Mansi Agrawal vs Anurag Bagadia

1 MCC-870-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
th
ON THE 17 OF JULY, 2026
MISC. CIVIL CASE No. 870 of 2026
MANSI AGRAWAL
Versus
ANURAG BAGADIA
Appearance:
Shri Kapil Duggal - Advocate for the applicant.
Shri Ashok Lalwani - Senior Advocate with Shri Aakash Lalwani -
Advocate for the respondent.
ORDER
This application under Section 24 CPC has been filed for transfer of
matrimonial case RCA/HM/228/2025 before Principal Judge, Family Court,
Katni to the Family Court, Gwalior.
2. It is the case of applicant that the applicant was married to the
respondent in the year 2024 and thereafter certain disputes arose between the
parties in the year 2025 and as a result of the said disputes as many as 5
cases are pending before different Courts between the parties.
3. The applicant is apprehending threat to life, if she is made to attend
the Court at Katni. Katni is about 400 km from Gwalior where the applicant
is at present residing along with her parents as there are matrimonial disputes
between the applicant and the respondent. Therefore, making the applicant
travel to Katni on each date would not be conducive to fair trial and also it
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RAJESH KUMAR
JYOTISHI
Signing time: 7/22/2026
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will cause unnecessary inconvenience and hardship to the applicant. It is

argued that already 3 cases are pending at Gwalior before different Courts
and therefore, the divorce petition filed by the husband be also transferred to
the Family Court at Gwalior.
4 . Per contra, the application is vehemently opposed by learned
counsel for the respondent on the grounds that the applicant and respondent
both were divorcees and the applicant at the time of marriage was employed
in a private company as mentioned in her biodata. She is an educated person
of matured age and can very well travel from Gwalior to Katni. It is argued
that the case under Section 13 HMA was filed on 10.10.2025 and as a
counterblast to that the case under Section 9 HMA was filed by the applicant
at Gwalior on 23.12.2025 after getting information of filing of the divorce
petition at Katni. It is argued that the cases at Gwalior have been filed after
getting information of filing of divorce petition at Katni. It is further argued
that in the case under Domestic Violence Act and in the case under Section 9
HMA, the applicant has expressed intention to reside along with the
respondent husband in the joint matrimonial home at Katni and therefore, it
cannot be argued by the applicant that she is apprehending safety to her life
and limb in case she is made to appear at Katni.
5. It is, therefore, argued that the transfer petition be rejected. It is
further contended that in case of any inconvenience the applicant can seek
appearance through video conferencing to the extent feasible.
6. This Court has heard learned counsel for the rival parties at length
and perused the record.
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JYOTISHI
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7. At present, there are 5 cases pending between the parties before

different Courts. The two cases that are pending at Katni are divorce petition
under Section 13 HMA pending before Family Court and the proceedings in
pursuance to FIR registered for demand of dowry, which is also pending
before the JMFC at Katni.
8. On the other hand, the three cases that are pending at Gwalior are
application under Section 9 HMA and application for maintenance under
Section 125 CrPC/144 BNSS, both of which are pending before Family
Court, Gwalior and the complaint under Domestic Violence Act, which is
pending before the JMFC at Gwalior.
9. Counsel for the applicant had argued that as held by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Santhini v. Vijaya Venketesh, (2018) 1 SCC 1 in
matrimony and family matters video conferencing is not appropriate and
more so at the time of conciliation and mediation video conferencing is
utterly ineffective. Even otherwise, the trial by video conferencing is not
effective in matrimonial matters and the technical problems in conducting
trial by video conferencing in matrimonial matters have been highlighted by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case.
10. It is seen that the High Court has, in view of the upgraded
infrastructure now available, framed statutory Rules known as District Courts
of Madhya Pradesh Video Conferencing and Audiovisual Electronic Linkage
Rules, 2020, which also apply to Family Courts in Madhya Pradesh. The said
Rules have been framed after there has been general awareness about
meetings and appearances to be effective through video conferencing, and
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JYOTISHI
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huge upgrade of the said technology, which was resulted by awareness

disseminated in the society due to extraordinary situation created globally on
account of COVID-19 pandemic. The angle from which video conferencing
has been viewed by the public has undergone sea change when pre-COVID
period is compared to post-COVID period.
11. In the case of Santhini (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held in
para 58 as under:-
"58. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we sum up our conclusion
as follows:
58.1. In view of the scheme of the 1984 Act and in particular
Section 11, the hearing of matrimonial disputes may have to be
conducted in camera.
58.2. After the settlement fails and when a joint application is filed
or both the parties file their respective consent memorandum for
hearing of the case through videoconferencing before the Family
Court concerned, it may exercise the discretion to allow the said
prayer.
58.3. After the settlement fails, if the Family Court feels it
appropriate having regard to the facts and circumstances of the
case that videoconferencing will subserve the cause of justice, it
may so direct.
58.4. In a transfer petition, videoconferencing cannot be directed.
58.5. Our directions shall apply prospectively.
58.6. The decision in Krishna Veni Nagam [Krishna Veni
Nagam v. Harish Nagam, (2017) 4 SCC 150 : (2017) 2 SCC (Civ)
394] is overruled to the aforesaid extent.
On the contrary, the minority view contained in para 61 is as under:-
61.1. The Family Courts Act, 1984 has been enacted at a point in
time when modern technology (at least as we know it today)
which enables persons separated by spatial distances to
communicate with each other face to face was not the order of the
day or, in any case, was not as fully developed. That is no reason
for any court, especially for this Court which sets precedent for the
nation, to exclude the application of technology to facilitate the
judicial process.
61.2. Appropriate deployment of technology facilitates access to
justice. Litigation under the Family Courts Act, 1984 is not an
exception to this principle. This Court must be averse to judicially
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JYOTISHI
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laying down a restraint on such use of technology which facilitates
access to justice to persons in conflict, including those involved in
conflicts within the family. Modern technology is above all a
facilitator, enabler and leveller.
61.3. Videoconferencing is a technology which allows users in
different locations to hold face to face meetings.
Videoconferencing is being used extensively the world over (India
being no exception) in online teaching, administration, meetings,
negotiation, mediation and telemedicine among a myriad other
uses. Videoconferencing reduces cost, time, carbon footprint and
the like.
61.4. An in-camera trial is contemplated under Section 11 in two
situations : the first where the Family Court so desires; and the
second if either of the parties so desires. There is a fallacy in the
hypothesis that an in-camera trial is inconsistent with the usage of
videoconferencing techniques. A trial in camera postulates the
exclusion of the public from the courtroom and allows for
restraints on public reporting. Videoconferencing does not have to
be recorded nor is it accessible to the press or the public. The
proper adoption of videoconferencing does not negate the
postulates of an in-camera trial even if such a trial is required by
the court or by one of the parties under Section 11.
61.5. The Family Courts Act, 1984 envisages an active role for the
Family Court to foster settlements. Under the provisions of
Section 9, the Family Court has to endeavour to “assist and
persuade” parties to arrive at a settlement. Section 9 clearly
recognises a discretion in the Family Court to determine how to
structure the process. It does so by adopting the words “where it is
possible to do so consistent with the nature and circumstances of
the case”. Moreover, the High Courts can frame rules under
Section 9(1) and the Family Court may, subject to those rules,
“follow such procedure as it deems fit”. In the process of
settlement, Section 10(3) enables the Family Court to lay down its
own procedure. The Family Court is entitled to take the benefit of
counsellors, medical experts and persons professionally engaged
in promoting the welfare of the family.
61.6. The above provisions—far from excluding the use of
videoconferencing—are sufficiently enabling to allow the Family
Court to utilise technological advances to facilitate the purpose of
achieving justice in resolving family conflicts. There may arise a
variety of situations where in today's age and time parties are
unable to come face to face for counselling or can do so only at
such expense, delay or hardship which will defeat justice. One or
both spouses may face genuine difficulties arising from the

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6 MCC-870-2026
compulsions of employment, family circumstances (including the
needs of young children), disability and social or economic
handicaps in accessing a court situated in a location distant from
where either or both parties reside or work. It would be
inappropriate to deprive the Family Court which is vested with
such wide powers and procedural flexibility to adopt
videoconferencing as a facilitative tool, where it is convenient and
readily available. Whether videoconferencing should be allowed
must be determined on a case-to-case analysis to best effectuate
the concern of providing just solutions. Far from such a procedure
being excluded by the law, it will subserve the purpose of the law.
61.7. Conceivably there may be situations where parties (or one of
the spouses) do not want to be in the same room as the other. This
is especially true when there are serious allegations of marital
abuse. Videoconferencing allows things to be resolved from the
safety of a place which is not accessible to the other spouse
against whom there is a serious allegation of misbehaviour of a
psychiatric nature or in a case of substance
abuse.61.8. Videoconferencing is gender neutral. In fact it ensures
that one of the spouses cannot procrastinate and delay the
conclusion of the trial. Delay, it must be remembered, generally
defeats the cause of a party which is not the dominant partner in a
relationship. Asymmetries of power have a profound consequence
in marital ties. Imposing an unwavering requirement of personal
and physical presence (and exclusion of facilitative technological
tools such as videoconferencing) will result in a denial of justice.
61.9. The High Courts have allowed for videoconferencing in
resolving family conflicts. A body of precedent has grown around
the subject in the Indian context. The Judges of the High Court
should have a keen sense of awareness of prevailing social reality
in their States and of the federal structure. Videoconferencing has
been adopted internationally in resolving conflicts within the
family. There is a robust body of authoritative opinion on the
subject which supports videoconferencing, of course with
adequate safeguards. Whether videoconferencing should be
allowed in a particular family dispute before the Family Court, the
stage at which it should be allowed and the safeguards which
should be followed should best be left to the High Courts while
framing rules on the subject. Subject to such rules, the use of
videoconferencing must be left to the careful exercise of discretion
of the Family Court in each case.
61.10. The proposition that videoconferencing can be permitted
only after the conclusion of settlement proceedings (resultantly
excluding it in the settlement process), and thereafter only when

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7 MCC-870-2026
both parties agree to it does not accord either with the purpose or
the provisions of the Family Courts Act, 1984. Exclusion of
videoconferencing in the settlement process is not mandated either
expressly or by necessary implication by the legislation. On the
contrary, the legislation has enabling provisions which are
sufficiently broad to allow videoconferencing. Confining it to the
stage after the settlement process and in a situation where both
parties have agreed will seriously impede access to justice. It will
render the Family Court helpless to deal with human situations
which merit flexible solutions. Worse still, it will enable one
spouse to cause interminable delays thereby defeating the purpose
for which a specialised court has been set up."

12. Thereafter, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has framed the
statutory Rules as noted above and though it cannot be denied that the
mediation cannot effectively take place by video conferencing, but the
manner in which video conferencing is taking place at present is altogether
different from the manner in which video conferencing was taking place
prior to 2018 when the aforesaid judgement was passed by the Hon'ble Apex
Court. Now, atleast in Madhya Pradesh, each Court room in District Courts,
from Magistrate to Principal District Judge, are having separate video-
conferencing systems in the Court itself, that are so portable that can be
carried even to chambers of the judicial officer concerned.
13. Apart from that, almost all the major Court enters have remote-
point video conferencing facilities, where a person can reach and attend a
Court situated at distance. The litigant or witness sitting at distance does not
attend the proceedings from his home, where there is chance of prompting
and tutoring, but from these remote points. Even the jail inmates are
attending session trials through video conferencing. The extensive
infrastructure has been established and most of the concerns expressed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Santhini (supra) like the
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camera trials not being possible or confidentiality to be violated etc. have

been addressed by setting up of detailed infrastructure in Court centres, and
in each Court throughout the State. The technological advancement that has
taken place within the last 8 to 9 years is extensive and has totally changed
the manner in which video conferencing now takes place from the manner it
used to take place 8 to 9 years ago.
14. Now, even camera trials of sessions cases under POCSO Act are
taking place by video conferencing, and that is being ensured by setting up
the system and web camera in the chamber of concerned Judicial Officer.
15. Therefore, looking to the vast technological advancements, trials
of all cases by video conferencing is possible, though there may be just
exceptions where a judge may decide that looking to the demeanour of the
witness, he needs to be called physically before the Court. That is case
specific, but generally, in view of now available infrastructure, trial of cases
before Family Courts is effectively possible through video conferencing,
except mediation/conciliation.
16. So far as cases pending before different Courts are concerned, the
learned counsel for the applicant had vehemently argued that most
importantly case under Section 9 HMA is pending at Family Court Gwalior,
which should be tried along with the divorce petition pending at Katni.
17. Upon considering the aforesaid assertion, it is seen that the divorce
petition was filed on 10.10.2025, whereas Section 9 application was filed at
Gwalior on 23.12.2025, which was after getting notice of divorce petition.
Therefore, the applicant has voluntarily filed a case at Gwalior even after
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getting knowledge of pendency of divorce petition at Katni.

18. It is also important to note here that the applicant had earlier moved
an application for transfer of trial of dowry harassment case pending before
the JMFC at Katni to Gwalior and the said petition M.Cr.C. No.12764 of
2026 was withdrawn by the petitioner with liberty to appear through video
conferencing from Gwalior before the trial Court, Katni and therefore, the
trial of case for dowry harassment is proceeding at Katni itself.
19. The applicant's apprehension of threat to life and limb cannot be
said to be justified because the applicant has expressed her intention to
cohabit with the respondent at Katni in the application under Domestic
Violence Act as well as in Section 9 HMA. Even as per Section 21-A of
Hindu Marriage Act, the case at Family Court, Katni was instituted prior to
the case at Family Court Gwalior, which is under Section 9 of Hindu
Marriage Act.
20. Earlier the trend was to consider the inconvenience of wife only,
but now the aforesaid trend has undergone some changed in the recent years
and the cases for transfer have to be looked into with a more gender neutral
perspective (See- Anindita Das vs. Srijit Das (2006) 9 SCC 197, Preeti
Sharma vs. Manjit Sharma (2005) 11 SCC 535, Sunaina Vishwakarma Vs.
Vijay Kumar Vishwakarma, 2023 SCC Online MP 1148 (para 12), etc.)
21. In view of aforesaid, this Court does not find any good reason to
transfer the matrimonial case RCA/HM/228/2025 pending before Family
Court, Katni to the Family Court, Gwalior. The application is rejected. The
applicant would be at liberty to seek transfer of Section 9 application
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pending at Family Court, Gwalior to Family Court, Katni in view of Section

21-A of Hindu Marriage Act.
22. It is further noted that the applicant shall be at liberty to appear at
Family Court, Katni to the extent possible and feasible as per available
infrastructure, and to the extent deemed appropriate by the concerned Judge
at Family Court, Katni through video conferencing, which would be in
accordance with the Rules of 2020 framed by the High Court.
23. With the aforesaid observations, the application is dismissed.
(VIVEK JAIN)
JUDGE
rj

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Signed by: RAJESH KUMAR
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