M/S SEIRRA INFRAVENTURE PVT. LTD. vs MICRO AND SMALL ENTERPRISE FACILITATION COUNCIL MSEFC

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CGHC010234632022 2026:CGHC:46848

NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Digitally
signed by
VISHAKHA
BEOHAR
VISHAKHA
BEOHAR
WPC No. 3364 of 2022
Order Reserved on 30.09.2026
Order Delivered on 05.11.2026
1 - M/s Seirra Infraventure Pvt. Ltd. Through Authorized Signatory -
Ashok Jain S/o Shri Anupchand Jain , Aged About 62 Years ,
Residence Of DL /53 Sector - 2, Salt Lack Kolkata Bengal
Vidhannagar (North) Kolkata
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Micro And Small Enterprise Facilitation Council Msefc
(Constituted Under The Msmed Act, 2006), Through Secretary /
Competent Authority, Udyog Bhawan, Ring Road No. 1,
Telibandha, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
2 - R.K. Automotives Through Its Director, Arvind Garg S/o Shri
Vishwamitra Prasad Garg, R.K. Automotives, 43, A/2, Tifra,
Industrial Area, Bilaspur , District - Bilaspur Chhattisgarh , 495223,
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from the Case Information System)

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For Petitioner : Mr. Apoorva Tripathi, Advocate
For Respondent No. 2 : Mr. Soumitra Kesharwani, Advocate on
behalf of Mr. Apurv Goyal, Advocate
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SB-Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
CAV Order
1. By way of this petition, the petitioner seeks to challenge the
legality, validity and propriety of the ex parte order dated
30.10.2021 passed by the Micro and Small Enterprise
Facilitation Council (MSEFC), Chhattisgarh, on the ground
that the impugned order was passed without ensuring due
service of notice upon the petitioner and without affording him
a proper opportunity of hearing. It is contended that, despite
issuing notice on 07.09.2021, the Council proceeded to hear
the matter ex parte, reserved its order on 14.09.2021 and
ultimately passed the impugned order on 30.10.2021, without
ensuring due service of notice or making any genuine attempt
to initiate conciliation between the parties as contemplated
under Sections 18(1), 18(2) and 18(3) of the Micro, Small and
Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006. The petitioner
further submits that the impugned order is arbitrary, illegal
and violative of the principles of natural justice and Articles
14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It is also stated that

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an FIR was lodged against the petitioner on 01.03.2022, that
this Court passed an order in W.P.(C) No. 1609 of 2022 on
04.04.2022, and that the petitioner subsequently withdrew the
said petition on 26.04.2022.
2. The following reliefs have been sought by the petitioner in the
present petition:-
“This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to call for the
records of the case pertaining to the petitioner
from the respondents for its kind perusal.
A. This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set
aside the Ex- party order dated 30.10.2021
passed by the respondent no.1 against the
petitioner (Annexure P-1).
B. Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may
deem fit in the facts & circumstances of case.
C. Cost of the petition may also be awarded.”
3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is a company
incorporated in the year 2008 and engaged in coal excavation
and transportation work at the Parsa East and Kanta Basan
Coal Block, Surguja, Chhattisgarh. The petitioner has
challenged the legality and validity of the ex parte order dated
30.10.2021 passed by the Micro and Small Enterprise
Facilitation Council (MSEFC), Chhattisgarh, whereby a sum
of Rs. 24,04,061/-, including interest, was directed to be paid
to respondent No. 2 towards the alleged outstanding dues for

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the supply of lubricants. The petitioner disputes the claim and
contends that the alleged goods were neither ordered nor
received by it. It is further contended that the Council
proceeded ex parte on 14.09.2021 without ensuring due
service of notice upon the petitioner or affording it an
opportunity of hearing. Although the impugned order records
that notice was sent through the Samadhaan web portal and
WhatsApp, it does not disclose the mobile number used or
establish that the notice was duly served upon the petitioner.
The petitioner further contends that the Council passed the
impugned order without undertaking conciliation as
contemplated under Section 18(2) of the Micro, Small and
Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, or following the
subsequent statutory procedure under Section 18(3) of the
said Act. It is also stated that respondent No. 2 lodged an FIR
against the petitioner in respect of the same dispute, which
was subsequently quashed by this Court on 18.03.2025 on
the ground that the dispute was civil in nature. The petitioner
had earlier filed W.P.(C) No. 1609 of 2022, which was
dismissed as withdrawn on 26.04.2022 with liberty to file a
duly constituted petition. Accordingly, the petitioner has filed
the present petition challenging the impugned order on the

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grounds of violation of the principles of natural justice, non-
compliance with the statutory procedure and arbitrariness.
4. Mr. Apoorva Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner would
submit that the impugned ex parte order dated 30.10.2021
passed by the Micro and Small Enterprise Facilitation Council
(MSEFC), Chhattisgarh, is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the
provisions of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Act, 2006. It is contended that the Council
proceeded ex parte without ensuring due service of notice
upon the petitioner and without affording an effective
opportunity of hearing, thereby violating the principles of
natural justice. Learned counsel would further submit that the
Council failed to initiate and complete the conciliation
proceedings as contemplated under Section 18(2) of the Act
and proceeded to pass the impugned order without following
the procedure prescribed under Section 18(3) of the Act read
with the relevant provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996. Placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Silpi Industries v. Kerala State Road
Transport Corporation , 2021 SCC OnLine SC 439, it is
argued that the statutory procedure prescribed under Section
18 of the MSMED Act is required to be followed before
proceeding to arbitration. It is further submitted that no notice

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of commencement of arbitration proceedings was served
upon the petitioner, nor was the petitioner afforded an
opportunity to file its statement of defence or counterclaim.
Learned counsel would also contend that the Council
erroneously relied upon photocopies of invoices and
vouchers, without examining the original documents or
verifying whether the same had been acknowledged by the
petitioner, and thereby directed recovery of Rs. 22,34,117/-
along with interest.
5. In support of his submissions, learned counsel places
reliance upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. State of
Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 206; Gujarat State Civil
Supplies Corporation Limited v. Mahakali Foods (P)
Limited, (2023) 6 SCC 401; Electrosteel Steel Limited v.
Ispat Carrier (P) Limited, (2025) 7 SCC 773; Silpi
Industries v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation,
(2021) 18 SCC 790; Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation
Limited v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation
Council, (2025) 4 SCC 1; and India Glycols Limited v.
Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council,
Medchal-Malkajgiri, (2025) 5 SCC 780 , to contend that the
statutory framework governing references before the MSEFC

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and the arbitral proceedings contemplated under the MSMED
Act must be duly followed. Reliance is also placed upon
Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors,
(2005) 4 SCC 239 , in support of the requirement of effective
communication of relevant proceedings; Kiran Singh v.
Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 , on the consequences
of proceedings conducted without jurisdiction; and Whirlpool
Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, (1998)
8 SCC 1 , to contend that the availability of an alternative
remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the exercise
of writ jurisdiction, particularly where the proceedings suffer
from a violation of natural justice or jurisdictional infirmity.
Learned counsel further relies upon Assistant
Commissioner (CT), LTU, Kakinada v. Glaxo Smith Kline
Consumer Health Care Limited, (2020) 19 SCC 681 , in
support of his submissions concerning the statutory remedy
and the circumstances governing judicial interference in
proceedings where an alternative remedy is available.
Reliance is also placed upon Sarguja Transport Service v.
State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1987) 1 SCC 5 , and
the judgment of the Chhattisgarh High Court in M/s Jai Balaji
Industries Limited v. Garuda Ispat Private Limited, WP227
no. 67/2025 decided on 22.06.2026, in support of his

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submissions concerning the maintainability of the present
petition and the legal issues arising in the matter. On the
aforesaid grounds, learned counsel submits that the
impugned order deserves to be set aside.
6. Mr. Soumitra Kesharwani, Advocate, appearing on behalf of
Mr. Apurv Goyal, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, would
submit that the impugned order dated 30.10.2021 passed by
the Micro and Small Enterprise Facilitation Council (MSEFC),
Chhattisgarh, is in accordance with the provisions of the
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act,
2006. It is contended that respondent No. 2 supplied
lubricants to the petitioner against purchase orders issued by
it, and a sum of Rs. 22,34,117/- remained outstanding
towards the said supplies. Learned counsel would further
submit that the petitioner acknowledged its liability in the e-
mail dated 16.06.2021 and in paragraphs 8.8 and 8.9 of the
writ petition. It is further contended that respondent No. 2,
while filing the reference before the Council on 16.08.2021,
furnished the petitioner's address, e-mail address and mobile
number of its Director, and the Council duly issued notices
through physical and electronic modes, including WhatsApp,
which were seen by the petitioner. Despite due service of
notice and sufficient opportunity, the petitioner failed to

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appear before the Council on 14.09.2021, compelling the
Council to proceed ex parte and pass the impugned order.
Learned counsel would also submit that the reference was
decided within the period prescribed under Section 18(5) of
the Act, 2006, and the impugned order does not suffer from
any illegality warranting interference by this Court.
7. Learned counsel would further submit that the petitioner had
earlier challenged the same order in W.P.(C) No. 1609 of
2022, wherein this Court, by order dated 04.04.2022, directed
the petitioner to deposit Rs. 5,00,000/- as a condition for
staying recovery of the remaining amount. However, instead
of complying with the said direction, the petitioner withdrew
the petition on 26.04.2022 and subsequently filed the present
petition on substantially identical facts and grounds. It is,
therefore, contended that the petitioner cannot be permitted
to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court to circumvent the
statutory remedy available under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996, read with Section 19 of the
MSMED Act, 2006, which mandates pre-deposit of 75% of the
awarded amount. Learned counsel further submits that the
statutory period of limitation for challenging the award has
expired and that the present petition has been filed to avoid

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the mandatory pre-deposit and the consequences of the
earlier proceedings.
8. In support of his submissions, learned counsel places
reliance upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
India Glycols Limited v. Micro and Small Enterprises
Facilitation Council, Medchal-Malkajgiri, (2025) 5 SCC
780, and Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU, Kakinada v.
Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited, (2020)
19 SCC 681 , as well as the judgment of the Division Bench of
this Court in Collector and District Mission Director, Office
of the District Project, Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission
(SSA) v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council,
Chhattisgarh and Others, W.A. No. 427 of 2024 . On the
aforesaid grounds, learned counsel for respondent No. 2
prays for dismissal of the writ petition.
9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
pleadings as well as the original record of the proceedings
before the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council,
Chhattisgarh.
10. The principal challenge in the present writ petition is to
the ex parte order dated 30.10.2021, whereby the Micro and
Small Enterprises Facilitation Council directed the petitioner
to pay Rs.22,34,117/- towards the outstanding amount, along

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with interest of Rs.1,69,944/-, aggregating to Rs.24,04,061/-,
in respect of the goods allegedly supplied by respondent
No.2. The petitioner has questioned the proceedings primarily
on the ground of non-service of notice and alleged non-
compliance with the procedure prescribed under Section 18
of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development
Act, 2006 (for short, “the MSMED Act”).
11. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that respondent
No.2, a registered micro enterprise, approached the Council
claiming outstanding payment against the supply of
lubricants, including HYSPIN AWH 68 SC, HYSPIN AWH 100
SC and GREASE EP2. In support of its claim, respondent
No.2 produced copies of invoices, the purchase order dated
04.01.2021, the authorisation letter, an affidavit and its
Udyam Registration Certificate. The Council considered the
documents produced by respondent No.2 and recorded that
an amount of Rs.1,30,342/- had already been paid by the
petitioner, leaving an outstanding principal amount of
Rs.22,34,117/-.
12. The impugned order further records that the
proceedings were fixed for hearing on 14.09.2021 and that
notice was issued to the parties through letter Nos.775-76
dated 07.09.2021. It also records that the hearing notice was

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transmitted to the petitioner through the Samadhan web
portal and WhatsApp and that the notice had been viewed by
the petitioner. Despite the same, the petitioner did not appear
before the Council, nor did it file any reply disputing the claim
of respondent No.2. The Council, therefore, proceeded ex
parte.
13. The original record has been examined in the light of the
petitioner's objection regarding service of notice. The material
recorded in the impugned order indicates that the petitioner
was informed of the date of hearing through the modes
referred to therein. The petitioner has not demonstrated, on
the basis of the material placed before this Court, that the
Council proceeded without any notice or that the proceedings
were conducted in a manner which, by itself, warrants
interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Mere non-
appearance before the Council, in the circumstances
recorded in the impugned order, does not establish that the
order is vitiated for want of an opportunity of hearing.
14. Section 18 of the MSMED Act provides the procedure
for resolving disputes before the Micro and Small Enterprises
Facilitation Council. Under Section 18(2) of the Act, the
Council must first attempt to settle the dispute through
conciliation. If conciliation fails, the Council may proceed with

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arbitration itself or refer the matter to an appropriate institution
under Section 18(3) of the Act. Both stages must be followed
as prescribed by law, even if one of the parties remains
absent.
15. In the present case, the petitioner has alleged non-
compliance with Section 18 of the MSMED Act. However,
such an allegation must be assessed with reference to the
proceedings actually undertaken by the Council and the
material contained in its record. The impugned order records
the petitioner's non-appearance despite notice and the
Council's consideration of the claim and supporting
documents. On the material presently relied upon by the
petitioner, no sufficient ground has been established to hold
that the impugned order is liable to be set aside merely on the
ground that it was passed ex parte. The conclusion on
compliance with Sections 18(2) and 18(3) of the Act, however,
rests on the original record of the proceedings and cannot be
inferred solely from the fact of non-appearance.
16. It is also relevant that the petitioner did not file any reply
before the Council disputing the claim, the invoices or the
alleged outstanding amount. The Council recorded that no
response or correspondence had been received from the
petitioner and that the claim had not been controverted before

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it. The absence of a reply does not, by itself, dispense with
the Council's obligation to examine the material placed before
it; nevertheless, the Council's order indicates that it
considered the documents produced by respondent No.2
before determining the outstanding amount.
17. The dispute regarding the alleged supply of goods, the
correctness of the invoices and the amount payable involves
questions which are ordinarily to be examined in the statutory
adjudicatory process. The writ jurisdiction of this Court is not
intended to substitute for the statutory forum in the
determination of disputed contractual or commercial claims,
particularly where the petitioner had an opportunity to
participate in the proceedings but did not do so. No
independent ground of patent jurisdictional error or manifest
illegality has been demonstrated which, on the material
placed before this Court, would justify interference under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
18. The availability of the statutory remedy is also a relevant
consideration. An award or order arising from proceedings
under Section 18 of the MSMED Act is subject to the
remedies available under the applicable arbitration law,
including Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, subject to the statutory requirements governing such

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proceedings. Section 19 of the MSMED Act prescribes a pre-
deposit requirement for an application to set aside a decree,
award or other order made by the Council or an institution or
centre providing alternative dispute resolution services. The
existence of such a statutory mechanism is a material
consideration while deciding whether extraordinary writ
jurisdiction ought to be exercised.
19. It is settled that the rule of exhaustion of alternative
remedies is a rule of judicial discretion and not an absolute
bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Nevertheless, where
the statute provides a remedy for challenging the impugned
adjudicatory decision, and the petitioner fails to establish a
recognised ground for bypassing that remedy, interference
under Article 226 would not ordinarily be warranted. In the
present case, the petitioner has not established a sufficient
ground to bypass the statutory mechanism solely on the basis
of the objections raised in the writ petition.
20. The record also indicates that the petitioner had earlier
approached this Court by filing WPC No.1609 of 2022
challenging the same impugned order. By order dated
04.04.2022, the petitioner was directed to deposit
Rs.5,00,000/- as a condition for interim protection, whereafter
the petitioner withdrew the said petition on 26.04.2022. The

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present petition has again been filed challenging the same
order. Although withdrawal of the earlier petition does not, by
itself, determine the merits of the present challenge, the
procedural history is a relevant circumstance while examining
whether any exceptional ground has been established for
interference in writ jurisdiction.
21. Having considered the impugned order, the objections
raised by the petitioner, the response of respondent No.2 and
the material available on record, this Court finds no sufficient
ground, on the grounds presently urged, to set aside the
impugned order in exercise of its extraordinary writ
jurisdiction. The petitioner has failed to establish that the
order is liable to be interfered with merely because the
Council proceeded ex parte after recording that notice had
been transmitted to the petitioner and that the petitioner did
not appear or file a reply.
22. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed .
23. It is clarified that this Court has not undertaken an
independent adjudication of the underlying commercial claim
beyond examining the grounds raised for interference with the
impugned order. Any remedy otherwise available to the
petitioner under the applicable statutory provisions shall

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remain governed by the conditions and limitations prescribed
by law.
24. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Vishakha