NAMEETH SHARMA AND OTHERS vs STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)

CRR 4842 of 2024
Nameeth Sharma & Ors.
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Anr.

For the Petitioners : Mr. Malay Bhattacharya,
Mr. Madan Mohan Roy,
Ms. Sanchayita De.


For the Opposite party : Mr. Debrup Bhattacharjee,
Mr. Aniruddha Ganguly,
Ms. Neha Dutt Tewari.


For the State : Mr. Anamitra Banerjee,
Ms. Triparna Roy .


Heard on : 11.08.2026
Judgment on : 03.09.2026
Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:
1. The present revision has been preferred praying for quashing of
proceedings in G.R. Case No. 4280 of 2024 arising out of F.I.R. being
Nagerbazar P.S. Case No. 173 of 2024 dated 25.06.2024 under Sections
498A/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code, pending before the learned

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Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Barrackpore, North 24-
Parganas.
2. The petitioners herein are the husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law
and sister-in-law of the de facto complainant.
3. The de facto complainant in the present case filed the written complaint
against the petitioners herein on 25.06.2024 stating therein that:-
“Since after her marriage, her husband along with her
parents-in-law namely Kamal Nayan Sharma and Sunita
Sharma being the petitioner nos. 2 and 3 herein, sister-in-
law namely Nidhi Sharma being the petitioner no. 4 herein
and other in-laws residing together namely Pankaj Sharma,
Poonam Sharma and Satya Narayan being the petitioner
Nos. 5 to 7 herein tortured the complainant both physically
and mentally and also kept pressurizing her to bring more
money. When the complainant refused to bring money, the
accused persons used to torture the complainant on
26.03.2023. When the complainant had been to her
paternal house, her husband went there and assaulted the
complainant. Lastly, all the accused persons assaulted the
complainant and had driven her out of their house and
refused to give the stridhan articles of the complainant.”

4. In course of hearing, both the parties have filed their respective written
notes along with the judgments relied upon and the State has placed
the case diary.
5. Section 498A of IPC, lays down:-
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the
husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,
subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with

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imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years
and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty”
means—
(a)any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause
grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether
mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b)harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.
Ingredients of offence. - The essential ingredients of the

offence under sec. 498A are as follows:-
(1) A woman was married;
(2) She was subjected to cruelty;
(3) Such cruelty consisted in -
(i) any lawful conduct as was likely to drive such woman
to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to
her life, limb or health whether mental or physical;
(ii) harm to such woman with a view to coercing her to
meet unlawful demand for property or valuable security
or on account of failure of such woman or any of her
relations to meet the lawful demand;
(iii) the woman was subjected to such cruelty by her
husband or any relation of her husband.”
6. In Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. vs State of Telangana & Anr.,
in Criminal Appeal No. ………… of 2024 (arising out of SLP
(Criminal) No. 16239 of 2024, decided on December 10, 2024, the
Supreme Court held:-

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“ 15. An offence is punishable under Section 498A of
the IPC when a husband or his relative subjects a
woman to cruelty, which may result in
imprisonment for a term extending up to three years
and a fine. The Explanation under Section 498A of
the IPC defines “cruelty” for the purpose of Section
498A of the IPC to mean any of the acts mentioned
in clauses (a) or (b). The first limb of clause (a) of the
Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that
“cruelty” means any wilful conduct that is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide. The second limb of clause (a) of the
Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that
cruelty means any wilful conduct that is of such a
nature as to cause grave injury or danger to life,
limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the
woman. Further, clause (b) of the Explanation
of Section 498A of the IPC states that cruelty would
also include harassment of the woman where such
harassment is to coerce her or any person related to
her to meet any unlawful demand for any property
or valuable security or is on account of failure by
her or any person related to her to meet such
demand.
16. Further, Section 3 of the Dowry Act deals with
penalty for giving or taking dowry. It states that any
person who engages in giving, taking, or abetting
the exchange of dowry, shall face a punishment of
imprisonment for a minimum of five years and a fine
of not less than fifteen thousand rupees or the value
of the dowry, whichever is greater. Section 4 of the
Dowry Act talks of penalty for demanding dowry. It
states that any person demanding dowry directly or
indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or
guardians of a bride or bridegroom shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than six months, but which may
extend to two years and with fine which may
extend to ten thousand rupees.
18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the
allegations made by respondent No.2 are vague and
omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No.1
harassed her and that appellant Nos.2 to 6
instigated him to do so, respondent No.2 has not
provided any specific details or described any
particular instance of harassment. She has also not
mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which

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the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR
lacks concrete and precise allegations.
25. A mere reference to the names of family
members in a criminal case arising out of a
matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations
indicating their active involvement should be nipped
in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of
judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to
implicate all the members of the husband’s family
when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial
discord. Such generalised and sweeping
accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or
particularised allegations cannot form the basis for
criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution
in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions
and the legal process and avoid unnecessary
harassment of innocent family members. In the
present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the
members of the family of appellant No.1 have been
living in different cities and have not resided in the
matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and
respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be
dragged into criminal prosecution and the same
would be an abuse of the process of the law in the
absence of specific allegations made against each of
them.
28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way
of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty
inflicted on a woman by her husband and his
family, ensuring swift intervention by the State.
However, in recent years, as there have been a
notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the
country, accompanied by growing discord and
tension within the institution of marriage,
consequently, there has been a growing tendency to
misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a
tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the
husband and his family by a wife. Making vague
and generalised allegations during matrimonial
conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of
legal processes and an encouragement for use of
arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family.
Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section
498A of the IPC against the husband and his family
in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable
demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has,
time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the

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husband and his family in the absence of a clear
prima facie case against them.
29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any
woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what
has been contemplated under Section 498A of the
IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from
making a complaint or initiating any criminal
proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid
observations but we should not encourage a case
like as in the present one, where as a counterblast
to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by
the first appellant-husband of the second
respondent herein, a complaint under Section
498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the
insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for
the protection of a woman who is subjected to
cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an
unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes
it is misused as in the present case.
30. In the above context, this Court in G .V. Rao vs.
L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 observed as
follows:
“12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial
disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred
ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable
the young couple to settle down in life and live
peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes
suddenly erupt which often assume serious
proportions resulting in commission of heinous
crimes in which elders of the family are also
involved with the result that those who could have
counselled and brought about rapprochement are
rendered helpless on their being arrayed as
accused in the criminal case. There are many other
reasons which need not be mentioned here for not
encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the
parties may ponder over their defaults and
terminate their disputes amicably by mutual
agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law
where it takes years and years to conclude and in
that process the parties lose their “young” days in
chasing their “cases” in different courts.”
31. Further, this Court in Preeti Gupta vs. State
of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667 held that the

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courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in
dealing with these complaints and must take
pragmatic realties into consideration while dealing
with matrimonial cases. The allegations of
harassment by the husband’s close relatives who
had been living in different cities and never visited
or rarely visited the place where the complainant
resided would have an entirely different complexion.
The allegations of the complainant are required to
be scrutinized with great care and circumspection.
32. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the
impugned FIR No.82 of 2022 filed by respondent
No.2 was initiated with ulterior motives to settle
personal scores and grudges against appellant No.1
and his family members i.e., appellant Nos.2 to 6
herein. Hence, the present case at hand falls within
category (7) of illustrative parameters highlighted in
Bhajan Lal. Therefore, the High Court, in the
present case, erred in not exercising the powers
available to it under Section 482 CrPC and thereby
failed to prevent abuse of the Court’s process by
continuing the criminal prosecution against the
appellants.”
7. The materials in the case diary in the present case shows that the
allegations are general in nature. As such permitting the case to
proceed against the petitioners herein, will clearly be an abuse of
the process of law, considering that none of the ingredients
required to constitute the offences alleged are present against the
petitioners herein.

8. CRR 4842 of 2024 is thus allowed.
9. The proceedings in G.R. Case No. 4280 of 2024 arising out of F.I.R.
being Nagerbazar P.S. Case No. 173 of 2024 dated 25.06.2024 under
Sections 498A/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code, pending before the
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Barrackpore, North 24-
Parganas, is hereby quashed in respect of the petitioners namely

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Nameeth Sharma, Kamal Nayan Sharma, Sunita Sharma alias
Sunita K. Sharma, Nidhi Sharma alias K Nidhi Sharma, Pankaj
Sharma, Poonam Sharma and Satya Narayan Sharma.
10. All connected applications, if any, stands disposed of.
11. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
12. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary
compliance.
13. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal
formalities.


(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)