STATE OF HP vs YUDHVIR SINGH

25. Learned State counsel has rightly relied on

to contend that even in cases where a

major portion of the evidence is found deficient, if the

residue is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused, a

conviction can be based on it. This Court in

Hari Chand v.

State of Delhi, (1996) 9 SCC 112

held that:

2026:HHC:13586
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
High Court of H.P.
Cr. Appeal No. 369 of 2014
Reserved on: 12.03.2026
Date of Decision: 27.4.2026.
State of H.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Yudhvir Singh ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge.
1
Whether approved for reporting? Yes
For the Appellant : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General.
For the respondent : Mr Naresh Kaul, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
dated 03.03.2014 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Indora, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court). (Parties
shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were
arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned
Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal
High Court of H.P.
Code (IPC) and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It
was asserted that the informant Devinder Singh (PW1) was
going to his home on 09.12.2008 on his motorcycle bearing
registration No. PB-35K-4329. He reached near Sunny Slipper
Factory at 5:45 PM, when a Mahindra Bolero bearing
registration No. HP-38A-8856 came from the opposite side at
high speed and hit the motorcycle. The informant fell off the
motorcycle and sustained injuries. The accused was driving the
Mahindra Bolero at the time of the accident, and the accident
occurred due to his negligence. The accused ran away from the
spot after the accident. The informant was taken to the hospital.
An intimation was given to the police. An entry (Ext.PW8/B) was
recorded in the Police Station. ASI Karan Jeet Singh, HC Chain
Singh (PW8), Constable Joginder Singh and Constable Munish
Kumar had already left for traffic checking vide entry
(Ext.PW8/A). They were asked to verify the correctness of the
information. HC Chain Singh (PW8) went to the hospital for
verification. He filed an application (Ext.PW8/C) for conducting
the medical examination of the injured and certifying the fitness
of the injured to make the statement. The Medical Officer
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certified that the injured was fit to make the statement. HC
High Court of H.P.
Chain Singh (PW8) recorded the statement of Devinder Singh
(PW1) and sent it to the police station, where FIR (Ext.PW6/A)
was registered. HC Chain Singh (PW8) investigated the matter.
He obtained the treatment summary (Ext.P1) and other
documents (Ext.P2 to Ext.P6). He visited the spot and prepared
the site plan (Ext.PW8/D). He seized the vehicle bearing
registration No. HP -38A-8856 and PB-35K-4329 vide memos
(Ext.PW3/B and Ext. PW3/A). Sandeep Sharma (PW4) took the
photographs (Ext.PW4/A1 to Ext.PW4/A3) whose negatives are
Ext.PW4/A4 to Ext.PW4/A6. Narinder Sood (PW2) examined the
vehicles and found that there was no mechanical defect in them
that could have led to the accident. He issued the reports
(Ext.PW2/A and Ext.PW2/B). HC Chain Singh (PW8) recorded the
statements of witnesses as per their version. After the
completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and
presented before the learned Trial Court.
3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of
accusation was put to him for the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and
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Section 184 of the MV Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and
High Court of H.P.
claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove
its case. Devinder Singh (PW1) is the injured/informant.
Narinder Sood (PW2) examined the vehicles. Pawan Kumar
(PW3) is an eyewitness. Sandeep Sharma (PW4) and Vinay
Kumar (PW5) witnessed various recoveries. Chatter Singh (PW6)
signed the FIR. Ajay Singh (PW7) proved that the accused was
the driver of the vehicle. Chain Singh (PW8) investigated the
matter. Ashok Kumar (PW9) proved the entries in the daily
diary.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section
313 Cr.P.C., admitted that he was employed as a driver by Ajay
Kumar in the vehicle bearing registration number HP-38A-
8856. He claimed that the accident occurred due to the
negligence of the informant because he was not looking forward
while riding his motorcycle. He did not produce any evidence in
his defence.
6. The learned Trial Court held that the informant’s
statement was contradictory and could not be relied upon. The
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informant was interested in the success of his case, and he
High Court of H.P.
wanted to save himself from criminal liability. Statement of
Pawan Kumar (PW3) showed that the accident occurred due to
the informant’s negligence because he was looking towards the
factory, and hit the Mahindra Bolero. Ram Swaroop was present
on the spot but was not examined by the prosecution without
any reason. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the
accused of the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and Section 184 of the MV
Act.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal
asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the
evidence properly. The learned Trial Court discarded the
statements of prosecution witnesses without any cogent
reasons. The informant and Pawan Kumar (PW3) supported the
prosecution's case. The minor contradictions in the statements
of the witnesses were not sufficient to discard them. Hence, it
was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment
passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
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8. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy
High Court of H.P.
Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Naresh Kaul,
learned counsel for the respondent/accused.
9. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred
in acquitting the accused. It was duly proved by the statements
of the prosecution witnesses, the site plan, and the photographs
that the accused was driving the vehicle on the wrong side of the
road, which was the proximate cause of the accident. Learned
Trial Court relied upon minor contradictions in the statement of
the informant and Pawan Kumar, which were bound to come
with the passage of time and could not have been used for
discarding the prosecution's case. Hence, he prayed that the
present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court be set aside.
10. Mr Naresh Kaul, learned counsel for the
respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had
taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. Pawan
Kumar (PW3) admitted in his cross-examination that the
informant was looking towards the factory, which led to the
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accident. This admission shows the informant’s negligence, and
High Court of H.P.
the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the prosecution had
failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, he
prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment
of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of
acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of
evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no
reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on
the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed
on page 438:
“24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal
position that the interference with the finding of
acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be
warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of
acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the
same is based on a misreading/omission to consider
material evidence on record; and that no two
reasonable views are possible and only the view
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consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible
from the evidence available on record.
High Court of H.P.
13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v.
Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743 , wherein it was
observed:
21. We may note that the present appeal is one
against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of
judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against
acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse
on the face of the record and the only possible view
based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of
the accused, only in such an event, should the
appellate Court interfere with a judgment of
acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one
consistent with the acquittal and the other holding
the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse
to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference
in this regard may be made to the judgments of this
Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda
Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC
149 ; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC
581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC
471 .
14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
15. The informant Devinder Singh (PW1) stated that he
was going to his home on his motorcycle bearing registration
No. PB-35K-4329 on 09.12.2008. He reached the Sunny Slipper
factory at about 5:45 PM, when a vehicle bearing registration
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No. HP-38A-8856 came from the opposite side at high speed
High Court of H.P.
and hit the motorcycle on the wrong side. The motorcycle fell.
The driver of the vehicle fled from the spot. He stated in his
cross-examination that he had left the office at about 5 PM. The
place of accident was located at a distance of 8-10 kms from the
place of accident. There was a slight curve before the place of the
accident. Ram Swaroop was working in the Sunny factory. He
denied that he was looking towards the gate of the factory and
drove towards the wrong side of the road. He denied that the
accused tried to save him, which led to the accident.
16. The cross-examination of this witness shows that
the accused has not disputed the accident. It was suggested to
him that he had driven the motorcycle towards the wrong side of
the road, and he denied the suggestion. A denied suggestion
does not amount to any proof and cannot be used for discarding
the prosecution's case. The site plan (Ext.PW8/D) shows the
place of the accident. The width of the road is shown to be eight
feet. The motorcycle was going from Indora towards Mohtli and
was on the left side of the road. The pickup was coming from
Mohtli towards Indora and is shown to be towards its right side.
The photographs (Ext.PW4/A-1 to Ext.PW4/A-3) also show that
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the motorcycle is towards the left side of the road, whereas
High Court of H.P.
Mahindra Bolero is towards the right side of the road. Hence, the
photographs and the site plan corroborate the informant’s
version that the accident had occurred towards the right side of
the road for the Mahindra Bolero.
17. Pawan Kumar (PW3) stated that he was posted in the
Sunny Slipper factory and was discharging his duty on
09.12.2008. A pickup vehicle came from Mohtli and hit a
motorcycle coming from Indora at about 5:40- 5:45 PM. The
accident occurred due to the high speed of the driver of the
pickup and driving the pickup towards the wrong side of the
road. He stated in his cross-examination that there was a slight
curve at the place of the accident. He admitted that Ram
Swaroop used to ride the motorcycle with the informant. The
motorcyclist was looking towards the factory and hit the jeep.
This led to the accident, and there was no negligence on the part
of the driver of the pickup.
18. Learned Trial Court was swayed by the admission
made by this witness in the cross-examination that there was
no negligence on the part of the driver of the pickup. This
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statement was inadmissible and could not have been used for
High Court of H.P.
acquitting the accused. A witness can only depose about the fact
which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to
draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn
by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was
laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507
that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed
at 595:
“It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and
complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that
while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he
may not express any opinion on whether either or both of
the parties were negligent. The reason commonly
assigned is that this is the precise question the court has
to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not
relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his
opinion is not.”
19. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj
2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP) , where it was held:
“It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of
an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The
issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and
negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis
of evidence led before the Court.”
20. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the
statement made by this witness that the accident occurred
because of the negligence of the motorcyclist.
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21. It was submitted that the accident would not have
High Court of H.P.
occurred had the informant not looked towards the factory. This
submission is only stated to be rejected. The site plan, the
statements of the witnesses, and the photographs clearly show
that the Mahindra Bolero was being driven towards the right
side of the road. Therefore, the proximate cause of the accident
was driving the Mahindra Bolero towards the right side of the
road and not the informant looking towards the factory. Had the
Mahindra Bolero been driven towards the left side of the road,
the accident would not have occurred even if the informant was
looking towards the factory.
22. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the
Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic.
Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle
as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall
allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction
to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs.
State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side
of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed:
“The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space
of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was
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on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10
feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car
was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was
coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side.
The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there
was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus
could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled
on the left side of the road.”
High Court of H.P.
23. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar
2008 H.L.J. 399 , where the vehicle was taken towards the right
side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed:
“The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A
on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks
and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the
place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of
the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil
Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur
to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is
almost on the extreme right side of the road.”
24. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti
Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held:
“16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined
in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court.
In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The
width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches.
On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there
was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was
an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was
about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the
Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road.
This has been stated both by the injured and by PW-6.
This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was
hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is
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always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions
Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that
nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong
side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the
witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left
side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the
opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to
conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right
side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.”
High Court of H.P.
25. In the present case, the accused was driving the
Mahindra Bolero towards the wrong side of the road in breach of
the rules of the regulation framed by the Central Government,
and he was clearly negligent.
26. The learned Trial Court held that Ram Swaroop was
present, but he was not examined, and an adverse inference has
to be drawn against the prosecution. This conclusion cannot be
accepted. The question of adverse inference only arises when the
evidence on record is not sufficient to prove the case of the
2
party . In the present case, the prosecution's case is proved by
the statements of the informant and Pawan Kumar (PW3) as well
as the photographs and the site plan. Therefore, no adverse
inference can be drawn against the prosecution for not
examining Ram Swaroop.
2
Pandurang Jivaji Apte v. Ramchandra Gangadhar Ashtekar, (1981) 4 SCC 569, and Rattan Dev v. Pasam Devi,
(2002) 7 SCC 441
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27. Learned Trial Court held that the statement of the
informant was contradictory because he had stated in the FIR
that he was taken to the hospital by the passers-by, whereas he
had stated before the Court that Ram Swaroop and other factory
workers took him to the hospital. It was rightly submitted by Mr
Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the
respondent/State, that this was a minor contradiction related to
the detail, which was bound to come with time due to failure of
memory. The incident had occurred on 09.12.2008, whereas the
statement was made by the informant on 26.05.2012. Therefore,
the contradiction is not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s

Hon’ble Supreme Court held in	Rajan v. State of Haryana,

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952,	that the discrepancies in the

statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the
prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It
was observed: -
“32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task.
There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the
appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved
principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a
criminal case can be enumerated as under:
“I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the
approach must be whether the evidence of the witness,
read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once
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that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary
for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more
particularly keeping in view the deficiencies,
drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence
as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is
against the general tenor of the evidence given by the
witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the
evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.
High Court of H.P.
II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence
had the opportunity to form the opinion about the
general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the
appellate court which had not this benefit will have to
attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by
the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty
and formidable it would not be proper to reject the
evidence on the ground of minor variations or
infirmities in the matter of trivial details.
III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is
quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But
courts should bear in mind that it is only when
discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so
incompatible with the credibility of his version that the
court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.
IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching
the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by
taking sentences torn out of context here or there from
the evidence, attaching importance to some technical
error committed by the investigating officer, not going
to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit
rejection of the evidence as a whole.
V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations
falling in the narration of an incident (either as
between the evidence of two witnesses or as between
two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic
approach for judicial scrutiny.
VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to
possess a photographic memory and to recall the
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details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is
replayed on the mental screen.
High Court of H.P.
VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is
overtaken by events. The witness could not have
anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an
element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore,
cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.
VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to
person. What one may notice, another may not. An
object or movement might emboss its image on one
person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the
part of another.
IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a
conversation and reproduce the very words used by
them or heard by them. They can only recall the main
purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a
witness to be a human tape recorder.
X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the
time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make
their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the
moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot
expect people to make very precise or reliable
estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the
time sense of individuals, which varies from person to
person.
XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall
accurately the sequence of events that take place in
rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is
liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated
later on.
XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be
overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing
cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness,
mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of
events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur
of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness
sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking
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foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is
giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence
witnessed by him.
XIII. A former statement, though seemingly
inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be
sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the
former statement has the potency to discredit the latter
statement, even if the latter statement is at variance
with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful
to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada
Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC
217: 1983 Cri LJ 1096: (AIR 1983 SC 753) Leela Ram v.
State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525: AIR 1999 SC 3717
and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP (AIR 1959 SC
1012) ”
28. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri)

C<br>479: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253	that the

evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of
truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to
omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to
the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: -

“38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it<br>appears that no specific question was put to him as to<br>whether the appellant was present at the place of<br>occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of
			Rohtash Kumar v. State of
Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC
434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238]		held: (SCC p. 446, para 24)
	“24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence<br>read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once<br>that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary

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	for the court to scrutinise the evidence more,<br>.<br>particularly keeping in view the deficiencies,<br>P<br>drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence<br>as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is<br>.<br>against the general tenor of the evidence given by the<br>H<br>witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the<br>evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief.<br>Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue<br>f<br>importance to omissions, contradictions and<br>o<br>discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the<br>matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution<br>witness.”
t<br>39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of
		t<br>Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of
r<br>Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of
Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546]

C 40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32)

“30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignifci ant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and fni d out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such a discrepancy should not be attached undue signifci ance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even, in law, render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must

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essentially relate to the material particulars of the
prosecution case. The alleged improvements and
variations must be shown with respect to the material
particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such
improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is
not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The
credibility of a definite circumstance of the
prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference
to such minor or insignificant improvements.
Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments
of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat
[Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC
724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], Narayan Chetanram
Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram
Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457:
2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan
[Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205: 2001
SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana
[Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100:
2002 SCC (Cri) 961] .
High Court of H.P.
31 . What is to be seen next is whether the version
presented in the Court was substantially similar to
what was said during the investigation. It is only when
exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the
case that the Court has to consider whether the
witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar
v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055] ].
32 . These are variations which would not amount to
any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the
normal conduct of a person. The witness who is
watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten
by 15 people can hardly be expected to state a minute-
by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and
more particularly a person who is known to or is
related to the deceased, would give all his attention to
take steps to prevent the assault on the victim and
then to make every effort to provide him with medical
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	aid and inform the police. The statements which are<br>.<br>recorded immediately upon the incident would have to<br>P<br>be given a little leeway with regard to the statements<br>being made and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is<br>.<br>a settled principle of law that every improvement or<br>H<br>variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely<br>implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of<br>the court has to be reasonable and practicable.<br>f<br>Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v.<br>o<br>State of Haryana [Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana,<br>(2010) 12 SCC 350: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v.<br>State of Chhattisgarh [Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh,<br>(2011) 9 SCC 561: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777].”
t<br>r<br>41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v. u<br>State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this<br>Court held: (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49)
	o<br>“46. Then, it was argued that there are certain<br>C<br>discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of<br>the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these<br>witnesses have given different timings as to when they<br>had seen the scuffling and strangulation of the<br>deceased by the accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor<br>discrepancies or variations are traceable in the<br>statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has<br>to see is whether these variations are material and<br>affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every<br>variation may not be enough to adversely affect the<br>case of the prosecution.
	***
	49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should<br>examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and<br>read the said statement along with the statements of<br>other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational<br>conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in<br>part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any<br>material or serious contradiction in the statement of

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	these witnesses which may give any advantage to the<br>accused.”
.<br>P<br>42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar<br>v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri)<br>238], this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24)
	.<br>H<br>“24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence<br>read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once<br>f<br>that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary<br>o<br>for the court to scrutinise the evidence more,<br>particularly keeping in view the deficiencies,<br>drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence<br>t<br>as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is<br>r<br>against the general tenor of the evidence given by the<br>u<br>witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the<br>evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief.<br>o<br>Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue<br>importance to omissions, contradictions and<br>C<br>discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the<br>matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution<br>witness.”

these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused.”

. P 42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238], this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24)

. H “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once f that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary o for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence t as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is r against the general tenor of the evidence given by the u witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. o Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and C discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.”

29. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar,
2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817 , wherein it was
observed: -
“ 17. It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions
with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries
attributed to the hand or foot, but the constant narrative
of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the
place of occurrence, armed with guns, and they caused
the injury to the informant, PW-6. However, the
testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be
discarded merely because of minor contradictions or
omissions, as observed by this court in Narayan
Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra,
2000 8 SCC 457 . This Court, while considering the issue of
contradictions in the testimony while appreciating the
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evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions
in material particulars and not minor contradictions can
be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses.
The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as
under:
"42. Only such omissions which amount to a
contradiction in material particulars can be used to
discredit the testimony of the witness. The
omission in the police statement by itself would not
necessarily render the testimony of the witness
unreliable. When the version given by the witness
in the court is different in material particulars from
that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of
the prosecution becomes doubtful and not
otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to
appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as
memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of
observation differs from person to person. The
omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of
trivial details, as in the present case, the same
would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2.
Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a
witness on any material point, that is no ground to
reject the whole of the testimony of such witness."

30.	It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
i
Achchar Singh vs. State of H.P., AIR 2021 SC 3426		,	that the

testimony of a witness cannot be discarded due to exaggeration
alone. It was observed:
alone. It was observed:

“24. It is vehemently contended that the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses is exaggerated and thus false.
Cambridge Dictionary defines "exaggeration" as "the fact
of making something larger, more important, better or
worse than it is". Merriam-Webster defines the term
"exaggerate" as to "enlarge beyond bounds or the truth".
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The Concise Oxford Dictionary defni es it as "enlarged or
altered beyond normal proportions". These expressions
.<br>unambiguously suggest that the genesis of an
'exaggerated statement' lies in a fact, to which fci titious
P<br>additions are made to make it more penetrative. Every
.<br>exaggeration, therefore, has the ingredients of 'truth'. No
exaggerated statement is possible without an element of
H<br>truth. On the other hand, the Advanced Law Lexicon
defni es "false" as "erroneous, untrue; opposite of correct,
f<br>or true". Oxford Concise Dictionary states that "false" is
o<br>"wrong; not correct or true". Similar is the explanation in
other dictionaries as well. There is, thus, a marked
differential between an 'exaggerated version' and a 'false
t<br>version'. An exaggerated statement contains both truth
r<br>and falsity, whereas a false statement has no grain of
u<br>truth in it (being the 'opposite' of 'true'). It is well said
that to make a mountain out of a molehill, the molehill
o<br>shall have to exist primarily. A Court of law, being
mindful of such distinction, is duty-bound to disseminate
C<br>'truth' from 'falsehood' and sift the grain from the chaff
in case of exaggerations. It is only in a case where the
grain and the chaff are so inextricably intertwined that, in
their separation, no real evidence survives that the whole
evidence can be discarded. [			Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2003) 7 SCC 643	, 18	.]

"24. ...So far as this contention is concerned, it
must be kept in view that while appreciating the
evidence of witnesses in a criminal trial, especially
in a case of eyewitnesses, the maxim		falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus	cannot apply, and the court has to
make efforts to sift the grain from the chaff. It is of
course true that when a witness is said to have

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exaggerated in his evidence at the stage of trial
and has tried to involve many more accused and if
.<br>that part of the evidence is not found acceptable
the remaining part of the evidence has to be
P<br>scrutinised with care and the court must try to see
.<br>whether the acceptable part of the evidence gets
corroborated from other evidence on record so
H<br>that the acceptable part can be safely relied
upon..."

f<br>26. There is no gainsaying that homicidal deaths cannot
o<br>be left to judicium dei. The Court, in their quest to reach
the truth, ought to make earnest efforts to extract gold
t<br>out of the heap of black sand. The solemn duty is to dig
r<br>out the authenticity. It is only when the Court, despite its
best efforts, fails to reach a firm conclusion that the
u<br>benefit of the doubt is extended.

27. An eye-witness is always preferred to others. The
statements of P.W.1, P.W.11 and P.W.12 are, therefore, to
be analysed accordingly, while being mindful of the
difference between exaggeration and falsity. We find that
the truth can be effortlessly extracted from their
statements. The trial Court fell in grave error and
overlooked the credible and consistent evidence while
proceeding with a baseless premise that the exaggerated
statements made by the eyewitnesses belie their version.”

31.			It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Arvind Kumar @ Nemichand and others Versus State of Rajasthan,

2022 Cri. L.J. 374	, that the testimony of a witness cannot be

discarded because he had made a wrong statement regarding
some aspect. The principle that when a witness deposes
falsehood, his entire statement is to be discarded does not apply
to India. It was observed: -
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“48. The principle that when a witness deposes falsehood,
the evidence in its entirety has to be eschewed may not
have a strict application to the criminal jurisprudence in
our country. The principle governing sifting the chaff
from the grain has to be applied. However, when the
evidence is inseparable and such an attempt would either
be impossible or would make the evidence unacceptable,
the natural consequence would be one of avoidance. The
said principle has not assumed the status of law but
continues only as a rule of caution. One has to see the
nature of the discrepancy in a given case. When the
discrepancies are very material, shaking the very
credibility of the witness, leading to a conclusion in the
mind of the court that it is neither possible to separate it
nor to rely upon, it is for the said court to either accept or
reject."
High Court of H.P.
32. In the present case, the accused never disputed the
injury sustained by the informant, and the medical record was
tendered based on the statement made by the accused before the
learned Trial Court. Therefore, even if there are some
contradictions regarding taking the informant to the hospital,
the same does not affect the injury sustained by him and is not
sufficient to discard his testimony.
33. Further, the attention of the informant was not
drawn to the previous statement recorded by the Police, which is
an essential requirement under Section 145 of the Indian
Evidence Act. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Binay Kumar Singh Versus State of Bihar, 1997 (1) SCC 283 , that if a
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witness is to be contradicted with his previous statement, his
High Court of H.P.
attention must be drawn towards it. It was observed: -
“11. The credit of a witness can be impeached by proof of
any statement which is inconsistent with any part of his
evidence in Court. This principle is delineated in S. 155 (3)
of the Evidence Act, and it must be borne in mind when
reading S. 145, which consists of two limbs. It is provided
in the first limb of S.145 that a witness may be cross-
examined as to the previous statement made by him
without such writing being shown to him but the second
limb provides that "if it is intended to contradict him by
the writing his attention must before the writing can be
provided, be called to those parts of it which are to be
used for the purpose of contradicting him." There is thus
a distinction between the two vivid limbs, though subtle it
may be. The first limb does not envisage impeaching the
credit of a witness, but it merely enables the opposite
party to cross-examine the witness with reference to the
previous statements made by him. He may at that stage
succeed in eliciting materials to his benefit through such
cross-examination, even without resorting to the
procedure laid down in the second limb. But if the witness
disowns having made any statement which is
inconsistent with his present stand, his testimony in
Court on that score would not be vitiated until the cross-
examiner proceeds to comply with the procedure
prescribed in the second limb of S. 145.
12. In Bhagwan Singh's case (AIR 1952 SC 214) , Vivian Bose,
J., pointed out in paragraph 25 that during the cross-
examination of the witnesses concerned, the formalities
prescribed by S. 145 are complied with. The cross-
examination, in that case, indicated that every
circumstance intended to be used as a contradiction was
put to him point by point and passage by passage.
Learned Judges were called upon to deal with an
argument that witnesses' attention should have been
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specifically drawn to that passage in addition thereto.
Their Lordships were, however, satisfied in that case that
the procedure adopted was in substantial compliance
with S. 145, and hence held that all that is required is that
the witness must be treated fairly and must be afforded a
reasonable opportunity of explaining the contradictions
after his attention has been drawn to them in a fair and
reasonable manner. On the facts of that case, there is no
dispute with the proposition laid therein.
13. So long as the attention of PW 32 (Sukhdev Bhagat)
was not drawn to the statement attributed to him as
recorded by DW-10 (Nawal Kishore Prasad), we are not
persuaded to reject the evidence of PW-32 that he gave
Ex. 14 statement at the venue of occurrence and that he
had not given any other statement earlier thereto.”

u o 34. A similar view was taken in Alauddin v. State of Assam, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 760, wherein it was observed:

g h

C “7. When the two statements cannot stand together, they become contradictory statements. When a witness makes a statement in his evidence before the Court which is inconsistent with what he has stated in his statement recorded by the Police, there is a contradiction. When a prosecution witness whose statement under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC has been recorded states factual aspects before the Court which he has not stated in his prior statement recorded under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC, it is said that there is an omission. There will be an omission if the witness has omitted to state a fact in his statement recorded by the Police, which he states before the Court in his evidence. The explanation to Section 162CrPC indicates that an omission may amount to a contradiction when it is signifci ant and relevant. Thus, every omission is not a contradiction. It becomes a contradiction provided it satisfies the test laid down in the explanation under Section 162. Therefore, when an omission becomes a

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contradiction, the procedure provided in the proviso to<br>.<br>sub-Section (1) of Section 162 must be followed for<br>contradicting witnesses in the cross-examination.
P<br>8. As stated in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of section .<br>162, the witness has to be contradicted in the manner H<br>provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Section<br>145 reads thus:
	f<br>“145. Cross-examination as to previous<br>o<br>statements in writing.—A witness may be cross-<br>examined as to previous statements made by him in<br>writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to<br>t<br>matters in question, without such writing being<br>r<br>shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended<br>u<br>to contradict him by the writing, his attention must,<br>before the writing can be proved, be called to those<br>parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of<br>contradicting him.”
o<br>C<br>The Section operates in two parts. The first part provides<br>that a witness can be cross-examined as to his previous<br>statements made in writing without such writing being<br>shown to him. Thus, for example, a witness can be cross-<br>examined by asking whether his prior statement exists.<br>The second part is regarding contradicting a witness.<br>While confronting the witness with his prior statement to<br>prove contradictions, the witness must be shown his<br>prior statement. If there is a contradiction between the<br>statement made by the witness before the Court and what<br>is recorded in the statement recorded by the police, the<br>witness's attention must be drawn to specifci parts of his<br>prior statement, which are to be used to contradict him.<br>Section 145 provides that the relevant part can be put to<br>the witness without the writing being proved. However,<br>the previous statement used to contradict witnesses must<br>be proved subsequently. Only if the contradictory part of<br>his previous statement is proved can the contradictions<br>be said to be proved. The usual practice is to mark the<br>portion or part shown to the witness of his prior<br>statement produced on record. Marking is done

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differently in different States. In some States, practice is
to mark the beginning of the portion shown to the
witness with an alphabet and the end by marking with the
same alphabet. While recording the cross-examination,
the Trial Court must record that a particular portion
marked, for example, as AA was shown to the witness.
Which part of the prior statement is shown to the witness
for contradicting him has to be recorded in the cross-
examination. If the witness admits to having made such a
prior statement, that portion can be treated as proved. If
the witness does not admit the portion of his prior
statement with which he is confronted, it can be proved
through the Investigating Officer by asking whether the
witness made a statement that was shown to the witness.
Therefore, if the witness is intended to be confronted
with his prior statement reduced into writing, that
particular part of the statement, even before it is proved,
must be specifically shown to the witness. After that, the
part of the prior statement used to contradict the witness
has to be proved. As indicated earlier, it can be treated as
proved if the witness admits to having made such a
statement, or it can be proved in the cross-examination
of the concerned police officer. The object of this
requirement in Section 145 of the Evidence Act, in
confronting the witness by showing him the relevant part
of his prior statement, is to give the witness a chance to
explain the contradiction. Therefore, this is a rule of
fairness.
High Court of H.P.
9. If a former statement of the witness is inconsistent
with any part of his evidence given before the Court, it
can be used to impeach the credit of the witness in
accordance with clause (3) of Section 155 of the Evidence
Act, which reads thus:
“ 155. Impeaching the credibility of the witness. —
The credit of a witness may be impeached in the
following ways by the adverse party, or, with the
consent of the Court, by the party who calls him—
(1) ….……………………………………
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			(2) ………………………………………
			.<br>(3) by proof of former statements P<br>inconsistent with any part of his evidence<br>which is liable to be contradicted.”
.<br>H<br>It must be noted here that every contradiction or omission<br>is not a ground to discredit the witness or to disbelieve<br>his/her testimony. A minor or trivial omission or<br>f<br>contradiction brought to the record is not sufficient to<br>o<br>disbelieve the witness's version. Only when there is a<br>material contradiction or omission can the Court<br>disbelieve the witness's version either fully or partially.<br>t<br>What is a material contradiction or omission, depending<br>r<br>upon the facts of each case? Whether an omission is a<br>contradiction also depends on the facts of each case.
u<br>10. We are tempted to quote what is held in a landmark o<br>decision of this Court in the case of Tahsildar Singh v.<br>State of U.P., 1959 Supp (2) SCR 875. Paragraph 13 of the<br>said decision reads thus:
C<br>“13. The learned counsel's first argument is based<br>upon the words “in the manner provided by<br>Section145of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872” found in<br>Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section<br>145 of the Evidence Act, it is said, empowers the<br>accused to put all relevant questions to a witness<br>before his attention is called to those parts of the<br>writing with a view to contradicting him. In support<br>of this contention, reliance is placed upon the<br>judgment of this Court in Shyam Singh v. State of<br>Punjab [(1952) 1 SCC 514:1952 SCR 812]. Bose, J.<br>describes the procedure to be followed to contradict a<br>witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, thus at<br>p. 819:<br>Resort to Section 145 would only be necessary<br>if the witness denies that he made the former<br>statement. In that event, it would be<br>necessary to prove that he did, and if the<br>former statement was reduced to writing, then	C<br>“13. The learned counsel's first argument is based<br>upon the words “in the manner provided by<br>Section145of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872” found in<br>Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section<br>145 of the Evidence Act, it is said, empowers the<br>accused to put all relevant questions to a witness<br>before his attention is called to those parts of the<br>writing with a view to contradicting him. In support<br>of this contention, reliance is placed upon the<br>judgment of this Court in Shyam Singh v. State of<br>Punjab [(1952) 1 SCC 514:1952 SCR 812]. Bose, J.<br>describes the procedure to be followed to contradict a<br>witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, thus at<br>p. 819:
		Resort to Section 145 would only be necessary<br>if the witness denies that he made the former<br>statement. In that event, it would be<br>necessary to prove that he did, and if the<br>former statement was reduced to writing, then

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	Section 145 requires that his attention must<br>.<br>be drawn to these parts, which are to be used<br>P<br>for contradiction. But that position does not<br>arise when the witness admits the former<br>.<br>statement. In such a case, all that is necessary<br>H<br>is to look to the former statement of which no<br>further proof is necessary because of the<br>admission that it was made.”
f<br>It is unnecessary to refer to other cases wherein a o<br>similar procedure is suggested for putting questions<br>under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, for the<br>t<br>said decision of this Court, and similar decisions<br>r<br>were not considered the procedure in a case where<br>the statement in writing was intended to be used for u<br>contradiction under Section 162 of the Code of<br>o<br>Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is<br>in two parts: the first part enables the accused to cross-<br>C<br>examine a witness as to aprevious statement made by<br>him in writing or reduced to writing without such<br>writing being shown to him; the second part deals with<br>a situation where the cross-examination assumes the<br>shape of contradiction: in other words, both parts deal<br>with cross-examination; the first part with cross-<br>examination other than by way of contradiction, and the<br>second with cross-examination by way of contradiction<br>only. The procedure prescribed is that, if it is intended to<br>contradict a witness by the writing, his attention must,<br>before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts<br>of it which are to be used for the purpose of<br>contradicting him. The proviso to Section 162 of the<br>Code of Criminal Procedure only enables the accused to<br>make use of such a statement to contradict a witness in<br>the manner provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act.<br>It would be doing violence to the language of the proviso<br>if the said statement were allowed to be used for the<br>purpose of cross-examining a witness within the<br>meaning of the first part of Section 145 of the Evidence<br>Act. Nor are we impressed by the argument that it would

Section 145 requires that his attention must . be drawn to these parts, which are to be used P for contradiction. But that position does not arise when the witness admits the former . statement. In such a case, all that is necessary H is to look to the former statement of which no further proof is necessary because of the admission that it was made.”

f It is unnecessary to refer to other cases wherein a o similar procedure is suggested for putting questions under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, for the t said decision of this Court, and similar decisions r were not considered the procedure in a case where the statement in writing was intended to be used for u contradiction under Section 162 of the Code of o Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is in two parts: the first part enables the accused to cross- C examine a witness as to aprevious statement made by him in writing or reduced to writing without such writing being shown to him; the second part deals with a situation where the cross-examination assumes the shape of contradiction: in other words, both parts deal with cross-examination; the first part with cross- examination other than by way of contradiction, and the second with cross-examination by way of contradiction only. The procedure prescribed is that, if it is intended to contradict a witness by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. The proviso to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only enables the accused to make use of such a statement to contradict a witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. It would be doing violence to the language of the proviso if the said statement were allowed to be used for the purpose of cross-examining a witness within the meaning of the first part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Nor are we impressed by the argument that it would

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not be possible to invoke the second part of Section 145
of the Evidence Act without putting relevant questions
under the first part thereof. The difficulty is more
imaginary than real. The second part of Section 145 of
the Evidence Act clearly indicates the simple procedure
to be followed. To illustrate: A says in the witness box
that B stabbed C; before the police, he had stated that D
stabbed C. His attention can be drawn to that part of the
statement made before the police, which contradicts his
statement in the witness box. If he admits his previous
statement, no further proof is necessary; if he does not
admit it, the practice generally followed is to admit it,
subject to proof by the police officer. On the other hand,
the procedure suggested by the learned counsel may
be illustrated thus: If the witness is asked, “Did you
say before the police officer that you saw a gas
light?” and he answers, “Yes”, then the statement
which does not contain such recital is put to him as a
contradiction. This procedure involves two fallacies:
one is that it enables the accused to elicit by a process
of cross-examination what the witness stated before
the police officer. If a police officer did not make a
record of a witness's statement, his entire statement
could not be used for any purpose, whereas if a police
officer recorded a few sentences, by this process of
cross-examination, the witness's oral statement
could be brought on record. This procedure,
therefore, contravenes the express provision of
Section 162 of the Code. The second fallacy is that by
the illustration given by the learned counsel for the
appellants, there is no self-contradiction of the
primary statement made in the witness box, for the
witness has not yet made on the stand any assertion
at all which can serve as the basis. The contradiction,
under the section, should be between what a witness
asserted in the witness box and what he stated before
the police officer, and not between what he said he
had stated before the police officer and what he
actually said before him. In such a case, the question
High Court of H.P.
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	could not be put at all: only questions to contradict<br>.<br>can be put, and the question here posed does not<br>P<br>contradict; it leads to an answer which is<br>contradicted by the police statement. This argument<br>.<br>of the learned counsel based upon Section 145 of the<br>H<br>Evidence Act is, therefore, not of any relevance in<br>considering the express provisions of Section 162 of<br>the Code of Criminal Procedure.” (emphasis added)
f<br>This decision is a locus classicus, which will continue to o<br>guide our Trial Courts. In the facts of the case, the learned<br>Trial Judge has not marked those parts of the witnesses'<br>t<br>prior statements based on which they were sought to be<br>contradicted in the cross-examination.”

could not be put at all: only questions to contradict . can be put, and the question here posed does not P contradict; it leads to an answer which is contradicted by the police statement. This argument . of the learned counsel based upon Section 145 of the H Evidence Act is, therefore, not of any relevance in considering the express provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” (emphasis added)

f This decision is a locus classicus, which will continue to o guide our Trial Courts. In the facts of the case, the learned Trial Judge has not marked those parts of the witnesses' t prior statements based on which they were sought to be contradicted in the cross-examination.”

35. It was held in Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 757 that the Courts cannot suo motu take cognisance of
the contradiction and the same has to be brought on record as
per the law. It was observed:
“64. The court cannot suo motu make use of statements to
the police that have not been proved and ask questions
with reference to them which are inconsistent with the
testimony of the witness in the court. The words ‘ if duly
proved ’ are used in Section 162Cr. P.C. clearly shows that
the record of the statement of witnesses cannot be
admitted in evidence straightaway, nor can it be looked
into, but they must be duly proved for contradiction by
eliciting admission from the witness during cross-
examination and also during the cross-examination of
the Investigating Officer. The statement before the
Investigating Officer can be used for contradiction, but
only after strict compliance with Section 145 of the
Evidence Act, that is, by drawing attention to the parts
intended for contradiction.
65. Section 145 of the Evidence Act reads as follows:
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“145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in
writing. — A witness may be cross-examined as to
previous statements made by him in writing or reduced
into writing, and relevant to matters in question,
without such writing being shown to him, or being
proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the
writing, his attention must, before the writing can be
proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be
used for the purpose of contradicting him.”
High Court of H.P.
66. Under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, when it is intended
to contradict the witness by his previous statement reduced
into writing, the attention of such witness must be called to
those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of
contradicting him, before the writing can be used. While
recording the deposition of a witness, it becomes the duty of
the trial court to ensure that the part of the police statement
with which it is intended to contradict the witness is brought
to the notice of the witness in his cross-examination. The
attention of the witness is drawn to that part, and this must
be reflected in his cross-examination by reproducing it. If the
witness admits the part intended to contradict him, it stands
proved, and there is no need for further proof of
contradiction, and it will be read while appreciating the
evidence. If he denies having made that part of the
statement, his attention must be drawn to that statement,
and it must be mentioned in the deposition. By this process,
the contradiction is merely brought on record, but it is yet to
be proved. Thereafter, when the Investigating Officer is
examined in the court, his attention should be drawn to the
passage marked for contradiction; it will then be proved in
the deposition of the Investigating Officer, who, again, by
referring to the police statement, will depose about the
witness having made that statement. The process again
involves referring to the police statement and culling out the
part with which the maker of the statement was intended to
be contradicted. If the witness was not confronted with that
part of the statement with which the defence wanted to
contradict him, then the court cannot suo motu make use of
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statements to police not proved in compliance with Section
145 of the Evidence Act, that is, by drawing attention to the
parts intended for contradiction.” [See: V.K. Mishra v. State of
Uttarakhand: (2015) 9 SCC 588 ]
High Court of H.P.
36. In the present case, the attention of the informant
was not drawn to the previous statement, and he was not
allowed to explain it. Therefore, the learned Trial Court could
not have discarded the statement of the informant by looking to
the previous statement and finding a contradiction between the
previous statement and the statement before the Court.
37. The accused admitted in his statement recorded
under Section 313 of Cr.P.C that he was driving the vehicle at the
time of the accident. He also admitted the medical record, which
shows that the informant had sustained grievous injury.
Therefore, the prosecution's case was proved beyond a
reasonable doubt for the commission of offences punishable
under Sections 279 and 338 of the IPC. Since Section 338 of IPC is
an aggravated form of Section 337 of IPC, no separate conviction
is required to be recorded for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 337 of IPC as per Section 71 of IPC.
38. Section 184 of the MV Act punishes a person who is
driving a Motor Vehicle dangerously. Since the accused has been
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found guilty of the commission of an offence punishable under
High Court of H.P.
Section 279 of the IPC, which is similar to Section 184 of the MV
Act; hence, no separate conviction is required to be recorded
under Section 184 of the MV Act as per Section 71 of the IPC.
39. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had proceeded on
irrelevant consideration to acquit the accused. It failed to notice
the provisions of the Rules of Road regulation, which cast a duty
upon the driver of a motor vehicle to drive the vehicle towards
the left side of the road and took a view which could not have
been taken by any reasonable person. Therefore, the judgment
passed by the learned Trial Court is liable for interference.
40. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed,
and the accused is convicted of the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 279 and 338 of the IPC.
41. Let he be produced before the Court for hearing on
the quantum of sentence on 12.05.2026 .
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
th
27 April, 2026
(Nikita)

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