RAMESH vs Ram Kumar

Court
High Court of Himachal Pradesh
Case type
CRMMO - 302 (Criminal Misc. Petition(Main) u/s 482 CRPC)
Decided on
30-03-2026
<div> <b>IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA</b><br /><b> High Court of H.P.</b><br /> <b>Cr.MMO No.853 of 2025</b><br /> <b>Reserved on:20.03.2026</b><br /> <b>Date of Decision: 30.03.2026</b><br /> _______________________________________________________<br /> Sh. Ramesh …….Petitioner<br /> Versus <br /> Ram Kumar … Respondent<br /> <b>_______________________________________________________</b><br /> Coram:<br /> <b>Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.</b><br /> 1<br /> Whether approved for reporting? Yes.<br /> <b>For the Petitioners: </b> Mr. P.S. Chandel, Advocate.<br /> <b>For the Respondent</b> : Mr. Ajay Kumar Chauhan, Advocate.<br /> _______________________________________________________<br /> <b>Sandeep Sharma, Judge</b> (oral):<br /> Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with orders dated <br /> 04.06.2024 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jubbal, District <br /> Shimla, Himachal Pradesh (Camp at Rohru) and 18.06.2025 passed <br /> by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.II, Rohru, District Shimla, <br /> Himachal Pradesh (Annexures P-1 and P-2), whereby petitioner-<br /> accused (in short “ <b><i>accused</i></b> ”) came to be directed to pay interim <br /> compensation equivalent to 20% of the cheque amount within 60 days <br /> from the date of order, in terms of Section 143-A of Negotiable <br /> Instruments Act (in short “ <b><i>NI Act</i></b> ”) as inserted by Act 20 of 2018, <br /> accused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings filed <br /> under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, praying <br /> therein to quash and set aside the aforesaid orders. <br /> 1<br /> <i>Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? </i><br /> <b><i>::: Downloaded on - 30/03/2026 17:31:58 :::CIS</i></b><br /><br /> 2<br /> 2. Precisely, the facts of the case as emerge from the <br /><b> High Court of H.P.</b><br /> pleadings as well as other material adduced on record by the <br /> respective parties are that respondent/complainant (in short <br /> “ <b><i>complainant</i></b> ”) filed a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act in <br /> the competent Court of law, alleging therein that accused issued post-<br /> dated cheque No.876733 amounting to Rs.12,00,000/- dated <br /> 04.03.2022 drawn from SBI branch Pujarli No.4, Shimla in favour of <br /> the complainant towards discharge of his lawful liability. However, the <br /> same was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds in the bank <br /> account of the accused. Since despite having received legal notice, <br /> accused failed to make the payment good within stipulated time, <br /> complainant preferred the aforesaid complaint in the competent Court <br /> of law, which is pending adjudication. During proceedings of the case, <br /> accused filed an application under Section 145-2 of NI Act, praying <br /> therein to cross-examine the complainant. Learned Court below, after <br /> having heard learned counsel for the parties, proceeded to pass order <br /> dated 04.06.2024, whereby Court concerned, while allowing the <br /> application under Section 145-2 of the NI Act, thereby permitting the <br /> accused to cross-examine the complainant, also invoked the <br /> provisions of Section 143-A of NI Act, as inserted by Act 20 of 2018 <br /> and directed the accused to pay interim compensation equivalent to <br /> 20% of the cheque amount within 60 days from the date of the order. <br /> <b><i>::: Downloaded on - 30/03/2026 17:31:58 :::CIS</i></b><br /><br /> 3<br /> Though in terms of afore order, interim compensation awarded by the <br /><b> High Court of H.P.</b><br /> learned Court below was to be paid on or before 04.08.2024, but <br /> since accused failed to comply with the aforesaid direction, Court <br /> proceeded to pass order dated 18.06.2025, thereby directing the <br /> accused to pay interim compensation as per order dated 04.06.2025, <br /> failing which same shall be recovered in terms of provisions contained <br /> under Section 421 of Cr.P.C. Accused is aggrieved of second part of <br /> order dated 04.06.2024, whereby he has been directed to pay interim <br /> compensation equivalent to 20% of the cheque amount. <br /> <b>3.</b> In nutshell, the grouse of the accused, as has been <br /> highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. P.S. Chandel, <br /> learned counsel representing the petitioner, is that impugned order <br /> dated 04.06.2024, whereby the accused has been directed to pay <br /> interim compensation equivalent to 20% of the cheque amount, is in <br /> complete violation of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as no <br /> opportunity of being heard was afforded to the accused prior to <br /> passing of the aforesaid order. Mr. Chandel further submitted that by <br /> now it is well settled that while dealing with an application under <br /> Section 143-A of the NI Act, the Court is required to <i>prima facie </i><br /> evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the <br /> merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the <br /> application under Section 143-A (1). He submitted that neither any <br /> <b><i>::: Downloaded on - 30/03/2026 17:31:58 :::CIS</i></b><br /><br /> 4<br /> application under Section 143-A ever came to be filed at the behest of <br /><b> High Court of H.P.</b><br /> complainant nor any opportunity was ever afforded to file reply. Mr. <br /> Chandel further submitted that since accused has specifically denied <br /> factum of his having availed loan to the tune of Rs.12,00,000/-, <br /> learned Court below ought not have straightaway proceeded to order <br /> grant of interim compensation, rather at first instance, it was required <br /> to give an opportunity of being heard to the accused that too after <br /> evaluating the merits of the case set up by the complainant and the <br /> merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the <br /> application under Section 143-A (1) of the NI Act, which was <br /> otherwise never permitted to be filed. <br /> <b>4.</b> To the contrary, Mr. Ajay Kumar Chauhan, learned <br /> counsel representing the respondent, while supporting the impugned <br /> order, vehemently argued that bare reading of Section 143-A nowhere <br /> suggests that an opportunity to file reply, if any, is required to be given <br /> to the accused, rather, in terms of aforesaid provision of law, Court <br /> trying an offence under Section 138 of NI Act may order the drawer of <br /> the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant, which <br /> shall not exceed 20% of the cheque amount. <br /> <b>5.</b> Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused <br /> material available on record vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the orders <br /> impugned in the instant proceedings, this Court is persuaded to <br /> <b><i>::: Downloaded on - 30/03/2026 17:31:58 :::CIS</i></b><br /><br /> 5<br /> interfere with the same for the reason that same is not based upon <br /><b> High Court of H.P.</b><br /> proper appreciation of Section 143-A of NI Act as well as law laid <br /> down by Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court in number of <br /> judgments. At first instance, it would be apt to take note of Section <br /> 143 of NI Act, which reads as under:-<br /> <i>“</i> <b><i> 143 A</i></b> <i>S. </i> <b><i> </i></b> <b><i> </i></b> <i> </i> <i>Power to direct interim compensation</i><br /> <i>1. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal </i><br /> <i>Procedure, 1973, the Court trying an offence under section 138 </i><br /> <i>may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to </i><br /> <i>the complainant—</i><br /> <i>a. in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads </i><br /> <i>not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and</i><br /> <i>b. in any other case, upon framing of charge. </i><br /> <i>2. The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed </i><br /> <i>twenty percent of the amount of the cheque. </i><br /> <i>3. The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the </i><br /> <i>date of the order under sub-section (1), or within such further period </i><br /> <i>not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on </i><br /> <i>sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the</i><br /> <i>cheque. </i><br /> <i>4. If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the </i><br /> <i>complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim </i><br /> <i>compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the </i><br /> <i>Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant </i><br /> <i>financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within </i><br /> <i>such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by </i><br /> <i>the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant. </i><br /> <b><i>::: Downloaded on - 30/03/2026 17:31:58 :::CIS</i></b><br /><br /> 6<br /> <i>5. The interim compensation payable under this section may be </i><br /><b> High Court of H.P.</b><br /> <i>recovered as if it were a fine under section </i> <i>421</i> <i> of the Code of </i><br /> <i>Criminal Procedure, 1973. </i><br /> <i>6. The amount of fine imposed under section </i> <i>138</i> <i> or the amount of </i><br /> <i>compensation awarded under section </i> <i>357</i> <i> of the Code of Criminal </i><br /> <i>Procedure, 1973, shall be reduced by the amount paid or recovered </i><br /> <i>as interim compensation under this section.” </i><br /> <b>6.</b> Careful perusal of aforesaid provision of law suggests <br /> that Court trying an offence under Section 138 of NI Act may order the <br /> drawer of the cheque to pay the interim compensation to the <br /> complainant. <br /> <b>7.</b> Though having perused aforesaid provision of law, this <br /> Court is persuaded to agree with Mr. Ajay Kumar Chauhan, learned <br /> counsel representing the respondent, that Court of its own may also <br /> proceed to award interim compensation, which shall not exceed 20% <br /> of the cheque amount, but use of word “may” in aforesaid provision of <br /> law compels this Court to agree with the contention raised at the <br /> behest of the accused that it is not must for the Court to order <br /> payment of interim compensation in every complaint, rather it is the <br /> discretion of the learned trial Court “whether to order payment of <br /> interim compensation or not?” No doubt, power under Section 143-A <br /> (1) is discretionary as is evident from the bare reading of aforesaid <br /> provision but at the same time, it is not mandatory for the Court to <br /> order the accused to pay interim compensation. Once the Trial Court <br /> <b><i>::: Downloaded on - 30/03/2026 17:31:58 :::CIS</i></b><br /><br /> 7<br /> decides for ordering payment of interim compensation, the maximum <br /><b> High Court of H.P.</b><br /> cap that can be imposed is 20% of the cheque amount. Directing the <br /> accused to pay interim compensation between 1% to 20% of the <br /> cheque amount is another discretionary power of the Court, which is <br /> to be exercised in accordance with law after considering all attending <br /> parameters. Use of word “may” in aforesaid provision of law though <br /> gives discretion to the Court concerned to award interim <br /> compensation, but same cannot be awarded in a routine manner, <br /> rather Court concerned, while deciding issue of interim maintenance, <br /> is necessarily required to look into the pleadings adduced on record <br /> by the parties to the <i>lis</i> , especially defence of the accused. Had <br /> legislature used the word “shall” instead of “may, learned counsel <br /> representing the respondent was right in contending that in all <br /> eventualities, Court is under obligation to award interim maintenance, <br /> but in the instant case, use of word “may” instead of “shall” and cap of <br /> 20% of the cheque amount clearly suggests that though it is the <br /> discretion of the Court to award interim maintenance, but it shall not <br /> exceed 20% of the cheque amount, meaning thereby, Court, in given <br /> facts and circumstances, can proceed to grant interim compensation <br /> from 1% to 20% of the cheque. However for determining the correct <br /> percentage, Court is necessarily required to look into the defence of <br /> the accused. Since application for interim maintenance is normally <br /> <b><i>::: Downloaded on - 30/03/2026 17:31:58 :::CIS</i></b><br /><br /> 8<br /> decided at first instance and defence of the accused is not disclosed <br /><b> High Court of H.P.</b><br /> at the initial stage, learned Court below, while considering issue of <br /> interim compensation, is required to afford an opportunity to the <br /> accused to file reply to the application, if any, filed under Section 143-<br /> A of NI Act, wherein certainly he can provide reasoning for not <br /> awarding interim compensation, prayed at the behest of the <br /> complainant. Coordinate Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal <br /> with similar situation in Cr.MMO No. 264 of 2023, titled as <b><i>Mukesh </i></b><br /> <b><i>Kumar Vs Raman</i></b> , decided on 15.05.2023, wherein it has held as <br /> under:-<br /> <i>“Thus from a holistic reading of Section 143A of the Act, it becomes </i><br /> <i>apparent that power given to the Court to order payment of interim </i><br /> <i>compensation amount, is discretionary. It is not mandatory for the </i><br /> <i>Court to order the accused to pay interim compensation. However, </i><br /> <i>once the Trial Court decides for ordering payment of interim </i><br /> <i>compensation, the maximum cap that can be imposed is 20% of </i><br /> <i>the cheque amount. Directing the accused to pay interim </i><br /> <i>compensation between 1% to 20% of the cheque amount is </i><br /> <i>another discretionary power of the Court. The discretionary powers </i><br /> <i>be it for deciding to direct the accused to pay interim compensation </i><br /> <i>amount or to order him to pay specified percentage of cheque </i><br /> <i>amount, towards interim maintenance has to be exercised in </i><br /> <i>accordance with law after considering all attending parameters. The </i><br /> <i>learned Trial Court was to give a reasonable opportunity to the </i><br /> <i>accused-petitioner on the interim compensation to be awarded </i><br /> <i>against him. Without affording any opportunity to the petitioner and </i><br /> <i>without giving any reason for awarding 10% of the interim </i><br /> <i>compensation, learned Trial Court has simply ordered the petitioner </i><br /> <i>to pay 10% of the cheque amount as interim compensation. This </i><br /> <b><i>::: Downloaded on - 30/03/2026 17:31:58 :::CIS</i></b><br /><br /> 9<br /> <i>course is not in consonance with the scheme of the Act. The order </i><br /><b> High Court of H.P.</b><br /> <i>should indicate application of mind by the Court to the facts and </i><br /> <i>relevant factors while awarding interim compensation &amp; extent </i><br /> <i>thereof. The impugned order does not disclose any application of </i><br /> <i>mind. It straightway directed the petitioner to deposit 10% of the </i><br /> <i>cheque amount as interim compensation that too at his first </i><br /> <i>appearance in the Court. Hence for aforesaid reasons, the present </i><br /> <i>petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 05.08.2022 is set </i><br /> <i>aside alongwith consequent proceedings arising out of it. The </i><br /> <i>parties through their respective learned counsel are directed to </i><br /> <i>appear before the learned Trial Court on 13.06.2023. Learned Trial </i><br /> <i>Court shall consider the matter for the grant of interim </i><br /> <i>compensation afresh in light of above observations and in </i><br /> <i>accordance with law. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, </i><br /> <i>shall also stand disposed of.</i><br /> <b>8.</b> Reliance is also placed upon judgment passed by <br /> Hon’ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No.741 of 2024, case titled as <br /> <b><i>Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava Vs. The State of Jharkhand &amp; Anr., </i></b><br /> wherein Hon’ble Apex Court held that power under sub-section (1) of <br /> Section 143-A of NI Act is discretionary and not mandatory. Sub-<br /> section (1) of Section 143-A NI Act provides for passing a drastic <br /> order for payment of interim compensation against the accused in a <br /> complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, even before any adjudication <br /> is made on the guilt of the accused. Hon’ble Apex Court held that <br /> afore power can be exercised at the threshold even before the <br /> evidence is recorded, as such, if word “may’ is interpreted as “shall”, it <br /> would have drastic consequences as in every complainant under <br /> <b><i>::: Downloaded on - 30/03/2026 17:31:58 :::CIS</i></b><br /><br /> 10<br /> Section 138 of NI Act, the accused will have to pay interim <br /><b> High Court of H.P.</b><br /> compensation upto 20% of the cheque amount. Relevant paras of the <br /> afore judgment are extracted herein below:-<br /> <i>“</i> <b><i>MANDATORY OR DIRECTORY</i></b><br /> <i>9. There is no doubt that the word &quot;may&quot; ordinarily does not mean </i><br /> <i>&quot;must&quot;. Ordinarily, &quot;may&quot; will not be construed as &quot;shall&quot;. But this is </i><br /> <i>not an inflexible rule. The use of the word &quot;may&quot; in certain </i><br /> <i>legislations can be construed as &quot;shall&quot;, and the word &quot;shall&quot; can be </i><br /> <i>construed as &quot;may&quot;. It all depends on the nature of the power </i><br /> <i>conferred by the relevant provision of the statute and the effect of </i><br /> <i>the exercise of the power. The legislative intent also plays a role in </i><br /> <i>the interpretation of such provisions. Even the context in which the </i><br /> <i>word &quot;may&quot; has been used is also relevant.</i><br /> <i>10. The power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is to direct the </i><br /> <i>payment of interim compensation in a summary trial or a summons </i><br /> <i>case upon the recording of the plea of the accused that he was not </i><br /> <i>guilty and, in other cases, upon framing of charge. As the maximum </i><br /> <i>punishment under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is of imprisonment up </i><br /> <i>to 2 years, in view of clause (w) read with clause (x) of Section 2 of </i><br /> <i>the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, &#x27;the Cr.PC&#x27;), the </i><br /> <i>cases under Section 138 of the N.I. Act are triable as summons </i><br /> <i>cases. However, sub-section (1) of Section 143 provides that </i><br /> <i>notwithstanding anything contained in the Cr.PC, the learned </i><br /> <i>Magistrate shall try the complaint by adopting a summary procedure </i><br /> <i>under Sections 262 to 265 of the Cr.PC. However, when at the </i><br /> <i>commencement of the trial or during the course of a summary trial, it </i><br /> <i>appears to the Court that a sentence of imprisonment for a term </i><br /> <i>exceeding one year may have to be passed or for any other reason </i><br /> <i>it is undesirable to try the case summarily, the case shall be tried in </i><br /> <i>the manner provided by the CrPC. Therefore, the complaint under </i><br /> <i>Section 138 becomes a summons case in such a contingency. We </i><br /> <i>may note here that under Section 259 of the Cr.PC, subject to what </i><br /> <b><i>::: Downloaded on - 30/03/2026 17:31:58 :::CIS</i></b><br /><br /> 11<br /> <i>is provided in the said Section, the learned Magistrate has the </i><br /><b> High Court of H.P.</b><br /> <i>discretion to convert a summons case into a warrant case. Only in a </i><br /> <i>warrant case, there is a question of framing charge. Therefore, </i><br /> <i>clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 143A will apply only when </i><br /> <i>the case is being tried as a warrant case. In the case of a summary </i><br /> <i>or summons trial, the power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A </i><br /> <i>can be exercised after the plea of the accused is recorded.</i><br /> <i>11. Under sub-section (5) of Section 143A, it is provided that the </i><br /> <i>amount of interim compensation can be recovered as if it were a </i><br /> <i>fine under Section 421 of the Cr.PC. Therefore, by a legal fiction, </i><br /> <i>the interim compensation is treated as a fine for the purposes of its </i><br /> <i>recovery. Section 421 of the Cr.PC deals with the recovery of the </i><br /> <i>fine imposed by a criminal court while passing the sentence. Thus, </i><br /> <i>recourse can be taken to Section 421 of the Cr.PC. for recovery of </i><br /> <i>interim compensation, which reads thus:&quot;</i><br /> <i>421. Warrant for levy of fine.-(1) When an offender has been </i><br /> <i>sentenced to pay a fine, the Court passing the sentence may </i><br /> <i>take action for the recovery of the fine in either or both of the </i><br /> <i>following ways, that is to say, it may-</i><br /> <i>(a) issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by </i><br /> <i>attachment and sale of any movable property </i><br /> <i>belonging to the offender:</i><br /> <i>(b) issue a warrant to the Collector of the district. </i><br /> <i>authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of </i><br /> <i>land revenue from the movable or immovable </i><br /> <i>property, or both, of the defaulter:</i><br /> <i>Provided that, if the sentence directs that in default of payment of </i><br /> <i>the fine, the offender shall be imprisoned, and if such offender has </i><br /> <i>undergone the whole of such imprisonment in default, no Court shall </i><br /> <i>issue such warrant unless, for special reasons to be recorded in </i><br /> <i>writing, it considers it necessary so to do, or unless it has made an </i><br /> <b><i>::: Downloaded on - 30/03/2026 17:31:58 :::CIS</i></b><br /><br /> 12<br /> <i>order for the payment of expenses or compensation out of the fine </i><br /><b> High Court of H.P.</b><br /> <i>under Section 357.</i><br /> <i>(2) The State Government may make rules regulating the manner in </i><br /> <i>which warrants under clause (a) of sub-section (1) are to be </i><br /> <i>executed, and for the summary determination of any claims made </i><br /> <i>by any person other than the offender in respect of any property </i><br /> <i>attached in execution of such warrant.</i><br /> <i>(3) Where the Court issues a warrant to the Collector under clause </i><br /> <i>(b) of sub-section (1), the Collector shall realise the amount in </i><br /> <i>accordance with the law relating to recovery of arrears of land </i><br /> <i>revenue, as if such warrant were a certificate issued under such </i><br /> <i>law:</i><br /> <i>Provided that no such warrant shall be executed by the arrest or </i><br /> <i>detention in prison of the offender.&quot;</i><br /> <b><i>FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHILE EXERCISING </i></b><br /> <b><i>DISCRETION</i></b><br /> <i>16. When the court deals with an application under Section 143A of </i><br /> <i>the N.I. Act. the Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of </i><br /> <i>the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence </i><br /> <i>pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application under sub-</i><br /> <i>section (1) of Section 143A. The presumption under Section 139 of </i><br /> <i>the N.I. Act, by itself, is no ground to direct the payment of interim </i><br /> <i>compensation. The reason is that the presumption is rebuttable. The </i><br /> <i>question of applying the presumption will arise at the trial. Only if the </i><br /> <i>complainant makes out a prima facie case, a direction can be </i><br /> <i>issued to pay interim compensation. At this stage, the fact that the </i><br /> <i>accused is in financial distress can also be a consideration. Even if </i><br /> <i>the Court concludes that a case is made out for grant of interim </i><br /> <i>compensation, the Court will have to apply its mind to the quantum </i><br /> <i>of interim compensation to be granted. Even at this stage, the Court </i><br /> <b><i>::: Downloaded on - 30/03/2026 17:31:58 :::CIS</i></b><br /><br /> 13<br /> <i>will have to consider various factors such as the nature of the </i><br /><b> High Court of H.P.</b><br /> <i>transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the </i><br /> <i>complainant and the paying capacity of the accused. If the defence </i><br /> <i>of the accused is found to be prima facie a plausible defence, the </i><br /> <i>Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim </i><br /> <i>compensation. We may note that the factors required to be </i><br /> <i>considered, which we have set out above, are not exhaustive. There </i><br /> <i>could be several other factors in the facts of a given case, such as, </i><br /> <i>the pendency of a civil suit, etc. While deciding the prayer made </i><br /> <i>under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating </i><br /> <i>consideration of all the relevant factors.</i><br /> <i>17. In the present case, the Trial Court has mechanically passed an </i><br /> <i>order of deposit of Rs. 10,00,000/- without considering the issue of </i><br /> <i>prima facie case and other relevant factors. It is true that the sum of </i><br /> <i>Rs. 10,00,000/- represents less than 5 per cent of the cheque </i><br /> <i>amount, but the direction has been issued to pay the amount </i><br /> <i>without application of mind. Even the High Court has not applied its </i><br /> <i>mind. We, therefore, propose to direct the Trial Court to consider the </i><br /> <i>application for grant of interim compensation afresh. In the </i><br /> <i>meanwhile, the amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- deposited by the </i><br /> <i>appellant will continue to remain deposited with the Trial Court.</i><br /> <b>9.</b> In afore case, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that if word <br /> “may’ is interpreted as “shall”, such interpretation will be unjust and <br /> contrary to the well settled concept of fairness and justice. <br /> <b>10.</b> Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made <br /> herein above as well as law taken into consideration, this Court finds <br /> merit in the present petition and accordingly, the same is allowed. <br /> Impugned orders dated 04.06.2024 and 18.06.2025 (Annexures P-1 <br /> <b><i>::: Downloaded on - 30/03/2026 17:31:58 :::CIS</i></b><br /><br /> 14<br /> and P-2) as well as subsequent proceedings initiated in lieu thereof <br /><b> High Court of H.P.</b><br /> are quashed and set aside. <br /> <b>11.</b> Learned counsel representing the parties undertake to <br /> cause presence of their respective clients before the learned Court <br /> below on <b>23.04.2026</b> , enabling it to consider and decide the matter for <br /> grant of interim compensation afresh in light of observations made <br /> hereinabove and in accordance with law. Pending applications, if any, <br /> also stand disposed of.<br /> (Sandeep Sharma),<br /> Judge<br /> March 30, 2026 <br /> (sunil)<br /> <br /> <b><i>::: Downloaded on - 30/03/2026 17:31:58 :::CIS</i></b></div>