SURESHCHANDRA GIRDHARLAL RUPARELIYA vs JAYANTIBHAI HARIBHAI THUMBAR (HEIRS OF DECEASED HARIBHAI RUDABHAI THUMBAR)

C/CRA/449/2026 (GJHC240655242026) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 449 of 2026

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:


HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT

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Approved for Reporting Yes No
√
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SURESHCHANDRA GIRDHARLAL RUPARELIYA & ANR.
Versus
JAYANTIBHAI HARIBHAI THUMBAR (HEIRS OF DECEASED HARIBHAI
RUDABHAI THUMBAR) & ORS.
=============================================
Appearance:
MR NIRAD D BUCH(4000) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2
MR NILAY V SUCHAK(8280) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT

Date : 01/09/2026
JUDGMENT
1. Heard Mr. Nirad D. Buch, learned advocate with
Mr. Nilay V. Suchak, learned advocate for the petitioners.
2. This revision application is filed under Section 29(2)
of the Gujarat Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates
Control Act, 1947 (herein after referred to as “ the Rent
Act ”) against the judgment and decree dated 10.07.2026
passed by the Additional District Judge at Keshod
(District – Junagadh) in Regular Civil Appeal No. 46 of
2019, whereby the Appellate Court has confirmed the
judgment and eviction decree dated 29.06.2019 passed
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C/CRA/449/2026 (GJHC240655242026) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
by Additional Senior Civil Judge, Keshod in Regular Civil
Suit No. 185 of 2007.
3. For the sake of convenience and brevity, hereinafter,
the parties will be referred as per their original status in
the suit. The petitioners herein are original defendants –
tenants, whereas the respondents herein are legal heirs
and representatives of original plaintiff – landlord.
SHORT FACTS:
4. The Regular Civil Suit No. 185 of 2007 appears to
have been filed by one Haribhai Rudabhai Thumbar
(landlord) through his special Power of Attorney (POA),
namely Dineshbhai Haribhai Thumbar, who happens to be
his son, praying for the decree of eviction of rented shop
situated at Keshod, District – Junagadh, which was given
to the predecessor of the defendants on rent in the year
1965. It appears that during pendency of the suit, original
plaintiff died and upon his, alongwith other legal heirs of
the original plaintiff who were brought on record of the
suit, the POA was also joined as plaintiff No.1.5 being his
son. The landlord filed the suit for eviction under Section
13 of the Rent Act on several grounds. The suit was
contested by the defendants by filing a Written
Statement. The necessary issues were framed by the Trial
court and ultimately, upon appreciation of oral and
documentary evidence, the Trial court has decreed the
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C/CRA/449/2026 (GJHC240655242026) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
suit in favour of the plaintiff (landlord) on the ground that
there is a reasonable and bona fide requirement of rented
premises for betterment/ settlement of his son/grandson.
5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid
judgment and eviction decree, the defendants appear to
have challenged it by way of Regular Civil Appeal No. 46
of 2019 before the Appellate Court concerned. After
hearing the parties, the Appellate Court vide its
impugned order dated 10.07.2026 dismissed the appeal.
Hence, the present revision application.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONERS:
6. Mr. Buch, learned advocate, would submit that since
the suit in question was filed at the instance of special
POA, and as per cross-examination of POA of original
plaintiff, that until the power of attorney given, the rented
premises was looked after by his father, namely, original
plaintiff, the evidence of such POA could not establish the
fact of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the
landlord.
6.1. Mr. Buch, learned advocate, would further submit
that there is evidence on record to show that there is
alternative space available to the landlord for his use and
the family members of the landlord can be settled down
in that area, which is located just behind the rented shop.
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C/CRA/449/2026 (GJHC240655242026) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
It is submitted that in the absence of any cogent evidence
brought on record by the landlord to prove his reasonable
and bona fide requirement, the Courts below have
committed a serious error in law by decreeing the suit in
favour of the landlord.
6.2. Mr. Buch, learned advocate, would further submit
that despite the concurrent finding of fact recorded by
the Courts below against the defendants and in favor of
the plaintiff, that is, the plaintiff has proved a reasonable
and bona fide requirement of rented premises, such
finding of fact is not only perverse but grossly erroneous
which requires interference by this Court while
exercising its revisional jurisdiction.
6.3. Making the above submissions, Mr. Buch, learned
advocate, would request this Court to entertain this
revision application.
6.4 No other and further submissions being made by
the learned advocate for the petitioners.
ANALYSIS:
7. Having heard Mr. Buch, learned advocate for the
petitioners – defendants, it appears that this revision
application is filed against the concurrent finding of fact
recorded by the Courts below against the defendants,
whereby it has been held that there is a reasonable and
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C/CRA/449/2026 (GJHC240655242026) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
bona fide requirement of landlord who requires the
rented premises for betterment/settlement of his
son/grandson.
7.1. It is undisputed on record that the original plaintiff,
namely Haribhai Rudabhai Thumbar was having five sons
and two grandsons at the time of institution of the suit. It
is also not in dispute that one of the sons, namely,
Dineshbhai, who also happens to be his special POA is
residing just above the rented shop and having an agency
of Phillips company, selling the electrical appliances. The
other two sons of the landlord are in the business of
diamond polishing and are residing at Mumbai. There are
two grandsons of the original plaintiff and out of which
one grandson, namely, son of Jayantibhai (plaintiff
No.1.1) is a major. It came on record that for expansion of
the business of his son, namely Dineshbhai, as the area of
shop of plaintiff’s son was insufficient and grandsons of
plaintiff have to start their business, for such reasons, the
rented premises was required. Whereas, it has been so
observed by the Trial Court that the defendant-tenant can
get an alternative rented premises to run his business.
There is nothing on record to show that it causes great
hardship to the tenant vis-à-vis landlord if the eviction
decree passed; rather, the requirement of the landlord set
out in the plaint and proved by leading evidence cannot
be said to be mere desire.
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C/CRA/449/2026 (GJHC240655242026) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
8. At this stage, it would be apt to refer to the decision
of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Raghunath G.
Panhale (Dead) By Lrs. Vs. Chaganlal Sundarji & Co.
reported in (1999) 8 SCC 1 . The relevant paragraphs of
the aforesaid judgment reads thus:
“5. We shall initially refer to the legal principles applicable
to the case. Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel
and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 uses the words
“the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the
landlord” for his own occupation etc. The requirement must,
therefore, be both reasonable and bona fide.
6. The word “reasonable”, in our view, connotes that
the requirement or need is not fanciful or
unreasonable. It cannot be a mere desire. The word
“requirement” coupled with the word reasonable
means that it must be something more than a mere
desire but need not certainly be a compelling or
absolute or dire necessity (Aitken v. Shaw; Neville v.
Hardy). A reasonable and bona fide requirement is
something in between a mere desire or wish on one
hand and a compelling or dire or absolute necessity
on the other end. It may be a need in praesenti or within
reasonable proximity in the future. The use of the word
“bona fide” is an additional requirement under Section
13(1)(g) and it means that the requirement must also be
honest and not be tainted with any oblique motive.
7. The above principles have been laid down in various
decisions of this Court and we shall refer to a few of them
which are relevant to the issue before us. It was stated in
Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan that the reasonable
requirement postulates an element of “need” as opposed to
a mere “desire or wish”. It was also pointed out that if it
was indeed a case of a reasonable need, the same could
not be diluted by characterising it as only a mere desire. It
was stated:
“The distinction between desire and need should
doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even a
genuine need as nothing but a desire.”
(emphasis supplied)
It was also held that the language of the provision cannot
be unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or
extremely difficult for the landlord to get possession. If
more limitations are imposed upon the landlord
holding property, it would expose itself to the vice of
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C/CRA/449/2026 (GJHC240655242026) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
unconstitutionality (Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar). The
construction of the relevant statutory provision must
strike a just balance between the right of the
landlord and the right of the tenant . In Bega Begum
case the landlords adduced evidence to show that they
wanted to augment their present income by starting a hotel
business. This was treated as a genuine need and it was
held that it could not be equated with a mere desire. This
Court observed that “the Act does not completely overlook
the interest of the landlord”. In Mattulal v. Radhe Lal a like
principle was laid down stating that the test was not a
subjective but an objective one and that the court was to
judge whether the need of the landlord was reasonable and
bona fide. This Court held that the Additional District Judge
in that case was wrong in thinking that the landlord who
wanted to start an iron and steel business, had to produce
proof of preparations for starting his new business, such as
making arrangements for capital investment, approaching
the Iron and Steel Controller for the required permits etc.
This Court held that the above circumstances were “wholly
irrelevant” and observed:
“ It is difficult to imagine how the respondent
could be expected to make preparations for
starting the new business unless there was a
reasonable prospect of his being able to obtain
possession of the Lohia Bazar shop in the near
future .”
8. This Court took judicial notice of long delays in courts and
observed:
“It is a common but unfortunate failing of our judicial
system that a litigation takes an inordinately long time
in reaching a final conclusion and then also it is
uncertain as to how it will end and with what result” and
that, therefore,
“it would be too much to expect from him (landlord)
that he should make preparations for starting the new
business. Indeed, from a commercial and practical point
of view, it would be foolish on his part to make
arrangements for investment of capital, obtaining of
permits and receipt of stocks of iron and steel materials
when he would not know whether he would at all be able
to get possession of the Lohia Bazar shop, and if so,
when and after how many years”.
9. Next comes the decision of this Court in A.K.
Veeraraghava Iyengar v. N.V. Prasad. In that case, this
Court observed that the need was bona fide and that the
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tenant failed to adduce any evidence against the
“experience of landlord, his financial capacity and his
readiness and willingness to start jewellery shop”. In Vinay
Kumar v. District Judge, Ghaziapur, it was contended for the
tenant that the son of the landlord whose requirement was
pleaded, was in government service and, therefore, he
could not have any bona fide need to start a private
practice as a doctor. This contention was rejected. In Rena
Drego v. Lalchand Soni it was observed that in the light of
the factual position in that case, “when the landlady says
that she needs more accommodation for her family, there is
no scope for doubting the reasonableness of the
requirement”. It was held that the circumstances of the
case raised a presumption that the requirement was bona
fide and that “tenant has failed to show that the demand
for eviction was made with any oblique motive”. It was held
that in the absence of such evidence by the tenant, the
presumption of the bona fide need stood unrebutted. In
Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. it was again
observed that the court should not proceed on the
assumption that the requirement of the landlord was not
bona fide and that the tenant could not dictate to the
landlord as to how he should adjust himself without getting
possession of the tenanted premises. It was stated in
Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan and in Meenal Eknath
Khirsagar v. Traders and Agencies that the landlord was the
best judge of his requirement. In Sheela Chadha v. Dr
Achharaj Ram Sehgal, it was held that the landlord had the
discretion to determine his need. See also in this connection
the judgment of this Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.
Mahesh Chand Gupta. In Raj Kumar Khaitan v. Bibi Zubaida
Khatun this Court had even stated that it was necessary for
the landlord to state in the pleadings, the nature of the
business he proposed to start.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. So far as the argument of Mr. Buch, learned
advocate, that the oral evidence of original plaintiff
through special POA cannot be looked into by the Court is
concerned, first of all, such a plea was never pressed into
service before the Trial Court or Appellate Court,
inasmuch as, there is no issue framed in this regard.
Apart from above, it is not in dispute that special POA of
the original plaintiff happens to be his real son who is
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undisputably residing just above the rented shop and
having small shop of electrical appliances just beside the
rented shop. In that background of facts, it cannot be
gainsaid that the POA of original plaintiff has knowledge
of the suit.
9.1 Likewise, Mr. Buch, learned advocate has also tried
to impress me that there is another space available to the
landlord for use but again, no such arguments either
pressed before the Courts below nor anything brought
before this Court except submitted impugned
judgement/decree of the Courts below with this revision.
Apart from the aforesaid, a new plea at the stage of
revision cannot be permitted by this Court, especially
when such plea is not a pure question of law but depends
upon the fact and its appreciation. It is settled law that the
Revisional Court requires to see as to whether any
perversity and or gross error of law committed by the
Courts below while passing the eviction decree. If nothing
of the sort is found, merely because other view is possible,
the Revisional Court should not substitute such view.
10. It would be apposite to refer to and rely upon the
decision of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation
Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh reported in (2014) 9 SCC 78 ,
wherein it has been held thus:
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“ 28. Before we consider the matter further to find out the scope and
extent of revisional jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control
Acts, a quick observation about the “appellate jurisdiction” and
“revisional jurisdiction” is necessary. Conceptually, revisional
jurisdiction is a part of appellate jurisdiction but it is not vice versa.
Both, appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are creatures
of statutes. No party to the proceeding has an inherent right of appeal
or revision. An appeal is continuation of suit or original proceeding,
as the case may be. The power of the appellate court is coextensive
with that of the trial court. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves
rehearing on facts and law but such jurisdiction may be limited by
the statute itself that provides for the appellate jurisdiction. On the
other hand, revisional jurisdiction, though, is a part of appellate
jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated with that of a full-
fledged appeal. In other words, revision is not continuation of suit or
of original proceeding. When the aid of Revisional Court is invoked
on the revisional side, it can interfere within the permissible
parameters provided in the statute. It goes without saying that if a
revision is provided against an order passed by the Tribunal/appellate
authority, the decision of the Revisional Court is the operative
decision in law. In our view, as regards the extent of appellate or
revisional jurisdiction, much would, however, depend on the
language employed by the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction
and revisional jurisdiction.
*
43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts
entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded
by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on
reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the
court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the
evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts
is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the
court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any
error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority below, if
perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material
evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the
evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would
result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it
is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High
Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent
Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being
not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the
correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned
before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the
regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision
or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an
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appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to
a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be
equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a
court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied
that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the
order impugned before it suffers from procedura l illegality or
irregularity.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Having considered the aforesaid facts and
circumstances and taking note of the decisions of the
Hon'ble Apex Court supra, I am of the considered view
that there is no error, much less any gross error of law
committed by the Courts below, inasmuch as, the finding
of fact recorded by the Trial Court was neither perverse
nor grossly erroneous which requires interference of this
Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under
Section 29(2) of the Rent Act.

CONCLUSION :
12. In view of the foregoing reasons, I am of the
considered view that there is no case made out by the
petitioners to interfere with the judgment and decree
passed by the Courts below in this revision application.
Accordingly, the present Civil Revision Application is
found meritless and it is dismissed in limine . No order as
to costs.
(MAULIK J. SHELAT, J)
SHAHANAZ / GAURAV J THAKER
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