18 2026:HHC:31518
and   Another   Versus   State
represented   by   the   Public
Prosecutor   and   Another ’,
reported in 
(2009) 10 Supreme
Court   Cases   206 .   Relevant
paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said
judgment   are   reproduced,   as
under:­ 
“22. We have carefully perused the judgment of
the trial court and the impugned judgment of the
High   Court.   The   trial   court   very   minutely
examined the entire evidence and all documents
and exhibits on record. The trial court's analysis
of evidence also seems to be correct. The trial
court has not deviated from the normal norms or
methods of evaluation of the  evidence. By no
stretch   of   imagination,   we   can   hold   that   the
judgment   of   the   trial   court   is   based   on   no
evidence   or   evidence   which   is   thoroughly
unreliable and no reasonable person would act
upon it and consequently the judgment of the
trial court is perverse.
High Court of H.P.
23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that
the discussion and appreciation of the evidence
of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic
as   to   suffer   from   the   vice   of   irrationality
incurring the blame of being perverse and the
findings rendered by the trial court are against
the weight of evidence. The law is well settled
that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the
judgment   of   the   trial   court   is   perverse,   the
Appellate   Court   would   not   be   justified   in
substituting   its   own   view   and   reverse   the
judgment of acquittal.
24.   The   expression   `perverse'   has   been   dealt
with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead)
through   LRs.   &  Others   v.   Hanuman   Prasad
(Dead )   through   LRs.   &   Others,   this   Court
observed that the expression `perverse' means
that the findings of the subordinate authority are
not supported by the evidence brought on record
or they are against the law or suffer from the
vice of procedural irregularity.
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25. In  Parry's   (Calcutta   )   Employees'   Union   v.
Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others , the Court observed
that `perverse finding' means a finding which is
not only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence itself. In  Triveni
Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central Excise,
Cochin , the Court  observed  that  this is not  a
case where it can be said that the findings of the
authorities   are   based   on   no   evidence   or   that
they are so perverse that no reasonable person
would have arrived at those findings.
High Court of H.P.
26. In  M.   S.   Narayanagouda   v.   Girijamma   &
Another ,   the   Court   observed   that   any   order
made in conscious violation of pleading and law
is   a   perverse   order.   In   Moffett   v.   Gough,   the
Court   observed   that   a   perverse   verdict   may
probably   be   defined   as   one   that   is   not   only
against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the
Court   defined   `perverse'   as   turned   the   wrong
way, not right; distorted from the right; turned
away or deviating from what is right, proper,
correct etc.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined
by various dictionaries in the following manner:
1.   Oxford   Advanced   Learner's
Dictionary   of   Current   English   Sixth
Edition 
Perverse:   Showing   deliberate
determination to behave in a way that
most   people   think   is   wrong,
unacceptable or unreasonable.
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary
English –
International Edition 
Perverse:   Deliberately   departing   from
what is normal and reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English
­ 1998 Edition 
Perverse: Law (of a verdict) against the
weight of evidence or the direction of the
judge on a point of law.
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20 2026:HHC:31518
4.   New   Webster's   Dictionary   of   the
English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic
Edition) 
Perverse:   Purposely   deviating   from
accepted   or   expected   behavior   or
opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn;
cross or petulant.
High Court of H.P.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words
& Phrases, Fourth Edition 
Perverse:   A   perverse   verdict   may
probably be defined as one that is not
only against the weight of evidence but
is altogether against the evidence.
28. In  Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of
U.P. , the Court observed thus:
"8. … We are of the opinion that the trial
court   was   quite   justified   in   acquitting
the   appellants   of   the   charges   as   the
view taken by it was reasonable  one
and   the   order   of   acquittal   cannot   be
said  to  be perverse. It  is well  settled
that   appellate   court would   not   be
justified in interfering with the order of
acquittal unless the same is found to be
perverse. In the present case, the High
Court   has   committed   an   error   in
interfering with the order of acquittal of
the   appellants   recorded   by   the   trial
court as the same did not suffer from
the vice of perversity."
29. In  Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of
Police & Others , the Court while dealing with
the   scope   of  Articles   32  and  226  of   the
Constitution observed as under:
"9.   Normally   the   High   Court   and   this
Court   would   not   interfere   with   the
findings of fact recorded at the domestic
enquiry but  if  the  finding  of  "guilt" is
based   on  no  evidence,  it  would   be  a
perverse   finding   and   would   be
amenable to judicial scrutiny.
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10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to
be   maintained   between   the   decisions
which are perverse and those which are
not. If  a  decision is arrived  at  on no
evidence   or   evidence   which   is
thoroughly   unreliable   and   no
reasonable   person   would   act   upon   it,
the   order   would   be   perverse.   But   if
there is some evidence on record which
is acceptable and which could be relied
upon,   howsoever   compendious   it   may
be, the conclusions would not be treated
as perverse and the findings would not
be interfered with."
High Court of H.P.
30.   The   meaning   of   `perverse'   has   been
examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation
Officer­cum­   Assessing   Authority,   Karnal   &
Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992,
this Court observed as under:
"7. In the present case, the stage at and
the points on which the challenge to the
assessment   in   judicial   review   was
raised   and   entertained   was   not
appropriate.   In   our   opinion,   the   High
Court was in error in constituting itself
into   a   court   of   appeal   against   the
assessment. While it was open to the
respondent to have raised and for the
High Court to have considered whether
the   denial   of   relief   under   the   proviso
to  Section   39(5)  was   proper   or   not,   it
was   not   open   to   the   High   Court   re­
appreciate   the   primary   or   perceptive
facts which were otherwise within the
domain   of   the   fact­finding   authority
under the statute. The question whether
the transactions were or were not sales
exigible   to   sales   tax   constituted   an
exercise   in   recording   secondary   or
inferential facts based on primary facts
found by the statutory authorities. But
what was assaile. 
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18. Similar   view   has   again   been   taken   by   the
High Court of H.P.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘ S.R. Tewari Versus Union of
, reported in 
India and Another’ (2013) 6 Supreme Court
. Relevant paragraph 30 of the said judgment is
Cases 602
reproduced, as under:­
“30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can
be held to be perverse if the findings have been
arrived   at   by   ignoring   or   excluding   relevant
material   or   by   taking   into   consideration
irrelevant/inadmissible   material.   The   finding
may also be said to be perverse if it is “against
the   weight   of   evidence”,   or   if   the   finding   so
outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the
vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on
the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable
evidence and no reasonable person would act
upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there
is some evidence on record which is acceptable
and which could be relied upon, the conclusions
would   not   be   treated   as   perverse   and   the
findings   would   not   be   interfered   with.
(Vide:  Rajinder   Kumar   Kindra   v.   Delhi
Administration ,  Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner
of Police & Ors. ,  Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao &
Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh  thr. Secretary
and  Babu v. State of Kerala ).”
19. Even   otherwise,   the   expression  ‘perverse’   has
deliberately been explained, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in   case,   titled   as   Ramakant   Ambalal   Choksi’s   case
(supra).   Relevant paragraphs 35 to 37, of the judgment,
are reproduced, as under:­ 
“35.Any order made in conscious violation
of pleading and law is a perverse order. In
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Moffett v. Gough reported in (1878) 1 LR 1r
331,   the   Court   observed   that   a   perverse
verdict may probably be defined as one that
is not only against the weight of evidence
but is altogether  against  the evidence.   In
Godfrey v. Godfrey reported in 106 NW 814,
the Court defined “perverse” as “turned the
wrong way”; not right; distorted from the
right; turned away or deviating from what
is right, proper, correct, etc. 
High Court of H.P.
36.The   expression   "perverse"   has   been
defined   by   various   dictionaries   in   the
following manner: 
a. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of
Current English, 6th Ed. Perverse­Showing
deliberate determination to behave in a way
that   most   people   think   is   wrong,
unacceptable or unreasonable. 
b.   Longman   Dictionary   of   Contemporary
English   ­   International   Edition   Perverse   ­
Deliberately departing from what is normal
and reasonable. 
c. The New Oxford Dictionary of English ­
1998 Edition Perverse ­ Law (of a verdict)
against   the   weight   of   evidence   or   the
direction of the judge on a point of law.
d. New Webster's Dictionary of the English
Language   (Deluxe   Encyclopedic   Edition)
Perverse   ­   Purposely   deviating   from
accepted  or  expected  behavior   or  opinion;
wicked   or   wayward;   stubborn;   cross   or
petulant.
e. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words &
Phrases,   4th   Ed.   Perverse   ­   A   perverse
verdict may probably be defined as one that
is not only against the weight of evidence
but is altogether against the evidence. 
37.The wrong finding should stem out on a
complete misreading of evidence or it should
be based only on conjectures and surmises.
Safest approach on perversity is the classic
approach on the reasonable man’s inference
on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the
facts in evidence made by the court below is
possible, there is no perversity. If not, the
finding is perverse. Inadequacy of evidence
or   a   different   reading   of   evidence   is   not
perversity. (See: Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi
and others reported in (2016) 3 SCC 78)”
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High Court of H.P.
20. In   this   case,   an   application   under   Order   39
Rules 1 and 2 CPC, moved by the plaintiff Akshay Thapa,
was   dismissed   by   the   learned   trial   Court,   however,   the
learned   first   appellate   Court   has   allowed   the   said
application.
21. Plaintiff   Akshay   Thapa   in   the   suit   has
challenged   the   Will   dated   15.02.2019,   executed   by
defendant   No.   1   in   favour   of   defendant   No.   2.     The
document i.e. Will, will come into play after the death of
the   testator/executor   of   the   Will,   as   the   case   may   be.
When defendant No. 1 is alive, then, how the plaintiff can
seek the relief of cancellation of the Will dated 15.02.2019,
allegedly   executed   by   defendant   No.   1   in   favour   of
defendant No. 2. The learned trial Court, in the present
case, has rightly considered the stand of defendant No. 1.
22. Moreover,   the   suit   of   the   plaintiff   is   not
maintainable qua the challenge to Will dated 15.02.2019,
during the life time of defendant No. 1.
23. The   copy   of   the   Will,   which   is   stated   to   be
executed   by   the   father   of   the   plaintiff   i.e.   Sh.   Birender
Singh Thapa, has also been annexed with the petition, in
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25 2026:HHC:31518
which, the testator has expressed his intention that after
High Court of H.P.
his death, two storeyed building is to be given to both his
sons in equal share, whereas in the opening lines, he has
bequeathed his entire estate in favour of defendant No. 1.
In   such   situation,   the   plaintiff   has   to   prove   before   the
learned trial  Court  that  the limited estate was  given to
defendant   No.   1   or   the   intention   of   the   testator   was
otherwise.
24. These complicated questions cannot be decided
in the proceedings, under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, as
such,   learned   first   Appellate   Court   has   exceeded   its
jurisdiction by giving the findings qua interpretation of the
clauses of the Will, which is the sole domain of learned trial
Court,   that   too,   at   the   time   of   deciding   the   suit,   as
instituted by the plaintiff.
25. In view of the above, this Court is of the view
that   the   learned   first   appellate   Court   has   exceeded   its
jurisdiction   by   allowing   the   appeal,   as,   at   the   time   of
deciding the appeal, the learned first appellate Court was
not exercising the power of trial Court, nor the findings
have been recorded by learned first appellate Court that
the decision of learned trial Court suffers from perversity,
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26 2026:HHC:31518
which is liable to be interfered with.  In such situation, the
High Court of H.P.
order passed by the learned first appellate Court is not
sustainable in the eyes of law.
26. Consequently, the present appeal is allowed, as
prayed for.  The application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2
CPC, filed by the plaintiff is ordered to be dismissed.  The
order passed by the learned First Appellate Court is set­
aside and the order passed by the learned trial Court is
ordered to be restored.
27. Any   of   the   observations,   made   hereinabove,
shall not be taken, as an expression of opinion, on the
merits of the case, as these observations are confined, only
to the disposal of the present petition.
28. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand(s)
disposed of.
29. Record be sent back.
     (Virender Singh)
th
30  July, 2026               Judge
    ( Pramod Kumar )
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