Gautam Sharma vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
th
ON THE 15 OF OCTOBER, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 43492 of 2026
CNR No.: MPHC030291312026
GAUTAM SHARMA AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Raj Bahadur Singh Tomar - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Prabhat Pateriya - Govt. Advocate for the respondents/State.
ORDER
1. The present petition has been filed u/Art. 226 of the Constitution
praying for the following reliefs:-
"7.1 That, the respondent no. 2 and 3 may kindly directed to
permit petitioners to participate in the selection process for
the post Black Resource Centre Coordinator and Assistant
Project Coordinator in the Gwalior district.

7.2 That, the respondent kindly further directed not to reject
the applications of the petitioners for the post of BRCC and
APC.
7.3 That, the respondent kindly also directed to permit them
to appear in the written examination, which is going to be
schedule on 21-10-2026 and declared their result and a found
suitable kindly appoint as per their merit.

7.4 That, other relief doing justice including cost be ordered."
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners were
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initially working as Madhyamik Shikshak in District Gwalior. As promotion

to the post of Uchcha Madhyamik Shikshak was not being made due to an
interim order passed by the Apex Court regarding reservation in promotion,
the State Government amended the Madhya Pradesh State and Subordinate
Education Services (School Branch) Recruitment and Promotion Rules,
2016, and conducted a DPC. Thereafter, the petitioners, being eligible, were
posted as Uchcha Madhyamik Shikshak (Uchcha Prabhar) vide orders dated
12.08.2024 and 06.08.2024. Under the said orders, they were granted the
same powers and status as Uchcha Madhyamik Shikshak.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that respondent
No. 2 issued an advertisement dated 23.06.2025 for selection to the post of
District Project Coordinator (DPC) under the Samagra Shiksha Abhiyan, for
which Principals of High Schools, Lecturers and Uchcha Madhyamik
Shikshak were eligible. The petitioners participated in the written
examination, and several candidates working as Uchcha Madhyamik
Shikshak (Uchcha Prabhar) were declared successful. Thereafter, respondent
No. 2 issued a letter dated 02.09.2026 prescribing eligibility for selection to
the posts of Block Resource Centre Coordinator (BRCC) and Assistant
Project Coordinator (APC), which also included Lecturers and Uchcha
Madhyamik Shikshak. In pursuance thereof, respondent No. 3 issued an
advertisement dated 02.10.2026 for filling the said posts in District Gwalior,
fixing 14.10.2026 as the last date for submission of applications and
21.10.2026 as the date of examination.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners,
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being eligible and possessing B.Ed. degrees, applied for both posts.

However, respondent No. 3 orally informed them that their applications had
been treated as ineligible on the ground that Uchcha Madhyamik Shikshak
(Uchcha Prabhar) were not eligible. The same treatment was also given to
candidates in District Ashok Nagar.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the petitioners
have the same status, qualifications and duties as Uchcha Madhyamik
Shikshak and, therefore, cannot be denied the opportunity to participate in
the selection process, particularly when they were permitted to participate in
the selection for the higher post of DPC. Even Head Masters of Middle
Schools have been made eligible for the posts of BRCC and APC, whereas
the petitioners, who hold a higher post, have been excluded without any valid
reason. The action of the respondents is arbitrary and discriminatory and
violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, prays that the
respondents be directed to permit the petitioners to participate in the
selection process for the posts of BRCC and APC in District Gwalior, not to
reject their applications, and allow them to appear in the written examination
scheduled for 21.10.2026. It is further prayed that their results be declared
and, if found suitable, they be appointed according to merit.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State submitted that
the substantive post of the petitioners are Madhyamik Shikshak and not
Uchcha Madhyamik Shikshak and that the petitioners are only holding
charge of the post of Uchcha Madhyamik Shikshak. As per the
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advertisement (Annexure P-2), the requisite qualification is that of a Uchcha

Madhyamik Shikshak is School Lecturer or an equivalent qualification.
Since the substantive post of the petitioners are Madhyamik Shikshak, the
petitioners' eligibility cannot be considered equivalent to that of a Uchcha
Madhyamik Shikshak merely on the ground that the petitioners are holding
charge of the said post. The minimum qualification can only be considered
on the basis of the substantive posts of the petitioners. Therefore, the
petitioners are not entitled to participate in the examination for the post of
BRCC.
8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
9. The relevant part of amended Madhya Pradesh State and Sub
Ordinate Education Services (School Branch) Recruitment and Promotion
Rules, 2016 reads as under for ready reference and convenience;
In the said Rules, in rule 6, after clause (c), the following
clause shall be added, namely:-
"(d) In case, if it is necessary to fill up vacancies of the
higher post immediately and the suitable Government
Servant who hold qualification required for higher post are
available and eligible on basis of seniority cum merit then the
appointing authority of concerned post may issue on order
f o r officiating of higher rank untill further orders. The
officers so ordered to officiate at such higher rank, shall have
no seniority or pay of such higher rank of such higher post
till such officer officiates on such higher post. Such
officiating officer shall exercise all the powers of such higher
post as exercisable by an officer promoted to such higher
rank to which he is currently officiating.".
10. The contention raised by the petitioners that they were initially
working as Madhyamik Shikshak and were subsequently assigned the posts
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of Uchcha Madhyamik Shikshak against vacant posts pursuant to an interim

order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and after amendment of the
Rules of 2016 a DPC was constituted, which considered their eligibility for
the higher posts, and they were found eligible and posted accordingly. This
contention is however, cannot be accepted, as it proceeds on an incorrect
interpretation of the amended Rule. A plain reading of the amended
provision shows that the relevant expression used therein is “officiating” and
not “promoted”. The provision specifically authorises the competent
authority to permit an eligible government servant to officiate in a higher
rank until further orders, where an immediate arrangement is required to fill
the vacancy. It further clarifies that such an arrangement does not confer any
right to claim seniority or pay attached to the higher rank. Therefore, merely
because the petitioners were assigned the duties and responsibilities of the
post of Uchcha Madhyamik Shikshak, it cannot be construed that they were
regularly promoted to the said post. Their placement was only in an
officiating capacity, which is distinct from substantive promotion under the
applicable recruitment and promotion rules. Consequently, the petitioners
cannot claim the benefit of regular promotion merely on the basis of their
officiating arrangement, and the challenge raised on this ground is devoid of
merit.
11. Upon perusal of the record, it appears that the substantive post of
the petitioners are Madhyamik Shikshak and not Uchcha Madhyamik
Shikshak, and that the petitioners are merely holding charge of the post of
Uchcha Madhyamik Shikshak. As per the advertisement (Annexure P-2), the
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requisite qualification is that of a School Lecturer or an equivalent

qualification. Therefore, the petitioners' eligibility is to be determined on the
basis of the substantive post held by the petitioners, and merely holding
charge of the post of Uchcha Madhyamik Shikshak does not entitle the
petitioners to claim equivalence with the requisite qualification.
Consequently, the petitioners are not entitled to participate in the
examination for the post of BRCC.
12. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that
interim relief has already been granted by the Coordinate Bench in favour of
similarly situated persons and that the interim order passed by the Coordinate
Bench is binding upon this Court. However, only the final judgment and
order passed by the Coordinate Bench would have binding effect, and even
as per the advertisement, the petitioners do not possess the minimum
essential qualification. Therefore, the interim order passed by the Coordinate
Bench is not binding upon this Court, and the submission made by learned
counsel for the petitioners is rejected.
13. It is well established principle of law that principle of negative
equality has no place under Article 14 of Constitution of India.
14. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Another v.
International Trading Co. & Another, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 437 has held
as under :
"13. What remains now to be considered, is the effect of
permission granted to the thirty two vessels. As highlighted by
learned counsel for the appellants, even if it is accepted that there
was any improper permission, that may render such permissions
vulnerable so far as the thirty two vessels are concerned, but it
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cannot come to the aid of the respondents. It is not necessary to
deal with that aspect because two wrongs do not make one right. A
party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in
another case direction should be given for doing another wrong. It
would not be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetuating
another wrong. In such matters there is no discrimination
involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14
of the Constitution of India (in short "the Constitution") cannot be
pressed into service in such cases. What the concept of equal
treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It
does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both
wrongs on a par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong
has been committed in some other cases by introducing a concept
of negative equality the respondents cannot strengthen their case.
They have to establish strength of their case on some other basis
and not by claiming negative equality."

15. The Supreme Court in the case of Directorate of Film Festivals and
Others v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain & Others reported in (2007) 4 SCC 737 has
held as under :
"22. When a grievance of discrimination is made, the High Court
cannot just examine whether someone similarly situated has been
granted a relief or benefit and then automatically direct grant of
such relief or benefit to the person aggrieved. The High Court has
to first examine whether the petitioner who has approached the
court has established a right, entitling him to the relief sought on
the facts and circumstances of the case. In the context of such
examination, the fact that some others, who are similarly situated,
have been granted relief which the petitioner is seeking, may be of
some relevance. But where in law, a writ petitioner has not
established a right or is not entitled to relief, the fact that a
similarly situated person has been illegally granted relief, is not a
ground to direct similar relief to him. That would be enforcing a
negative equality by perpetuation of an illegality which is
impermissible in law. The principle has been stated by this Court
in Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh [(1995) 1 SCC 745] thus:
(SCC pp. 750-51, para 8).

"Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent
Authority has passed a particular order in the case of
another person similarly situated can never be the
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ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on
the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the
other person might be legal and valid or it might not be.
That has to be investigated first before it can be directed
to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order
in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to
law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of
his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted
order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ
compelling the respondent Authority to repeat the
illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The
extraordinary and discretionary power of the High
Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely
because the respondent Authority has passed one
illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High
Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality
over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action
must be corrected, if it can be done according to law--
indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct
the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in
accordance with law- but even if it cannot be corrected,
it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its
repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent
Authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not
condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such
illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate
complaint of discrimination.
Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the
interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to
public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule
of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the
other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it
can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the
petitioner if it is found that the petitioners' case is
similar to the other persons' case. But then why examine
another person's case in his absence rather than
examining the case of the petitioner who is present
before the court and seeking the relief. Is it not more
appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement
of the petitioner before the court to the relief asked for
in the facts and circumstances of his case than to
enquire into the correctness of the order made or action

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taken in another person's case, which other person is not
before the case nor is his case. In our considered
opinion, such a course--barring exceptional situations--
would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other
words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the
well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and
say that because in one case a particular order has been
passed or a particular action has been taken, the same
must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such
an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each
case must be decided on its own merits, factual and
legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles."

16. The Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State Electricity Board
and Another v. Gulshan Lal & Others, reported in, (2009) 12 SCC 231 has
held as under :
"32. The appellant is State within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India. For holding a public office, an employee
must possess the requisite prescribed qualification, in absence
whereof the additional reliefs could not have been granted to them
relying on or on the basis of the judgment passed in the earlier
cases.

33. Conditions of service of the employees of the appellants are
governed by the statutory rules. Violation thereof is impermissible
in law. Whereas the appellants are bound by the doctrine of
equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, it is also well settled that unequals cannot be treated as
equals. Herein, equality doctrine has been invoked only on the
basis of relief granted in the case of Anil Kapoor.

34. In Anil Kapoor's case, a writ petition was also filed for the
purpose of grant of designation. The same has rightly or wrongly
been allowed. That would not mean that equality can be claimed
on the basis thereof which would lead to a wholly anomalous
situation. Decree granted by a competent court of law is no doubt
binding on the employer. But, when in a subsequent litigation the
absurd result emanating from the cascading effect thereof becomes
apparent before another court and it is found that the said judgment
is illegal, it is well settled, that by application of Article 14 of the
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Constitution of India alone, similar relief should not be granted.

35. Equality clause carries with it a positive effect. It signifies
treating persons equally who are situated similarly. Those who had
been occupying the position of Foreman Grade I and/or Foreman
Grade II and other employees who were far below them either for
the purpose of seniority or otherwise could not have been treated
equally. The cascading effect thereof would be that for all intent
and purport those who are in the joint seniority list being above
Anil Kapoor and others in the seniority list would derive the same
benefit irrespective of the fact as to whether they are qualified to
hold the post of Foreman Grade I and/or otherwise gained
sufficient experience therefor for promotion to that post."

17. The Supreme Court in the case of Shanti Sports Club & Another v.
Union of India & Others, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 705, has held as under :
"71. Article 14 of the Constitution declares that:

"14. Equality before law.--The State shall not deny to
any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India."
The concept of equality enshrined in that article is a positive
concept. The Court can command the State to give equal treatment
to similarly situated persons, but cannot issue a mandate that the
State should commit illegality or pass wrong order because in
another case such an illegality has been committed or wrong order
has been passed. If any illegality or irregularity has been
committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals,
others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this
Court and seek a direction that the same irregularity or illegality be
committed in their favour by the State or its
agencies/instrumentalities. In other words, Article 14 cannot be
invoked for perpetuating irregularities or illegalities. In
Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh [(1995) 1 SCC 745] this Court
made a lucid exposition of law on this subject. The facts of that
case were that the respondents, who had given the highest bid for
338 sq yd plot in Sector 31-A, Chandigarh defaulted in paying the
price in accordance with the terms and conditions of allotment.
After giving him opportunity of showing cause, the estate officer
cancelled the lease of the plot. The appeal and the revision filed by
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him were dismissed by the Chief Administrator and the Chief
Commissioner, Chandigarh respectively. Thereafter, the
respondent applied for refund of the amount deposited by him. His
request was accepted and the entire amount paid by him was
refunded. He then filed a petition for review of the order passed by
the Chief Commissioner, which was dismissed. However, the
officer concerned entertained the second review and directed that
the plot be restored to the respondent. The latter did not avail
benefit of this unusual order and started litigation by filing writ
petition in the High Court, which was dismissed on 18-3-1991.
Thereafter, the respondent again approached the estate officer with
the request to settle his case in accordance with the policy of the
Government to restore the plots to the defaulters by charging
forfeiture amount of 5%. His request was rejected by the estate
officer. He then filed another writ petition before the High Court,
which was allowed only on the ground that in another case
pertaining to Smt Prakash Rani, the Administrator had restored the
plot despite dismissal of the writ petition filed by her. While
reversing the order of the High Court, this Court observed as
under: (Jagjit Singh case [(1995) 1 SCC 745] , SCC pp. 750-51,
para 8)


"8. ... We are of the opinion that the basis or the
principle, if it can be called one, on which the writ
petition has been allowed by the High Court is
unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since
we have come across many such instances, we think it
necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length.
Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent
Authority has passed a particular order in the case of
another person similarly situated can never be the
ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on
the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the
other person might be legal and valid or it might not be.
That has to be investigated first before it can be directed
to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order
in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to
law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of
his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted
order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ
compelling the respondent Authority to repeat the
illegality or to pass another unwarranted order.
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(emphasis in original) The extraordinary and
discretionary power of the High Court cannot be
exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the
respondent Authority has passed one
illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High
Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality
over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action
must be corrected, if it can be done according to law-
indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct
the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders
in accordance with law--but even if it cannot be
corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a
basis for its repetition. (emphasis supplied) By refusing
to direct the respondent Authority to repeat the
illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal
act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis
for a legitimate complaint of discrimination.
Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the
interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to
public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule
of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the
other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it
can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the
petitioner if it is found that the petitioner's case is
similar to the other person's case. But then why examine
another person's case in his absence rather than
examining the case of the petitioner who is present
before the court and seeking the relief. Is it not more
appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement
of the petitioner before the court to the relief asked for
in the facts and circumstances of his case than to
enquire into the correctness of the order made or action
taken in another person's case, which other person is not
before the case (sic court) nor is his case. In our
considered opinion, such a course barring exceptional
situations would neither be advisable nor desirable. In
other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and
the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction
and say that because in one case a particular order has
been passed or a particular action has been taken, the
same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether
such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise.

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Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual
and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles.
The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be
equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and
High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the
precedents, as understood in the judicial world."


18. The Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and Another v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81 has held as
under :
"8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the
Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by
extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said
provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a
positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have
been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such
an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same
relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot
be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in
illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in
a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been
committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a
wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating
or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a
similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any
particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits
on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14
cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make
functioning of administration impossible. (Vide Chandigarh
Admn. v. Jagjit Singh [(1995) 1 SCC 745 : AIR 1995 SC 705],
Anand Buttons Ltd.v. State of Haryana [(2005) 9 SCC 164 : AIR
2005 SC 565] ,K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P.[(2006) 3 SCC 581 :
AIR 2006 SC 898] and Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab[(2010) 11
SCC 455 : AIR 2010 SC 1937].)"
19. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the law laid down by the
Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, this Court finds that the
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petitioners do not possess the requisite qualification prescribed under the

advertisement (Annexure P-2) for participating in the examination for
selection to the posts of BRCC and APC. Merely holding charge of the post
of Uchcha Madhyamik Shikshak does not confer eligibility upon the
petitioners when the substantive post held by the petitioners are Madhyamik
Shikshak. Further, the petitioners cannot claim parity with similarly situated
persons merely on the ground that respondents have allowed them to
participate in the written examination at earlier point of time.
20. Accordingly, no case for interference is made out. The present
petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed.
(ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT)
JUDGE
vpn/-

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