Yogesh Premjibhai Suvariya vs State Of Gujarat

Court
Supreme Court

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 1079
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.6908/2026)
YOGESH PREMJIBHAI SUVARIYA & ANR. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. RESPONDENT(S)
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. We have heard Mr. Nikhil Goel, learned senior counsel
for the appellants and Mr. Prashant Bhagwati, learned
counsel for Respondent No.1-State of Gujarat. None has
appeared for Respondent No.2- de facto complainant, though
served.
3. Appellants are aggrieved by order dated 17.03.2026
passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad (briefly
the ‘High Court’ hereinafter), partly allowing the
revision application of the appellants. By the impugned
judgment and order, while the appellants have been
discharged from the offence punishable under Section 406
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’), the
charge under Section 420 read with Section 114 of the IPC
against the appellants has been sustained.
4. Appellants are the Directors of Shivamy Enterprises
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ABHINAV KUMAR
Date: 2026.10.05
11:17:30 IST
Reason:
Pvt. Ltd. (for short, ‘Shivamy’), a private limited
company, which is engaged in the steel business. Informant
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(Respondent No.2) is an employee of one Hans Ispat Ltd.
Since the year 2006, Shivamy has been purchasing steel
bars from Hans Ispat Ltd., whereafter Shivamy sold it to
third parties. It is the case of the appellants that it
had paid about Rs.3,50,00,000/- approximately to Hans
Ispat Ltd. for such business transactions.
5. Respondent No.2 lodged First Information before the
Police Station- Anjar, District- Kutch East, Gujarat,
alleging that appellants had approached him for purchase
of TMT bars and as a matter of fact, had purchased 293
metric tonnes of TMT bars worth Rs.1,19,00,000/-, vide
purchase orders dated 14.11.2011 and 21.11.2011. It is the
allegation of Respondent No.2 that after supplying the TMT
bars, bills were raised by Hans Ispat Ltd., pursuant to
which appellants had issued 10 post-dated cheques. While
the cheques were dishonoured, the bills remained unpaid by
the appellants.
6. Based on the aforesaid First Information, FIR No.
I-8/2012 was registered at Police Station- Anjar,
District- Kutch East, Gujarat under Sections 406, 420 and
114 of IPC.
7. On completion of investigation, police filed charge-
sheet against the appellants, charging them of having
committed offences under Sections 406, 420 and 114 of IPC
leading to registration of Criminal Case No. 584 of 2012
which was assigned to the Court of Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Anjar, Kutch.
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8. Appellants preferred application for discharge before
the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Anjar,
Kutch in Criminal Case No.584 of 2012. Vide order dated
08.02.2016, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Anjar rejected the application seeking discharge.
9. Aggrieved thereby, a criminal revision application
was filed before the High Court, being Criminal Revision
Application No. 213 of 2016. The said revision application
was dismissed by the High Court vide the order dated
24.03.2021 on the ground that it was not maintainable.
10. This decision of the High Court was assailed by the
appellants before this Court in Criminal Appeal No.5430 of
2024. Vide order dated 18.12.2024, this Court held that
the revision application was maintainable and accordingly,
set aside the order of the High Court rejecting the
revision application, further directing the High Court to
consider the revision application on merit.
11. Thereafter, the revision application was heard by the
High Court and as noted supra , vide the judgment and order
dated 17.03.2026, the same was partly allowed. While the
appellants have been discharged from the offence
punishable under Section 406 of IPC, the order rejecting
the discharge application, qua the offences under Section
420 read with Section 114 of IPC, has been confirmed. The
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate has been directed to
alter the charges and frame a modified charge against the
appellants under Section 420 read with Section 114 of IPC.
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12. This order came to be challenged in the related
Special Leave Petition, in which this Court had issued
notice vide the order dated 24.04.2026 and also directed
that further proceedings in Criminal Case No.584 of 2012,
pending before the Court of Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Anjar shall remain stayed.
13. Mr. Goel, learned Senior counsel for the appellants
submits that the dispute between the parties is entirely
civil in nature. Instead of instituting a civil suit for
recovery, Respondent No.2 has abused the criminal process
by lodging First Information and getting a criminal case
registered against the appellants. The object of the
criminal case is to recover the amount allegedly not paid
by the appellants. That cannot be the purport of the
criminal process. In this connection, learned Senior
counsel has referred to the First Information as well as
to the statement of Respondent No.2 made before the police
under Section 161 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1973
(for short, ‘CrPC’) and submits therefrom that a deposit
of Rs.2,00,00,000/- made by Shivamy was lying with Hans
Ispat Ltd. Despite repeated requests, the said amount was
not being returned back, neither to Shivamy nor to the
appellants. Therefore, to set off the outstanding dues,
the related payments amounting to Rs.1,19,00,000/- were
withheld by the appellants. This has been sought to be
given a criminal colour by Respondent No.2. He further
submits that this Court may exercise its jurisdiction to
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quash the criminal proceedings. In support of such
submissions, learned Senior counsel has placed reliance on
the following decisions:
(a) Delhi Race Club versus State of Uttar
Pradesh, [(2024) 10 Supreme Court Cases 690];
(b) Lalit Chaturvedi versus State of Uttar
Pradesh, [(2024) 12 Supreme Court Cases 483];
(c) Shailesh Kumar Singh alias Shailesh R.
Singh versus State of Uttar Pradesh, [2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1462]; and,
(d) G. Saminathan versus The State, Represented
by the Sub-Inspector of Police, [2026 INSC 772].
14. Per contra , learned counsel for the respondent-State
of Gujarat strenuously argued that though the dispute
between the appellant and Respondent No.2 may have its
genesis in business transaction having a civil flavour but
the subsequent conduct of the appellants in withholding
payments certainly has got criminal overtones. Police has
investigated the case and prima facie has found it to be
fit for trial. In such circumstances, it would be too far
fetched to contend that the dispute between the parties is
entirely of civil nature and, therefore, the criminal
proceedings should be quashed.
15. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties
have received the due consideration of the Court.
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16. While Section 406 of IPC provides for punishment for
criminal breach of trust, Section 405 of IPC is the
substantive provision dealing with criminal breach of
trust. Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with
property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly
misappropriates or converts to his own use that property,
or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in
violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in
which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal
contract, express or implied, which he has made touching
the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other
person so to do, in such a case, he is said to have
committed the offence of ‘criminal breach of trust’.
17. Section 420 of IPC deals with cheating and
dishonestly inducing delivery of property. It says that
whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person
deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to
make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable
security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which
is capable of being converted into a valuable security,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also
be liable to fine.
18. Cheating is defined in Section 415 of IPC which says
that whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or
dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any
property to any person, or to consent that any person
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shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the
person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he
would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which
act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or
harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property,
is said to ‘cheat’.
19. Under Section 114 of IPC, a person would be liable to
be punished as an abettor, if he is present when the act
or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence
of the abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have
committed such act or offence.
20. In G. Saminathan (supra) , this Court elaborated on
the ingredients constituting a fraudulent act dealt with
in Section 415 of IPC and held thus:
“7.2 For the invocation of Section 420 of IPC,
which provides for cheating and dishonestly
inducing the delivery of property, the
ingredients of Section 415 of IPC have to be
established. To constitute the offence under
Section 415 of IPC, it is essential that, by
way of certain acts, a fraudulent or dishonest
inducement is made and the person so deceived
was made to deliver any property on account of
such inducement. The said provision lays down
two separate classes of acts which the person
deceived may be induced to do, as follows:
i) In the first class of acts he may be induced
fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver the
property to any person or consent that any
person shall retain any property.
ii) The second class of acts set forth in the
Section is the intentional inducement of doing
or omitting to do anything which the person
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deceived would not do or omit to do if he were
not so deceived.”
20.1. The sine qua non for attracting Section 415 IPC is
‘fraudulence’, ‘dishonesty’ or ‘intentional inducement’.
Absence of the aforesaid elements would debase the offence
of cheating.
21. Adverting to the facts of the present case, we may
refer to the statement of Respondent No.2 made under
Section 161 of the CrPC. In his aforesaid statement, he
stated that the ownership of Hans Ispat Ltd. was earlier
with the Barnala Group with its Head Office at
Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh. From the Barnala Group,
Electrotherm India Pvt. Ltd. had purchased the company
with effect from 01.06.2010. From the aforesaid company,
Hans Ispat Ltd. took over the ownership. In his aforesaid
statement, he admitted that an amount of Rs.2,00,00,000/-
was paid by the appellants to the aforesaid company during
the period from 01.12.2006 to 15.02.2007 when the Barnala
group owned the company. He went on to explain that such
amount deposited by the appellants were required to be
taken care of by Barnala Group and not by the new owners
of the company.
22. From the above, it is evident that the money was paid
by the appellants to the company when the Barnala group
owned the company. Appellants are insisting on repayment,
failing which they have adjusted the dues of Respondent
No. 2. According to respondent No. 2 this amount should be
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repaid by the Barnala group and not by the present owners.
Therefore, the amount due to him should be paid by the
appellants. Thus, the dispute raised by Respondent No.2 is
pre-eminently a civil one. However, no civil suit has been
instituted by Respondent No.2 against the appellants.
23. A Two-Judge Bench of this Court in Delhi Race Club
(supra) held that if it is the case of the complainant
that a particular amount is due and payable to him, then
he should have filed a civil suit for recovery of the
amount. He could not have gone to the Court of Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate by filing a complaint of
cheating and criminal breach of trust. This Court held as
follows:
“51. If it is the case of the complainant that
a particular amount is due and payable to him
then he should have filed a civil suit for
recovery of the amount against the appellants
herein. But he could not have gone to the Court
of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate by
filing a complaint of cheating and criminal
breach of trust. It appears that till this
date, the complainant has not filed any civil
suit for recovery of the amount which according
to him is due and payable to him by the
appellants. He seems to have prima facie lost
the period of limitation for filing such a
civil suit.
52. In such circumstances referred to above,
the continuation of the criminal proceeding
would be nothing but abuse of the process of
law.”
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23.1. While concluding, this Court explained that the
offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust are
independent and distinct. The two offences cannot coexist
simultaneously in the same set of facts. This Court
declared as under:
“55. It is high time that the police officers
across the country are imparted proper training
in law so as to understand the fine distinction
between the offence of cheating vis-à-vis
criminal breach of trust. Both offences are
independent and distinct. The two offences cannot
coexist simultaneously in the same set of facts.
They are antithetical to each other. The two
provisions of IPC (now BNS, 2023) are not twins
that they cannot survive without each other.”
24. In Lalit Chaturvedi (supra) , a Two-Judge Bench of
this Court under similar circumstances, has held that even
if the assertions made in the complaint are correct, even
then, a criminal offence under Section 420 read with
Section 415 of IPC is not established in the absence of
deception by making false and misleading representation,
dishonest concealment or any other act or omission. This
Court held as follows:
“5. This Court, in a number of judgments, has
pointed out the clear distinction between a
civil wrong in the form of breach of contract,
non-payment of money or disregard to and
violation of the contractual terms; and a
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criminal offence under Sections 420 and 406
IPC. Repeated judgments of this Court, however,
are somehow overlooked, and are not being
applied and enforced. We will be referring to
these judgments. The impugned judgment
dismisses the application filed by the
appellants under Section 482 CrPC on the ground
of delay/laches and also the factum that the
charge-sheet had been filed on 12-12-2019. This
ground and reason is also not valid.”
24.1. In the facts and circumstances of the case and
referring to several judgments, this Court held thus:
“9.We will assume that the assertions made in
the complaint are correct, but even then, a
criminal offence under Section 420 read with
Section 415 IPC is not established in the absence
of deception by making false and misleading
representation, dishonest concealment or any
other act or omission, or inducement of the
complainant to deliver any property at the time
of the contract(s) being entered. The ingredients
to allege the offence are neither stated nor can
be inferred from the averments. A prayer is made
to the police for recovery of money from the
appellants. The police is to investigate the
allegations which discloses a criminal act.
Police does not have the power and authority to
recover money or act as a civil court for
recovery of money.”
25. In the case of Shailesh Kumar Singh alias Shailesh R.
Singh (supra), a Two-Judge Bench of this Court noticed
that it was a case of civil nature and wondered why the
High Court was not able to understand the civil nature of
the dispute. The Bench also enquired as to whether any
civil suit was filed for recovery of money by the
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informant. But no such civil suit was filed. In such
circumstances, this Court held as under:
“13. We also enquired with the learned counsel
appearing for the Respondent No. 4 whether his
client has filed any civil suit or has
initiated any other proceedings for recovery of
the money. It appears that no civil suit has
been filed for recovery of money till this
date. Money cannot be recovered, more
particularly, in a civil dispute between the
parties by filing a First Information Report
and seeking the help of the Police. This
amounts to abuse of process of law.
14. We could have said many things but we
refrain from observing anything further. If the
Respondent No. 4 has to recover a particular
amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any
other appropriate remedy available to him in
law. He cannot be permitted to take recourse of
criminal proceedings.”
25.1. In the facts of that case, the FIR registered under
Sections 60(b), 316(2) and 318(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 was quashed.
26. Reverting back to G. Saminathan (supra), this Court
referred to the judgments analysed to above and held that
when the dispute between the parties is essentially civil
in nature, a case of cheating or criminal breach of trust
per se would not arise.
27. Having given our anxious consideration to the
submissions made at the Bar, relevant materials on record
and the decided cases, we have no hesitation in coming to
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the conclusion that the grievance raised by Respondent
No.2 is essentially civil in nature. Instead of availing
his civil remedy, Respondent No.2 has resorted to criminal
proceedings to recover the amounts stated to have been
withheld by the appellants. This certainly cannot be the
object of a criminal proceeding.
28. In the circumstances, we are of the view that
allowing the criminal proceedings to continue would be
nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court.
29. That being the position, we set aside the impugned
judgment and order dated 17.03.2026 passed by the High
Court as well as the order dated 08.02.2016 of the learned
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Anjar, Kutch.
30. Consequently, Criminal Case No.584 of 2012, pending
on the file of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Anjar, Kutch, is hereby quashed.
31. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is allowed.
32. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.
…………………………………………………...J.
[UJJAL BHUYAN]
…………………………………………………...J.
[ATUL S. CHANDURKAR]
NEW DELHI;
rd
23 SEPTEMBER, 2026.
AK
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