Md. Ariz Hasnain @ Ariz Hasnain vs State Of Jharkhand

2026 INSC 456
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 11860 of 2025)

Md. ARIZ HASNAIN
@ ARIZ HASNAIN ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF JHARKHAND ….RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R
Mehta, J.
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
st

3. This appeal arises from the order dated 21
February, 2025 passed by the learned Single Judge
1
of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in
Criminal M.P. No. 742 of 2024, whereby the petition
preferred by the appellant, challenging the order
nd
dated 2 February, 2024 rendered by the learned
2
AJC XVIII cum Special Judge, ATS, Ranchi ,
Signature Not Verified

1
Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”.
2
Hereinafter, referred to as “Special Judge” or “trial Court”.
Digitally signed by
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2026.05.06
18:21:45 IST
Reason:
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extending the time period for submission of
chargesheet, was dismissed. While dismissing the
said petition, the High Court observed that since the
chargesheet had already been filed within the
extended period and hence, the petition for default
bail had lost its efficacy.

BRIEF FACTS
4. The brief facts relevant and essential for
disposal of the appeal are noted hereinbelow.
5. The appellant was arraigned as an accused in
th
connection with FIR No. 13 of 2023 dated 7
November, 2023 registered at Police Station ATS,
Ranchi for the offences punishable under Sections
3
124A, 153A, 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
and Sections 18, 20, 38, and 39 of the Unlawful
4
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 .
6. The appellant claims that he was illegally
th
detained on 4 November, 2023, i.e., even before the
registration of the FIR which came to be registered on
th
7 November, 2023. The appellant was formally
shown arrested in documents on the very same day.
th
On 8 November, 2023, the appellant was remanded

3
Hereinafter, referred to as “IPC”.
4
Hereinafter, referred to as “UAPA”.
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to judicial custody. The orders of remand were
th
periodically extended and by order dated 18
January, 2024, the period of remand was extended
th
till 5 February, 2024. The period of 90 days as
prescribed under Section 167(2) of the Code of
5
Criminal Procedure, 1973 , was coming to an end on
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5 February, 2024.
7. While the appellant was in judicial custody, the
nd
Investigating Officer moved an application dated 2
February, 2024 before the learned Special Judge
seeking an extension of 30 days to complete the
investigation, which was allowed on the very same
day and the time for filing the chargesheet was
extended by a further period of 25 days from the date
of completion of 90 days of custody as provided under
Section 167(2) of the CrPC. It is the specific case of
the appellant that all these actions were taken behind
his back and without any intimation to him as he was
in judicial custody.
th
8. The statutory period of 90 days expired on 5
February, 2024, without the chargesheet being filed.
On that date, the appellant was produced before the

5
Hereinafter, referred to as “CrPC”.
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learned Special Judge via video conferencing, and his
judicial custody was further extended by 14 days.
9. Claiming to be completely unaware of the
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proceedings dated 2 February, 2024, wherein the
period for completion of investigation was extended,
th
the appellant moved an application on 8 February,
2024 seeking default bail under Section 167(2) of the
CrPC. Notice on the said application was issued to
the Public Prosecutor and a reply was sought.
th
10. On 20 February, 2024, the learned Special
nd
Judge intimated the appellant of the order dated 2
February, 2024, whereby the time for completion of
the investigation had been extended and with
reference thereto, the prayer for default bail was
th
rejected vide order dated 20 February, 2024.
th
Subsequently, on 28 February, 2024, upon an
application being made by the investigating agency,
the learned Special Judge granted a further extension
of 25 days for concluding the investigation.
th
11. On 29 February, 2024, the appellant filed the
subject Miscellaneous Petition No. 742 of 2024 before
nd
the High Court, assailing the order dated 2
February, 2024, whereby the time for completion of
the investigation had been extended. The contentions
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advanced and the relief sought for by the appellant in
the said petition are enumerated below:-
i. The order dated 02.02.2024 suffers from
manifest illegality as he was neither informed
of the filing/ listing of the application, nor
supplied a copy of it and nor heard at the
time of passing of the order - which is
mandated as per settled law interpreting
Section 43-D(2) UAPA.
ii. The Ld. APP merely forwarded the application
for extension of time without applying his
mind and without submitting a report as
mandated under Section 43-D(2) UAPA.
12. The appellant also preferred another Criminal
Appeal (DB) No. 260 of 2024, challenging the order
th
dated 20 February, 2024, whereby his application
for default bail had been dismissed on the ground of
extension of time to complete investigation granted
nd
on 2 February, 2024.
13. Fourth and final extension to conclude
investigation was further granted by the learned
th
Special Judge on 19 April, 2024 for a period of 15
days.
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14. During the pendency of the subject
Miscellaneous Petition No. 742 of 2024 before the
High Court, the chargesheet came to be filed against
nd
the appellant on 2 May, 2024 for the offences
punishable under Sections 153A and 120B of the IPC
and Sections 16, 18, 20, 38 and 39 of the UAPA. The
st
High Court, vide impugned order dated 21
February, 2025, proceeded to dismiss the said
petition, observing that since the chargesheet had
been submitted within the extended period, nothing
survived for consideration in the matter.
15. Being aggrieved, the appellant has approached
this Court by way of the instant appeal by special
leave.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
16. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant
submitted that the impugned orders passed by the
trial Court and the High Court are wholly
unsustainable in facts and in law.
17. A pertinent argument was raised on behalf of
the appellant that at the time when the first extension
was granted by the learned Special Judge vide order
nd
dated 2 February, 2024 the appellant was neither
produced before the Court, either physically or
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through video conferencing, nor was he served with
or otherwise notified of the application seeking
extension.
18. Learned counsel further submitted that the
nd
order dated 2 February, 2024 does not disclose any
justifiable reasons or grounds for extension of time to
conclude investigation. It was contended that the
nd
order dated 2 February, 2024 merely records the
bald submission of the learned APP that the
investigation was pending, without reflecting any
application of mind either to the progress of
investigation or to the necessity for continued
detention of the appellant.
19. It was further contended that the two
subsequent extension orders reflect verbatim the
same reasons as were recorded in the first order of
nd
extension dated 2 February, 2024. It was, thus,
contended that the extension to conclude the
investigation beyond 90 days having been granted in
a mechanical manner without intimating the
appellant and without providing him an opportunity
to raise objections, the appellant gained the
indefeasible right to be released on default bail under
Section 167(2) of the CrPC.
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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

20. Per contra , Shri Rajiv Shankar Dwivedi, learned
standing counsel for the State of Jharkhand,
vehemently and fervently opposed the submissions
advanced on behalf of the appellant and supported
the impugned order, contending that the extension of
time for completion of investigation had been validly
granted in accordance with law and that the
chargesheet had been filed within the extended
period and thus the right to default bail under
Section 167(2) of the CrPC did not survive.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
21. We have given our thoughtful consideration to
the submissions advanced at bar and have carefully
gone through the impugned order and the material
placed on record.
th
22. By order dated 9 March, 2026, Shri Dwivedi,
was directed to respond as to whether, at the time of
grant of extension of the period for completion of
investigation, the appellant was produced before the
learned Special Judge. The said order is reproduced
hereinbelow for the sake of ready reference:-
“Learned counsel appearing for the respondent- State
of Jharkhand, upon instructions, prays for and is
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granted two weeks’ time to place on record whether,
at the time when the extension was granted by the
designated Court, the petitioner was produced, either
virtually or physically, or not.
List the matter immediately after two weeks.”

23. In compliance of the aforesaid order, Shri
Dwivedi, has placed on record the copies of order
sheets of the trial Court. A perusal of the order sheet
nd
dated 2 February, 2024 recorded by the learned
Special Judge reflects that the appellant was neither
intimated of the application for extension of time filed
by the public prosecutor nor was he provided any
opportunity of hearing on the said prayer.
24. For the sake of convenience, the proceedings
nd
dated 2 February, 2024, as recorded in the order
sheet of the trial Court, are extracted hereinbelow for
ready reference:-
“02.02.2024- Two separate (sic) petitions filed on
behalf of Rohit Ranjan Singh, Dy SP, ATS, Ranchi for
extension of period for completing the investigation
against the accused namely Ariz Hasnain & Md Nasim
@ Mohsin along with upto-date case diary and
affidavit. The petition is duly forwarded by the Addl
P.P of ATS.
Petitions filed by I.O. of this case has been duly
pressed through the Addl P.P of ATS to extend judicial
custody remand of accused persons named above
beyond the period of 90 days for further 30 days. The
Ld. Addl P.P of ATS submitted that the accused
namely Ariz Hasnain & Md Nasim @ Mohsin were
remanded in this case on 08.11.2023 & 09.11.2023
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respectively and their 90 days period of judicial
remand is going to expire. The Addl P.P. further
submitted that the accused were in contact with
people related to terrorist organization ISIS and
investigation of the case need more time as it is not
possible for the I.O. of ATS to complete the
investigation of this case within the seeked period.
Therefore the judicial remand in respect of the above-
named accused persons is required to be extended
from 90 days to further 30 days for smooth and
proper investigation of the matter under provision of
Section 43-D of the Unlawful Activities (Prohibition)
Act 1967, as the power of extending the remand is
vested with the court under the said provision.
Heard and perused the case record. It transpires
(sic) that the FIR No. 13/2023 dated 07.11.2023 was
registered u/s 124(A)/153(A) & 120B of IPC & Section
18/20/38/39 of U.A.P Act against the accused
namely Ariz Hasnain, Nasim, Mashrat@ Khushi,
Jishan Gull Aarif, Khalid, Aisha & other unknowns
and investigation is in progress. The accused persons
namely Ariz Hasnain & Md Nasim @ Mohsin were
remanded in this case on 08.11.2023 & 09.11.2023
and their 90 days of judicial custody is going to
complete on 05.02.2024 & 06.02.2024.
Under the facts and circumstances and
considering the submission of the Ld Add P.P. that
investigation is still pending and due to that reason,
the prayer of I.O. is hereby allowed and the period for
completing the investigation against the accused
persons namely Ariz Hasnain & Md Nasim @Mohsin
is extended for further 25 days from the date of
completion of 90 days of judicial custody.”

25. Shri Dwivedi was not in a position to dispute
that the aforesaid proceedings do not reflect that the
appellant had been intimated of the application for
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extension of time or that he was provided an
opportunity to object to the same.
26. At this juncture, we may gainfully refer to the
6
decision of this Court in Jigar v. State of Gujarat ,
wherein the Court considered the scope and import
of the requirement of notice and production of the
accused at the stage of consideration of an
application for extension of time for completion of
investigation and observed as follows:-
“ 41. Clause ( b ) of sub-section (2) of Section
167CrPC lays down that no Magistrate shall
authorise the detention of the accused in the
custody of the police unless the accused is
produced before him in person. It also provides
that judicial custody can be extended on the
production of the accused either in person or
through the medium of electronic video linkage.
Thus, the requirement of the law is that while
extending the remand to judicial custody, the
presence of the accused has to be procured either
physically or virtually. This is the mandatory
requirement of law. This requirement is sine qua
non for the exercise of the power to extend the
judicial custody remand. The reason is that the
accused has a right to oppose the prayer for the
extension of the remand.

42. When the Special Court exercises the power of
granting extension under the proviso to sub-section
(2) of Section 20 of the 2015 Act, it will necessarily
lead to the extension of the judicial custody beyond
the period of 90 days up to 180 days. Therefore, even

6
(2023) 6 SCC 484.
11

in terms of the requirement of clause ( b ) of sub-
section (2) of Section 167CrPC, it is mandatory to
procure the presence of the accused before the
Special Court when a prayer of the prosecution for
the extension of time to complete investigation is
considered . In fact, the Constitution Bench of this
Court in the first part of para 53(2)( a ) in its decision
in Sanjay Dutt [ Sanjay Dutt v. State , (1994) 5 SCC
410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] holds so.
…
44. As noted earlier, the only modification made by
the larger Bench in Sanjay Dutt [ Sanjay Dutt v. State ,
(1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] to the
decision in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur [ Hitendra Vishnu
Thakur v. State of Maharashtra , (1994) 4 SCC 602 :
1994 SCC (Cri) 1087] is about the mode of service of
notice of the application for extension. In so many
words, in para 53(2)( a ) of the judgment, this Court
in Sanjay Dutt [ Sanjay Dutt v. State , (1994) 5
SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] held that it is
mandatory to produce the accused at the time
when the Court considers the application for
extension and that the accused must be informed
that the question of extension of the period of
investigation is being considered. The accused may
not be entitled to get a copy of the report as a matter
of right as it may contain details of the investigation
carried out. But, if we accept the submission of the
respondents that the accused has no say in the
matter, the requirement of giving notice by producing
the accused will become an empty and meaningless
formality. Moreover, it will be against the mandate of
clause ( b ) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section
167CrPC. It cannot be accepted that the accused is
not entitled to raise any objection to the application
for extension. The scope of the objections may be
limited. The accused can always point out to the
Court that the prayer has to be made by the Public
Prosecutor and not by the investigating agency.
Secondly, the accused can always point out the twin
requirements of the report in terms of the proviso
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nd
2 February, 2024 passed by the learned Special
13

Judge does not reflect application of mind whatsoever
for extending the period for completion of
investigation. A bald observation has been made in
the said order to the effect that, considering the
submission of the learned APP that the investigation
was still pending, the prayer of the Investigating
Officer was being allowed and the period for
completion of the investigation was accordingly
extended by another 25 days.
28. Under the provisions of Section 167(2) of the
CrPC, a clear mandate exists restricting the custody
of the accused for a period beyond 60 days or 90
days, as the case may be. If the investigation is not
completed and chargesheet is not filed within the
aforesaid period, it would give rise to an indefeasible
right in favour of the accused to seek default bail.
Hence, any direction to extend the period for filing of
chargesheet encroaches upon the personal liberty of
an individual arrested in connection with a
cognizable offence and thus, any such direction must
be preceded by due application of mind and by
recording justifiable reasons.
29. It may be reiterated that the learned Special
Judge neither provided any opportunity to the
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appellant to oppose the prayer for extension of time
to file the chargesheet nor did it apply its judicial
mind while allowing the prayer for extension of time.
In an absolutely mechanical manner, the learned
Special Judge recorded the prayer of the public
prosecutor and casually extended the period for filing
of chargesheet by 25 days. Hence, the order
extending time to conclude investigation is grossly
illegal, arbitrary and violative of the fundamental
right of liberty of the appellant as guaranteed under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
30. It may be noted that in the proceedings dated
th
28 February, 2024, learned counsel representing
the appellant in the trial Court was intimated of the
second application for extension and arguments were
heard. However, even in the said proceedings, while
extending the period for completion of investigation,
the learned Special Judge failed to assign any cogent
or valid reason whatsoever. The extract of reasons
recorded for extending the time to conclude the
investigation is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“The accused persons namely Ariz. Hasnain &
Md Nazim Mohsin were remanded in this case on
08.11.2023 & 09.11.2023 and vide order dated
02.02.2024 of this court extension for 25 days was
15

granted to the 10 for investigation after completion of
90 days, and now 115 days is going to complete on
01.03.2024 & 02.03.2024 respectively for the accused
persons.
Under the facts and circumstances and
considering the submission of the Ld A.P.P that
investigation is still pending and due to that
reason, the prayer of I.O. is hereby allowed and the
period for completing the investigation against
the accused persons namely Ariz Hasnain & Md
Nasim @ Mohsin is extended for further 25 days
from the date of completion of 115 days of their
judicial custody i.e. from 01.03.2024 for the
accused Ariz Hasnain& 02.03.2024 for Md Nasim
@Mohsin.”
(Emphasis supplied)
31. Likewise, even in the subsequent orders dated
th th
28 March, 2024 and 19 April, 2024, the reasons
for extension of completion of investigation are
verbatim similar to those as were set out in the order
nd
dated 2 February, 2024.
th

32. Admittedly, much prior to the order dated 28
February, 2024 being passed on the second
application for extension, the appellant had already
moved the trial Court by way of an application for
th
default bail. The said application was rejected on 20
February, 2024 by relying on the first order of
nd
extension dated 2 February, 2024.
33. In view of these facts and circumstances, we are
nd
convinced that the order dated 2 February, 2024
16

whereby, the prayer for extension of time made by the
investigating agency was accepted and the time to
conclude investigation was further extended by 25
days, was passed without providing any opportunity
of hearing or effective representation to the appellant.
Furthermore, the reasons for extension were virtually
non-existent and totally perfunctory.
34. In this context, it would be apposite to again
advert to observations of this Court in Jigar (supra),
wherein this Court while dealing with a similar
statutory scheme authoritatively held that the grant
of extension is not a mere formality but must be
preceded by due application of mind both by the
Public Prosecutor and the Court. This Court, in
paragraph 43, observed as follows:-
“ 43. The requirement of the report under the proviso
added by sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the 2015 Act
to clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 167CrPC is
twofold. Firstly, in the report of the Public Prosecutor,
the progress of the investigation should be set out and
secondly, the report must disclose specific reasons for
continuing the detention of the accused beyond the
said period of 90 days. Therefore, the extension of
time is not an empty formality. The Public
Prosecutor has to apply his mind before he
submits a report/an application for extension.
The prosecution has to make out a case in terms
of both the aforesaid requirements and the Court
must apply its mind to the contents of the report
17

before accepting the prayer for grant of
extension. ”
(Emphasis supplied)

35. Thus, the orders of extension, as referred to
above, clearly reflect that the extensions were granted
in a totally mechanical manner without assigning any
justifiable reasons. This patent lacuna in the series
of extensions coupled with the fact that the first
nd
extension granted vide order dated 2 February,
2024, was, in itself, illegal and arbitrary as it was
passed without notice and effective opportunity of
raising objections to the appellant prior to the grant
of such extension are fatal and renders the continued
custody of the appellant beyond the period of 90 days
illegal, entitling him to claim default bail.
36. It is not in dispute that the appellant had moved
the trial Court seeking default bail well before the
filing of chargesheet. In view of the fact that the order
nd
dated 2 February, 2024 extending the time for
completion of investigation has been held to be
illegal, and since the chargesheet came to be filed well
after the expiry of the statutory period of 90 days, the
appellant’s right to claim default bail stood
crystallized upon the filing of the application under
18

Section 167(2) of the CrPC and the appellant
acquired an indefeasible right to be released on bail.

CONCLUSION
37. As an upshot of the aforesaid discussion, the
impugned orders are declared to be bad in the eyes
of law and are accordingly set aside.
38. The appellant shall be released on default bail
under Section 167(2) of the CrPC upon furnishing
bail bonds and sureties to the satisfaction of the trial
Court. The trial Court shall be entitled to impose
suitable conditions to secure the presence of the
accused during the trial.
39. The appeal is allowed in these terms.
40. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.

….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)


...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 30, 2026.

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