SUMA MINERALS PRIVATE LIMITED vs INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED

Court
Rajasthan High Court

[2026:RJ-JP:46292]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13951/2024
CNR: RJHC020712382024 | URN: CW / 28105U / 2024
Suma Minerals Private Limited, Having Its Office At Khasra No. 704,
Opposite Hotel Kuldeep, Ajmer Road, Madanganj, Kishangarh,
Rajasthan - 305801, through its Authorized Signatory.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Through Its State Head,
having its Office at Jaipur Regional Office, Indian Oil
Bhawan, Ashok Chowk, Near Radha Swamy Satsang
Bhavan, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur-302004.
2. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, through its Managing
Director, G-9, Aliyavar Jung Marg, Bandra East, Mumbai
400051.
3. Divisional Head, Indian Oil Corporation Limited having its
Office at Ajmer Divisional Office, Plot No. SP 42, MTC
Industrial Area, Daurai, Ajmer- 305003.
4. The District Collector And District Magistrate, Ajmer.
5. The Sub Divisional Magistrate, Ajmer Road, Kishangarh.
6. The Chief Controller, Petroleum and Explosives Safety
Organisation having its Office at A Block CGO Complex, Fifth
Floor Seminary Hills, Nagpur, Maharashtra- 440006.
7. The Deputy Chief Controller of Explosives, Petroleum and
Explosives Safety Organization, Having its Office At-
Amrapali Circle, Near Power House, Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur -
302021.
8. Joint Chief Controller of Explosives, Petroleum And
Explosives Safety Organization, Having Its Office At - Hall
No. 502 And 507, Level- 5, Block-B, Old CGO Complex, NH-
IV, Faridabad, Haryana- 121001.
----Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. M.M. Ranjan Senior Advocate
assisted by Mr. Ashwani Kumar Chobisa
Advocate, Ms. Pratyushi Mehta
Advocate, Mr. Rohan Agarwal Advocate
and Ms. Priyansha Gupta Advocate.
For Respondents : Ms. Suruchi Kasliwal Advocate with Mr.
Vikram Singh Advocate,
(D.B. SAW/204/2026 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
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Mr. Dikshant Jain Advocate & Ms.
Annika Anna, Advocate,
Mr. Sharad Joshi AGC for Respondents
No. 4 & 5.
Mr. Pawan Pareek Advocate for
Respondents No. 6 to 8.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
REPORTABLE
Date of conclusion of arguments :: 28.10.2026
Date on which judgment was reserved :: 28.10.2026
Whether the full judgment or only
the operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment
Date of pronouncement :: 18.11.2026
1. Present writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner
seeking a direction against the respondent-Indian Oil Corporation
Limited (in short 'IOCL') to vacate the land belonging to the
petitioner and hand over peaceful and vacant possession thereof,
upon expiry of the lease agreement dated 16.03.2004. The petitioner
has also sought directions for removal of the fixtures, equipment and
remaining petroleum stock lying at the premises, payment of
outstanding lease rent and dealership-related dues, reimbursement
of the value of unsold petroleum products and compensation for the
period of unauthorised occupation.
2. Facts, in brief, are that the petitioner entered into a lease
agreement dated 16.03.2004 with IOCL in respect of the land in
question for a period of 19 years and 11 months for establishing and
operating a petroleum outlet. A separate dealership agreement was
executed between the parties on 11.11.2008 for a period of five
years. The lease agreement, by virtue of its stipulated duration,
expired on 15.02.2024 by efflux of time.
(D.B. SAW/204/2026 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
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3. It is stated that Clause 1(j) of the lease agreement
contemplated renewal of the lease up to the year 2034, subject to
execution of a separate lease deed by both parties. Significantly, the
expression 'automatic', originally appearing in the relevant
stipulation, was struck off with the consent of the parties. Thus,
according to the petitioner, the agreement did not confer any
automatic or unilateral right of renewal upon IOCL and any further
lease could come into existence only upon mutual consent and
execution of a fresh lease deed.
4. Upon expiry of the lease, the petitioner issued
communications dated 01.03.2024, 02.03.2024 and 05.03.2024,
informing IOCL and the concerned authorities that since the lease
had expired, therefore, the operation of the petroleum outlet had
been closed with effect from 01.03.2024. IOCL was accordingly
requested to remove its fixtures, equipment and petroleum stock
and restore peaceful possession of the land in question to the
petitioner. Despite the aforesaid communications, Respondent-IOCL
neither vacated the premises, nor removed its installations.
5. It is further contended that Respondent-IOCL remitted
only half month's rent amounting to Rs.16,137/- for February, 2024
and subsequently remitted a sum of Rs.25,899.52 on 13.03.2024
without there being any renewed lease agreement. The petitioner
returned the amount through demand draft on 15.03.2024,
expressly declining to accept the same as rent under any renewed
tenancy. A further communication dated 14.05.2024 was also
addressed to IOCL requesting removal of its fixtures and unsold
petroleum stock.
6. In the meantime, IOCL instituted Civil Suit No.33/2024
before the competent Civil Court at Kishangarh on 17.05.2024,
(D.B. SAW/204/2026 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
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seeking relief in relation to continuation/renewal of the lease. An
interim order of status quo was passed by the Civil Court on
01.06.2024. However, the appellate court, vide order dated
25.07.2024, set aside the said interim order and directed the trial
court to first examine the question of jurisdiction.
7. The petitioner thereafter filed an application under Section
8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter to be
referred as ‘the Act of 1996’), in the aforesaid civil suit, which came
to be allowed by the Civil Court vide order dated 23.09.2024,
resulting in dismissal of the civil suit. The said order attained finality,
as neither party challenged it. Subsequently, Respondent-IOCL
invoked the arbitration clause by issuing notice dated 13.05.2025
under Section 21 of the Act of 1996 and also filed an application
before this Court under Section 11 of the Act of 1996 seeking
appointment of an arbitrator.
8. Furthermore, Respondent-IOCL also approached the
Commercial Court, Ajmer, by filing an application under Section 9 of
the Act of 1996 seeking interim protection. The said application was
dismissed on 07.11.2025. The Commercial Court specifically noticed
the absence of material establishing service of the alleged notices
dated 16.10.2023 and 12.01.2024, purportedly sent by Respondent-
IOCL seeking renewal of the lease and also noticed that the lease
had expired on 15.02.2024. Although an appeal under Section 37 of
the Act of 1996 was preferred by the Respondent-IOCL against the
said order dated 07.11.2025, yet it was subsequently withdrawn by
Respondent-IOCL.
9. It has further been brought to the notice of this Court that
during the pendency of the present writ petition, Co-ordinate Bench
of this Court, vide order dated 23.02.2026, issued interim directions
(D.B. SAW/204/2026 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
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against respondent relating to removal of petroleum products from
the disputed premises. Order dated 23.02.2026 passed by the Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in the present writ petition was
challenged by the IOCL by way of filing intra court appeal before the
Division Bench, which was registered as D.B. Special Appeal (Writ)
No. 204/2026. The aforesaid appeal was allowed by the Division
Bench vide order dated 20.04.2026 setting aside order dated
23.02.2026 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court. Later on,
when the order passed by the Division Bench was challenged before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court by the petitioner by way of filing SLP, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, while quashing the order passed by the
Division Bench of this Court, vide order dated 17.09.2026 relegated
the parties to this Court for decision of the writ petition on merits.
10. Respondent-IOCL has opposed the writ petition and also
raised objections regarding maintainability of the writ petition. It was
contended that the dispute has arisen out of a lease agreement
containing an arbitration clause and, therefore, the petitioner ought
to be relegated to the agreed mechanism of arbitration rather than
invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226
of the Constitution of India. An interim application (I.A. no. 2/2025)
under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 was also filed by the respondent
in the instant writ petition.
11. It was contended that the petitioner itself invoked the
arbitration clause by filing an application under Section 8 of the 1996
Act in the civil suit instituted by Respondent-IOCL in relation to the
same lease deed. The said application filed by the petitioner was
allowed by the Civil Court on 23.09.2024 and the said order has
attained finality. Therefore, according to Respondent-IOCL, the
petitioner cannot subsequently take a different stand and writ
(D.B. SAW/204/2026 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
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petition cannot be filed by the petitioner ignoring and bypassing the
arbitration clause. It is contended that the petitioner is estopped by
its own conduct from maintaining the present writ petition.
12. It is further submitted that Respondent-IOCL has already
filed Arbitration Application No.108/2025 seeking appointment of an
arbitrator, which is pending before this Court. Hence, the present
writ petition would also prejudice the pending arbitration proceedings
and render the contractual and statutory remedy under the Act of
1996 ineffective.
13. On merits, Respondent-IOCL has contended that the lease
agreement, when read as a whole, confers upon it a right to renew
lease deed for a further period of ten years. It is asserted that the
notices dated 16.10.2023 and 12.01.2024 were issued to the
petitioner well before expiry of the original lease, unequivocally
expressing IOCL's intention to continue the lease. Therefore, the
petitioner cannot deny the renewal merely by relying upon the expiry
of the original term.
14. The respondent has also contended that the petitioner is
seeking enforcement of contractual rights and obligations, including
determination of outstanding rent, dealership charges, value of
unsold petroleum stock and damages. Such claims involve
interpretation of the contractual stipulations and disputed questions
of fact, which can be adjudicated only by the arbitral tribunal.
15. It is further contended that Section 5 of the Act of 1996
restricts judicial intervention in matters governed by arbitration and,
therefore, the petitioner cannot bypass the agreed contractual
mechanism. Accordingly, prayer has been made for dismissal of the
writ petition or for relegation of the parties to arbitration.
(D.B. SAW/204/2026 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
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16. Shri M.M. Ranjan, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the petitioner submitted that IOCL, being an instrumentality of the
State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, is
amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. It is contended that
the present petition is not an ordinary claim for enforcement of
contractual obligations, but essentially seeks restoration of
possession of the petitioner's own property after expiry of the
stipulated lease period. The continued occupation of the premises by
a public sector corporation, despite expiry of the lease and repeated
demands for handing over possession, constitutes an arbitrary and
unauthorised deprivation of the petitioner's property.
17. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the existence of an
arbitration clause cannot operate as an absolute bar to the exercise
of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
particularly when the relief sought is against the continued
unauthorised occupation of private property by a State
instrumentality. Reliance has been placed upon decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
& Another vs. Dolly Das, (1999) 4 SCC 450, Harbanslal Sahnia
& Another vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. & Others, (2003) 2 SCC
107, Unitech Limited & Others vs. Telangana State Industrial
Infrastructure Corporation (TSIIC) & Others, (2021) 16 SCC
35, National Company represented by its Managing Partner
vs. Territory Manager, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited
& Another, (2021) 13 SCC 121 and Uttar Pradesh Power
Transmission Corporation Limited & Another vs. CG Power
and Industrial Solutions Limited & Another, (2021) 6 SCC 15 .
18. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the lease
agreement did not confer any automatic right of renewal upon
(D.B. SAW/204/2026 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
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Respondent-IOCL. Clause 1(j) of the lease agreement, while reading
in entirety would make it clear that execution of a separate lease
deed by both parties is the fundamental requirement of renewal of
lease. The word 'automatic' having been consciously struck off from
the relevant stipulation, Respondent-IOCL could not claim renewal as
a matter of unilateral contractual entitlement. It was also argued
that the alleged communications dated 16.10.2023 and 12.01.2024
were never served upon the petitioner, which is apparent from order
dated 07.11.2025 passed by the Commercial Court, wherein while
dismissing the application under Section 9 of the Act of 1996, it was
specifically noticed that there was no material on record establishing
receipt of any such notices by the petitioner.
19. Learned Senior Counsel emphasised that the conduct of
IOCL itself demonstrates that it acknowledged expiry of the lease.
The remittance of only half month's rent for February, 2024, followed
by the petitioner's return of the subsequent amount, strengthens the
petitioner's stand that lease deed was never renewed and rather due
to lapse of original period, it stood terminated.
20. It was also contended that a renewal of lease and
extension of lease are legally distinct concepts. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, renewal requiring execution of a fresh
registered instrument was the mandatory requirement and absence
thereof cannot be ignored by assuming its automatic existence
merely by unilateral assertion by the Respondent-IOCL. In this
regard, learned Senior Counsel relied upon judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. & Others vs. Lalji
Tandon (dead) through LRs, (2004) 1 SCC 1 .
21. Learned Senior Counsel also sought to distinguish the
arbitration proceedings from the relief of eviction. It was submitted
(D.B. SAW/204/2026 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
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that assuming for the sake of argument that disputes relating to
contractual dues, damages, dealership charges and other monetary
claims are referable to arbitration, even then, the same cannot
confer upon IOCL an indefinite right to retain possession of the
petitioner's property after expiry of the lease. The arbitration clause
cannot be construed as a licence to continue unauthorised
occupation. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Company
represented by its Managing Partner vs. Territory Manager,
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited & Another (supra) ,
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the petroleum
corporation to vacate the premises and pay market rent till delivery
of possession.
22. Per contra, Ms. Suruchi Kasliwal, learned counsel
appearing for Respondent-IOCL vehemently opposed the writ petition
and reiterated that the petitioner itself had invoked the arbitration
clause by filing an application under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 in
the civil suit instituted by Respondent-IOCL. The application filed by
the petitioner was allowed by the Civil Court on 23.09.2024 and the
said order had attained finality. Therefore, the petitioner cannot
approbate and reprobate by relying upon the arbitration clause for
securing dismissal of the civil suit and subsequently contending that
the same clause does not govern the present dispute.
23. Learned counsel also submitted that the arbitration
proceedings are not merely contemplated, but have already been
initiated by IOCL through notice dated 13.05.2025, followed by an
application under Section 11(6) of the Act of 1996, registered as
Arbitration Application No.108/2025, which is also pending before
this Court. The dismissal of the application under Section 9 of the Act
(D.B. SAW/204/2026 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
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of 1996 does not extinguish IOCL's right to seek appropriate interim
protection under Section 17 of the Act of 1996 after constitution of
the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, the petitioner ought to pursue its
remedies before the arbitral tribunal instead of seeking adjudication
of contractual disputes through a writ petition.
24. It was further contended by learned counsel that the lease
agreement must be interpreted as a whole and not by isolating
Clause 1(j) thereof. According to IOCL, the contractual arrangement
conferred upon it a right to seek renewal for a further period of ten
years and such intention was unequivocally communicated through
letters dated 16.10.2023 and 12.01.2024, well before expiry of the
original lease. Thus, the petitioner cannot unilaterally terminate the
contractual relationship or insist upon delivery of possession without
adjudication of IOCL's claim for renewal.
25. Learned Counsel further submitted that the controversy
involves disputed questions relating to interpretation of contractual
stipulations, service of notices, renewal of lease, payment of rent,
dealership obligations and ownership of petroleum stock. Such issues
are essentially contractual and are appropriately triable by the
arbitral tribunal. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. & Others vs. Bridge &
Roof Company (India) Ltd., (1996) 6 SCC 22, Joshi
Technologies International Inc. vs. Union of India & Others,
(2015) 7 SCC 728, ABL International Ltd. & Another vs.
Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. & Others,
(2004) 3 SCC 553 and Brij Raj Oberoi vs. Secretary, Tourism
and Civil Aviation Department & Another, (2022) 17 SCC 81.
26. Furthermore, it was also contended by the learned
counsel that the petitioner has failed to establish any exceptional
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circumstance warranting exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the writ petition deserves
to be dismissed on the ground of availability of an efficacious and
mutually agreed alternative remedy.
27. This Court has considered the rival submissions advanced
by learned counsel for the parties, examined the pleadings and
material available on record and has also given thoughtful
consideration to the legal position governing the controversy.
28. At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the nature of the
controversy and the precise reliefs sought in the present writ
petition. Though the petitioner has raised various claims arising out
of the lease and dealership arrangements, the principal grievance is
that Respondent-IOCL continues to occupy the petitioner's land even
after expiry of the lease agreement dated 16.03.2004. The primary
relief sought is restoration of possession of the land to its lawful
owner. The other claims, relating to outstanding rent, dealership
charges, reimbursement of the value of unsold petroleum stock and
damages, are consequential or independent monetary claims arising
out of the contractual relationship between the parties.
29. The first and foremost objection raised by the
Respondent-IOCL is as to whether the existence of an arbitration
clause in the lease agreement, coupled with the petitioner's own
application under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 in civil suit filed by the
Respondent-IOCL, precludes this Court from entertaining the present
writ petition or not?
30. For the purpose of examining the aforesaid fundamental
question, it would be appropriate to refer the relevant clauses of the
lease agreement, which are as under:
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“1. THE LESSEE DO HEREBY CONVENANT WITH THE LESSOR
AS FOLLOWS:
a) xxxx
b) xxxx
j) PROVIDED ALWAYS AND IT IS AGREED AND DECLARED that
the expiration of the said term, the lease will be with the
corporations-desire-hereto-be-renewed-up-to 2034 (for which
separate Lease deed shall be signed by both parties) from the
expiration of the last mentioned term give to the Lessors one
calendar months previous notice of their intention nor to take
any renewed lease.”
“IV AND IT IS HEREBY AGREED AND DECLARED BY AND
BETWEEN THE PARTIES HERETO AS FOLLOWS:
a) xxxx
b) xxxx
c) xxxx
d) Any dispute or difference of any nature whatsoever
regarding any right liability act omission or account of any of
the parties hereto (save and except relating to valuation by the
values or by a Referee) arising out of or in relation to these
presents shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Director
(Marketing) of the Lessee and if the Director (Marketing) is
unable or unwilling to act as a sole arbitrator then the matter
will be referred to the sole arbitration of any other person
designated or nominated such Director (Marketing) in his place
and should willing to act as such arbitrator and the Lessors will
not be entitled to raise any objection to any such arbitration on
the ground that the arbitrator so appointed is an office office
the Lessee or that as such officer he had death with the
matters to which the disputes related or had expressed his
views thereon. The arbitrator to whom the matter is originally
referred being transferred or vacating his officer or being
unable to act for any person such Director (Marketing) as
aforesaid at the time of such transfer vacation of the office or
on his inability to act shall nominate or designate another
person to act as an arbitrator pursuant to this clause and such
other person shall be entitled to proceed with the reference
from the point at which is was left by his predecessor. It is also
a term of these presents that no person other then the Director
(Marketing) or the person or persons designated by such
Director (Marketing) of the Lessee as aforesaid, shall act as an
arbitrator and if for any reason that is not possible, the matter
is not be referred to arbitration at all. The award of the
arbitrator so appointed shall be final. Conclusive and binding on
both the parties and such arbitration shall be held subject to
and in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act,
1940 and any statutory modification or reenactment thereof.”
31. Since the objection raised by the Respondent-IOCL is
based upon Sections 5 and 8 of the Act of 1996, it would also be
relevant to refer the same, which are as under:
(D.B. SAW/204/2026 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
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“ 5. Extent of judicial intervention. —Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in force,
in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall
intervene except where so provided in this Part.
8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an
1
arbitration agreement. — [(1) A judicial authority, before
which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of
an arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration
agreement or any person claiming through or under him, so
applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement
on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any
judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any Court,
refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no
valid arbitration agreement exists.]

(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be
entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration
agreement or a duly certified copy thereof:
2
[Provided that where the original arbitration agreement or a
certified copy thereof is not available with the party applying
for reference to arbitration under sub-section (1), and the said
agreement or certified copy is retained by the other party to
that agreement, then, the party so applying shall file such
application along with a copy of the arbitration agreement and
a petition praying the Court to call upon the other party to
produce the original arbitration agreement or its duly certified
copy before that Court.]

(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under
sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial
authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and
an arbitral award made.”
32. Since expression ‘Court’ has been employed by the
legislature in aforesaid Sections 5 and 8, which has been defined
under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act of 1996 and is being reproduced as
under:
“ 2. Definitions. —(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise
requires,—
(a) xxxx
(b) xxxx
4
[(e) “Court” means—
(i) in the case of an arbitration other than international
commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise
of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to
decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the
arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit,
but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such
principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;
(ii) in the case of international commercial arbitration, the High
Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having
jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter
of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a
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suit, and in other cases, a High Court having jurisdiction to hear
appeals from decrees of courts subordinate to that High
Court;]”
33. There can be no quarrel with the settled proposition that
where parties have consciously incorporated an arbitration clause in
their agreement, disputes falling within its ambit are ordinarily
required to be resolved through the agreed mechanism. The High
Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, does not ordinarily undertake adjudication of
complicated contractual claims, particularly where the parties have
an efficacious alternative remedy available under the agreement
itself. The judgments rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in State
of U.P. & Others vs. Bridge & Roof Company (India) Ltd.
(supra) and Joshi Technologies International Inc. (supra)
undoubtedly recognise this principle.
34. However, the existence of an arbitration clause does not
ipso facto oust the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. It is also
pertinent to observe that Sections 5 and 8 of the Act of 1996 cannot
be construed so as to curtail or exclude the constitutional jurisdiction
of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Section 5 of the Act of 1996 expressly restricts judicial intervention
in matters governed by Part I of the Act of 1996, whereas Section 8
of the Act of 1996 obligates a judicial authority, before which an
action is brought in a matter forming the subject of an arbitration
agreement, to refer the parties to arbitration, subject to fulfilment of
the statutory requirements. The expression 'Court', as defined under
Section 2(1)(e) of the Act of 1996, is also relevant to the judicial
forum contemplated under the said enactment and does not include
the constitutional jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under
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Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The jurisdiction exercised by
a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India emanates
directly from the Constitution and cannot be equated with its
ordinary civil or statutory jurisdiction. Therefore, neither Section 5,
nor Section 8 of the Act of 1996 can be interpreted as imposing an
absolute embargo upon the exercise of constitutional writ
jurisdiction. The existence of an arbitration agreement may
constitute a relevant consideration for the writ court while deciding
whether to entertain a petition, but it cannot, by itself, operate as a
statutory bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. The exercise of
such jurisdiction would, of course, remain subject to the well-settled
principles governing judicial restraint in contractual matters and
availability of alternative remedies.
35. It is settled preposition of law that the availability of an
alternative remedy is a self-imposed restriction on the exercise of
writ jurisdiction and not an absolute bar to its invocation. Where the
action complained of involves arbitrary conduct by a State
instrumentality, infringement of legal rights or a situation warranting
an appropriate public law remedy, the jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India can be exercised notwithstanding the
existence of an alternative contractual remedy. In the case of
Harbanslal Sahnia & Another (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held as under:
“ 4. The appellants filed a writ petition laying challenge to the
order of termination. The petition has been dismissed by the
High Court on the ground that the relationship between the
parties is contractual and the dealership agreement contains an
arbitration clause and therefore the appropriate remedy
available to the appellants was to have recourse to arbitration
rather invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The
appellants sought for a review of the order of the High Court
which prayer has been refused. The appellants have filed these
appeals by special leave.
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7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy
by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the
appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants
was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that
the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an
alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of
compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the
alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ
jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ
petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii)
where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii)
where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction
or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v.
Registrar of Trade Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1] .) The present case
attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as
noted, the petitioners' dealership, which is their bread and
butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent
cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should
have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of
driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.”
36. Similarly in the case of Uttar Pradesh Power
Transmission Corporation Limited & Another (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the following principles:
“ 66. Even though there is an arbitration clause, the petitioner
herein has not opposed the writ petition on the ground of
existence of an arbitration clause. There is no whisper of any
arbitration agreement in the counter-affidavit filed by U PPTCL to
the writ petition in the High Court. In any case, the existence of
an arbitration clause does not debar the court from entertaining
a writ petition.
67. It is well settled that availability of an alternative remedy
does not prohibit the High Court from entertaining a writ
petition in an appropriate case. The High Court may entertain a
writ petition, notwithstanding the availability of an alternative
remedy, particularly : (i) where the writ petition seeks
enforcement of a fundamental right; (ii) where there is failure
of principles of natural justice or (iii) where the impugned
orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or (iv) the
vires of an Act is under challenge. Reference may be made to
Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1
and Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corpn. v. Gayatri Construction
Co., (2008) 8 SCC 172, cited on behalf of Respondent 1.
68. In Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2003) 2
SCC 107], this Court allowed the appeal from an order of the
High Court dismissing a writ petition and set aside the
impugned judgment of the High Court as also the impugned
order of the Indian Oil Corporation terminating the dealership
of the appellants notwithstanding the fact that the dealership
agreement contained an arbitration clause.
69. It is now well settled by a plethora of decisions of this
Court that relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
may be granted in a case arising out of contract. However, the
writ jurisdiction under Article 226, being discretionary, the High
Courts usually refrain from entertaining a writ petition which
involves adjudication of disputed questions of fact which may
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require analysis of evidence of witnesses. Monetary relief can
also be granted in a writ petition.”
37. While recognising the aforesaid principles in the case of
Unitech Limited & Others (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held as under:
“ 39. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in ABL International Ltd.
v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC
553] [ABL International] analysed a long line of precedent of
15
this Court to conclude that writs under Article 226 are
maintainable for asserting contractual rights against the State,
or its instrumentalities, as defined under Article 12 of the
Indian Constitution.
39.1. Speaking through N. Santosh Hegde, J. the Court held :
(ABL International case, SCC p. 572, para 27)
“27. … the following legal principles emerge as to the
maintainability of a writ petition:
(a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State
or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a contractual
obligation is maintainable.
(b) Merely because some disputed questions of fact arise for
consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to
entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule.
(c) A writ petition involving a consequential relief of
monetary claim is also maintainable.”
This exposition has been followed by this Court, and has been
adopted by the three-Judge Bench decisions of this Court in
State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706 and
Popatrao Vyankatrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 19
SCC 241.
39.2. The decision in ABL International, cautions that the
plenary power under Article 226 must be used with
circumspection when other remedies have been provided by the
contract. But as a statement of principle, the jurisdiction under
Article 226 is not excluded in contractual matters.
39.3. Article 23.1 of the development agreement in the present
case mandates the parties to resolve their disputes through an
arbitration. However, the presence of an arbitration clause
within a contract between a State instrumentality and a private
party has not acted as an absolute bar to availing remedies
18
under Article 226 .
39.4. If the State instrumentality violates its constitutional
mandate under Article 14 to act fairly and reasonably, relief
under the plenary powers of Article 226 of the Constitution
14
would lie. This principle was recognised in ABL International
14
(ABL International case SCC p. 572, para 28)
“28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the
maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the court should bear in mind the fact
that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226
of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by
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any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court
having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to
entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has
imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of
this power. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade
Marks [Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998)
8 SCC 1] .) And this plenary right of the High Court to issue
a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the
Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless
such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary
and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional
mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate
reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise
the said jurisdiction.”
(emphasis supplied)
39.5. Therefore, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article
226, the Court is entitled to enquire into whether the action of
the State or its instrumentalities is arbitrary or unfair and in
consequence, in violation of Article 14. The jurisdiction under
Article 226 is a valuable constitutional safeguard against an
arbitrary exercise of State power or a misuse of authority.
39.6. In determining as to whether the jurisdiction should be
exercised in a contractual dispute, the Court must, undoubtedly
eschew, disputed questions of fact which would depend upon
an evidentiary determination requiring a trial. But equally, it is
well settled that the jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be
ousted only on the basis that the dispute pertains to the
contractual arena. This is for the simple reason that the State
and its instrumentalities are not exempt from the duty to act
fairly merely because in their business dealings they have
entered into the realm of contract. Similarly, the presence of an
arbitration clause does (sic not) oust the jurisdiction under
Article 226 in all cases though, it still needs to be decided from
case to case as to whether recourse to a public law remedy can
justifiably be invoked.
39.7. The jurisdiction under Article 226 was rightly invoked by
the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in this case, when the foundational representation of
the contract has failed. T SIIC , a State instrumentality, has not
just reneged on its contractual obligation, but hoarded the
refund of the principal and interest on the consideration that
was paid by Unitech over a decade ago. It does not dispute the
entitlement of Unitech to the refund of its principal.”
38. While keeping the aforesaid principles in mind and
examining the facts of the present case in the context of the above
principles, this Court finds that the controversy relating to continued
occupation of immovable property after expiry of a lease stands on a
somewhat distinct footing from disputes concerning performance of
contractual obligations during the subsistence of the contract. An
arbitration clause may govern disputes concerning payment of rent,
contractual liabilities, damages, breach of obligations and other
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monetary consequences. However, the existence of such a clause
cannot, by itself, be treated as an independent source of authority
for a lessee to continue occupying the property indefinitely after
expiry of the lease, particularly when the lessor has expressly
declined renewal and demanded restoration of possession.
39. The above distinction is quite significant in the present
case because IOCL is admittedly a public sector corporation
amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The petitioner is not
merely seeking enforcement of a disputed contractual promise or
recovery of a monetary amount. It is seeking restoration of
possession of its property from a public sector undertaking which,
according to the petitioner, has ceased to have any subsisting legal
authority to retain the premises. The relief of delivery of possession,
in the peculiar circumstances of the present case, cannot be
relegated to arbitration merely by referring to the existence of an
arbitration clause.
40. This Court finds that the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in National Company represented by its
Managing Partner vs. Territory Manager, Bharat Petroleum
Corporation Limited & Another (supra) , is of considerable
importance in this regard. In the said case, facts are almost similar
where the petroleum corporation continued to occupy the leased
premises even after expiry of the lease. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
considered the objection regarding maintainability of writ
proceedings in view of available alternative remedies and ultimately
directed the corporation to vacate the premises and hand over
peaceful and vacant possession to the owner, besides directing
payment of market rent from the date of expiry of the lease till
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delivery of possession. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held as under:
“ 17. Perusal of the impugned judgment [National Co. v. Bharat
Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 38941] rendered
by the Division Bench would reveal that though an objection
with regard to maintainability of the writ petition on the ground
of alternate remedy was seriously raised by Respondent 1 BPCL,
the Division Bench was not impressed much with the said
submission. As a matter of fact, the Division Bench not only
referred to the judgment of this Court in ABL International Ltd.
v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Export Credit
Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553 but also
emboldened the following observations of this Court while
reproducing para 19 of the said judgment, which reads thus :
(ABL International case, SCC p. 568)
“19. Therefore, it is clear from the above enunciation of law
that merely because one of the parties to the litigation
raises a dispute in regard to the facts of the case, the Court
entertaining such petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not always bound to relegate the parties to
a suit.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. The Division Bench also referred to the judgment of this
Court in Dolly Das [Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dolly
Das, (1999) 4 SCC 450], wherein this Court held that in similar
facts, the appellants therein were justified in approaching the
writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and
directed HPCL to hand over vacant possession and pay the
monthly rent.
19. It is to be noted, as has been noted by the High Court, that
the Division Bench of the same High Court in its decision in
Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. R. Ravikrishnan, 2011 SCC
OnLine Mad 1093 had held that oil company was in legal
possession of the subject land, while the actual physical
possession was with the dealers. The Division Bench specifically
rejected the claim made by the oil company under Section 2(4)
(ii)(a) of the Tenants Act, in view of the judgment of this Court
in S.R. Radhakrishnan v. Neelamegam, (2003) 10 SCC 705.
20. Having noted that to get the benefit under Section 9 of the
Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1972, the petroleum
company should be in actual possession of the land and since
they were not in actual possession, they were not entitled to
protection under Section 9 of the Tenants Act, the Division
Bench in the impugned judgment stopped at granting relief in
favour of the appellant only on the ground that the view of the
16
Division Bench in R. Ravikrishnan was subject-matter of
appeal in a batch of special leave petitions/appeals pending
before this Court.
21. It could thus clearly be seen that the Division Bench itself
did not find much favour with the arguments advanced on
behalf of Respondent 1 BPCL with regard to non-exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the
ground of availability of alternate remedy and declined the relief
only on the ground that the view taken by the other Division
16
Bench in R. Ravikrishnan and other matters, was pending
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consideration before this Court in a batch of appeals and special
leave petitions.
30. In the result, the appeal is allowed in the following terms:
30.1. Respondent 1 BPCL is directed to vacate and hand over
peaceful and vacant possession of the said premises to the
appellant within a period of three months from today.
30.2. Respondent 1 BPCL is directed to pay arrears of market
rent to the appellant from 31-12-2009 till the date of handing
over of possession.”
41. The principle emerging from the aforesaid decision is that
a public sector oil corporation cannot claim an indefeasible right to
retain possession of private property after expiry of the lease merely
because its commercial operations are being conducted from the
premises. Where the lease has expired and the owner's entitlement
to restoration of possession is established, the writ court is not
powerless to grant appropriate relief merely because the relationship
between the parties originated in a contract.
42. The present case, therefore, requires consideration in the
light of the aforesaid principle. It is apparent that the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of National Company represented by
its Managing Partner vs. Territory Manager, Bharat Petroleum
Corporation Limited & Another (supra) also considered the
statutory protection available to tenants under the applicable local
legislation and the factual circumstances of that case. Nevertheless,
the judgment clearly recognises the maintainability of writ petition in
a dispute concerning continued occupation by a public sector oil
corporation after expiry of a lease, subject to the governing statutory
framework and the facts of the individual case. The aforesaid
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cannot be brushed aside
merely by describing the controversy as contractual.
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43. The petitioner has also highlighted the hazardous nature
of petroleum products lying at the premises. The material placed on
record indicates that the presence of such products required
appropriate safety measures and regulatory intervention. In the
present writ petition, Co-ordinate Bench of this Court by way of an
interim order dated 23.02.2026 directed for removal of the
petroleum products. Order dated 23.02.2026 passed by Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in the present writ petition was challenged by the
IOCL by way of filing intra court appeal before the Division bench,
registered as D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 204/2026. The aforesaid
appeal was allowed by the Division Bench vide order dated
20.04.2026 setting aside order dated 23.02.2026 passed by the Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court, while treating order dated 23.02.2026
as granting final relief at interim stage. Order dated 20.04.2026
passed by the Division Bench of this Court was further challenged by
the petitioner by way of filing SLP (C) No.26778/2026 before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated
17.09.2026 set aside order dated 20.04.2026 passed by the Division
Bench of this Court and relegated the parties to this Court for
adjudication of the pending writ petition on merits. While doing so,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressly kept all contentions open and
requested expeditious disposal. Consequently, the present writ
petition is required to be decided on its merits.
44. The contention of IOCL that the petitioner itself invoked
the arbitration clause under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 also
deserves consideration. Undoubtedly, the petitioner filed an
application under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 in the civil suit
instituted by IOCL and the same was allowed by the Civil Court on
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23.09.2024. The petitioner cannot now be permitted to take a wholly
contradictory stand that the arbitration clause is altogether non-
existent or that every dispute arising out of the lease agreement is
incapable of reference to arbitration.
45. However, the aforesaid conduct of the petitioner cannot be
construed as a waiver of its constitutional remedy under Article 226
of the Constitution of India or as an admission that IOCL possesses a
subsisting right to retain the petitioner's property. The order passed
under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 merely resulted in the parties
being relegated to the agreed arbitral mechanism in respect of
disputes falling within the scope of the arbitration agreement. It did
not adjudicate the merits of IOCL's claim for renewal, nor did it
create or revive a lease which had otherwise expired by efflux of
time. Equally, it did not amount to an adjudication that the petitioner
had consented to continued occupation of its land.
46. The principle of estoppel by conduct cannot be extended
to defeat a substantive legal right or to confer upon a party a right
which it does not otherwise possess under the law. In the facts and
circumstances of the case and in view of above discussion, the
petitioner can pursue arbitration for determination of monetary and
other contractual claims while simultaneously seeking appropriate
relief in writ petition against continued occupation of its property.
47. The pendency of Arbitration Application No.108/2025
seeking appointment of an arbitrator also does not warrant keeping
the present writ petition in abeyance. The question before this Court
is not relating to appointment of arbitrator for adjudication of
contractual disputes. The limited question is whether the pendency
of proceedings for appointment of arbitrator can justify continued
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retention of possession by Respondent-IOCL after expiry of the
lease. The above two different proceedings operate in distinct fields
and decision of the present writ petition would not render the arbitral
proceedings infructuous insofar as the remaining contractual claims
are concerned.
48. On respectful consideration of the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Brij Raj Oberoi (supra) , relied upon
by learned Counsel for Respondent-IOCL, does not advance its case
to the extent claimed. The said judgment does not lay down that an
arbitration clause invariably bars the constitutional Court from
examining a claim for restoration of possession against a public
sector corporation, irrespective of the nature of the relief sought and
the circumstances in which possession is retained.
49. Similarly, in the case of Vidya Drolia & Others vs.
Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1 , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court lucidly explained the principles governing arbitrability
of disputes. The judgment recognises that landlord-tenant disputes
governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, are ordinarily
arbitrable, whereas disputes governed by special rent legislation
conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon a designated forum are not
arbitrable. Thus, the petitioner's contention that every dispute
concerning a lease is inherently non-arbitrable cannot be accepted.
However, the question of arbitrability of a contractual claim and the
question whether a writ court can grant an appropriate constitutional
remedy against a public sector corporation are conceptually distinct.
The former concerns the forum competent to adjudicate contractual
disputes, whereas the latter concerns the availability and exercise of
constitutional jurisdiction in the facts of a particular case.
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50. Consequently, this Court is not inclined to hold that the
entire lease dispute is outside the scope of arbitration. The
arbitration clause would continue to govern disputes relating to
contractual breaches, interpretation of contractual obligations,
outstanding rent, dealership charges, damages, reimbursement of
petroleum stock and other monetary liabilities fall within its scope.
Those matters can appropriately be examined by the arbitral tribunal
in accordance with law. However, the availability of arbitration for
those purposes cannot, by itself, furnish IOCL with an indefeasible
right to continue occupying the petitioner's land when the material
on record establishes that the original lease has expired.
51. Having dealt with the preliminary objection, the next
question for consideration of this Court is as to whether the lease
agreement dated 16.03.2004 stood renewed beyond 15.02.2024 or
whether Respondent-IOCL continued in occupation without a
subsisting lease.
52. There is no dispute regarding execution of the lease
agreement dated 16.03.2004 for a period of 19 years and 11
months. Consequently, the original lease came to an end on
15.02.2024 by efflux of time, unless a valid renewal thereof had
taken place in accordance with the contractual stipulations and
applicable law.
53. This Court finds that Clause 1(j) of the above lease
agreement is of most considerable significance. It is noticeable that
the entire lease agreement is a document typed on computer,
printout of which was signed by both the parties. This Court also
noticed that except the above Clause 1 (j), at no other place in the
entire lease agreement, cuttings, interpolations or insertions are
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made by the parties. The aforesaid clause 1(j) contemplates renewal
of the lease up to the year 2034 at the desire of the Corporation,
however, after writing 2034, by ink-pen it has been consciously
inserted in the said clause that “for which separate lease deed shall
be signed by both parties” . It is also an admitted position that in the
aforesaid clause, the expression 'automatic' was struck off from the
relevant clause with the consent of the parties. The cuttings and
insertions are duly attested by the respective parties by putting their
signatures at the relevant places of corrections.
54. Thus, in view of above, the striking off of the expression
'automatic' and insertion of the phrase “for which separate lease
deed shall be signed by both parties” cannot be treated as an
insignificant or inconsequential alteration. It indicates that the
parties consciously did not intend renewal to operate automatically
upon expiry of the original lease. The requirement of execution of a
separate lease deed by both parties further strengthens the position
that continuation of the lease beyond its original tenure was
contemplated through a legally recognised process of execution of
fresh lease deed and not merely by unilateral assertion of either
party.
55. It is settled law that there exists a distinction between
extension of a lease and renewal thereof. An extension may,
depending upon the terms of the instrument, continue the existing
lease, whereas renewal ordinarily contemplates the creation of a
fresh lease in accordance with the agreed terms. In State of U.P. &
Others vs. Lalji Tandon (dead) through LRs (supra) , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the distinction between extension
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and renewal and emphasised that the effect of a renewal clause must
be determined from the language employed in the instrument.
“ 13. In India, a lease may be in perpetuity. Neither the
Transfer of Property Act nor the general law abhors a lease in
perpetuity. (Mulla on the Transfer of Property Act, 9th Edn.,
1999, p. 1011.) Where a covenant for renewal exists, its
exercise is, of course, a unilateral act of the lessee, and the
consent of the lessor is unnecessary. (Baker v. Merckel [(1960)
1 All ER 668 : (1960) 1 QB 657 : (1960) 2 WLR 492 (CA)] ,
also Mulla, ibid., p. 1204.) Where the principal lease executed
between the parties containing a covenant for renewal, is
renewed in accordance with the said covenant, whether the
renewed lease shall also contain similar clause for renewal
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, regard
being had to the intention of the parties as displayed in the
original covenant for renewal and the surrounding
circumstances. There is a difference between an extension of
lease in accordance with the covenant in that regard contained
in the principal lease and renewal of lease, again in accordance
with the covenant for renewal contained in the original lease. In
the case of extension it is not necessary to have a fresh deed of
lease executed, as the extension of lease for the term agreed
upon shall be a necessary consequence of the clause for
extension. However, option for renewal consistently with the
covenant for renewal has to be exercised consistently with the
terms thereof and, if exercised, a fresh deed of lease shall have
to be executed between the parties. Failing the execution of a
fresh deed of lease, another lease for a fixed term shall not
come into existence though the principal lease in spite of the
expiry of the term thereof may continue by holding over for
year by year or month by month, as the case may be.”
56. Thus, in view of above, where the parties have
themselves stipulated execution of a separate lease deed for
renewal, continuation of possession or unilateral correspondence
cannot, without compliance with the applicable legal requirements,
be treated as conclusive proof of creation of a renewed lease.
57. In the present case, Respondent-IOCL has relied upon
communications dated 16.10.2023 and 12.01.2024 to contend that it
had exercised its alleged right of renewal before expiry of the original
lease. However, the petitioner has categorically disputed receipt of
the said communications. Significantly, the Commercial Court, while
deciding the application under Section 9 of the Act of 1996 on
07.11.2025, specifically noticed that IOCL had not placed on record
material establishing that the alleged notices seeking renewal had
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been received by the petitioner. In the record of present writ petition
also, Respondent-IOCL has not placed any material to substantiate
its claim. Even otherwise, merely showing unilateral intention by one
of the party would not substitute the explicit contractual requirement
of execution of a fresh lease deed for renewal, more particularly,
when the petitioner had expressly communicated its refusal to
continue the arrangement and demanded restoration of possession.
58. It has also not been disputed that the petitioner issued
communications dated 01.03.2024, 02.03.2024 and 05.03.2024,
specifically informing Respondent-IOCL that the lease had expired
and the petroleum outlet had been closed. The petitioner also called
upon IOCL to remove its fixtures, equipment and remaining
petroleum stock. These communications were followed by another
demand dated 14.05.2024. There is no material on record
demonstrating that IOCL responded to these communications by
asserting a duly perfected renewal supported by a separate
registered lease deed. The remittance of half month's rent by
Respondent-IOCL for February, 2024 and the subsequent remittance
of Rs. 25,899.52 on 13.03.2024, which was returned by the
petitioner, are also relevant circumstances. Though payment or
acceptance of rent, by itself, may not conclusively determine the
question of renewal, the conduct of the parties is required to be
considered cumulatively. The petitioner's prompt return of the
amount clearly demonstrates that it did not consent to continuation
of the lease or accept the remittance as consideration for any
renewed tenancy.
59. This Court is conscious that the lease agreement must be
read as a whole and that Clause 1(j) cannot be interpreted in
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isolation. There can be no disagreement with this settled principle.
However, even reading the instrument as a whole would also not
alter the position that requiring execution of a separate lease deed
was must and there was no clause for automatic renewal in the lease
agreement.
60. This Court also finds considerable force in the submission
that the continued occupation of the premises by IOCL, despite
expiry of the lease and repeated demands for restoration of
possession, cannot be justified. A public sector corporation is
expected to act fairly, reasonably and in accordance with law. It
cannot insist upon retention of private property indefinitely without
establishing a subsisting legal entitlement to do so.
61. At the same time, this Court would refrain from recording
any final determination concerning the exact amount of rent payable
after 15.02.2024, the market rate of occupation charges,
outstanding dealership dues, the value and ownership of unsold
petroleum stock or the petitioner's claim for damages and interest.
These claims involve contractual and accounting questions which are
appropriately left open for adjudication by the arbitral tribunal,
subject to the terms and scope of the arbitration agreement.
62. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the arbitration clause cannot be treated as a
blanket protection for Respondent-IOCL to continue occupying the
petitioner's land after expiry of the lease. The contractual disputes
between the parties, including claims for outstanding dues,
damages, reimbursement of petroleum stock and other monetary
liabilities, may be adjudicated through arbitration. However, the relief
of restoration of possession stands on a distinct footing in the
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peculiar facts of the present case, particularly when the original lease
has expired, the petitioner has repeatedly demanded possession and
IOCL has failed to establish a duly perfected renewal of the lease.
63. Accordingly, the preliminary objections regarding
maintainability of the writ petition alongwith application under
Section 8 of the Act of 1996 (I.A. no. 2/2025) filed by Respondent in
the present writ petition, are rejected to the extent of the relief
seeking restoration of possession and removal of IOCL's installations
from the petitioner's land. This conclusion shall not be construed as a
declaration that every dispute connected with, ancillary to or arising
out of renewal or termination of a lease is non-arbitrable. The
arbitration agreement shall remain operative in respect of disputes
falling within its scope and the parties shall be at liberty to pursue
their respective contractual and monetary claims before the arbitral
tribunal in accordance with law.
64. Consequently, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is
allowed in the following terms:
(i) The respondent-Indian Oil Corporation Limited is directed to
vacate the land in question, situated at Ajmer Road, Madanganj
Kishangarh, District Ajmer and hand over peaceful and vacant
possession thereof to the petitioner within a period of 60 days from
the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment.
(ii) Respondent-Indian Oil Corporation Limited shall, within the
aforesaid period, remove all its fixtures, equipment, installations and
other structures from the premises and restore the land to the
petitioner, subject to compliance with applicable statutory
requirements and safety regulations. The removal and handling of
such products shall be undertaken in coordination with the Petroleum
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and Explosives Safety Organisation (PESO) and other competent
authorities, strictly in accordance with the applicable safety norms.
(iii) The parties shall be entitled to pursue their respective claims for
outstanding lease rent, dealership charges, market rent/occupation
charges for the period of continued occupation after expiry of the
lease, damages, interest and reimbursement of the value of unsold
petroleum stock before the arbitral tribunal, subject to its
constitution, to be decided in Arbitration Application No. 108/2025 in
accordance with the arbitration agreement and law. The arbitral
tribunal, if so constituted, shall independently examine the aforesaid
claims without being influenced by any observation made in this
judgment concerning the petitioner's entitlement to restoration of
possession.
65. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI
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