MR. BALAKERTHY PUNYAKOTI vs STATE OF KARNATAKA,
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
R
RD
DATED THIS THE 23 DAY OF JUNE, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 8735 OF 2026
BETWEEN:
1. MR. BALAKERTHY PUNYAKOTI,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
SON OF MR. RAMALINGAM PUNYAKOTI,
PRESENTLY R/AT 5C, TOWER 1A,
SOUTHSIDE OF SOUTHLAND,
11 HEUNG YIP ROAD, WONG CHUK HANG,
HONG KONG ISLAND.
2. MRS. PADMAVATHI PUNYAKOTI,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
WIFE OF MR. RAMALINGAM PUNYAKOTI,
PERMANENT RESIDENT OF
NO. 1/357, RAMALAYAM STREET,
UNDAVALLI PANCHAYITHI, REDDY BAZAAR,
GUNTUR - 522 501,
ANDHRA PRADESH.
3. MR. RAMALINGAM PUNYAKOTI,
AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS,
SON OF MR. KUPPUSWAMY PUNYAKOTI,
NO. 1/357, RAMALAYAM STREET,
UNDAVALLI PANCHAYITHI, REDDY BAZAAR,
GUNTUR - 522 501,
ANDHRA PRADESH
…PETITIONERS
(BY SMT. KEERTHI.K, ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed
by PADMAVATHI
B K
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka
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AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REP. BY THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER,
SOUTH WOMEN POLICE STATION,
REP. BY H.C.G.P,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
2. MRS. POORNIMA BALAWANT WAGMODE,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
WIFE OF MR. BALAKERTHY PUNYAKOTI,
PRESENTLY R/AT: NO. B6 0001,
L & T SOUTH CITY APARTMENT,
AREKERE MICO LAYOUT,
BANNERGHATTA ROAD,
BENGALURU-560076.
EMAIL: [email protected]
/[email protected]
PH: +91 9148227571, 85295596227
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. B.N. JAGADEESHA, SPP-I FOR R-1)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528
BNSS) TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 08/06/2026 PASSED
IN C.C. NO.7358/2026 BY THE LEARNED XXXVII ADDITIONAL
CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, BENGALURU INSOFAR AS IT
DIRECTS THE PETITIONERS TO FILE A REGULAR BAIL
APPLICATION AND ETC.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioners are before this Court in
circumstances as peculiar as they are disquieting,
disclosing an episode of palpable illegality—if not a
troubling misapprehension of settled legal principles—on
the part of the concerned Court. A crime in Crime
No.115/2025 came to be registered against the petitioners for
offences punishable under Sections 85 and 351(2) read with
Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and Sections 3 and
4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Upon registration of the said
crime, all the petitioners were enlarged on anticipatory bail, by
a competent Court.
2. Thereafter, the police proceeded to conduct
investigation and, upon culmination of such investigation, filed
the charge-sheet before the jurisdictional Court. Following the
filing of the charge-sheet and the taking of cognizance, the
concerned Court, by order dated 08.06.2026, passed
what can only be described as a rather perplexing
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direction, calling upon the petitioners to secure regular
bail on or before the next date of hearing,
notwithstanding the subsistence of an order granting
anticipatory bail in their favour.
2.1. The petitioners, instead of seeking regular bail,
chose to move an application seeking exemption from personal
appearance before the concerned Court. The said application
came to be considered by the concerned Court, which, by order
dated 16.06.2026, allowed the prayer for exemption subject to
payment of costs of Rs.100/- by each of the petitioners.
However, while granting such exemption, the concerned Court
simultaneously directed the petitioners to remain present on
the next date of hearing. In the very same order, the
concerned Court further observed that the petitioners had
neither secured regular bail nor furnished sureties.
2.2. It is these orders—dated 08.06.2026 and the
consequential order dated 16.06.2026—that have driven the
petitioners to the doors of this Court. Calling in question the
legality, propriety, and sustainability of the aforesaid orders,
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the petitioners have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court in the
present petition.
3. Heard Sri.Keerthi K, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioners, Sri.B.N.Jagadeesha, learned SPP-I appearing
for respondent No.1 and have perused the material on record.
4. Since the entire issue arises form the order
directing the petitioners of apply for regular bail, the said order
is required to be noticed. The order dated 08.06.2026 reads as
follows:
"8/6/26
Accused no. 1 to 3 present.
Advocate Sri AM filed vaklath
for accused along with
furnished memo with certified
copy of orders passed by
Hon'ble LXXI Addl. City Civil
and Sessions Judge, Crl.Mis in
no. Bengaluru 130/2026.
Accused no. 1 to 3 not applied
for regular bail
for appearance
of A1 to A3
Ld. Counsel for accused
furnished memo with citations
and submitted that no need to
obtain regular bail.
Accused no. 1 to 3 are
permitted to comply the
conditions imposed in Crl.Mis
no. 130/2026, but no
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directions to this court to
obtain bail bond or surety
bond.
The submisssion of the Ld.
Counsel with regarding no
need of regular bail is
rejected. Directed to file
regular bail application on
next date of hearing by
16.06.2026.
Sd/-
8/6
XXXVII ACJM, Bengaluru "
(Emphasis added)
The concerned Court by rejecting the submissions of the
petitioners, directs them to apply for regular bail by the next
date of hearing, i.e., 16.06.2026.
5. It is now a too well settled principle of law
that, the filing of a chargesheet, taking of cognizance, or
issuance of summons does not terminate the
anticipatory bail already granted. A Constitution Bench of
the Apex Court, considers this very issue in the case of
1
SUSHILA AGGARWAL v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) , and
observes as follows:
1
(2020) 5 SCC 1
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“…. …. ….
7.5. However, in Siddharam Satlingappa
Mhetre [ Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of
Maharashtra , (2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri)
514] , despite the specific observations by the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia [ Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab ,
(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] that the
normal rule should be not to limit the operation of
the order in relation to a period of time, in other
words in an appropriate case and looking to the facts
and circumstances of the case and the stage at
which the pre-arrest bail application was made, the
court concerned can limit the operation of the order
in relation to a period of time, on absolute
misreading of the judgment in Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia [ Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab ,
(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] and just
contrary to the observations made in paras 42 and
43 of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [ Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia v. State of Punjab , (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 465] , an absolute proposition of law is laid
down that the life of the order under Section 438
CrPC granting bail cannot be curtailed. Despite the
clear-cut observations made by the Constitution
Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [ Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia v. State of Punjab , (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 465] made in paras 42 and 43,
in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh [ Salauddin
Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra , (1996)
1 SCC 667 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 198] , a three-Judge
Bench of this Court has observed and held that the
order of “anticipatory bail” has to be necessarily
limited in time-frame. In many cases, subsequently
the decision in Salauddin Abdulsamad
Shaikh [ Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of
Maharashtra , (1996) 1 SCC 667 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
198] has been followed, despite the specific
observations made by the Constitution Bench
in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [ Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia v. State of Punjab , (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 465] made in paras 42 and 43 which, as
such, are just contrary to the view taken in
subsequent decisions in Siddharam Satlingappa
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Mhetre [ Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of
Maharashtra , (2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri)
514] and Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh [ Salauddin
Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra , (1996)
1 SCC 667 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 198] . At this stage, it is
required to be noted that in Salauddin Abdulsamad
Shaikh [ Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of
Maharashtra , (1996) 1 SCC 667 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
198] , this Court had not at all considered the
decision of the Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia [ Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab ,
(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] . It cannot
be disputed that the decision of this Court
in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [ Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia v. State of Punjab , (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 465] is a Constitution Bench decision
which is binding unless it is upset by a larger Bench
than the Constitution Bench. Therefore, considering
the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court
in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [ Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia v. State of Punjab , (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 465] and the relevant observations
reproduced hereinabove, the decision of this Court
in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre [ Siddharam
Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra , (2011)
1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 514] to the extent it
takes the view that the life of the order under
Section 438 CrPC cannot be curtailed is not a correct
law in light of the observations made by the
Constitution Bench in paras 42 and 43 in Gurbaksh
Singh Sibbia [ Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of
Punjab , (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] .
The decision of this Court in Salauddin Abdulsamad
Shaikh [ Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of
Maharashtra , (1996) 1 SCC 667 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
198] which takes an extreme view that the order of
“anticipatory bail” has to be necessarily limited in
time-frame is also not a good law and is against and
just contrary to the decision of this Court
in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [ Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia v. State of Punjab , (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 465] , which is a Constitution Bench
judgment.
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7.6. Thus, considering the observations made
by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbaksh
Singh Sibbia [ Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of
Punjab , (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , the
court may, if there are reasons for doing so, limit the
operation of the order to a short period only after
filing of an FIR in respect of the matter covered by
order and the applicant may in such case be directed
to obtain an order of bail under Sections 437 or 439
of the Code within a reasonable short period after
the filing of the FIR. The Constitution Bench has
further observed that the same need not be followed
as an invariable rule. It is further observed and held
that normal rule should be not to limit the operation
of the order in relation to a period of time. We are of
the opinion that the conditions can be imposed by
the court concerned while granting pre-arrest bail
order including limiting the operation of the order in
relation to a period of time if the circumstances so
warrant, more particularly the stage at which the
“anticipatory bail” application is moved, namely,
whether the same is at the stage before the FIR is
filed or at the stage when the FIR is filed and the
investigation is in progress or at the stage when the
investigation is complete and the charge-sheet is
filed. However, as observed hereinabove, the normal
rule should be not to limit the order in relation to a
period of time.
…. …. ….
Re Question 2 : Whether the life of an
anticipatory bail should end at the time and stage
when the accused is summoned by the court.
77. The question here is whether there is anything
in the law which per se requires that upon filing of the
charge-sheet, or the summoning of the accused, by the
court — (or even the addition of an offence in the charge-
sheet, of which an applicant on bail is accused of freshly),
his liberty ought to be forfeited and that he should be
asked to surrender and apply for regular bail.
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77.1. The observations about the width and
amplitude of the power under Section 438, made in answer
to the first question, are equally relevant here too.
77.2. In the present context, further, the judgment
and observations of this Court in its interpretation of
Section 167(2) are telling. It was held in Gurcharan
Singh [ Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) , (1978) 1
SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] , that the release by grant
of bail of an accused under Section 167(2) amounts to
“deemed bail”. This is borne out by Section 167(2) which
states that anyone released on bail under its provision
“ shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of
Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter ”. The
judgment in Aslam Babalal Desai [ Aslam Babalal
Desai v. State of Maharashtra , (1992) 4 SCC 272 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 870] has clarified that when an
accused is released by operation of Section 167(2)
and subsequently, a charge-sheet is filed, there is no
question of the cancellation of his bail.
77.3. In these circumstances , the mere fact
that an accused is given relief under Section 438 at
one stage, per se does not mean that upon the filing
of a charge-sheet, he is necessarily to surrender
or/and apply for regular bail. The analogy to
“deemed bail” under Section 167(2) with
anticipatory bail leads this Court to conclude that the
mere subsequent event of the filing of a charge-
sheet cannot compel the accused to surrender and
seek regular bail. As a matter of fact, interestingly, if
indeed, if a charge-sheet is filed where the accused
is on anticipatory bail, the normal implication would
be that there was no occasion for the investigating
agency or the police to require his custody, because
there would have been nothing in his behaviour
requiring such a step. In other words, an accused,
who is granted anticipatory bail would continue to
be at liberty when the charge-sheet is filed, the
natural implication is that there is no occasion for a
direction by the court that he be arrested and further
that he had cooperated with the investigation.
77.4. At the same time, however, at any time
during the investigation were any occasion to arise calling
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for intervention of the court for infraction of any of the
conditions imposed under Section 437(3) read with Section
438(2) or the violation of any other condition imposed in
the given facts of a case, recourse can always be had
under Section 439(2).
78. Section 438(3) states that when a person is
granted anticipatory bail, is later arrested without warrant
by an officer in charge of a police station “ on such
accusation”, and is willing to give bail, “he shall be
released on bail; and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of
such offence decides that a warrant should issue in the
first instance against that person he shall issue a bailable
warrant in conformity with the direction of the court under
sub-section (1) ”. The order granting anticipatory bail,
is also as noticed earlier, and in several previous
decisions, a “ direction ” under Section 438 “ that in
the event of such arrest ” the applicant be released
on bail. Therefore, when an accused in fact is
granted bail, and the conditions outlined in Section
438(2) are included as part of the direction “to
release” him in the event of arrest, all the necessary
conditions which he is obliged to follow exist.
Section 438(3) outlines the steps to be taken, in the
event of arrest of one who has been granted relief
under Section 438(1). In the event of non-compliance
with any or all conditions, imposed by the court, the
agency concerned or the police, a direction can be sought
from the court under Section 439(2).
79. The view that this Court expresses about the
prosecution's option to apply for a direction to arrest the
accused, finds support in Pradeep Ram [ Pradeep
Ram v. State of Jharkhand , (2019) 17 SCC 326 : 2019
SCC OnLine SC 825] wherein this Court held as follows :
(SCC pp. 340-45, paras 23, 27, 29-31)
“ 23. Both Sections 437(5) and 439(2)
empowers the court to arrest an accused and commit
him to custody, who has been released on bail under
Chapter XXXIII. There may be numerous grounds for
exercise of power under Sections 437(5) and 439(2).
The principles and grounds for cancelling a bail
are well settled, but in the present case, we are
concerned only with one aspect of the matter
i.e. a case where after accused has been
granted the bail, new and serious offences are
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added in the case. A person against whom
serious offences have been added, who is
already on bail can very well be directed to be
arrested and committed to custody by the court
in exercise of power under Sections 437(5) and
439(2). Cancelling the bail granted to an
accused and directing him to be arrested and
taken into custody can be one course of action,
which can be adopted while exercising power
under Sections 437(5) and 439(2), but there
may be cases where without cancelling the bail
granted to an accused, on relevant
consideration, court can direct the accused to
be arrested and committed to custody. The
addition of serious offences is one of such
circumstances, under which the court can direct
the accused to be arrested and committed to
custody despite the bail having been granted
with regard to the offences with which he was
charged at the time when bail was considered
and granted .
*
27. We may have again to look into provisions
of Sections 437(5) and 439(2) CrPC. Sub-section (5)
of Section 437 CrPC uses expression ‘if it considers it
necessary so to do, direct that such person be
arrested and commit him to custody’. Similarly, sub-
section (2) of Section 439 CrPC provides:‘may direct
that any person who has been released on bail under
this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody’.
A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions indicates
that provision does not mandatorily provide that the
court before directing arrest of such accused who has
already been granted bail must necessarily cancel his
earlier bail . A discretion has been given to the
court to pass such orders to direct for such
person be arrested and commit him to the
custody which direction may be with an order
for cancellation of earlier bail or permission to
arrest such accused due to addition of graver
and non-bailable offences. The two-Judge Bench
judgment in Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel [ Mithabhai
Pashabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat , (2009) 6 SCC
332 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1047] uses the word
“ordinarily” in para 18 of the judgment which cannot
be read as that mandatorily bail earlier granted to
the accused has to be cancelled before the
investigating officer to arrest him due to addition of
graver and non-bailable offences.
*
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29. Relying on the abovesaid order, the
learned counsel for the appellant submits that
respondent State ought to get first the order dated
10-3-2016 [ Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand ,
2016 SCC OnLine Jhar 3254] granting bail to the
appellant cancelled before seeking custody of the
appellant. It may be true that by mere addition of an
offence in a criminal case, in which the accused is
bailed out, investigating authorities itself may not
proceed to arrest the accused and need to obtain an
order from the court, which has released the accused
on the bail. It is also open for the accused, who is
already on bail and with regard to whom serious
offences have been added to apply for bail in respect
of new offences added and the court after applying
the mind may either refuse the bail or grant the bail
with regard to new offences. In a case, bail
application of the accused for newly added offences
is rejected, the accused can very well be arrested. In
all cases, where the accused is bailed out under
orders of the court and new offences are added
including offences of serious nature, it is not
necessary that in all cases earlier bail should be
cancelled by the court before granting
permission to arrest an accused on the basis of
new offences. The powers under Sections
437(5) and 439(2) are wide powers granted to
the court by the legislature under which the
court can permit an accused to be arrested and
commit him to custody without even cancelling
the bail with regard to earlier offences.
Sections 437(5) and 439(2) cannot be read into
restricted manner that order for arresting the
accused and commit him to custody can only be
passed by the court after cancelling the earlier
bail.
30. Coming back to the present case, the
appellant was already into jail custody with regard to
another case and the investigating agency applied
before the Special Judge, NIA Court to grant
production warrant to produce the accused before
the court. The Special Judge having accepted the
prayer of grant of production warrant, the accused
was produced before the court on 26-6-2018 and
remanded to custody. Thus, in the present case,
production of the accused was with the permission of
the court. Thus, the present is not a case where
investigating agency itself has taken into custody the
appellant after addition of new offences rather the
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accused was produced in the court in pursuance of
production warrant obtained from the court by the
investigating agency. We, thus do not find any error
in the procedure which was adopted by the Special
Judge, NIA Court with regard to production of the
appellant before the Court. In the facts of the present
case, it was not necessary for the Special Judge to
pass an order cancelling the bail dated 10-3-2016
[ Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand , 2016 SCC
OnLine Jhar 3254] granted to the appellant before
permitting the appellant-accused to be produced
before it or remanding him to the judicial custody.
31. In view of the foregoing discussions, we
arrive at the following conclusions in respect of a
circumstance where after grant of bail to an accused,
further cognizable and non-bailable offences are
added—
31.1. The accused can surrender and apply for
bail for newly added cognizable and non-bailable
offences. In event of refusal of bail, the accused can
certainly be arrested.
31.2. The investigating agency can seek order
from the court under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) CrPC
for arrest of the accused and his custody.
31.3. The court, in exercise of power under
Section 437(5) or 439(2) CrPC, can direct for taking
into custody the accused who has already been
granted bail after cancellation of his bail. The court in
exercise of power under Section 437(5) as well as
Section 439(2) can direct the person who has already
been granted bail to be arrested and commit him to
custody on addition of graver and non-bailable
offences which may not be necessary always with
order of cancelling of earlier bail.
31.4. In a case where an accused has already
been granted bail, the investigating authority on
addition of an offence or offences may not proceed to
arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused on
such addition of offence or offences it need to obtain
an order to arrest the accused from the court which
had granted the bail.”
80. Earlier, in the decision in Dolat
Ram v. State of Haryana [ Dolat Ram v. State of
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Haryana , (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]
this Court had observed that : (SCC p. 351, para 4)
“ 4. … bail once granted should not be
cancelled in a mechanical manner without
considering whether any supervening
circumstances have rendered it no longer
conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to
retain his freedom by enjoying the concession
of bail during the trial .”
81. This decision was followed, and its ratio applied,
in Hazari Lal Das v. State of W.B. [ Hazari Lal Das v. State
of W.B. , (2009) 10 SCC 652 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 381] The
decision in Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of
Gujarat [ Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat ,
(2016) 1 SCC 152 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 240] stated, after
culling out the principles in Mhetre [ Siddharam Satlingappa
Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra , (2011) 1 SCC 694 :
(2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 514] , as follows : ( Bhadresh
case [ Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat , (2016)
1 SCC 152 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 240] , SCC p. 167, para
25)
“ 25.6. It is a settled legal position that
the court which grants the bail also has the
power to cancel it. The discretion of grant or
cancellation of bail can be exercised either at
the instance of the accused, the Public
Prosecutor or the complainant, on finding new
material or circumstances at any point of time.
25.7. In pursuance of the order of the
Court of Session or the High Court, once the
accused is released on anticipatory bail by the
trial court, then it would be unreasonable to
compel the accused to surrender before the
trial court and again apply for regular bail.
25.8. Discretion vested in the court in all
matters should be exercised with care and
circumspection depending upon the facts and
circumstances justifying its exercise. Similarly,
the discretion vested with the court under
Section 438 CrPC should also be exercised with
caution and prudence. It is unnecessary to
travel beyond it and subject the wide power
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and discretion conferred by the legislature to a
rigorous code of self-imposed limitations.
25.9. No inflexible guidelines or
straitjacket formula can be provided for grant
or refusal of the anticipatory bail because all
circumstances and situations of future cannot
be clearly visualised for the grant or refusal of
anticipatory bail. In consonance with legislative
intention, the grant or refusal of anticipatory
bail should necessarily depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case .”
82. The three-Judge Bench decision
in Sudhir v. State of Maharashtra [ Sudhir v. State of
Maharashtra , (2016) 1 SCC 146 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 234 :
(2016) 1 SCC (L&S) 48] noticed the decision in Bhadresh
Bipinbhai Sheth [ Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of
Gujarat , (2016) 1 SCC 152 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 240] and
did not disapprove it. However, the Court did not grant
relief, given that anticipatory bail was declined initially,
and the application to the High Court was withdrawn, after
which a second anticipatory bail was granted. The High
Court cancelled the grant of relief. This Court affirmed the
High Court's view [ Ramesh Manik Patil v. State of
Maharashtra , 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 4994] . In that
judgment, Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth [ Bhadresh Bipinbhai
Sheth v. State of Gujarat , (2016) 1 SCC 152 : (2016) 1
SCC (Cri) 240] was noticed, while considering the scope of
the power under Section 439(2). In another
decision, Arvind Tiwary v. State of Bihar [ Arvind
Tiwary v. State of Bihar , (2018) 8 SCC 475 : (2018) 3
SCC (Cri) 590] the issue was whether the
anticipatory bail, granted subject to certain
conditions, earlier, which had been considered by
this Court, could be cancelled. The conditions
included, inter alia, that sums were to be secured by
bank guarantee. The aggrieved corporation directed
that the “defalcated sum” specified in respect of
every accused should be secured through such
guarantee. Upon failure to comply with that demand,
an order of cancellation was sought. This Court held
that cancellation could not be resorted to on the
assumption that the applicants were guilty. Similarly,
in Chand Nath Yogi v. State of Haryana [ Chand Nath
Yogi v. State of Haryana , (2003) 1 SCC 326 : 2003 SCC
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(Cri) 312] , Padmakar Tukaram Bhavnagare v. State of
Maharashtra [ Padmakar Tukaram Bhavnagare v. State of
Maharashtra , (2012) 13 SCC 720 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri)
393] , X v. State of Telangana [ X v. State of Telangana ,
(2018) 16 SCC 511 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 902] , and
several other judgments the same views were expressed.
83. Therefore, unless circumstances to the
contrary : in the form of behaviour of the accused
suggestive of his fleeing from justice, or evading the
authority or jurisdiction of the court, or his
intimidating witnesses, or trying to intimidate them,
or violate any condition imposed while granting
anticipatory bail, the law does not require the person
to surrender to the court upon summons for trial
being served on him. Subject to compliance with the
conditions imposed, the anticipatory bail given to a
person, can continue till end of the trial. This answers
Question 2 referred to the present Bench.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court has unequivocally declared that once
anticipatory bail is granted, such protection ordinarily
enures in favour of the accused without being shackled
by any artificial or predetermined period of expiry. The
mere filing of a charge-sheet, the taking of cognizance
by the competent Court, or even the issuance of
summons would not, by themselves, eclipse or
extinguish the protective umbrella of anticipatory bail,
unless the Court, for compelling and exceptional reasons
to be recorded in writing, directs otherwise.
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6. Subsequently, the Apex Court in the case of SUMIT
2
v. STATE OF U.P . , observes as follows:
“……. ……. …….
11. A plain reading of the order referred to above would
indicate that the anticipatory bail was granted by the High
Court as prayed for but the same was limited only upto
filing of the chargesheet . Once the chargesheet was
filed, the protection earlier granted came to an end
and in such circumstances, the appellant once again
prayed for anticipatory bail by way of a fresh
application which came to be rejected by the High
Court.
12. We fail to understand what is the idea in
restricting the grant of anticipatory bail upto the
stage of completion of investigation and filing of the
chargesheet.
13. Either the Court may grant anticipatory bail or
may decline. However, once having exercised its
discretion in favour of the accused upon
consideration of the overall matter, there was no
good reason for the High Court to restrict it upto the
stage of filing of the chargesheet.
14. In the earlier order passed by the High Court referred
to above in para 10 the High Court observed that having
regard to the nature of the allegations, the role of the
applicant and all the facts and circumstances of the case,
the accused could be said to have made out a case for
grant of anticipatory bail.
15. If the aforesaid be so, then the High Court should have
indicated while declining to grant anticipatory bail by way of
the impugned order as to what was so particular or what
was so gross that the High Court thought fit not to grant
anticipatory bail.
2
2026 SCC OnLine SC 186
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POSITION OF LAW
16. In Bharat Chaudhary v. State of Bihar , (2003) 8 SCC
77, this Court held that there is no restriction in
Section 438 Cr. P.C. to grant anticipatory bail even when
charge sheet has been filed and cognizance is taken. The
relevant part of the said decision reads as thus:—
“7. From the perusal of this part of Section 438 of CrPC,
we find no restriction in regard to exercise of this power
in a suitable case either by the Court of Session, High
Court or this Court even when cognizance is taken or a
charge-sheet is filed. The object of Section 438 is to
prevent undue harassment of the accused persons by
pre-trial arrest and detention. The fact, that a court has
either taken cognizance of the complaint or the
investigating agency has filed a charge-sheet, would not
by itself, in our opinion, prevent the courts concerned
from granting anticipatory bail in appropriate cases. The
gravity of the offence is an important factor to be taken
into consideration while granting such anticipatory bail
so also the need for custodial interrogation, but these
are only factors that must be borne in mind by the
courts concerned while entertaining a petition for grant
of anticipatory bail and the fact of taking cognizance or
filing of a charge-sheet cannot by itself be construed as
a prohibition against the grant of anticipatory bail. In
our opinion, the courts i.e. the Court of Session, High
Court or this Court has the necessary power vested in
them to grant anticipatory bail in non-bailable offences
under Section 438 of CrPC even when cognizance is
taken or a charge-sheet is filed provided the facts of the
case require the court to do so.”…
[Emphasis supplied]
17. The very same view as aforesaid came to be reiterated
in Ravindra Saxena v. State of Rajasthan , (2010) 1 SCC
684. In the said case the High Court had rejected the
application seeking anticipatory bail on the ground that the
chargesheet had been filed, such approach was held to be
erroneous. The Court observed that a Constitution Bench
in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab , (1980) 2
SCC 565, clearly held that the anticipatory bail can be
granted at any time so long as the applicant has not been
arrested:
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“7. We are of the considered opinion that the approach
adopted by the High Court is wholly erroneous. The
application for anticipatory bail has been rejected
without considering the case of the appellant solely on
the ground that the challan has now been presented.
8. We may notice here that the provision with regard to
the grant of anticipatory bail was introduced on the
recommendations of the Law Commission of India in its
Forty-first Report dated 24-9- 1969. The
recommendations were considered by this Court in a
Constitution Bench decision in Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia v. State of Punjab [(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 465]. Upon consideration of the entire issue
this Court laid down certain salutary principles to be
followed in exercise of the power under
Section 438 CrPC by the Sessions Court and the High
Court. It is clearly held that the anticipatory bail can be
granted at any time so long as the applicant has not
been arrested. When the application is made to the
High Court or the Court of Session it must apply its own
mind on the question and decide when the case is made
out for granting such relief.”
[Emphasis supplied]
18. In Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) , (2020) 5
SCC 1, the following questions were referred to the larger
Bench of five judges:
i. Whether the protection granted to a person
under Section 438 CrPC should be limited to a
fixed period so as to enable the person to
surrender before the trial court and seek
regular bail?
ii. Whether the life of an anticipatory bail should end at
the time and stage when the accused is summoned
by the court?
19. The Constitution Bench answered the reference as
under:
“91.1. Regarding Question 1, this Court holds that the
protection granted to a person under
Section 438 CrPC should not invariably be limited to a
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fixed period; it should enure in favour of the accused
without any restriction on time. Normal conditions
under Section 437(3) read with Section 438(2) should
be imposed; if there are specific facts or features in
regard to any offence, it is open for the court to impose
any appropriate condition (including fixed nature of
relief, or its being tied to an event), etc.
91.2. As regards the second question referred to this
Court, it is held that the life or duration of an
anticipatory bail order does not end normally at the
time and stage when the accused is summoned by the
court, or when charges are framed, but can continue till
the end of the trial. Again, if there are any special or
peculiar features necessitating the court to limit the
tenure of anticipatory bail, it is open for it to do so.”
[Emphasis supplied]
20. The following observations made by the Constitution
Bench in paras 77.3 and 77.4 respectively of Sushila
Aggarwal (supra) are also relevant which reads as under:
“77.3. In these circumstances, the mere fact that an
accused is given relief under Section 438 at one stage,
per se does not mean that upon the filing of a charge-
sheet, he is necessarily to surrender or/and apply for
regular bail. The analogy to “deemed bail” under
Section 167(2) with anticipatory bail leads this Court to
conclude that the mere subsequent event of the filing of
a charge-sheet cannot compel the accused to surrender
and seek regular bail. As a matter of fact, interestingly,
if indeed, if a charge-sheet is filed where the accused is
on anticipatory bail, the normal implication would be
that there was no occasion for the investigating agency
or the police to require his custody, because there
would have been nothing in his behaviour requiring
such a step. In other words, an accused, who is granted
anticipatory bail would continue to be at liberty when
the charge-sheet is filed, the natural implication is that
there is no occasion for a direction by the court that he
be arrested and further that he had cooperated with the
investigation.
77.4. At the same time, however, at any time during
the investigation were any occasion to arise calling for
intervention of the court for infraction of any of the
conditions imposed under Section 437(3) read with
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Section 438(2) or the violation of any other condition
imposed in the given facts of a case, recourse can
always be had under Section 439(2).”
[Emphasis supplied]
21. In the High Court of Delhi v. CBI , 2004 SCC OnLine Del
53, somewhat similar question arose whether
Section 170 Cr. P.C. prevents the Trial Court from taking a
charge-sheet on record unless the accused is taken into
custody. The Delhi High Court observed as under:
“15. Word “custody” appearing in this section does not
contemplate either police or judicial custody. It merely
connotes the presentation of accused by the
investigating officer before the Court at the time of
filing of the charge-sheet whereafter the role of the
Court starts. Had it not been so the investigating officer
would not have been vested with powers to release a
person on bail in a bailable offence after finding that
there was sufficient evidence to put the accused on trial
and it would have been obligatory upon him to produce
such an accused in custody before the Magistrate for
being released on bail by the Court.
16. In case the police/investigating officer thinks it
unnecessary to present the accused in custody for the
reason that the accused would neither abscond nor
would disobey the summons as he has been
cooperating in investigation and investigation can be
completed without arresting him, the IO is not obliged
to produce such an accused in custody.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
19. It appears that the learned Special Judge was
labouring under a misconception that in every non-
bailable and cognizable offence the police is required to
invariably arrest a person, even if it is not essential for
the purpose of investigation.
20. Rather the law is otherwise. In normal and ordinary
course the police should always avoid arresting a
person and sending him to jail, if it is possible for the
police to complete the investigation without his arrest
and if every kind of cooperation is provided by the
accused to the investigating officer in completing the
investigation. It is only in cases of utmost necessity,
where the investigation cannot be completed without
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arresting the person, for instance, a person may be
required for recovery of incriminating articles or weapon
of offence or for eliciting some information or clue as to
his accomplices or any circumstantial evidence, that his
arrest may be necessary. Such an arrest may also be
necessary if the investigating officer concerned or
officer in charge of the police station thinks that
presence of the accused will be difficult to procure
because of grave and serious nature of crime as the
possibility of his absconding or disobeying the process
or fleeing from justice cannot be ruled out.”
[Emphasis supplied]
22. The aforesaid decision of the Delhi High Court
received imprimatur of this Court in Siddharth v. State of
Uttar Pradesh , (2022) 1 SCC 676, wherein it was observed
as under:
“9. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view of the
High Courts and would like to give our imprimatur to
the said judicial view. It has rightly been observed on
consideration of Section 170 CrPC that it does not
impose an obligation on the officer-in-charge to arrest
each and every accused at the time of filing of the
charge-sheet. We have, in fact, come across cases
where the accused has cooperated with the
investigation throughout and yet on the charge-sheet
being filed nonbailable warrants have been issued for
his production premised on the requirement that there
is an obligation to arrest the accused and produce him
before the court. We are of the view that if the
investigating officer does not believe that the accused
will abscond or disobey summons he/she is not required
to be produced in custody. The word “custody”
appearing in Section 170 CrPC does not contemplate
either police or judicial custody but it merely connotes
the presentation of the accused by the investigating
officer before the court while filing the chargesheet.
10. We may note that personal liberty is an important
aspect of our constitutional mandate. The occasion to
arrest an accused during investigation arises when
custodial investigation becomes necessary or it is a
heinous crime or where there is a possibility of
influencing the witnesses or accused may abscond.
Merely because an arrest can be made because it is
lawful does not mandate that arrest must be made. A
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distinction must be made between the existence of the
power to arrest and the justification for exercise of
it [Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC
260 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1172]. If arrest is made routine, it
can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self-
esteem of a person. If the investigating officer has no
reason to believe that the accused will abscond or
disobey summons and has, in fact, throughout
cooperated with the investigation we fail to appreciate
why there should be a compulsion on the officer to
arrest the accused.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
12. In the present case when the appellant has joined
the investigation, investigation has completed and he
has been roped in after seven years of registration of
the FIR we can think of no reason why at this stage he
must be arrested before the chargesheet is taken on
record. We may note that the learned counsel for the
appellant has already stated before us that on
summons being issued the appellant will put the
appearance before the trial court.”
23. Further, this Court in Satender Kumar
Antil v. CBI , (2022) 10 SCC 51 said in clear terms that the
mandate laid down in Siddharth (supra) should be strictly
complied with.
24. In Md. Asfak Alam v. State of Jharkhand , 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 892 under a similar situation where the
appellant therein had been granted interim protection by
the High Court under Section 438 CrPC and the charge-
sheet was filed before the application seeking pre-arrest
bail was finally heard, the High Court rejected the pending
anticipatory bail and directed the appellant to surrender
before the competent authority and seek regular bail. In
this backdrop, this Court observed as under:
“14. ……What appears from the record is that the
appellant cooperated with the investigation both before
8-8-2022, when no protection was granted to him and
after 8-8-2022, when he enjoyed protection till the
filing of the charge-sheet and the cognizance thereof on
1-10-2022. Thus, once the charge-sheet was filed and
there was no impediment, at least on the part of the
accused, the court having regard to the nature of the
offences, the allegations and the maximum sentence of
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the offences they were likely to carry, ought to have
granted the bail as a matter of course. However, the
court did not do so but mechanically rejected and,
virtually, to rub salt in the wound directed the appellant
to surrender and seek regular bail before the trial court.
Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the High Court
fell into error in adopting such a casual approach. The
impugned order of rejecting the bail and directing the
appellant, to surrender and later seek bail, therefore,
cannot stand, and is hereby set aside……”
[Emphasis supplied]
25. Thus, the position of law is well settled: once
anticipatory bail is granted, it ordinarily continues
without fixed expiry. The filing of a charge-sheet,
taking of cognizance, or issuance of summons does
not terminate protection unless special reasons are
recorded. The Constitution Bench in the case of Sushila
Aggarwal (supra) held that duration is a matter of judicial
discretion and cannot be confined by arbitrary timelines. In
the case of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of
Maharashtra , (2011) 1 SCC 694, this Court similarly
cautioned that anticipatory bail should not hinge on
procedural milestones.
26. Risk management can be taken care of by way of
imposing conditions of cooperation, attendance, and
non-tampering, not by imposing time limits. Where
circumstances change, modification or cancellation
may be sought under the BNSS, 2023, but expiry
clauses inserted at inception are unsustainable.
27. In such circumstances referred to above, the impugned
order passed by the High Court is set aside.
28. We order that in the event of arrest of the
appellant in connection with the offence enumerated
above, he shall be released on anticipatory bail
subject to the terms and conditions that the
Investigating Officer deem fit to impose.
29. Once the appellant is released by the
Investigating Officer, he shall thereafter appear
before the Trial Court and furnish fresh bail bond.
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30. Before we close this matter, we would like to clarify
something important. Take a case, wherein an accused has
been released on bail, pending the investigation, and later
upon completion of the investigation, chargesheet is filed
with addition of new cognizable and non-bailable offences,
then what would be the position?
31. The aforesaid question was looked into and
answered by this Court in Pradeep Ram v. State of
Jharkhand , 2019 Cri LJ 3801, wherein this Court after
discussing various decisions, more particularly, the
decision in Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT Delhi , (2001) 4
SCC 280 held that with the addition of a new
cognizable and non-bailable offence more particularly
of a serious nature, the accused becomes disentitled
to the liberty earlier granted to him in relation to the
offences for which the FIR came to be registered.
32. In such circumstances, the correct approach of
the Court concerned should be to apply its mind
afresh as to whether the accused is entitled for grant
of bail in the changed circumstances.
33. In Prahlad Singh Bhati (supra), the FIR initially
was registered under Sections 306 and 498A of
the IPC respectively. But, subsequently, the
chargesheet showed that the accused had committed
offence under Sections 302 of the IPC. This Court
took the view that with the change of the nature of
the offence, the accused could be said to have
become disentitled to the liberty granted to him in
relation to the offence for which the FIR was
registered, more particularly, if the offence is altered
for an aggravated crime.
34. In such circumstances referred to above, we
arrive at following conclusions in respect of a
circumstance whereafter the grant of bail to an
accused, further cognizable and non-bailable
offences are added:—
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(i) The accused can surrender and apply for bail for
newly added cognizable and non-bailable offences. In
the event of refusal of bail, the accused can certainly
be arrested.
(ii) The investigating agency can seek order from the
court under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.
P.C. respectively for arrest of the accused and his
custody.
(iii) The Court, in exercise of its power under
Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr. P.C. respectively,
can direct for taking into custody the accused who
has already been granted bail after cancellation of his
bail. The Court in exercise of its power under Section
437(5) as well as Section 439(2) respectively can
direct the person who has already been granted bail
to be arrested and commit him to custody on addition
of graver and non-cognizable offences which may not
be necessary always with order of cancelling of
earlier bail.
(iv) In a case where an accused has already been
granted bail, the investigating authority on addition
of an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest
the accused, but for arresting the accused on such
addition of offence or offences it needs to obtain an
order to arrest the accused from the Court which had
granted the bail. ”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. If the principles so authoritatively enunciated by the
Apex Court in the afore-extracted judgments are juxtaposed
with the facts obtaining in the case at hand, what
unmistakably emerges is that the concerned Court, in
directing the petitioners to seek regular bail solely upon
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the filing of the charge-sheet, has proceeded in complete
disregard of the most elementary and settled canons
governing anticipatory bail. The direction issued betrays
an alarming obliviousness to rudimentary principles of
criminal jurisprudence that stand crystallized by binding
precedent.
8. In the light of the aforesaid, the order dated
08.06.2026, insofar as it compels the petitioners to secure
regular bail, becomes unsustainable in law and is liable to be
obliterated. The order dated 13.01.2026, whereby anticipatory
bail was granted to the petitioners, shall continue to operate in
full force and vigour, unaffected by the subsequent filing of the
charge-sheet. The protective shield of anticipatory bail granted
to the petitioners stands restored and shall endure throughout
the pendency of the trial, subject, of course, to compliance with
the conditions already imposed. As an inevitable corollary, the
consequential order dated 16.06.2026, passed by the
concerned Court, also cannot withstand judicial scrutiny and
accordingly stands set aside.
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9. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) The petition is allowed.
(ii) The order dated 08.06.2026, passed by the
concerned Court in C.C.No.7358/2026, qua the
petitioners, stands quashed.
(iii) The anticipatory bail granted by the concerned
Court, vide orders dated 13.01.2026, in
Crl.Misc.No.130/2026 and Crl.Misc.No.132/2026,
qua the petitioners, stands restored and would
continue throughout the trial, unless circumstances
of breach of conditions should warrant.
(iv) All other conditions stipulated by the concerned
Court, while granting the anticipatory bail, in the
orders dated 13.01.2026, passed in
Crl.Misc.No.130/2026 and Crl.Misc.No.132/2026,
qua the petitioners, remain intact and are not
disturbed.
(v) Consequently, the order dated 16.06.2026, passed
by the concerned Court in C.C.No.7358/2026, qua
the petitioners, stands quashed.
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(vi) Registry is directed to circulate this order to all the
concerned Courts which handle bail applications to
follow the observations rendered in the course of
the order, failing which, the matter would be viewed
seriously.
Ordered accordingly.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
CBC
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 36