MADHAV INFRA PROJECTS LIMITED vs ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENT CIR 2 (3) AHMEDABAD
- Court
- Gujarat High Court
C/SCA/7309/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 29/06/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7309 of 2026
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
and
HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI
=============================================
Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
=============================================
MADHAV INFRA PROJECTS LIMITED
Versus
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENT CIR 2 (3)
AHMEDABAD
=============================================
Appearance:
MR B S SOPARKAR(6851) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR.VARUN K.PATEL(3802) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
=============================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
and
HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI
Date : 29/06/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA)
1. Heard learned Advocate Mr.B.S.Soparkar appearing for
the petitioner and learned Senior Standing Counsel
Mr.Varun K. Patel for the respondent. The Affidavit
tendered by learned Senior Standing Counsel, Mr.Varun
K. Patel is ordered to be taken on record.
2. Having regard to the controversy involved, with the
consent of the learned advocates for the respective
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parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing.
3. RULE . Learned Senior Standing Counsel Mr.Varun K Patel
waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the
respondent.
4. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, the petitioner challenges the notice dated
30.03.2026 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax
Act, 1961 (for short “the Act”) seeking to re-open income
tax assessment of the petitioner for the Assessment Year
2015-16 (for short “the assessment year under
consideration”) by the Assistant Commissioner of Income
Tax, Central Circle 2(3), Ahmedabad (for short “the
respondent”).
4.1 The petitioner is a company and has filed its return of
income for the assessment year 2015-16 on 30.10.2015
declaring total income at Rs.12,89,11,970/-. The
petitioner is part of MSK Group which is engaged in the
business of infrastructure development. The said MSK
and Madhav Group of Gujarat including the petitioner
were subjected to search action under Section 132 of the
Act on 18.05.2024. The Respondent issued a notice dated
30.03.2026 under Section 148 of the Act for the year
under consideration. It is stated therein that a search was
initiated under Section 132 of the Act on 18.05.2024 in
the case of the Petitioner or in the case of the person in
respect of which the Petitioner is assessable under the
Act. It was further stated that the Respondent is satisfied,
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with the approval of Principal Commissioner or
Commissioner, that the books of accounts or documents,
seized or requisitioned under section 132 or section 132A
of the Act in the case of MSK and Madhav Group pertains
or pertain to, or any information contained therein, relate
to the Petitioner or the person in respect of which, the
Petitioner is assessable under the Act and hence, the
notice dated 30.03.2026 is issued under Section 148 of
the Act after obtaining prior approval of Directorate
General of Income Tax (Investigation), Ahmedabad. The
Petitioner has challenged the said notice under Section
148 of the Act principally on the ground of limitation.
5. Learned Advocate Mr.B.S.Soparkar for the petitioner
submitted that the respondent has acted illegally and
without jurisdiction while issuing Notice under Section
148 of the Act as the same is barred by limitation. It was
further contended that the impugned notice is time-
barred under the statutory scheme governing search
assessment. It was submitted that in the present case,
search action in question was carried out on 18.05.2024
i.e. during the Financial Year 2024-25. Since the search
st
under Section 132 of the Act was initiated on or after 1
st
April, 2021 but before 1 September, 2024, the
provisions of Sections 147 to 151 of the Act as they stood
immediately before the commencement of Finance (No.
2) Act, 2024 shall apply as contemplated under Section
152(3) of the Act. Hence, relying upon Section 149 of the
Act, it is contended that the Notice under Section 148 of
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the Act can be issued up to six years from the end of the
relevant assessment year. Further, relying upon the
Section 153A of the Act, it is submitted that Notice under
Section 153A of the Act can be issued for a period of “ten
assessment years” immediately preceding the
assessment year relevant to the previous year in which
search is carried out and for the “relevant assessment
years”, subject to fulfillment of certain conditions.
5.1 It is further submitted that the “relevant assessment
year” means assessment year preceding the assessment
year relevant to the previous year in which search is
carried out or requisition is made, which falls beyond six
assessment years but not later than ten assessment
years from the “end of the assessment year relevant to
the previous year in which search is conducted”.
5.2 Reference is also made to the provisions of Section 149
of the Act, more particularly the proviso to Section 149
read with explanation – 1 to Section 153A of the Act, and
it is submitted that so far as the limitation is concerned,
for reopening of the assessment, the same is pari materia
to Section 153C of the Act.
5.3 It is submitted that in the instant case, the search action
was carried out in the case of third party on 18.05.2024
i.e. during the Financial Year 2024-25, and hence
relevant assessment year to the previous year in which
the search was undertaken under Section 132 of the Act
is Assessment Year 2025-26. It is further submitted that
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the notice under Section 148 of the Act for the
Assessment Year 2015-16 would be time-barred, as the
period of ten years would end at the Assessment Year
2016-17, since the Assessment Year 2025-26 will become
the first assessment year as per the provisions of Section
153A of the Act. The table showing the calculation was
placed before this Court and the same is reproduced as
under:
Number Assessment Year
st
Assessment Year 2025-26
1 year
nd
Assessment Year 2024-25
2 year
rd
3 year Assessment Year 2023-24
th
4 year Assessment Year 2022-23
th
5 year Assessment Year 2021-22
th
6 year Assessment Year 2020-21
th
Assessment Year 2019-20
7 year
th
8 year Assessment Year 2018-19
th
9 year Assessment Year 2017-18
th
10 year Assessment Year 2016-17
5.4 In support of his submissions, learned Advocate
Mr.Soparkar has placed reliance on the judgment of the
Delhi High Court in the case of Dinesh Jindal vs. Assistant
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Commissioner of Income-tax [2024] 164 taxmann.com
746 / 469 ITR 32 (Delhi) / Writ Petition (Civil) No. 12091 of
2023 decided on 27.05.2024. Reliance is also placed on
the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of
Principal Commissioner of Income-tax (Central-1) vs.
Ojjus Medicare (P.) Ltd. [2024] 161 taxmann.com 160 /
465 ITR 101 (Delhi). Finally, he has also placed reliance
on the judgment of Madras High Court, Bench at Madurai,
passed in A.R. Safiullah vs. ACIT [Writ Petition (MD) No.
4327 of 2021, dated 24-3-2021].
5.5 Thus, it is urged that the impugned notice issued under
Section 148 of the Act for the assessment year 2015-16
may be quashed and set aside.
6. Per contra, learned Senior Standing Counsel Mr.Varun
Patel for the respondent Department opposed the
petition and contended that the impugned notice under
Section 148 of the Act is valid and within the limitation. It
is further contended that since the search was initiated
after 01.04.2021, the old Section 153A/153C assessment
regime does not apply to the present case. Instead, the
case falls under the new Section 148/149 reassessment
regime introduced by the Finance Act, 2021. Under the
new Section 149(1)(b), the limitation period is not
calculated backward from the search year. Instead, a
notice can be issued if not more than 10 years have
elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year,
provided the escaped income is Rs. 50 lakhs or more.
Accordingly, the notice for AY 2015-16 is perfectly valid
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and within the limitation period.
7. It is further submitted that the petitioner assessee in
support of the contention regarding inclusion of search
year has wrongly construed the word ‘end’ used in the
explanation 1 to Section 153A, which is otherwise missing
in the notes on clauses and the memorandum explaining
the provisions. It is further submitted that the
st nd st
assessment year has two ends, one 1 April, and 2 31
March. For the purpose of going forward, the end would
st
be considered as 31 March. Whereas for the purpose of
st
going backward, the end would be considered as 1 April.
Thus, since it is required to go backward for purpose of
calculating 10 assessment years, ‘end’ is to be construed
st
as 1 April. It is therefore submitted that considering the
aforesaid contentions and the legislative intent as borne
out from the notes on clauses and memorandum
explaining the provisions relating to Finance Act, 2017,
for purpose of calculating 10 assessment years, search
year is to be excluded and it is always to be considered
as six plus four assessment years and therefore, ‘end’ is
st
to be construed as 1 April for going backward for making
the said provision effectively workable as per the
legislative intent. It is submitted that the purpose of
introducing the amendment was to extend the reach of
assessing officer and therefore while interpreting the
provisions of Section 153A of I.T., apart from the six
previous assessment years, the authority of assessing
officer must include for another four years, otherwise the
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intention of the legislature and purpose of the proviso
would be defeated.
7.1 While referring to Explanation (1) to Section 153A of the
Act, it is contended that the “relevant assessment year”
which finds place in the provisions of Section 153A(b) of
the Act cannot be construed by adopting two different
methodologies - one wherein, for calculating the six
assessment years, the period would start from the
previous year in which such search is conducted or
requisition is made, and for the very same assessee, if it
is found that the income of Rs.50 lakhs has escaped, for
calculating ten years, the first assessment year has to be
ignored. In other words, if search year is included for
calculating period of 10 A.Ys. as contended by the
petitioner, there will be two different calculations, first,
for six AYs excluding the search year and second, for 10
A.Ys. including the search year, which cannot be
legislative intent. It is also submitted that the assessment
year in which search was conducted, cannot be included
while calculating ten assessment years, otherwise, A.Y.
2019-20 will come under both i.e. original six assessment
years preceding the relevant assessment year in which
th
search was carried (as 6 AY) and under extended
th
category of ten assessment years also (as 7 AY) and the
same could not be the intention of the legislature. The
following statement containing the calculation of ten
assessment year as per Assessee’s case and Revenue’s
case corroborates the aforesaid contentions:
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No of
Year.
Assessee’s
calculation
of 10A.Ys.
(including
search
year)
Revenue’s
calculation of
10A.Ys.
(Excluding
search year)
1. 2025-26 2024-25
2. 2024-25 2023-24
3. 2023-24 2022-23
4. 2022-23 2021-22
5. 2021-22 2020-21
6. 2020-21 2019-20
7. 2019-20 2018-19
8. 2018-19 2017-18
9. 2017-18 2016-17
10. 2016-17 2015-16
7.2 It is further submitted that in case of Bhavin Kishorbhai
Zinzuwadia Vs. ACIT [2024] 169 Taxmann.com 505 (Guj.)
this Hon’ble Court has already decided this issue
accepting the calculations of 10 assessment years for the
purpose of Section 153C excluding the search year/the
year in which the incriminating material is received by AO
of other person.
7.3 An attempt is also made to distinguish the judgment of
the Delhi High Court in the case of Ojjus Medicare
(supra), by submitting that two methods cannot be
adopted for computation of the six-year block period as
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mentioned in Sections 153A and 153C of the Act and for
calculation of the ten-year block period by excluding the
previous year from computation of ten years. Thus, it is
urged that this Court may take a different view,
disagreeing with the judgments of the Delhi High Court as
well as the Kerala High Court, and it is urged that the
action of the respondent may be upheld for reopening
the Assessment Year 2015-16.
7.4 Thus, it is urged that the action of the respondent in
issuing the impugned notice for the A.Y. 2015-16 under
Section 148 of the Act may be upheld and the present
petition may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS AND OPINION:
8. We have heard the learned advocates for the respective
parties at length. We have also perused the case laws
cited, considered the provisions threadbare and have
also perused the material on record.
9. The sole issue that arises for consideration in the present
petition is that –
(i) Whether the notice issued by the respondent for the
Assessment Year 2015-16 is barred by limitation;
(ii) Dealing with this issue, uncontroverted facts are that the
search took place in the case of the petitioner on
18.05.2024 which indisputably falls in the Financial Year
2024-25 and Assessment Year 2025-26. Therefore, the
date of search would be taken into consideration for the
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purpose of initiation of proceedings under Section 153A
of the Act. Keeping that legal principle in mind, ten years
that could be covered subject to fulfilling other conditions
emanating from the statute, would be as under:
Number Assessment Year
st
1 year Assessment Year 2025-26
nd
Assessment Year 2024-25
2 year
rd
3 year Assessment Year 2023-24
th
Assessment Year 2022-23
4 year
th
5 year Assessment Year 2021-22
th
6 year Assessment Year 2020-21
th
7 year Assessment Year 2019-20
th
8 year Assessment Year 2018-19
th
9 year Assessment Year 2017-18
th
10 year Assessment Year 2016-17
The only difference between the calculation as per the
revenue and the petitioner is the inclusion or exclusion of
the search year. Revenue contends that while calculating
the period of ten years, search year is to be excluded and
the calculation starts from assessment year immediately
preceding the previous year relevant to the assessment
year in which search is conducted whereas the
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petitioner’s contention is that the calculation of the
period of ten years would include the search year.
10. The short controversy turns upon whether, while
computing the ten-year block, the assessment year
relevant to the previous year in which search is
conducted (hereinafter “the search assessment year”) is
to be included in the reckoning, unlike the computation of
six assessment years which expressly excludes it.
11. With reference to the relevant assessment year, it is
necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 153A(1)(b)
of the Act which reads as under :
“Section 153A(1)(b) : (The Assessing Officer shall) assess or
reassess the total income of six assessment years immediately
preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in
which such search is conducted or requisition is made and for the
relevant assessment year or years.”
11.1 The key expression that flows from reading of the section
is “six assessment years immediately preceding the
assessment year relevant to the previous year in which
such search is conducted” and “for the relevant
assessment year or years.” is phrased independently,
disjointed from earlier phrase.
12. In juxtaposition, the Fourth Proviso permits assessment
beyond six years subject to specified conditions and
refers to “relevant assessment year” as stated in
Explanation 1 of Section 153A of the Act defines
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“relevant assessment year” as:
“For the purpose of this sub-section, the expression “relevant
assessment year” shall mean an assessment year preceding
the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which
search is conducted or requisition is made which falls beyond
six assessment years but not later than ten assessment years
from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous
year in which search is conducted or requisition is made.”
12.1 The key expression that flows from reading of the section
is “not later than ten assessment years from the end of
the assessment year relevant to the previous year in
which search is conducted” .
13. Thus, the computational framework of Section 153A of
the Act, including Explanation 1, applies pari materia to
the proceedings under Section 153C of the Act. A plain
reading of Section 153A of the Act reveals that the
Parliament has consciously adopted two different
phraseologies:
Six-Year Block Ten-Year Block
“not later than ten
“six assessment years
assessment years from
immediately preceding”
the end of the
assessment year”
13.1 This linguistic distinction is deliberate and must be given
full effect. Under Section 153A(1)(b) of the Act, the
anchor point is “the assessment year relevant to the
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previous year in which search is conducted”. Therefore,
six years must be “immediately preceding” that
assessment year. The phrase “immediately preceding”
necessarily excludes the search assessment year itself. In
contrast thereto, Explanation 1 of Section 153A of the Act
introduces a materially different formulation: “not later
than ten assessment years from the end of the
assessment year relevant to the previous year in which
search is conducted”. This computation mechanism does
not use the phrase “immediately preceding” but instead,
requires reckoning from the end of the assessment year
relevant to the previous year of search. Thus, the
assessment year relevant to the previous year of search
becomes the reference year and the ten-year period is
counted from the end of that assessment year. This
necessarily includes the search assessment year within
the ten-year framework and resultantly, the search year
becomes the first year in the reckoning of the ten-year
block.
13.2 If Parliament intended identical computation for both six
and ten years, it would have used identical language.
Instead, it has consciously used different phraseology, for
six years “immediately preceding” and for ten years
“from the end of the assessment year”. Legally, it is well
settled that while interpreting plain language of a
Statute, the Court must give meaning to every word used
by the Legislature. To compute ten years by excluding
the search year (as is done for six years) would render
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the phrase “from the end of the assessment year” otiose
and merge two distinct statutory schemes into one that
would violate settled principles of statutory
interpretation. The scheme of Section 153A reflects
calibrated expansion in as much as ordinary search
assessment would be computed as six years immediately
preceding the search year whereas exceptional extended
jurisdiction up to ten years is not a mere arithmetic
extension of the six-year model; it is governed by a
separately structured computational rule. The
Legislature, in its wisdom, has consciously created:
A backward-looking “preceding” model (six years),
and
A reckoning “from the end of the assessment year”
model (ten years).
13.3 Thus, it can be concluded that Section 153A of the Act
prescribes two distinct and independent computational
regimes. The six assessment years are those
“immediately preceding” the assessment year relevant to
the previous year of search, thereby excluding the search
year whereas the ten assessment years under
Explanation 1 of Section 153A of the Act are to be
computed “from the end of the assessment year”
relevant to the previous year of search. The statutory
language necessarily results in inclusion of the search
assessment year within the ten-year reckoning. Any
interpretation that applies the six-year exclusion model, if
made applicable to the ten-year block, would defeat the
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legislative scheme and render material words redundant.
Accordingly, while computing the extended ten-year
period under Explanation 1 to Section 153A read with
Section 153C of the Act, the assessment year relevant to
the previous year of search is to be included in the
reckoning.
13.4 Even otherwise, this issue is no more res integra as the
same is covered by the judgement of this Court in the
case of Jayantibhai Karamshibhai Maniya vs. Income-tax
Officer, [2026] 182 taxmann.com 493 (Guj.). This Court
has taken a view, after considering the earlier judgement
in the case of Bhavin Zinzuwadia (supra) , that while
calculating the period of ten years under Section 153C of
the Act, keeping in mind the language of Explanation 1 to
Section 153A of the Act, the search year or the year in
which seized material is received by the Jurisdictional
Assessing Officer of the petitioner is required to be taken
into consideration. Relevant extract of the said judgment
can be usefully referred to as under:
“ 9.2 The provisions of Sections 153A / 153C of the Act find place
in the proviso to Section 149 of the Act and, hence, the
limitation as provided in Sections 153A / 153C of the Act gets
triggered upon the initiation of assessment proceedings
emanating from a search under Sections 132 / 132A of the
Act. We may, at this stage, mention that the Delhi High Court
as well as the Madras High Court has already considered the
implications of Explanation (1) to Section 153A of the Act to
the limitation and the expression “relevant assessment year”
used therein in Explanation (1) to Section 153A of the Act.
The Delhi High Court, in the case of Ojjus Medicare (P.) Ltd.
(supra), after considering an array of judgments of other High
Courts as well as of the Supreme Court and upon a
threadbare consideration and analysis of the statutory
provisions of Sections 153A, 148 and 149 of the Act, has held
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thus:
“ 88 Section 153A replicates the basis on which the six
AYs' are to be identified and computed with the solitary
distinction being that in the case of the searched person,
the six AYs' are liable to be computed from the AY
pertaining to the FY in which the search was conducted.
The starting point for the purpose of identifying the six AYs'
in the case of section 153A would thus turn upon the year
of search as opposed to the handover of material which is
spoken of in the First Proviso to section 153C. If one were
to therefore assume that a search took place on a person
between 01 April 2021 to 31 March 2022, the pertinent AY
would become AY 2022-23 and the corresponding six AYs’
would by as follows:
Computation of the six-year block
period as provided under section
153C of the Act
No of years
AY 2021-22 1
AY 2020-21 2
AY 2019-20 3
AY 2018-19 4
AY 2017-18 5
AY 2016-17 6
89. That takes us then to the issue of identifying the
“relevant assessment year” for the purposes of computing
the ten year block. Explanation 1 to section 153A specifies
the manner in which the entire ten AY period is to be
computed. While the computation of six AYs follows the
position as enunciated and identified above, Explanation I
prescribes that the ten AYs' would have to be computed
from the end of the AY relevant to the FY in which the
search was conducted or requisition made The ten AY
period consequently is to be reckoned from the end of the
AY pertaining to the previous year in which the search was
conducted as distinct from the preceding year which is
spoken of in the case of the six relevant AYs.
90. Viewed in that light, and while keeping the period of
01 April 2021 to 31 March 2022 as the constant, the
relevant AY would be AY 2022-23. The ten AYs would have
to be computed from 31 March 2023with the said date
indubitably constituting the end of the AY relevant to the
previous year of search. Viewed in light of the above, the
block period of 10 AYs would be as follows.-
Computation of the six-year
block period as provided under
section 153C read with Section
No of years
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153Aof the Act
AY 2022-23 1
AY 2021-22 2
AY 2020-21 3
AY 2019-20 4
AY 2018-19 5
AY 2017-18 6
AY 2016-17 7
AY 2015-14 8
AY 2014-15 9
AY 2013-14 10
91 Tested on the aforesaid precepts, it would be manifest
that AY 2022-23 would form the first year of the block of
ten AYs’ terminating in AY 2013-14. We, in this regard also
bear in consideration the following instructive passages as
appearing in the decision handed down by a learned Judge
of the Madras High Court in A. R. Safiullah. We deem it
appropriate to extract the following paragraphs from that
decision:-
“9 Explanation-I is clear as to the manner of
computation of the ten assessment years. It clearly and
firmly fixes the starting point. It is the end of the
assessment year relevant to the previous year in which
search is conducted or requisition is made. There cannot
be any doubt that since search was made in this case on
10.04.2018, the assessment year is 2019-20. The end of
the assessment year 2019-20 is 31.03.2020. The
computation of ten years has to run backwards from the
said date i.e. 31.03.2020. The first year will of course be
the search assessment year itself. In that event, the ten
assessment years will be as follows:
1st Year 2019-20
2nd Year 2018-19
3rd Year 2017-18
4th Year 2016-17
5th Year 2015-16
6th Year 2014-15
7th Year 2013-14
8th Year 2012-13
9th Year 2011-2012
10th Year 2010-2011
The case on hand pertains to AY 2009-10. It is obviously
beyond the ten year outer ceiling limit prescribed by the
statute. The terminal point is the tenth year calculated
from the end of the assessment year relevant to the
previous year in which search is conducted. The long arm
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C/SCA/7309/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 29/06/2026
of the law can go up to this terminal point and not one day
beyond. When the statute is clear and admits of no
ambiguity, it has to be strictly construed and there is no
scope for looking to the explanatory notes appended to
statute or circular issued by the department.
10. In the case on hand, the statute has prescribed one
mode of computing the six years and another mode for
computing the ten years. Section 153A(1)(b) states that
the assessing officer shall assess or reassess the total
income of six years immediately preceding the assessment
year relevant to the previous year in which search is
conducted. Applying this yardstick, the six years would go
up to 2013-14. The search assessment year, namely, 2019-
20 has to be excluded. This is because, the statute talks of
the six years preceding the search assessment year. But,
while computing the ten assessment years, the starting
point has to be the end of the search assessment year. In
other words, search assessment year has to be including in
the latter case. It is not for me to fathom the wisdom of the
parliament. I cannot assume that the amendment
introduced by the Finance Act, 2017 intended to bring in
four more years over and above the six years already
provided within the scope of the provision. When the law
has prescribed a particular length, it is not for the court to
stretch it. Plasticity is the new mantra in neuroscience,
thanks to the teachings of Norman Doidge. It implies that
contrary to settled wisdom, even brain structure can be
changed. But not so when it comes to a provision in a
taxing statute that is free of ambiguity Such a provision
cannot be elastically construed.
11. One other contention urged by the standing counsel
has to be dealt with. It is pointed out that the petitioner
has invoked the writ jurisdiction at the notice stage. Since
the petitioner has demonstrated that the subject
assessment year lies beyond the ambit of the provision,
the respondent has no jurisdiction to issue the impugned
notice Once lack of jurisdiction has been established, the
maintainability of the writ petition cannot be in doubt.”
In our considered opinion, the decision in A.R Safiullah
correctly expounds the legal position and the interpretation
liable to be accorded to the identification of the ten AYs
which are spoken of in sections153A and 153C.”
9.3 Thus, it is precisely held hereinabove that the statute
prescribes different modes of computation for six years and
ten years. We reiterate that the provisions of Section 153A(1)
(b) of the Act stipulate that the Assessing Officer shall assess
or reassess the total income of six years immediately
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C/SCA/7309/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 29/06/2026
preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year
in which the search is conducted. However, the ten
assessment year period, consequently, is to be reckoned
from the end of the assessment year pertaining to the
previous year in which the search was conducted, as distinct
from the preceding year which is spoken of in the case of the
six relevant assessment years. Thus, the contention with
regard to the computation of six years as well as ten years
under the provisions of Section 153A of the Act has already
been gone into by the Delhi High Court as well as the Madras
High Court, and we have no convincing reason to take a
divergent view from the view expressed hereinabove.
Applying the aforesaid computation to the facts of the
present case, taking the date of the search as 09.05.2024
during the Financial Year 2024-25, the Assessment Year
2025-26 will become the first assessment year and, in the
same manner, the Assessment Year 2016-17 will become the
tenth assessment year. Thus, the year under consideration,
namely, Assessment Year 201516, for which the impugned
notice has been issued under Section 148 of the Act, would
fall beyond the period of ten years prescribed under the
statute as it stood immediately before the commencement of
the Finance Act, 2021, and hence, on this count, the
impugned notice can be said to be barred by limitation. ”
14. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned Notice issued
under Section 148 of the Act dated 30.03.2026 for A.Y.
2015-16 is barred by limitation as the same falls beyond
the permissible period of ten years. We, therefore, quash
and set aside the Notice dated 30.03.2026 issued under
Section 148 of the Act for Assessment Year 2015-16 on
the ground of limitation. Accordingly, the present writ
petition is allowed. RULE is made absolute. No order as
to cost.
(A. S. SUPEHIA, J)
(VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI,J)
NEHA/6
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