Shalim Uddin Barbhuiya vs The State Of Assam And 6 Ors.

Court
Gauhati High Court

Page No. 1/16

GAHC010158822025



2026:GAU-AS:16855

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(THE HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

Writ petition [c] no. 4087/2025

Shalim Uddin Barbhuiya, son of Late Foizur
Rahman Barbhuiya, Vill.- Bahadurpur Part-II,
P.O. and Dist. Hailakandi, Assam.

………………Petitioner

- -
VERSUS

1. The State of Assam to be represented by the
Commissioner and Secretary to the
Government of Assam, School Education
Department, Dispur, Guwahati-781006.
2. The Commissioner and Secretary to the
Government of Assam, Finance Department,
Dispur, Guwahati-781006.
3. The Director of Elementary Education, Assam,
Kahilipara, Guwahati-19.
4. The Director of Pension, Housefed Complex,
Guwahati-06.
5. The District Elementary Education Officer,
Hailakandi, P.O. and Dist- Hailakandi, Assam,
Pin-788151.

Page No. 2/16

6. The Block Elementary Education Officer, Lala,
P.O. Lala, Dist. Hailakandi, Assam-788163.
7. The Treasury Officer, Hailakandi, P.O.
Hailakandi, Dist. Hailakandi, Assam, Pin-
788151.

………………. Respondents



BeFore
Hon’BLe Mr. JUStice MAniSH cHoUDHUrY

Advocates :

Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr. A.R. Bhuyan, Senior
Advocate
Mr. A. Sarif, Advocate

Advocate for the Respondent nos. 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 : Ms. S. Konwar, Junior
Government Advocate, Assam
& Standing Counsel,
Elementary Education
Department.

Advocate for the Respondent nos. 2 & 7 : Ms. R.M. Baruah, Advocate

Dates of hearing : 10.11.2026 & 12.11.2026

Date of pronouncement of judgment : 12.11.2026

Whether the pronouncement is of the
Operative part of the judgment ? : No

Whether the full judgment has been
Pronounced ? : Yes

Page No. 3/16


JUDGMent & orDer

1. In this writ petition, the petitioner has sought to invoke the extra-ordinary and
discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India with the following prayers :-

It is therefore most respectfully prayed that your Lordships would
graciously be pleased to admit this petition, call for the record, issue
Rule calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why a writ in the
nature of Mandamus/Certiorari or other appropriate writ should not be
issued in directing the respondents to release the pension and other
retirement benefits such as GIS, Earned Leave, Gratuity etc. and/or
direct the respondents to grant benefits/reliefs as entitled by the
petitioner as prescribed by the rules framed by the Government of
Assam [if any] under Terminated Employees [Temporary Benefits] Act,
2022 and/or on perusal of records Your Lordships would be pleased to
make the Rule absolute and/or pass such further or other order or
orders as Your Lordships may deem fit and proper.
-AND-
In the interim this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to observe that
pendency of the writ shall not be a bar for the respondents to release
the retirement benefits of the petitioner for the interest of justice.

2. From the contents of an Order dated 20.10.1997 of the District Elementary
Education Officer [DEEO], In-Charge, Hailakandi, which the petitioner has relied
upon to buttress his case, it is discernible that the petitioner was initially
allowed to work as a Lower Division Assistant [LDA] since 05.08.1996 as per
verbal instruction of the then DEEO, Hailakandi on the basis of a note of the
Minister, Irrigation, Assam as reflected in a Communication dated 18.06.1997.
By the Order dated 20.10.1997 and another Order dated 10.03.1998 issued by

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the DEEO, Hailakandi, the petitioner’s service was adjusted subject to
regularization in due course as LDA in the Lala Block vice one Bimal Chandra
Das, LDA in Lala Block transferred and adjusted in the office of the Deputy
Inspector of Schools, Hailakandi vide an Order dated 20.10.1997 issued by the
DEEO. Hailakandi. The DEEO vide another Order dated 04.12.1998 directed the
Deputy Inspector of Schools, Hailakandi to release the salary of the petitioner
with effect from 05.08.1996 to 19.10.1997 subject to availability of fund.

3. The nature of service rendered by the petitioner, which is the basis for the
reliefs claimed in the present writ petition, can be known from observations and
determination made in the Orders passed in two writ petitions, W.P.[C] no.
5787/1999 and W.P.[C] no. 2578/2016; and a writ appeal, W.A. no. 40/2017,
which were also at the instance of the present petitioner.

4. In the backdrop narrated in paragraph 2 above, the petitioner preferred the writ
petition, W.P.[C] no. 5787/1999, seeking a direction to the respondent
authorities to release the salary of the petitioner for the period from 05.08.1996
to 19.10.1997 and not to oust him from service and also, to regularize his
service as LDA w.e.f. 05.08.1996. Upon perusal of the materials on record and
after hearing, the writ petition was dismissed by an Order dated 01.04.2005.

4.1. In the Order dated 01.04.2005, the Court observed that it was evident that the
petitioner was never appointed on the basis of any selection, but was appointed
as suggested by the Minister, Irrigation Department. The appointment of the
petitioner to the public service could not have been done in the manner as had
been done. It was held that the Minister had no authority to make any such
appointment. For the purpose of appointment, a selection was must. As no
selection was done in the case of the petitioner, the appointment/engagement/
adjustment of the petitioner as LDA was held to be illegal and invalid. The
Court further held that there being no selection, the prayer for regularization
could not be granted. However, in view of the submission made on behalf of
the petitioner that he was adjusted vide Orders - dated 20.10.1997 & dated

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10.09.1998 - against a regular vacancy subject to regularization in due course,
the Court directed that the salary for the period of such adjustment be paid to
the petitioner if he had discharged his duties as LDA. The Court further
observed that in view of exigency of service, the respondent authorities could
continue the ad-hoc service. But, as the ad-hoc service should not be continued
for indefinite time, there had to be a regular selection.

5. After dismissal of the writ petition, W.P.[C] no. 5787/1999 by the Order dated
01.04.2005, the Director of Elementary Education, Assam passed a Termination
Order dated 26.10.2005. By the Order dated 26.10.2005, the service of the
petitioner was terminated with immediate effect. The petitioner claimed to have
continued to serve in the offices under the Elementary Education Department
receiving salary subsequently upto May, 2017.

6. The case set up by the petitioner is that the said Termination Order dated
06.10.2005 was not communicated to him.

7. I have heard Mr. A.R. Bhuyan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. A. Sarif,
learned counsel for the petitioner; Ms. S. Konwar, learned Junior Government
Advocate, Assam & Standing Counsel, Elementary Education Department for the
respondent nos. 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6; and Ms. R.M. Baruah, learned counsel for the
respondent nos. 2 & 7.

8. Mr. Bhuyan, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted
that the alleged Order of Termination dated 26.10.2005 was never served or
communicated to the petitioner. He has submitted that the petitioner was
initially appointed as a Lower Division Assistant [LDA] on 05.08.1996 and since
then, the petitioner was allowed to serve in the offices of the authorities under
the Elementary Education Department till 17.05.2017. He has further submitted
that during the period of service rendered by the petitioner, the petitioner was
also allowed a scale of pay with allowances, as admissible under the law. The
period of service rendered by the petitioner from 05.08.1996 to 17.05.2017 was

Page No. 6/16

continuous. As the petitioner received salaries regularly for a period of more
than twenty years, the petitioner is entitled to receive pension and other
pensionary benefits in terms of an Office Memorandum dated 06.09.2003 of the
Pension and Public Grievances Department, Government of Assam. He has
further contended that in the earlier rounds, the issue regarding grant of
pension and pensionary benefits was never agitated. It is only after non-
acceptance of the prayer of the petitioner for invalidation of the Termination
Order dated 26.10.2005, the petitioner by this writ petition has sought for a
direction to the respondent authorities to release the pension and other
pensionary benefits. Mr. Bhuyan has submitted that the Terminated Employees
[Temporary Benefits] Bill, 2022 which was a private bill, had not become an act
subsequently and reference to it in the prayer part of the writ petition was
mistakenly made. With regard to his submission regarding non-communication
of the Order of Termination, he has relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in State of Punjab vs. Khemi Ram, AIR 1970 SC 214 ,
specifically to paragraph 16. He has contended that actual knowledge of an
order of termination is necessary because of the adverse consequences likely to
be visited by such an Order of Termination.

9. Ms. Konwar, learned Junior Government Advocate, Assam & Standing Counsel,
Elementary Education Department appearing for the State respondents has
submitted that the petitioner had earlier approached this Court by three writ
petitions and this is the fourth round of litigation. The Order of Termination
dated 26.10.2005 was the subject-matter of litigation in the second round as
well as in the third round. Therefore, the issue of the pension and pensionary
benefits to the petitioner is relatable to the previous rounds of litigations and
could have been agitated then. The issue of pension could have been raised by
the petitioner in the earlier rounds of litigations, at least from the second round
of litigation onward. Ms. Konwar has submitted that the issue of regularisation
of the petitioner’s service was considered and rejected in the earlier rounds. Ms.
Konwar has further contended that the Office Memorandum dated 06.09.2003
could not be made applicable to the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner has

Page No. 7/16

deliberately sought to mislead the court by seeking a direction on the basis of
one statute, the Terminated Employees [Temporary Benefits] Act, 2022, which
was never enacted and remained as a bill in the Parliament.

10. Before a deliberation on the issues raised by the petitioner in the present writ
petition, it is pertinent to mention that the petitioner had earlier mounted a
challenge to the Termination Order dated 26.10.2005 in a writ petition, W.P.[C]
no. 2578/2016 projecting that the writ petition was filed immediately after he
came to know about the Termination Order dated 26.10.2005. The challenge to
the Termination Order dated 26.10.2005 was made on the premise that the
Termination Order was never served upon him and therefore, the petitioner was
unaware of the Termination Order. It was contended that as the Termination
Order was not served on him, therefore, the same could not be stated to have
taken effect. Contending so, the petitioner sought quashing of the Order dated
26.10.2005 and for his re-instatement. After hearing the learned counsel for the
parties, the writ petition, W.P.[C] no. 2578/2016 was dismissed by an Order
dated 20.01.2017 imposing a cost of Rs. 5,000/- upon the petitioner.

10.1. The Coordinate Bench found that there was no appointment order issued to the
petitioner. Yet, the petitioner was allowed to work without any appointment
order. After examination of the entire fact situation obtaining in the case of the
petitioner, the Court had proceeded to observe as under :-

Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds
no error or infirmity in the order dated 26.10.2005. When the petitioner
was not appointed at all, either legally or illegally, question of
termination of service of the petitioner in the sense ‘termination’ is
understood was not necessary, not to speak of service of the
termination order on the petitioner. Therefore, service of such order
upon the petitioner also became inconsequential . It is trite that
application of principles of natural justice would depend upon facts and
circumstances of each individual case. There cannot be any

Page No. 8/16

straightjacket formula regarding application of the principles of natural
justice. Present is a clear case of abuse of the public recruitment
process and trying to enter into Government service in a most
surreptitious and clandestine manner which cannot receive the
imprimatur of any Court of law .
As noticed above, petitioner had not only manipulated his entry into
Government service but there has also been distortion of the Court’s
order to confer illegal gain upon the petitioner .
For all the aforesaid reasons, Court is of the view that petitioner is not
entitled to any relief.
There is no merit in the writ petition which is accordingly dismissed with
cost of Rs. 5,000/-.
Interim order passed earlier shall stand vacated.
[Emphasis supplied in bold]

11. Undeterred by the Order of dismissal dated 20.01.2017, the petitioner carried
the matter to the Division Bench by way of an intra-court appeal, Writ Appeal
no. 40/2017. After considering the matter in its entirety, the Division Bench
dismissed the intra-court appeal by an Order dated 15.02.2017 with the
following observations :-

the writ petitioner
What emerges from the above discussion is that
was the beneficiary of an illegal process as he secured entry into
govt. service on a verbal order, without selection or through due
process. This was the reason for the termination decision of the writ
petitioner by the DEE, Assam, under the impugned order dated
26.10.2005. The refusal by the writ court under the circumstances to
interfere with the termination order cannot therefore be faulted.
Therefore finding the Writ Appeal to be devoid of merit, we dismiss the
same.

Page No. 9/16

[Emphasis supplied in bold]

12. Thereafter, the petitioner carried the matter to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India by way of special leave to appeal, SLP[C] no. 14796/2017 assailing the
Order dated 15.02.2017 [supra]. Upon hearing the parties, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court dismissed the SLP finding no reason to entertain it. However, in the Order
dated 09.05.2017 whereby the SLP was dismissed, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed that the petitioner shall be paid wages for the period he had actually
worked and there shall be no recovery.

13. It is an admitted case of the petitioner that he had received monthly salaries till
May, 2017.

14. After dismissal of the SLP on 09.05.2017, the petitioner had ventured for a third
round of litigation seeking setting aside and quashing of the same Order of
Termination dated 26.10.2005 in a third writ petition, W.P.[C] no. 7741/2018.
The Court while considering the Order of Termination, had gone through the
orders passed in the previous rounds of litigation. The Court had observed that
by the Order dated 01.04.2005 passed in the writ petition, W.P.[C] no.
5787/1999 dismissed the prayer for regularisation made by the petitioner and
consequent to the Order dated 01.04.2005, the petitioner’s service was
terminated by the Order dated 26.10.2005. When the petitioner approached
again by the second writ petition, W.P.[C] no. 2578/2016 seeking quashing of
the Order dated 26.10.2005 terminating his service, the Court while dismissing
the writ petition, imposed a cost of Rs. 5,000/- upon the petitioner. The Order
dated 20.01.2017 was affirmed by the appellate court in the intra-court appeal
and the challenge made was also dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on
09.05.2017.

15. Taking note of the above events, the coordinate bench in its Order dated
28.01.2025 passed in the writ petition, W.P.[C] no. 7741/2018 had observed as
under :-

Page No. 10/16


7. The petitioner has by way of this present petition, again made a
challenge to the termination order dated 26.10.2005 which cannot be
allowed, in view of the fact that there has been a finality to the validity
of the termination order dated 26.10.2005 , by the decision of the Single
Bench, which has been upheld by the Division Bench and Hon’ble
Supreme Court. There is no specific prayer made in the writ petition for
payment of salary for the work done by the petitioner.
8. In view of the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any
ground to allow the writ petition.
9. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
[Emphasis supplied in bold]

16. Immediately after dismissal of the writ petition on 28.05.2025, the petitioner
has embarked on his litigious journey for the fourth occasion by the present
writ petition, which was filed on 19.07.2025 seeking the above reliefs.

17. In so far as the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner to the effect that the impugned Order of Termination dated
26.10.2005 was neither served nor communicated to the petitioner is
concerned, it is pertinent to notice that in his second writ petition, W.P.[C] no.
2578/2016, the petitioner as the basic grievance had contended that the
Termination Order was never served upon him. Therefore, he was unaware of
the Termination Order. On that basis, it was contended on behalf of the
petitioner that an order which was not served on the affected party, could not
be said to have taken effect and on that basis, the petitioner sought for
quashing of the Order of Termination dated 26.10.2005 and also, for his
reinstatement. The Court considered the said contention of the petitioner and
after taking note of the previous events, the Court in its Order of dismissal
dated 20.01.2017 had found no error or infirmity in the Termination Order
dated 26.10.2005. The Court had observed that as the petitioner was not

Page No. 11/16

appointed at all, either legally or illegally, the question of termination of service
of the petitioner in the sense ‘termination’ was not necessary, not to speak of
service of the Termination Order on the petitioner. The Court held to the effect
that the service of such Termination Order upon the petitioner became
inconsequential.

18. The Order dated 20.01.2017 was challenged, firstly, in an intra-court appeal,
Writ Appeal no. 40 of 2017 resulting in dismissal on 15.10.2017, and secondly,
by way of a special leave petition, S.L.P.[C] no. 14796/2017 resulting again in
dismissal on 09.05.2017. Even after attainment of finality, the Order of
Termination was again challenged by the petitioner in the writ petition, W.P.[C]
no. 7741/2018, which was dismissed on 28.01.2025.

19. It is trite law that the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens are a
significant feature of the Constitution and the High Courts under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India are bound to protect these fundamental rights. If a
case is made out for exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 in support of a
citizen’s fundamental right, the High Court is not to hesitate to exercise the
jurisdiction. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
Devilal Modi vs. States Tax Officer, Patlam and others, AIR 1965 SC 1150 ,
has observed that the question as to whether a citizen should be allowed to
challenge the validity of the same order by successive petitions under Article
226 cannot be answered merely in the light of the significance and importance
of the citizens’ fundamental rights. It is held that the general principle
underlying the doctrine of res judicata is ultimately based on public policy. One
important consideration of public policy is that decisions pronounced by courts
of competent jurisdiction should be final, unless they are modified or reversed
by appellate authorities; and the order principle is that no one should be made
to face the same kind of litigation twice over, because such a process would be
contrary to considerations of fair play and justice. The rule of res judicata
postulates that if a plea could have been taken by a party in a proceeding
between him and his opponent, he would not be permitted to take that plea

Page No. 12/16

against the same party in a subsequent proceeding which is based on the same
cause of action. Because if the doctrine of constructive res judicata is not
applied to writ proceedings, it would be open to the party to take one
proceeding after another and urge new grounds every time; and that plainly is
inconsistent with consideration of public policy.

20. The Office Memorandum dated 06.09.2003 has laid down that a Government
servant rendering twenty years of service without being confirmed shall be
eligible for pensionary benefits and even after rendering twenty years of
continuous service, the Government servant is superannuated or incapacitated
or dead then also, the pensionary benefit shall be admissible to a Government
servant because of rendering twenty years of continuous service before his
death.

21. When the issue is considered qua the petitioner, it is found already that it has
already been determined in the previous rounds of litigation that appointment /
engagement / adjustment of the petitioner as a Lower Division Assistant [LDA]
cannot be treated as legal and valid and therefore, the regularisation of the
petitioner cannot be granted. The Court in its Order dated 01.04.2005 had
categorically observed that in view of exigency of service to continue the ad-
hoc service of the petitioner, the respondent authorities might continue the ad-
hoc service of the petitioner but such ad-hoc service could not be continued for
indefinite time and there had to be a regular selection. It had been finally
determined in the previous round categorically that the petitioner was never
appointed at all, either legally or illegally. By fortuitous circumstances, the
petitioner continued to receive the salaries up-to May, 2017, as admitted by the
petitioner himself. The twenty years of continuous service as contemplated in
the Office Memorandum dated 06.09.2003 ought to be a continuous service by
a Government servant. As the petitioner was never appointed, either legally or
illegally, the question treating the petitioner as a Government servant to extend
the benefit of pension and pensionary benefits in terms of the Office
Memorandum dated 06.09.2003 could not arise at all.

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22. It is relevant to note, though at the time of hearing the learned Senior Counsel
has submitted that the reference to the Terminated Employees [Temporary
Benefits] Act, 2022 was due to inadvertence, that a writ petition like the
present one, which is the fourth writ petition preferred by the petitioner, is
preferred ordinarily with the assistance and consultation on the legal aspects
with a learned counsel. The petitioner has annexed a Bill no. 272 of 2022,
namely, the Terminated Employees [Temporary Benefits] Bill, 2022 as part of
the writ petition as Annexure – 23. The Bill was a private Bill which had never
become an Act and the Bill was introduced to provide certain benefits to the
employees by the employer of any establishment or organisation, which was
not owned, controlled or funded by any Government. Therefore, the Court is of
the unhesitant view that the reference to ‘the Terminated Employees
[Temporary Benefits] Act, 2022’ in the body and prayer portions of the writ
petition is completely misconceived. A private Bill which did not ever become an
Act ought not have been referred to by the petitioner seeking the relief in the
form of pension and other retirement benefits.

23. This Court finds it appropriate to refer to the following observations made by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of M. Nagabhushana vs. State
of Karnataka , [2011] 3 SCC 408 , :-

11. We find that disregarding the aforesaid clear finding of this Court,
the appellant, on identical issues, further filed a new writ petition out of
which the present appeal arises. That writ petition, as noted above, was
rejected both by the learned Single Judge and by the Division Bench in
clear terms. It is obvious that such a litigative adventure by the present
appellant is clearly against the principles of res judicata as well as
principles of constructive res judicata and principles analogous thereto.
12. The principles of res judicata are of universal application as they are
based on two age-old principles, namely, interest reipublicae ut sit finis

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litium which means that it is in the interest of the State that there should
be an end to litigation and the other principle is nemo debet bis vexari,
si constat curiae quod sit pro una et eademn causa meaning thereby
that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the
court that it is for one and the same cause. This doctrine of res judicata
is common to all civilised system of jurisprudence to the extent that a
judgment after a proper trial by a court of competent jurisdiction should
be regarded as final and conclusive determination of the questions
litigated and should for ever set the controversy at rest.
13. That principle of finality of litigation is based on high principle of
public policy. […..] The doctrine of res judicata has been evolved to
prevent such an anarchy. That is why it is perceived that the plea of res
judicata is not a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which
sustains the rule of law in ensuring finality in litigation. This principle
seeks to promote honesty and a fair administration of justice and to
prevent abuse in the matter of accessing court for agitating on issues
which have become final between the parties.
*
18. Therefore, any proceeding which has been initiated in breach of the
principle of res judicata is prima facie a proceeding which has been
initiated in abuse of the process of court.
*
21. Following all these principles a Constitution Bench of this Court in
Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. v. State of Maharashtra
[(1990) 2 SCC 715 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 339 : (1990) 13 ATC 348] laid
down the following principle: (SCC p. 741, para 35)
35. … an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the
actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the
parties might and ought to have litigated and have had decided
as incidental to or essentially connected with subject-matter of

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the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate
purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of
claim and defence. Thus, the principle of constructive res
judicata underlying Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of
Civil Procedure was applied to writ case. We, accordingly hold
that the writ case is fit to be dismissed on the ground of res
judicata.
22. In view of such authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution
Bench of this Court, there can be no doubt that the principles of
constructive res judicata, as explained in Explanation IV to Section 11
CPC, are also applicable to writ petitions.
23. Thus, the attempt to re-argue the case which has been finally
decided by the court of last resort is a clear abuse of process of the
court, regardless of the principles of res judicata, as has been held by
this Court in K.K. Modi vs. K.N. Modi [(1998) 3 SCC 573] . In SCC para
44 of the Report, this principle has been very lucidly discussed by this
Court and the relevant portions whereof are extracted below: (SCC p.
592)
‘ 44 . One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of
the court is relitigation. It is an abuse of the process of the court
and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to relitigate
the same issue which has already been tried and decided
earlier against him. The reagitation may or may not be barred
as res judicata.’

24. A writ remedy is an equitable one. A person should not take recourse to the
writ proceedings over and over again as the same amounts to abuse of the
process of law. The prayers made in the second writ petition and the third writ
petition were similar. Although, the prayer made in the present writ petition,
which is the fourth one, are couched in a different manner, a look at the

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manners in which the petitioner had structured his previous three writ petitions,
it becomes evident that the core issue in each of the four writ petitions revolves
around the appointment of the petitioner in the post of Lower Division
Assistant, which was found to be non-existent. Evidently, the issue raised in the
present writ petition is relatable to the matter of appointment of the petitioner
in the post of Lower Division Assistant only. Thus, the core issue was and is the
same. Therefore, such repeated filing of writ petitions on the same core issue is
clearly an abuse of the process of law and of the court.

25. In the above fact situation obtaining in the case of the petitioner, this Court
finds that the present venture by the petitioner for the fourth time is a complete
misadventure. This approach on the part of the petitioner for the fourth
occasion seeking the above reliefs is clearly in abuse of the process of law,
which is to be visited with exemplary cost. Having found no merit at all, the writ
petition stands dismissed for the misadventure by the petitioner. The Court is
inclined to impose exemplary cost for such venture. However, considering the
age of the petitioner, as implored by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the petitioner, this Court finds Rs. 25,000/- towards cost as reasonable and
just. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed with a cost of Rs. 25,000/-. The
said amount of Rs. 25,000/- is to be deposited before the Registry within a
period of one month from today.

26. On deposit of the said amount before the Registry by the petitioner, the
Registry is to transfer the amount in favour of the Gauhati High Court Bar
Association.

Ananta Konwar
2026.11.16 18:52:54 +05'30'

JUDGE

Comparing Assistant