VRITPAL SINDHU vs AMIT AGRAWAL

1

2026:CGHC:19083
AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
AVINASH
SHARMA
WPC No. 612 of 2022
Digitally signed
by AVINASH
SHARMA
Date:
2026.05.14
10:45:23 +0530
1 - Vritpal Sindhu S/o Shri Mitrasen Sindhu Aged About 56 Years Managing /
Authorised Partner - M.S. And Sons, Resident Of 53-55, Section 14, Sindhu Bhawan,
Rohtak, Haryana- 124001.
2 - Veersen Sindhu S/o Shri Mitrasen Sindhu Aged About 61 Years Managing /
Authorised Partner - M.S. And Sons, Gevra Project, Dipka 1, Garud Nagar Dipka,
Korba District, Chhattisgarh - 495452.
--- Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Amit Agrawal S/o Shri Naresh Agrawal Aged About 34 Years C/o Maa Banjari
Enterprises And Logistics, Priyadarshi Complex, Chhatamuda By- Pass, Tehsil And
District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh – 496001.
2 - Dev Sindhu Managing / Authorised Partner - M.S. And Sons, Plot No. 11, Khand No.
251/664, Himgir Road, Kanika, Sundargarh District Odisha - 770075.
3 - Pradeep Mor Managing / Authorised Partner - M.S. And Sons, Plot No. 11, Block
No. 251/664, Himgir Road, Kanika, Sundargarh District Odisha - 770075.
4 - Abhimanyu Sindhu Managing / Authorised Partner - M.S. And Sons, Post Khanda
Kheri, Tehsil Hansi, Hisar District Haryana., District : Hisar, Haryana
5 - Rudra Sen Sindhu Managing / Authorised Partner - M.S. And Sons, Sindhu
Tradelinks Limited, 129 Transport Centre, Rohtak Road, Pubjabi Bagh, New Delhi-
110035
6 - Satyapal Sindhu Managing / Authorised Partner - M.S. And Sons, Sindhu Tradelinks
Limited, 129 Transport Centre, Rohtak Road, Punjabi Bagh, New Delhi - 110035.
7 - Parameshwari Sindhu Managing / Authorised Partner - M.S. And Sons, Post
Khanda Kheri, Tehsil Hansi, Hisar District Haryana.
--- Respondent(s)

2
WPC No. 664 of 2022
1 - Vritpal Sindhu S/o Shri Mitrasen Sindhu Aged About 56 Years Managing/authorised
Partner- M.S. And Sons, R/o 53-55, Section 14, Sindhu Bhawan, Rohtak, Haryana-
124001.
2 - Veersen Sindhu S/o Shri Mitrasen Sindhu Aged About 61 Years
Managing/authorised Partner- M.S. And Sons, Gevra Project, Dipka 1, Garud Nagar
Dipka, Korba District, Chhattisgarh-495452.
--- Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - Prateek Agrawal S/o Shri Vijay Kumar Agrawal Aged About 32 Years Partner-
Trishul Enterprises, R/o Gandhi Ganj, Tehsil And District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh-
496001.
2 - Dev Sindhu Managing/authorised Partner- M.S. And Sons, Plot No. 11, Khand No.
251/664, Himgir Road, Kanika, Sundargarh District, Odisha- 770075.
3 - Pradeep More Managing/authorised Partner- M.S. And Sons, Plot No. 11, Block No.
251/664, Himgir Raod, Kanika, Sundergarh District, Odisha- 770075.
4 - Abhimanyu Sindhu Managing/authorised Partner- M.S. And Sons, Post Khanda
Kheri, Tehsil Hansi, Hisar District Haryana.
5 - Rudra Sen Sindhu Managing/ Authorised Partner/ M.S. And Sons, Sindhu
Tradelinks Limited, 129 Transport Centre, Rohtak Road, Pubjabi Bagh, New Delhi-
110035.
6 - Satyapal Sindhu Managing/authorised Partner- M.S. And Sons, Sindhu Tradelinks
Limited, 129 Transport Centre, Rohtak Road, Punjabi Bagh, New Delhi- 110035.
7 - Parameshwari Sindhu Managing/authorised Partner- M.S. And Sons, Post- Khanda
Kheri, Tehsil Hansi, Hisar District, Haryana.
--- Respondent(s)

For Petitioners : Shri Amrito Das, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1 : Ms. Aprajita Pandey appears on behalf of Shri
Harshwardhan Agrawal, Advocates.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
Order on Board

25/04/2026

1. Since dispute involved in both the petitions is common, they are being disposed
of by this common order.
2. WPC No.612 of 2022 has been filed against the order dated 27.10.2021 passed

3
by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh C.G. in case
No.CC/2020/172 whereby the petitioners and Respondent Nos.2 to 7 were
directed to pay total amount of Rs.24,61,852/- to the Respondent No.1 inclusive
of Rs.5,000/- towards mental agony and Rs.1,000/- towards litigation expenses.
3. Similarly WPC No.664 of 2022 has been filed against the order dated
27.10.2021 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Raigarh Chhattisgarh in case No.CC/2020/171 whereby the petitioners and
Respondent Nos.2 to 7 were directed to pay total amount of Rs.45,91,070 to
the Respondent No.1.
4. The said amount was directed to be paid within a period of 45 days from the
date of impugned order.
5. For the purposes of disposal, facts pleaded in WPC No.612 of 2022 will be
referred to. The petitioners are the Managing Partners of the firm which goes by
the name of M.S. & Sons. The said firm is in the business of coal handling and
has its washery/depot located at Hemgir, Odisha. From 04.09.2018 to
19.03.2019, coal was transported from washery / depot of M.S. & Sons, which is
at Hemgir, Odisha to TRN ACB (India) Ltd. at Navapara, Gharghoda, Raigarh. In
the said period, the Respondent No.1 provided transportation logistics to the
petitioners for which the Respondent No.1 was to receive the corresponding
consideration amount. For the aforementioned transportation logistics provided
by the respondent No.1, the respondent No.1 purportedly furnished invoices to
the petitioners from time to time. Respondent No.1 allege that the invoices
collectively amounted to INR 66,44,798/- out of which, INR 41,88,964/- has
been paid by the petitioners. Consequently, an amount of INR 24,55,852/-
purportedly stood outstanding. On 01.10.2020, the respondent No.1, through his

4
Advocates, issued a notice to the petitioners which inter alia called upon the
petitioners to pay within 7 days, the outstanding amount of INR 24,55,852/-
along with INR 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakh only) as compensation for
damages. Pursuant to the notice dated 01.10.2020, in order to recover the
outstanding amount from the petitioners, respondent preferred a complaint
dated 19.10.2020 (hereinafter referred to as "Complaint") before the District
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh under Section 35(1) of the
Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). In the
Complaint, the Respondent No.1 prayed inter alia that the District Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh direct the Petitioners to (a) pay the
outstanding amount of INR 24,55,852/- and (b) pay the amount of INR
5,00,000/- as compensation for the respondent being mentally, physically and
monetarily aggrieved owing to deprivation of the outstanding amount. On
01.09.2021, the petitioners filed preliminary objections to the Complaint and
submitted that in the facts and circumstances and in terms of the Act, the
petitioners can neither be classified as a "consumers" as per Section 2(7) of the
Act nor as provider of good or services and therefore, the Complaint preferred
by present respondent No.1 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, Raigarh was not a consumer complaint as defined under Section
2(6) of the Act. Additionally, the preliminary objections stated that the
arrangement entered into between the entities of petitioners and the respondent
No.1 i.e., M.S. & Sons and Maa Banjari Enterprises and Logistics respectively,
was commercial in nature and therefore, the instant dispute is not a consumer
dispute. In view of the preliminary objections dated 01.09.2021 filed by the
present petitioners before District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission,

5
Raigarh, a reply was filed on behalf of the respondent on 21.09.2021 denying
the contentions of the petitioners in the preliminary objections. The petitioners,
on 27.10.2021, filed written submissions before the District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Raigarh, stating inter alia that the respondent No.1
does not fall within the definition of consumer under Section 2(7) of the Act; the
amount realized by the respondent No.1 through providing transportation
logistics stems from a commercial arrangement between the petitioners and the
respondent No.1 and consequently, would be categorized under "commercial
purpose" which served as an exception to the definition of consumer as per
Section 2(7) of the Act; and that the instant proceedings before District
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh lie before a competent
court since the proceedings pertain to recovery of outstanding amount. The
District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh proceeded and
passed the final order dated 27.10.2021 (hereinafter referred to as the
"impugned order") whereby INR 24,55,852/- towards the outstanding dues to
the respondent No.1, INR 5,000/- towards compensation for mental agony
suffered by the respondent No.1 and INR 1,000/- towards the litigation costs
borne by the respondent No.1 and all the aforementioned costs were directed to
be paid within 45 days of the date of the impugned order. Subsequently, on
06.12.2021, petitioners preferred a revision application which came to be
registered as RP/21/03 of 2021 under Section 47(1)(b) of the Act before the
Chhattisgarh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission against the
impugned order. Thereafter, in accordance with the request of the Advocate for
the Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2, the Chhattisgarh State Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission vide order dated 28.12.2021 dismissed the revision

6
application dated 06.12.2021 with the liberty to the Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 to
prefer an appeal in accordance with the prescribed procedure under the Act.
Being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 27.10.2021 (ANNEXURE P/1),
the petitioners having no other recourse or remedy available for redressal of
grievance; are constrained to approach this Hon'ble Court for seeking justice; by
preferring a Writ Petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Raigarh, while passing the impugned order, failed to
appreciate that the petitioners' firm had associated with the respondent No.1’s
firm with regard to obtaining transportation logistics in furtherance of their coal
manufacturing business and therefore, the petitioners cannot be classified under
the ambit of a "consumer", as defined under Section 2(7) of the Act. It is also
submitted that in terms of the given commercial arrangement, the petitioners
were not, in any manner whatsoever, involved in the process of providing goods
or services to the respondent No.1. Therefore, the impugned order passed by
the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh suffers from
perversity and is bad in law and accordingly liable to be quashed and set aside.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Raigarh committed grave error by not appreciating that
the respondent No.1 was not a competent "consumer" to prefer a "complaint"
before it. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that in terms of the given
commercial arrangement between the petitioners' firm and the respondent No.1,
the petitioners did not, in any form or manner, provide any goods or services to
the respondent No.1 which would enable the respondent No.1 to assume the
status of a "consumer" within the Act. The petitioners had entered into a simple

7
commercial understanding with the respondent No.1 whereby the respondent
was to provide transportation logistics from the petitioners' coal washery/depot
at Hemgir to TRN ACB (India) Ltd. at Navapara, Gharghoda, Raigarh.
Therefore, in view of the present factual matrix, by no stretch of imagination can
it be stated that the respondent No.1 is a "consumer" under the Act and
consequently, the impugned order passed by the District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Raigarh is untenable and erroneous.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Raigarh, while passing the impugned order erred in
overlooking the locus of the respondent No.1 qua the maintainability of the
Complaint dated 19.10.2020. As evident from ANNEXURE P/3 of the present
petition, the Complaint dated 19.10.2020 was preferred under Section 35(1) of
the Act. It is pertinent to note here that Section 35 of the Act stipulates the
manner in which a "complaint" is to be made. Further, "complaint" is defined
under Section 2(6) of the Act, which inter alia states that the complaint "means
any allegation in writing made by a complainant". Section 2(5) of the Act defines
the "complainant" as hereunder:
"(5) "complainant" means -
(i) a consumer; or
(ii) any voluntary consumer association registered under any law
for the time being in force; or
(iii) the Central Government or any State Government, or
(iv) the Central Authority; or
(v) one or more consumers, where there are numerous consumers
having the same interest; or
(vi) in case of death of a consumer, his legal heir or legal
representative; or
(vii) in case of a consumer being a minor, his parent or legal
guardian”
9. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that a bare perusal of Section 2(5)

8
would indicate that barring Central Government or Central Authority, no party
can prefer a complaint under Section 35(1) unless the party is a "consumer"
under Section 2(7) of the Act. It is reiterated that there is no iota of doubt in
stating that respondent No.1 is not a consumer and therefore, had no locus in
preferring a complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission Raigarh. Therefore, the District Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, Raigarh, by way of entertaining the Complaint dated 19.10.2020,
acted outside the scope of its jurisdiction conferred by the Act and thus, the
impugned order is unsustainable and liable to be quashed and set aside on this
ground alone.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Raigarh erred in ignoring that in terms of the
commercial arrangement between the petitioners and the respondent No.1, the
respondent, through his firm, issued multiple bills/invoices whereby the
respondent received the payment of the consideration amount for transportation
on the business account of his transportation company namely, Maa Banjari
Enterprises and Logistics (Trishul Enterprises in WPC No.664 of 2022). This
implies that the Respondent No.1, in turn, utilizes the consideration amount so
received towards the operations and affairs of Maa Banjari Enterprises and
Logistics and Trishul Enterprises. In view of the same, there is no room for
doubt that the respondent utilized the consideration amount for "commercial
purpose" of his company and therefore, falls within the exception of "commercial
purpose" as envisaged under Section 2(7) of the Act. Therefore, the impugned
order suffers from grave perversity in considering the respondent as a
"consumer".

9
11. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Raigarh failed in acting in consonance with the
objective of the Act. The preamble of the Act states as - "An Act to provide for
protection of the interests of consumers and for the said purpose, to establish
authorities for timely and effective administration and settlement of consumers'
disputes and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."
12. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that as indicated by the preamble of
the Act, the consumer fora authorities including the District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Raigarh have been established to ensure "protection of
interests of consumers". It is humbly submitted by the petitioners that the
Complaint dated 19.10.2020 preferred by the respondent against the petitioners
was in relation to recovery of outstanding amount arising out of the commercial
arrangement between the petitioners and the respondent. The Petitioner
submits that in such circumstances, a suit or any other proceeding for recovery
of money would lie within the jurisdiction of the appropriate and/or competent
court and not the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh.
Therefore, the impugned order directing payment of the outstanding amount
emanates from an error in exercise of jurisdiction by the District Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh and is liable to be quashed and set
aside on this ground also.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that because not only did the District
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh entertained the erroneous
Complaint dated 19.10.2020 filed by the respondent No.1, the District Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh proceeded to pass the impugned
order directing the petitioners to pay the outstanding amount to the respondent

10
No.1. In this backdrop, the petitioners submit that not only did the District
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh acted outside the scope of
its jurisdiction in accordance with the Act proceeded to pass the impugned order
which amounts to colorable exercise of power vested with the District Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh by the Act. Therefore, the impugned
order is liable to be quashed and set aside.
14. Learned counsel for Respondent No.1 by emphasizing on their return submits
that the present case is squarely covered by the judgment dated 27.03.2024
passed in WA No.140 of 2024 by this Court wherein, the division Bench upheld
the order dated 23.02.2024 of Single Judge passed in WPC No.1092 of 2024,
whereby, learned Single Judge in view of the fact that petitioner has efficacious
alternate remedy to prefer an appeal before the C.G. State Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Raipur according to the provisions of Section 47 of the
Act, 2019, dismissed the writ petition as non maintainable.
15. Learned counsel for Respondent No.1 submits that after passing of impugned
award, the petitioner approached the State Commission by filing revision which
was dismissed as being not maintainable, however, liberty was reserved in
favour of the petitioners to file appeal under the provision of law. Despite of filing
an appeal, the petitioners have filed this petition which is liable to dismissed
being not maintainable in view of alternate remedy of appeal available to the
petitioner.
16. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available
with the petition carefully.
17. The petitioners are the Managing Partners of M.S. & Sons, a firm engaged in
coal handling, with a washery/depot located in Hemgir, Odisha. From

11
04.09.2018 to 19.03.2019, coal was transported from the petitioners' washery to
TRN ACB (India) Ltd. at Navapara, Gharghoda, Raigarh. The respondent No.1
provided transportation logistics services for the petitioners, for which they were
to be compensated through invoices. According to the respondent No.1, the
total amount due from the petitioners for the transportation services provided
was INR 66,44,798/-, of which INR 41,88,964/- had already been paid, leaving
an outstanding balance of INR 24,55,852/-.
18. On 01.10.2020, the respondent No.1 issued a notice demanding the outstanding
amount of INR 24,55,852/- along with INR 5,00,000/- as compensation for
damages. When the petitioners failed to pay, the respondent No.1 filed a
complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission,
Raigarh, on 19.10.2020, seeking recovery of the outstanding amount and
compensation for the alleged damages. The District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Raigarh, passed the impugned order on 27.10.2021,
directing the petitioners to pay the outstanding dues of INR 24,55,852/- along
with INR 5,000/- as compensation for mental agony and INR 1,000/- towards
litigation costs.
19. What mainly lies for consideration before this Court is as to whether complaint
as filed by Respondent No.1 before District Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission was maintainable or not ?, and further whether the plea of
Respondent No.1 that petitioners have alternative remedy of appeal has
substance or not ?
20. At first, this Court would deal with the question of alternative remedy of appeal
being available to the petitioner.

12
21. In this regard, it would be apt to go through the catena of decisions by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
22. In the matter of Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks , (1998) 8 SCC
1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in paragraphs Nos.15 & 16 as under:-
15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having
regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not
to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon
itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and
efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally
exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been
consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least
three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed
for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where
there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or
where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or
the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law
on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we
would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the
constitutional law as they still hold the field.
16. Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana [1950 SCC 221 :
AIR 1950 SC 163 : 1950 SCR 566] laid down that existence of an
adequate legal remedy was a factor to be taken into consideration
in the matter of granting writs. This was followed by another
Rashid case, namely, K.S. Rashid & Son v. Income Tax
Investigation Commission [AIR 1954 SC 207 : (1954) 25 ITR 167]
which reiterated the above proposition and held that where
alternative remedy existed, it would be a sound exercise of
discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226. This
proposition was, however, qualified by the significant words,
“unless there are good grounds therefor”, which indicated that
alternative remedy would not operate as an absolute bar and that
writ petition under Article 226 could still be entertained in
exceptional circumstances.
23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Hukum Chandra vs. Vivek Singh
in CA No.23775 of 2003 vide order dated 09.02.2004 held in paragraph No.2
as follows:-

13
2. A petition filed in the High Court seeking relief under Article 226
or 227 of the Constitution of India was entertained in the year
1993 by the then High Court of Allahabad. Consequent upon re-
organisation of the State of Uttar Pradesh, the matter came to be
transferred to the High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital. On
24.11.2003, when the matter came up for hearing, the High Court
formed an opinion that an alternate efficacious remedy of filing a
revision as provided by Section 18 of Uttar Pradesh Urban
Buildings (Regulations on Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972
was available to the appellant, the petition did not lie. The
petitioner in the High Court had explained in his petition the
circumstances in which it was impracticable then to file the
revision and therefore the writ jurisdiction of the High Court was
being invoked. That explanation had found favour with the High
Court while admitting the petition and issuing rule. After the matter
had remained pending for little over 10 years, the High Court was
not justified in dismissing the writ petition solely on the ground of
availability of an alternative remedy. Availability of an alternate
efficacious remedy does not implicitly and necessarily take away
the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear a writ petition and
exclusion of exercise of writ jurisdiction on account of availability
of alternate remedy is a rule of discretion.
24. Further, in the matter of Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer-
cum-Assessing Authority and Others, {2023 SCC OnLine SC 95}, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in paragraphs Nos.4, 6, 7 & 8, which reads as
under:-
4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few
words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by article 226 of the
Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the High
Courts holding writ petitions as "not maintainable" merely because
the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not
been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ
jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under article 226
is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power
must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in
this regard may be made to article 329 and ordainments of other
similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in
terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power
to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite
availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been

14
invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ
petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere
fact that the petitioner before the High Court, in a given case, has
not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot
mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is
axiomatic that the High Courts (bearing in mind the facts of each
particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ
petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise
of power under article 226 that has evolved through judicial
precedents is that the High Courts should normally not entertain a
writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy
is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere
availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the
party invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226
has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court
and render a writ petition "not maintainable". In a long line of
decisions, this court has made it clear that availability of an
alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the
"maintainability" of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a
party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a
rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law.
Though elementary, it needs to be restated that "entertainability"
and "maintainability" of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The
fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight
of. The objection as to "maintainability" goes to the root of the
matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the
courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for
adjudication. On the other hand, the question of "entertainability" is
entirely within the realm of discretion of the High Courts, writ
remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being
maintainable may not be entertained by a High Court for very
many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner,
despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief
would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition
by a High Court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed
the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an
exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would
not be proper.
6. At the end of the last century, this court in paragraph 15 of its
decision reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 (Whirlpool Corporation v.
Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai) carved out the exceptions on
the existence whereof a writ court would be justified in entertaining
a writ petition despite the party approaching it not having availed

15
the alternative remedy provided by the statute. The same read as
under :
(i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the
fundamental rights ;
(ii) where there is violation of principles of natural justice ;
(iii) where the order or the proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction ; or
(iv) where the vires of an Act is challenged.
7. Not too long ago, this court in its decision reported in [2021]
SCC Online SC 884 (Assistant Commissioner of State Tax v.
Commercial Steel Limited) has reiterated the same principles in *
paragraph 11.
8. That apart, we may also usefully refer to the decisions of this
Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC 724 (State of U. P. v. Indian Hume
Pipe Co. Ltd.) and (2000) 10 SCC 482 (Union of India v. State of
Haryana). What appears on a plain reading of the former decision
is that whether a certain item falls within an entry in a sales tax
statute, raises a pure question of law and if investigation into facts
is unnecessary, the High Court could entertain a writ petition in its
discretion even though the alternative remedy was not availed of ;
and, unless exercise of discretion is shown to be unreasonable or
perverse, this Court would not interfere. In the latter decision, this
court found the issue raised by the appellant to be pristinely legal
requiring determination by the High Court without putting the
appellant through the mill of statutory appeals in the hierarchy.
What follows from the said decisions is that where the controversy
is a purely legal one and it does not (2021) 93 GSTR 1 (SC). *
(1977) 39 STC 355 (SC) involve disputed questions of fact but only
questions of law, then it should be decided by the High Court
instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an
alternative remedy being available.
25.
Recently, in the matter of the Utkal Highways Engineers and Contractors
Versus Chief General Manager and Others {2025 SCC OnLine SC 1400} the
hon’ble Supreme Court held in paragraph No.8 as follows:-
8. Be that as it may, the High Court has not dealt with the merits of
the writ petition. Moreover, it is not an inviolable rule that no
money claim can be adjudicated upon in exercise of writ

16
jurisdiction. Non-payment of admitted dues, inter alia, may be
considered an arbitrary action on the part of respondents and for
claiming the same, a writ petition may lie. 1 Further, throwing a writ
petition on ground of availability of alternative remedy after 10
years, particularly, when parties have exchanged their affidavits, is
not the correct course unless there are disputed questions of fact
which by their very nature cannot be adjudicated upon without
recording formal evidence.
26.
The Bombay High Court also in the matter of Govind Dewaji Chavan v.
Wasudeo Ambadas Bhusate and Others, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 6613 held
in paragraphs Nos. 8, 9 and 11, which reads as under:-
8. A preliminary objection regarding the Writ Petition not being
maintainable in view of existence of alternative remedy needs to
be considered first. It is the case of the petitioner that there was
violation of principles of natural justice in the present case
because the petitioner was never made party in the proceedings
before the District Consumer Forum. It was submitted, in such a
situation, it has been held by Courts that a Writ Petition could be
entertained by this Court. There is no doubt about the fact that the
impugned order passed by the District Consumer Forum can be
made subject matter of challenge in appeal before the State
Consumer Commission under the provisions of the said Act. But,
the facts of the present case show that the petitioner was never
made party in the complaint filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The
opposite party No. 4 (respondent No. 6 in this Writ Petition) was
the Assistant Director of Town Planning, Yavatmal in the official
capacity. The person holding the said office did file the reply and
denied the allegations made by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in
respect of map drawn on 5-4-1991. But, the petitioner was never
party before the District Consumer Forum and yet the entire
liability was foisted on him. Thus, there was clear violation of the
principles of natural justice in the present case when the
impugned order was passed.
9. In the case of Committee of Management v. Vice-Chancellor
reported at (2009) 2 SCC 630, while considering the question of
maintainability of Writ Petition when alternative remedy is
available, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:—
“22. Apart from the fact that a statutory authority cannot consider
the validity of a Statute, as has been urged before us by Mr.
Chaudhari, it is beyond any doubt or dispute that availability of an

17
alternative remedy by itself may not be a ground for the High
Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. It may exercise its writ
jurisdiction despite the fact that an alternative remedy is available,
inter alia, in a case where the same would not be an efficacious
one.
23. Furthermore, when an order has been passed by an authority
without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural
justice, the superior Courts shall not refuse to exercise their
jurisdiction although there exists an alternative remedy. In this
context, it is appropriate to refer to the observations made by this
Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade
Marks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 1:
“15 But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this
Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies,
namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement
of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a
violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or
proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is
challenged.” [See also Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing
Committee v. C.K. Rajan, (2003) 7 SCC 546]”
11. Thus, it is evident that when there is violation of principles of
natural justice or the order of the District Consumer Forum, can be
said to be without jurisdiction, a Writ Petition challenging such
order of the District Consumer Forum cannot be thrown out only
on the ground of existence of alternative remedy of filing appeal
before the State Consumer Commission. Therefore, the
preliminary objection raised on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2
is rejected and the present Writ Petition is held to be maintainable.
27. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai ,
Hukum Chandra v. Vivek Singh , Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and
Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority and Utkal Highways Engineers
and Contractors v. Chief General Manager , it is crystal clear that availability
of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the exercise of
writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The rule of

18
alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. Where the
order impugned is alleged to be wholly without jurisdiction or where the
controversy involved is purely a question of law not requiring adjudication of
disputed facts, the High Court would be justified in entertaining the writ petition
despite availability of an appellate remedy.
28. In the present case, the core issue raised by the petitioners pertains to the very
jurisdiction of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh
to entertain the complaint filed by respondent No.1. The contention of the
petitioners is that the dispute arises out of a purely commercial transaction
between two business entities and that respondent No.1 does not fall within the
definition of “consumer” under Section 2(7) of the Consumer Protection Act,
2019. If the respondent No.1 is not a “consumer” within the meaning of the Act,
the complaint itself would not be maintainable and the proceedings before the
District Commission would be without jurisdiction. Such a question goes to the
root of the matter and is a pure question of law.
29. Furthermore, it is not in dispute that the petitioners had initially approached the
State Commission by way of a revision which was dismissed as not
maintainable, with liberty to file an appeal. The impugned order is thus directly
under challenge before this Court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In such
circumstances, relegating the petitioners to avail the alternative remedy of
appeal would not be appropriate, particularly when the issue raised strikes at
the very competence of the District Commission to entertain the complaint.
30. In light of the settled legal position as enunciated in the aforesaid judgments,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the present writ petitions are

19
maintainable despite availability of the statutory remedy of appeal under the
Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The preliminary objection raised by respondent
No.1 with regard to availability of alternative remedy, therefore, deserves to be
rejected.
31. Accordingly, it is held that the writ petitions are maintainable and this Court
proceeds to examine the issue regarding maintainability of the complaint before
the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission on merits.
32.
Section 2(7) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 defines "consumer" as a
person who buys goods or hires services for personal use, and not for
commercial purposes. In this case, the petitioners entered into a commercial
arrangement with the respondent No.1 for transportation logistics. The
respondent No.1, through his firm, Maa Banjari Enterprises and Logistics and
Trishul Enterprises respectively, issued invoices for the services provided, and
the payments made by the petitioners were for the commercial purpose of
running the transportation business. Therefore, the respondent No.1’s claim falls
within the "commercial purpose" exception under Section 2(7) and does not
qualify as a consumer dispute.
33.
At the expense of repetition, Section 2 (5) of the Act reads as under:-
(5) "complainant" means-
(i) a consumer; or
(ii) any voluntary consumer association registered under any law
for the time being in force; or
(iii) the Central Government or any State Government; or
(iv) the Central Authority; or
(v) one or more consumers, where there are numerous consumers
having the same interest; or

20
(vi) in case of death of a consumer, his legal heir or legal
representative; or
(vii) in case of a consumer being a minor, his parent or legal
guardian;
34. Additionally, Section 2(6) defines a "complaint" as an allegation in writing made
by a "complainant," which can be any "consumer" or certain other specified
entities. Given that the respondent No.1 is not a "consumer," he does not have
the locus standi to file a complaint before the District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Raigarh.
35. The Consumer Protection Act is designed to protect the interests of consumers
and resolve disputes related to the provision of goods and services. The District
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh, does not have the
jurisdiction to entertain disputes that arise from commercial arrangements, such
as the one between the petitioners and the respondent No.1. A suit for recovery
of money in such circumstances lies within the jurisdiction of a competent civil
court, not a consumer forum.
36. The District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh, erred by
failing to appreciate that the dispute between the petitioners and the respondent
No.1 is a commercial matter and that the respondent does not meet the
definition of a "consumer" under the Act. The Commission further erred by
exercising its jurisdiction in a matter that should have been addressed in a civil
court, not under the consumer protection framework.
37. Since the petitioners were not, in any manner, involved in the process of
providing goods or services to the Respondent No.1. The Respondent No.1 is
not a ‘competent consumer’ in order to prefer a complaint before the District
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission.

21
38. In the matter of Annapurna B. Uppin and Others v. Malsiddappa And
Another, (2024) 8 SCC 700, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in paragraphs
Nos.15 & 18, which reads as under:-
15. Secondly, the investment made by Respondent 1 complainant
was for deriving benefit by getting an interest on the same @ 18%
p.a., therefore, it would be an investment for profit/gain. It was a
commercial transaction and therefore also would be outside the
purview of the 1986 Act. Commercial disputes cannot be decided
in summary proceeding under the 1986 Act but the appropriate
remedy for recovery of the said amount, if any, admissible to
Respondent 1 complainant, would be before the civil court. The
complaint was thus not maintainable.
18. For all the reasons recorded above, we are of the view that the
District Forum, the State and the National Commissions fell in
error in allowing the complaint and upholding it in appeal and
revision. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned orders
are set aside and the complaint is dismissed.
39. In view of the foregoing discussion and upon careful consideration of the
statutory provisions contained in Sections 2(5), 2(6) and 2(7) of the Consumer
Protection Act, 2019, this Court is of the opinion that Respondent No.1, being
engaged in the business of transportation logistics and having entered into a
purely commercial arrangement with the petitioners for providing transport
services, does not fall within the definition of a “consumer” under the Act. The
dispute between the parties arises out of a commercial transaction pertaining to
recovery of alleged outstanding dues and does not constitute a consumer
dispute within the meaning of the Act. Consequently, the District Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, Raigarh lacked jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint and to pass the impugned order. Accordingly, the impugned orders
dated 27.10.2021 passed in Case Nos. CC/2020/172 and CC/2020/171 are
hereby set aside. It is, however, made clear that Respondent No.1 shall be at

22
liberty to avail such remedy as may be available to him under law before the
competent civil court or appropriate forum.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge

Avinash