Kuldeep vs The Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal Cum Labour Court Rohtak And Others

CWP No. 1354 of 2026 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
(266) CWP No. 1354 of 2026
Date of Decision: 02.11.2026
Kuldeep ......Petitioner
Versus
The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour .....Respondents
Court, Rohtak and others
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH
Present: Mr. Sandeep Singal, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Chirag Wadhwa, DAG, Haryana.

KIRTI SINGH , J. (ORAL)
1. The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227
of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the award dated 27.08.2025
(Annexure P-4), passed by respondent No.1, whereby the reference
concerning the alleged termination of services of the petitioner-workman
was answered against him and his claim for reinstatement with continuity of
service and full back wages was declined.
2. Briefly stated, the case set up by the petitioner is that he was
appointed as a Mali with respondent No.2-Government College, Meham, on
15.11.2012 and continued to discharge his duties satisfactorily till
19.11.2018. According to him, although he had completed more than 240
days of service, the management stopped him from marking his attendance
and subsequently, on 29.11.2018, verbally informed him that his services
had been terminated. It is his further case that the action was taken without
issuance of any notice, payment of retrenchment compensation or
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CWP No. 1354 of 2026 -2-
compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (for short, 'the Act of 1947'). He also alleged that no charge-sheet was
issued, no enquiry was conducted and no opportunity of hearing was
afforded to him. Claiming that the work of Mali was perennial in nature and
that the work continued to exist with respondent No.2, he further alleged
violation of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act of 1947. The petitioner
had initially instituted a civil suit in respect of the alleged termination, which
was withdrawn vide order dated 22.08.2019 with liberty to avail the
appropriate remedy. Thereafter, he raised an industrial dispute by serving a
demand notice and, upon failure of conciliation, the matter came to be
referred to the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak.
3. Upon notice, respondent No.2 contested the claim by filing its
written statement. Its specific stand was that the petitioner had not been
appointed by the college but had been deployed through respondent No.3-
M/s Alert Detective Security Limited, an outsourcing agency, vide letter
No.1175 dated 22.11.2012, on DC rates, under the Right Sizing Policy of the
Government of Haryana. It was further pleaded that the petitioner had
himself remained absent from duty from the morning of 19.11.2018 and that
his services had never been terminated by the college. The management also
relied upon a show-cause notice dated 19.11.2018, issued to the petitioner
regarding his work and absence, and a resolution dated 22.11.2018 of the
College Staff Council, whereby it was decided to request the outsourcing
agency to replace him on account of his alleged unsatisfactory work and
conduct. Respondent No.3 was proceeded against ex parte vide order dated
07.01.2020.
4. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Tribunal framed the
following issues: (i) Whether the termination of services of the workman is
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CWP No. 1354 of 2026 -3-
justified and, if not, to what relief is he entitled?(ii) Relief.
5. Upon consideration of the evidence led by the parties, the
learned Tribunal answered the first issue against the petitioner, holding that
he had been deployed through M/s Alert Detective Security Limited and that
no relationship of employer and employee between him and respondent No.2
had been established. It further accepted the management's stand that the
case was one of absenteeism and that the petitioner's services had not been
terminated. Consequently, the reference was answered against the petitioner
and he was held entitled to no relief. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has
approached this Court.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the learned
Tribunal has failed to appreciate the evidence in its proper perspective. It is
argued that the management did not produce any agreement between
respondent Nos.2 and 3, nor did it place on record the registration certificate
required under Section 7 or the licence contemplated under Section 12 of the
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (for short, 'the Act of
1970'). According to learned counsel, in the absence of such documents, the
petitioner could not have been treated as an employee of the outsourcing
agency, and the relationship of employer and employee with respondent
No.2 ought to have been inferred. It is further contended that the petitioner
had rendered service for more than 240 days and, therefore, his services
could not have been dispensed with without compliance with Section 25-F
of the Act of 1947. Learned counsel also submits that the allegations
regarding unsatisfactory work and absence were stigmatic in nature and
could not have been made the basis for discontinuing the petitioner's
services without holding a proper enquiry. It is further argued that the work
of Mali continued to exist and that the management had retained or engaged
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CWP No. 1354 of 2026 -4-
other persons, thereby violating Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act of 1947.
On these grounds, interference with the impugned award is sought.
7. Per contra, learned State counsel supports the impugned award
and submits that the petitioner was never appointed by respondent No.2.
Rather, he was deployed by respondent No.3 through its letter dated
22.11.2012 and was working at the college on DC rates. It is further
submitted that the contemporaneous record, particularly the show-cause
notice dated 19.11.2018 and the resolution dated 22.11.2018, establishes that
the petitioner had left his duties without prior intimation and that the college
had merely requested the outsourcing agency to replace him. Learned State
counsel further submits that the petitioner has not established that he had
completed 240 days of continuous service in the relevant period or that any
junior to him was retained in service. It is, thus, contended that neither an
employer-employee relationship with respondent No.2 nor any act of
retrenchment at its instance has been established. The findings recorded by
the learned Tribunal, being based upon the material before it, do not warrant
interference in the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
relevant material on record.
9. The principal controversy which arises for consideration is
whether the petitioner has been able to establish that he was an employee of
respondent No.2 and that his services were terminated by the said
respondent in violation of the provisions of the Act of 1947. The question as
to whether the provisions of Section 25-F or the other provisions relied upon
by the petitioner were attracted would necessarily depend upon the
establishment of these foundational facts.
10. At the outset, it is necessary to notice that the determination of
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CWP No. 1354 of 2026 -5-
an employer-employee relationship cannot be made merely on the basis of
the place where a person discharges his duties or the fact that the work
performed by him is connected with the activities of a particular
establishment. The question has to be determined by examining the real
nature of the relationship between the parties, having regard to the relevant
circumstances, including the authority responsible for appointment, payment
of remuneration, power of dismissal, extent of supervision and control, and
the overall arrangement under which the workman was engaged. In
Workmen of Nilgiri Cooperative Marketing Society Ltd. v. State of Tamil
Nadu, (2004) 3 SCC 514, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that no single test
is conclusive for determining the jural relationship of employer and
employee and that the relevant factors have to be considered cumulatively in
the facts of each case. The mere fact that a person has been working
continuously at the premises of an establishment would not, by itself,
establish such relationship.
11. In the present case, the petitioner asserts that he was directly
appointed by respondent No.2 on 15.11.2012. The management, on the other
hand, has consistently maintained that he was deployed through respondent
No.3. In support of its stand, reliance has been placed upon letter No.1175
dated 22.11.2012, addressed by M/s Alert Detective Security Limited to the
Principal, Government College, Meham, specifically referring to the
deployment of the petitioner, along with another person, for duty at the
college.
12. The aforesaid document is a relevant piece of material
supporting the management's version that the petitioner was deployed
through the outsourcing agency. It is true that the production of this letter, by
itself, does not conclusively establish every term and condition of the
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CWP No. 1354 of 2026 -6-
contractual arrangement between respondent Nos.2 and 3. Nevertheless, it
cannot be ignored while examining the rival versions regarding the
petitioner's engagement. The petitioner has principally sought to discredit
the aforesaid arrangement on the ground that the management did not
produce the agreement between respondent Nos.2 and 3 or the registration
certificate under Section 7 and the licence under Section 12 of the Act of
1970. The argument, however, cannot be accepted in the absolute terms in
which it has been advanced.
13. Sections 7 and 12 of the Act of 1970 deal with registration of
the establishment by the principal employer and licensing of the contractor,
respectively. Their statutory requirements are required to be complied with
wherever the provisions of the Act are attracted. However, the mere absence
of proof of such registration or licence does not, as a matter of law,
automatically result in the workman becoming an employee of the principal
employer.
14. In Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. National Union Waterfront
Workers, (2001) 7 SCC 1, the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court explained the legal consequences of the statutory scheme governing
contract labour. It was held that even abolition of contract labour under
Section 10 of the Act of 1970 does not result in automatic absorption of
contract labourers as employees of the principal employer. The Court also
clarified that where a contract is found to be a sham or camouflage, the
appropriate adjudicatory forum may determine the real relationship between
the parties. Thus, the question whether the petitioner was in fact employed
by respondent No.2 or was deployed through respondent No.3 had to be
determined on the basis of the entire factual arrangement and the evidence
available, rather than by drawing an automatic inference from the alleged
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CWP No. 1354 of 2026 -7-
non-production of statutory certificates.
15. In the present case, apart from the deployment letter dated
22.11.2012, the management has relied upon the c correspondence
exchanged in November 2018. The show-cause notice dated 19.11.2018,
issued by the Principal, Government College, Meham, called upon the
petitioner to explain his position regarding the alleged improper cutting of
plants and his absence from duty from the morning of that date. Thereafter,
the resolution dated 22.11.2018 of the College Staff Council recorded the
management's dissatisfaction with the petitioner's work and conduct and
resolved that respondent No.3 be requested to take him back and provide
another suitable and competent gardener.
16. The aforesaid documents, when read together with the
deployment letter, lend support to the management's stand that the petitioner
had been deployed through the outsourcing agency and that the college was
seeking his replacement through the said agency. Significantly, the
resolution does not purport to terminate the petitioner's employment by an
order of the college; rather, it records a decision to request the agency to
replace him.
17. It is evident that the petitioner's assertion that he was directly
appointed by respondent No.2 has to be considered alongside the specific
deployment letter and the subsequent correspondence relied upon by the
management. The fact that the petitioner discharged the work of a Mali
within the premises of the college is not, by itself, sufficient to displace the
management's case regarding his deployment through the outsourcing
agency.
18. The petitioner has also not been able to show, on the basis of the
material placed before this Court, that the arrangement was merely a
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CWP No. 1354 of 2026 -8-
camouflage or that respondent No.3 was a name-lender and the college was,
in reality, exercising all the incidents of an employer. In the absence of such
material, the finding of the learned Tribunal that the relationship of employer
and employee between the petitioner and respondent No.2 had not been
established cannot be said to be wholly unsupported by the record.
19. The next submission relates to the alleged violation of Section
25-F of the Act of 1947. Its applicability, however, presupposes that there
has been a retrenchment by the employer concerned. In the present case, the
petitioner asserts that he was prevented from marking his attendance from
19.11.2018 and was subsequently informed that his services had been
terminated. The management has denied having terminated his services and
has maintained that he himself remained absent from duty from the morning
of 19.11.2018.
20. The show-cause notice dated 19.11.2018 and the resolution
dated 22.11.2018 are relevant in this regard. The former records the
management's contemporaneous grievance concerning the petitioner's work
and absence, while the latter records the decision to request the outsourcing
agency to replace him. No order of termination issued by respondent No.2
has been brought to the notice of this Court. Nor does the resolution dated
22.11.2018, on its face, purport to terminate the petitioner's services; it is a
communication concerning his replacement through the agency.
21. The mere fact that the petitioner may have ceased to work at the
college would not, without examining the nature of the arrangement and the
circumstances in which he ceased to attend duties, necessarily establish an
act of retrenchment by respondent No.2. In the circumstances, and
particularly in view of the finding that the petitioner failed to establish an
employer-employee relationship with respondent No.2, the contention
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CWP No. 1354 of 2026 -9-
regarding non-compliance with Section 25-F cannot be accepted as a ground
for setting aside the award.
22. The contention regarding completion of 240 days of continuous
service also does not, by itself, advance the petitioner's case. The
requirement of 240 days is relevant for determining the entitlement of a
workman to the protection contemplated under Section 25-F, but the same
cannot dispense with the requirement of establishing the foundational
relationship of employment and the factum of retrenchment.
23. In R.M. Yellatti v. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC
106, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the burden of proof in cases
where a workman asserts completion of 240 days of continuous service. The
initial burden is upon the workman to plead and establish the requisite
period of service by leading cogent evidence. The mere assertion of having
completed 240 days would not, in itself, be sufficient.
24. In the present case, the petitioner has asserted that he had
worked for more than 240 days. However, the issue of continuous service
cannot be considered in isolation from the question as to who was his
employer and whether his services were retrenched by respondent No.2. In
view of the findings recorded hereinabove on these foundational aspects, the
plea under Section 25-F does not furnish a basis for interference with the
impugned award.
25. The plea regarding violation of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the
Act of 1947 is equally required to be examined in the context of the
foundational facts. Section 25-G deals with the principle of 'last come, first
go' in cases of retrenchment, subject to the statutory conditions, whereas
Section 25-H concerns preference in re-employment of retrenched workmen
in the circumstances contemplated therein.
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CWP No. 1354 of 2026 -10-
26. For invoking these provisions, the petitioner was required to
establish the relevant facts concerning retrenchment, the category of
workmen concerned and the retention or subsequent engagement of other
persons in circumstances attracting the statutory protections. A general
assertion that the work of Mali continued to exist or that other persons were
working in the college would not, by itself, establish a violation of either
provision. The petitioner has not been able tos jow from the material placed
before this Court that any junior workman similarly situated was retained in
preference to him or that the statutory conditions attracting Section 25-H
stood fulfilled.
27. It is also well settled that the jurisdiction of this Court under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is supervisory and not appellate.
The Court does not ordinarily undertake a fresh appreciation of evidence
merely because another view may be possible. Interference is warranted
where the findings of the Tribunal are shown to be perverse, based on no
evidence, founded upon a misreading of material evidence or vitiated by a
patent error of law or jurisdiction.
28. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the limitations governing the exercise of
certiorari jurisdiction and held that the High Court does not sit as a Court of
appeal over the findings of the inferior Tribunal. A mere error in appreciation
of evidence or a possible alternative view would not, by itself, justify
interference unless the finding suffers from an error of the nature recognised
in law.
29. Examined in the aforesaid legal framework, this Court finds that
the petitioner has not been able to establish any such perversity or patent
illegality in the conclusion reached by the learned Tribunal as would warrant
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CWP No. 1354 of 2026 -11-
interference in exercise of the extraordinary or supervisory jurisdiction of
this Court.
30. Accordingly, finding no ground for interference, the present writ
petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
31. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
(KIRTI SINGH)
JUDGE
nd
November 02 , 2026
Gurpreet Singh
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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