R KRISHNA vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
- 1 -
Reserved on : 28.08.2026
Pronounced on : 04.11.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 04 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION NO. 11826 OF 2025 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
R.KRISHNA
S/O LATE RANGAPPA
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO. 584
NEAR POWERHOUSE,
H.M.T LAYOUT
NAGASANDRA MAIN ROAD
BENGALURU – 560 072.
…PETITIONER
Digitally
signed by
PADMAVATHI
B K
Location:
High Court of
Karnataka
(BY SRI SANDESH J.COUTA, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI MONICA PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1.
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY BANSHANKARI POLICE
EOD/CID
BENGALURU – 560 070.
- 2 -
2. SRI P.R.BALAJI,
S/O LATE RADHAKRISHNA GUPTA
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO. 88/77
SHIVARAMKARANTH ROAD,
CHIKKAKALASANDRA,
BENGALURU – 560 061.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPP-I FOR R-1;
SRI B.C.AVINASH, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF
THE BNSS, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS
INITIATED AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN SPL.C. NO. 769/2024
PENDING ON THE FILES OF THE PRINCIPAL CITY CIVIL AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, AT BANGALORE AND SPL. COURT FOR KPIDFE
ACT, AT BENGALURU (CCH-1) (ANNEXURE-A) AND CONSEQUENTLY
QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET DATED 03.04.2024 REGISTERED
AGAINST THE PETITIONER FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE
UNDER SECTIONS 403, 406, 409, 120(B) READ WITH SECTION 34
OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 AND SECTION 9 OF THE
KARNATAKA PROTECTION OF INTEREST OF DEPOSITORS IN
FINANCIAL ESTABLISHMENT ACT, 2004.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 28.08.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
- 3 -
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner/accused No.8 stands at the doors of this Court
calling in question proceedings in Special Case No.769 of 2024
registered for offences punishable under Sections 403, 406, 409,
120B r/w Section 34 of the IPC and Section 9 of the Karnataka
Protection of Interest of Depositors in Financial Establishments Act,
2004.
2. Heard Sri Sandesh J. Chouta , learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner, Sri B. N. Jagadeesha , learned State
Public Prosecutor-I appearing for respondent No.1 and
Sri B. C. Avinash , learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2.
3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -
One Vikram Investments/accused No.1, an entity established
by one Raghavendra Srinath and his wife Sunita Acharya as
founders, with the objective of collecting funds and investing in the
commodities future market began its operation. Accused No.4 is
- 4 -
said to have approached the petitioner and sought investments
from the petitioner ensuring timely credit of returns. Between 2010
and 2016 the petitioner is said to have invested at different
intervals Rs.21,00,00,000/- based on the assured returns of 4 to 5
per cent every month. The petitioner also received an interest of
Rs.13,72,97,990/- during the said period. A crime comes to be
registered on 03-03-2018 in Crime No.73 of 2018 against accused
Nos. 1 to 7 and investigation ensued, at which point in time, the
petitioner was not named in the FIR. The Police conduct
investigation and file a charge sheet on 03-04-2024, at which point
in time, the petitioner is drawn into the dragnet of proceedings on
several scores. It is this that has driven the petitioner to this Court
in the subject petition.
3.1. A coordinate Bench of this Court had granted an interim
order of stay of all further proceedings against the petitioner by the
following order on 24-04-2025:
“ ORAL ORDER
Sri Prabhulinga Navadgi, learned senior counsel
representing the petitioner’s counsel submits that the only
allegation against the petitioner-accused No.8 is that he had
- 5 -
invested a sum of Rs.20,18,00,000/-, and has received returns
of a sum of INR 55,69,56,225/-, which is far greater than the
returns received by other depositors.
The learned High Court Government Pleader accepts
notice for the respondent No.1-State. Issue emergent notice to
respondent No.2.
Interim order as prayed for, insofar it relates to the
petitioner-accused No.8, till the next date of hearing.
A week’s time is granted for compliance of office
objection.”
The said interim order is in subsistence even today. The matter is
thus heard.
4. The learned senior counsel Sri Sandesh J. Chouta
appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the
petitioner is only an investor. He has invested amounts; was in the
verge of losing the amounts but has received certain amounts
which according to the prosecution is in huge profit. An investor
cannot be dragged into the dragnet of proceedings is the settled
principle of law. Therefore, the learned senior counsel submits that
the petitioner must not be permitted to be tried as he is only an
investor.
- 6 -
5. Per contra, the learned State Public Prosecutor-I
Sri B.N. Jagadeesha would vehemently refute the submissions in
contending that the petitioner/accused No.8 projects himself to be
an investor. But, all the investors’ money to the tune of Rs.45/-
crores is given to the petitioner by the Company. Scores and scores
of people have invested in Vikram Investments and all the
investments have gone wrong. Therefore, analyzing the role of the
petitioner he has been drawn into the web of proceedings. He would
take this Court through the charge sheet material, to demonstrate
what is the role of this petitioner in the entire episode of crime. He
would submit that the chart appended to the petition itself would
pin the petitioner down. The learned State Public Prosecutor-I
would further contend qua the other co-accused who had preferred
Criminal Petition No.602 of 2024 and connected cases arising out of
the same crime have withdrawn those cases reserving liberty to
urge all the contentions in an application seeking their discharge.
He would submit that the petitioner/accused No.8 cannot be shown
a different treatment while his role being the same. He would seek
dismissal of the petition.
- 7 -
nd
6. Learned counsel appearing for the 2
respondent/complainant Sri B. C. Avinash , would toe the lines of
the learned State Public Prosecutor-I and seek dismissal of the
petition.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
8. The establishment of Vikram Investments and the purpose
for which it is established are not in dispute. After about several
years, alleging that the Company/Vikram Investments has
hoodwinked scores and scores of people, crime in Crime No.73 of
2018 comes to be registered. Some of the accused have
approached this Court in four Criminal Petitions viz., Criminal
Petitions No.602 of 2024 c/w 863 of 2022, 2410 of 2022 and 12566
of 2022, all of which were withdrawn or they were disposed of as
withdrawn reserving liberty to urge all contentions before the
concerned Court in an application seeking their discharge. The
order reads as follows:
- 8 -
“ORAL ORDER
Heard Sri.Kiran S. Javali, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the petitioners in Cri.P.Nos.602/2024, 863/2022,
2410/2022 and Sri.B.V.Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the petitioner in Crl.P.No.12566/2022.
2. After arguing the matter at length, the learned Senior
Counsels seek leave of this Court to withdraw the petitions with
liberty to file applications seeking discharge before the
concerned Court.
3. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, the Criminal
Petitions are disposed with liberty to urge all the contentions
that are now projected before the Concerned Court.
4. In the event, they want to file applications seeking
discharge, it is needless to observe that the concerned Court
shall consider all aspects and pass necessary orders, in
accordance with law.
Pending applications, if any, stand disposed .”
The learned senior counsel however would try to distinguish the
role of those petitioners with the present petitioner/accused No.8.
9. It is admitted fact that the name of the petitioner did not
figure while registering the crime. However, it does figure now at
the time when the charge sheet is filed. Therefore, what is the role
of accused No.8 is necessary to be noticed. It reads as follows:
“…. …. ….
- 9 -
8) -8 .
ಈ ಪ ಕರಣದ ಎ ಆ
ೋಾದ ಆ ಕೃಷ ರವರು ಒಬ ಯ ಎ ೆ ೕ ಉಧ"# ಾ$ದು%
-2 -7 , -1 " "
ಆ
ೋ ಮತು( ಆ
ೋ ರವರ )ಾಲು+ಾ ,ೆಯ ಆ
ೋ -ಕ ಂ ಇ0ೆ1 ೆ 2ಂ 3 ನ56
-4 2012 2016
ಆ
ೋ ಸೂತ ಂ ಸು
ೇ8 ರವರ ಮು9ಾಂತರ 0ೇ ಾ5:ಂದ 0ೇ ಾ5ನವ
ೆ;ೆ ಒಟು
.20,80,00,000/-
ರೂ ಗಳನು? ಹೂA,ೆ BಾA Cೇ
ೆ ಎDಾ6 ಹೂA,ೆ+ಾರ $ಂತ ಅF GೆಚುI ಅಂದ
ೆ
.55,69,56,225/- (
ರೂ ಐವKೆLದು ,ೋM ಅರವKೊ(ಂಬತು( ಲNದ ಐವKಾ(ರು ಾ-ರದ ಇನೂ?ರ
) -1 " "
ಇಪOKೈದು ರೂ)ಾQ ಗಳನು? ಆ
ೋ -ಕ ಂ ಇ0ೆ1 ೆ 2ಂ 3 ಸಂ ೆRಯ ವFQಂದ
. .34,89,56,225/- (
S1ೕಕ SರುKಾ(
ೆ ಅಂದ
ೆ GೆಚುIವ ಾ$ ರೂ ಮುವತ(0ಾಲುT ,ೋM
) -2
ಎಂಬKೊ(ಂಬತು( ಲNದ ಐವKಾ(ರು ಾ-ರದ ಇನೂ?ರ ಇಪOKೆLದು ರೂ)ಾQ ಗಳನು? ಆ
ೋ ಮತು(
-7 , -1 " "
ಆ
ೋ ರವರ )ಾಲು+ಾ ,ೆಯ ಆ
ೋ -ಕ ಂ ಇ0ೆ1 ೆ 2ಂ 3 ವFQಂದ DಾUಾಂಶದ
2018 -1 "
ರೂಪದ56 GೆಚುIವ ಾ$ Wೆಬ ವ ರವ
ೆ;ೆ DಾUಾಂಶದ ಹಣ ಸತತYಾ$ ಆ
ೋ -ಕ ಂ
" . 2017
ಇ0ೆ1 ೆ 2ಂ 3 ವFQಂದ ಪZೆದು,ೊಂAರುKಾ(
ೆ ಆದ
ೆ ನೂ
ಾರು ಹೂA,ೆ+ಾರ ;ೆ ನYೆಂಬ
. -1 " "
ಂದDೇ DಾUಾಂಶದ ಹಣ [ಂ\ರು$ಸುವ]ದು :56SರುKಾ(
ೆ ಆ
ೋ -ಕ ಂ ಇ0ೆ1 ೆ 2ಂ 3 ನ56
14.19 63
ಒಟು ,ೋM ರೂ)ಾQಗಳನು? ಹೂA,ೆ BಾAದ% ಜನ ಹೂA,ೆ+ಾರ ;ೆ ಒಂದು
ರೂ)ಾQಯನೂ? ಸಹ DಾUಾಂಶದ ರೂಪದDಾ6ಗ5ೕ ಅಥYಾ ಮೂಲ ಹೂA,ೆ ಹಣವ0ಾ?ಗ5ೕ :ೕಡ+ೇ
-8 . 2018
ಇದ%ರೂ ಸಹ ಆ
ೋ ಆ ಕೃಷ ರವರು Wೆಬ ವ ರವ
ೆಗೂ :ರಂತರYಾ$ ಅತ"aಕ
-1 " "
DಾUಾಂಶ Gಾಗೂ ಅಸಹಜ DಾUಾಂಶವನು? ಆ
ೋ -ಕ ಂ ಇ0ೆ1 ೆ 2ಂ 3 ವFQಂದ ಹಣ
, , , 420,
ಪZೆದು,ೊಂಡು Cೇ
ೆ ಹೂA,ೆ+ಾರ ;ೆ ನಂb,ೆ +ೊ ೕಹ cೕಸ ವಂಚ0ೆ BಾAದು% ಕಲಂ
120( ) 34 9
b ಸ[ತ ಐ S ಮತು( ಕಲಂ ಕ0ಾdಟಕ ಹಣ,ಾಸು ಸಂ ೆRಗಳ eೇವf+ಾರರ [ತ
2004
ಸಂರNgಾ ,ಾh% ಅAಯ56 ijಾಹd ಅಪ
ಾಧ ಎಸ$ರುವ]+ಾ$ +ೋkಾ
ೋಪgೆಯನು?
.”
Gೊ ಸDಾ$+ೆ
A table is appended to the charge sheet, which would demonstrate
the manner in which the amounts are generated to the account of
the petitioner. It reads as follows:
“PART-III
Evaluation of R. Krishna and CE analysis and fund flow
transactions period wise as per CE bank statement: - (Annex -
79)
(Amount in Crores)
- 10 -
Period Paid to R Received
Krishna from R
Krishna
Cumulative
Bal
2011-12 0.05 0.50 -0.45
2012-13
0.40 0.90 -0.96
2013-14 1.16 1.37 -1.16
2014-15 7.42 9.53 -3.27
2015-16 14.59 8.50 2.82
2016-17 22.31 - 25.13
2017-18 9.77 - 34.90
Total 55.70 20.80 34.90
The table below explains the total amount shown as income by
R. Krishna and calculation of percentage of such income based
on Weighted Average Investment Balance. While calculating
such percentage, payment made to R. Krishna not considered,
only receipts are considered. As none of the payments were
subjected to TDS, we surmise that may not be in the nature of
revenue.
(Amount in Crores)
PART - IV
•
Details of Total investors as per Investors List compared with
Bank Statement.
- 11 -
Notes:
The Investors List details, which consist of account number of
Investors provided to us by CID (Refer Annex 80). The total
number of Investors is 2638 and after removal of the duplicate
account number the exclusive account numbers is 2133. And as
per bank statement the total account number is 2737. When
these account numbers are compared with Investors list, then
all the account number are matched with the Investors List.
•
Details of Total investors as per Master Data compared with
Bank Statement.
- 12 -
Notes:
The master data details, which consist of account number from Exit
and Existing List provided to us by CID (Refer Annex - 81). After
removal of the duplicate account number the exclusive account
numbers is 1966. Out of these account numbers matched with
Investors list is 1248. And unmatched account numbers are 718.
Then these unmatched account numbers compared with bank
statement account numbers of 2737 and found 209 account
numbers are matched with bank statement.”
The aforesaid chart is drawn from the audit report. The investment
of the petitioner up to 2014-15 was Rs.9.53 crores and in the year
2015-16 it was Rs. 8.50 crores. But, what is paid to him for a total
investment finally in the year 2018 was Rs. 55.70 crores as against
the investment of 20.80 crores. On what basis is not indicated. It is
not the petitioner who is the only investor. There are scores and
scores of people who have invested in this Company, to whom no
money is returned. But, to the petitioner for an investment of 40%,
140% is returned, as the chart shows total investment up to 2017-
18 is Rs.20.80 crores. Particularly for 2016-17 and 2017-18 there
is zero investment. But, the returns are Rs. 22.31 crores and Rs.
9.77 crores respectively. If this should not be tried, in the
considered view of this Court, what else should be tried.
- 13 -
10. These are in the realm of seriously disputed questions of
fact, as investors money to the tune of several crores is allegedly
swindled by the accused. Where the amount was parked, according
to the prosecution, is in the account of such persons i.e., accused
No.8 who had invested Rs. 20.80 crores, but gets back Rs. 55.70
crores. By no stretch of calculation of interest in any market 140
times return is heard. This is where the needle of suspicion arises.
In that light, this is a matter to be tried, as the issue revolves round
seriously disputed questions of fact.
11. It is by now too well-settled that this Court while
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C./528 of
the BNSS cannot embark upon a mini-trial by entering into the
merits of the allegations. In this regard, it is apposite to refer to
the judgments of the Apex Court.
11.1. The Apex Court in KAPTAN SINGH v. STATE OF
1
UTTAR PRADESH , has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
1
(2021) 9 SCC 35
- 14 -
9.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in
the present case the High Court in exercise of powers
under Section 482 CrPC has quashed the criminal
proceedings for the offences under Sections 147, 148,
149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC. It is required to be noted
that when the High Court in exercise of powers under
Section 482 CrPC quashed the criminal proceedings, by
the time the investigating officer after recording the
statement of the witnesses, statement of the
complainant and collecting the evidence from the
incident place and after taking statement of the
independent witnesses and even statement of the
accused persons, has filed the charge-sheet before the
learned Magistrate for the offences under Sections 147,
148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC and even the learned
Magistrate also took the cognizance. From the impugned
judgment and order [Radhey Shyam Gupta v. State of U.P.,
2020 SCC OnLine All 914] passed by the High Court, it does
not appear that the High Court took into consideration the
material collected during the investigation/inquiry and even
the statements recorded. If the petition under Section 482
CrPC was at the stage of FIR in that case the allegations
in the FIR/complaint only are required to be considered
and whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or not is
required to be considered. However, thereafter when
the statements are recorded, evidence is collected and
the charge-sheet is filed after conclusion of the
investigation/inquiry the matter stands on different
footing and the Court is required to consider the
material/evidence collected during the investigation.
Even at this stage also, as observed and held by this Court in
a catena of decisions, the High Court is not required to go into
the merits of the allegations and/or enter into the merits of
the case as if the High Court is exercising the appellate
jurisdiction and/or conducting the trial. As held by this Court
in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel [Dineshbhai Chandubhai
Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104 : (2018) 1 SCC
- 15 -
(Cri) 683] in order to examine as to whether factual contents
of FIR disclose any cognizable offence or not, the High Court
cannot act like the investigating agency nor can exercise the
powers like an appellate court. It is further observed and held
that that question is required to be examined keeping in view,
the contents of FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring
no proof. At such stage, the High Court cannot appreciate
evidence nor can it draw its own inferences from
contents of FIR and material relied on. It is further
observed it is more so, when the material relied on is
disputed. It is further observed that in such a situation,
it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such
stage to probe and then of the court to examine
questions once the charge-sheet is filed along with such
material as to how far and to what extent reliance can
be placed on such material.
9.2. In Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar [Dhruvaram
Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 :
(2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 672] after considering the decisions of this
Court in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992
Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , it is held by this
Court that exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC to
quash the proceedings is an exception and not a rule. It is
further observed that inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 CrPC though wide is to be exercised
sparingly, carefully and with caution, only when such
exercise is justified by tests specifically laid down in the
section itself. It is further observed that appreciation of
evidence is not permissible at the stage of quashing of
proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482
CrPC. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in Arvind
Khanna [CBI v. Arvind Khanna, (2019) 10 SCC 686 : (2020) 1
SCC (Cri) 94] , Managipet [State of Telangana v. Managipet,
(2019) 19 SCC 87 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] and
- 16 -
in XYZ [XYZ v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 10 SCC 337 : (2020) 1
SCC (Cri) 173] , referred to hereinabove.
9.3. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the
aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of
the opinion that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in
quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under
Section 482 CrPC.
10. The High Court has failed to appreciate and consider
the fact that there are very serious triable issues/allegations
which are required to be gone into and considered at the time
of trial. The High Court has lost sight of crucial aspects which
have emerged during the course of the investigation. The High
Court has failed to appreciate and consider the fact that the
document i.e. a joint notarised affidavit of Mamta Gupta
Accused 2 and Munni Devi under which according to Accused 2
Ms Mamta Gupta, Rs 25 lakhs was paid and the possession
was transferred to her itself is seriously disputed. It is required
to be noted that in the registered agreement to sell dated 27-
10-2010, the sale consideration is stated to be Rs 25 lakhs
and with no reference to payment of Rs 25 lakhs to Ms Munni
Devi and no reference to handing over the possession.
However, in the joint notarised affidavit of the same date i.e.
27-10-2010 sale consideration is stated to be Rs 35 lakhs out
of which Rs 25 lakhs is alleged to have been paid and there is
a reference to transfer of possession to Accused 2. Whether Rs
25 lakhs has been paid or not the accused have to establish
during the trial, because the accused are relying upon the said
document and payment of Rs 25 lakhs as mentioned in the
joint notarised affidavit dated 27-10-2010. It is also required
to be considered that the first agreement to sell in which Rs 25
lakhs is stated to be sale consideration and there is reference
to the payment of Rs 10 lakhs by cheques. It is a registered
document. The aforesaid are all triable issues/allegations
which are required to be considered at the time of trial. The
High Court has failed to notice and/or consider the material
collected during the investigation.
- 17 -
11. Now so far as the finding recorded by the High Court
that no case is made out for the offence under Section 406 IPC
is concerned, it is to be noted that the High Court itself has
noted that the joint notarised affidavit dated 27-10-2010 is
seriously disputed, however as per the High Court the same is
required to be considered in the civil proceedings. There the
High Court has committed an error. Even the High Court has
failed to notice that another FIR has been lodged against the
accused for the offences under Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC
with respect to the said alleged joint notarised affidavit. Even
according to the accused the possession was handed over to
them. However, when the payment of Rs 25 lakhs as
mentioned in the joint notarised affidavit is seriously disputed
and even one of the cheques out of 5 cheques each of Rs 2
lakhs was dishonoured and according to the accused they were
handed over the possession (which is seriously disputed) it can
be said to be entrustment of property. Therefore, at this stage
to opine that no case is made out for the offence under
Section 406 IPC is premature and the aforesaid aspect is to be
considered during trial. It is also required to be noted that the
first suit was filed by Munni Devi and thereafter subsequent
suit came to be filed by the accused and that too for
permanent injunction only. Nothing is on record that any suit
for specific performance has been filed. Be that as it may, all
the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered at the time
of trial only.
12. Therefore, the High Court has grossly erred in
quashing the criminal proceedings by entering into the
merits of the allegations as if the High Court was
exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting
the trial. The High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in
quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers
under Section 482 CrPC.
13. Even the High Court has erred in observing that
original complaint has no locus. The aforesaid observation is
made on the premise that the complainant has not placed on
- 18 -
record the power of attorney along with the counter filed
before the High Court. However, when it is specifically stated
in the FIR that Munni Devi has executed the power of attorney
and thereafter the investigating officer has conducted the
investigation and has recorded the statement of the
complainant, accused and the independent witnesses,
thereafter whether the complainant is having the power of
attorney or not is to be considered during trial.
14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated
above, the impugned judgment and order [Radhey Shyam
Gupta v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 914] passed by
the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise
of powers under Section 482 CrPC is unsustainable and the
same deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly
quashed and set aside. Now, the trial is to be conducted and
proceeded further in accordance with law and on its own
merits. It is made clear that the observations made by this
Court in the present proceedings are to be treated to be
confined to the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC only and
the trial court to decide the case in accordance with law and
on its own merits and on the basis of the evidence to be laid
and without being influenced by any of the observations made
by us hereinabove. The present appeal is accordingly allowed.”
11.2. In the case of MUSKAN v. ISHAAN KHAN
2
(SATANIYA) , the Apex Court has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
C. ANALYSIS
2
2025 SCC Online SC 2355
- 19 -
17. The main issue that arises for our analysis is whether
the High Court was right in quashing the criminal proceedings
against the private respondents primarily on the ground that the
earlier complaints did not mention the two specific incidents
dated 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later on added in
the FIR and whether the same would not amount to conducting
a ‘ mini trial ’ which is clearly prohibited under the scheme of
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.
... ... ... ...
22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage
of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini
trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.
P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the
Court has to only consider whether any sufficient
material is available to proceed against the accused or
not. If sufficient material is available, the power under
Section 482 should not be exercised.
State of Odisha Pratima
23. This Court in the case of v.
10
Mohanty held that:
“ 8.2. It is trite that the power of quashing should
be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and in
rare cases. As per the settled proposition of law while
examining an FIR/complaint quashing of which is
sought, the court cannot embark upon any enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness of allegations made in the
FIR/complaint. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be
an exception rather than any ordinary rule. Normally the
criminal proceedings should not be quashed in exercise
of powers under Section 482 CrPC when after a
thorough investigation the charge-sheet has been filed.
At the stage of discharge and/or considering the
application under Section 482 CrPC the courts are
not required to go into the merits of the
allegations and/or evidence in detail as if
conducting the mini-trial. As held by this Court the
powers under Section 482 CrPC are very wide, but
conferment of wide power requires the court to be
more cautious. It casts an onerous and more
diligent duty on the Court.”
- 20 -
24. Further in the case of Central Bureau of
11
Investigation v. Aryan Singh , this Court held that at the
stage of Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., the High Court is not
required to conduct a mini trial.
“6. From the impugned common judgment
and order [ Aryan Singh v. CBI , 2022 SCC OnLine
P&H 4158] passed by the High Court, it appears
that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings
before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a
mini trial and/or the High Court was considering
the applications against the judgment and order
passed by the learned trial court on conclusion of
trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the
stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal
proceedings, while exercising the powers under
Section 482 CrPC, the Court is not required to
conduct the mini trial. The High Court in the
common impugned judgment and order has
observed that the charges against the accused are
not proved. This is not the stage where the
prosecution/investigating agency is/are required
to prove the charges. The charges are required to
be proved during the trial on the basis of the
evidence led by the prosecution/investigating
agency.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. This Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited
(supra) gave following directions to the Courts exercising the
power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.:
“ Conclusions
33. In view of the above and for the reasons
stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core
issue, whether the High Court would be justified in
passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or
“no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency
of the quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC and/or
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in
what circumstances and whether the High Court would
be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the
accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the
- 21 -
investigation or till the final report/charge-sheet is filed
under Section 173 CrPC, while dismissing/disposing
of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal
proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under
Section 482 CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:
33.1 ….
33.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation
into the cognizable offences.
33.3. It is only in cases where no cognizable
offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first
information report that the Court will not permit an
investigation to go on.
33.4. The power of quashing should be exercised
sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed,
in the “rarest of rare cases” (not to be confused with the
formation in the context of death penalty).
33.5. While examining an FIR/complaint,
quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark
upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or
otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint.
33.6 ….
33.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an
exception rather than an ordinary rule.
33.8 to 33.11 ….
33.12. The first information report is not an
encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details
relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the
investigation by the police is in progress, the court
should not go into the merits of the allegations in the
FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the
investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the
conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR
does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts
to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the
investigating officer finds that there is no substance in
the application made by the complainant, the
- 22 -
investigating officer may file an appropriate
report/summary before the learned Magistrate which
may be considered by the learned Magistrate in
accordance with the known procedure.
33.13 and 33.14 …..
33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is
made by the alleged accused and the court when it
exercises the power under Section 482 CrPC, only has to
consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose
commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is
not required to consider on merits whether or not the
merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence
and the court has to permit the investigating
agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. Further, this Court in the case of State of
12
Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani held that:
“13. There can be no dispute over the
proposition that inherent power in a matter of
quashment of FIR has to be exercised sparingly
and with caution and when and only when such
exercise is justified by the test specifically laid
down in the provision itself. There is no denial of
the fact that the power under Section 482 CrPC is
very wide but it needs no special emphasis to
state that conferment of wide power requires the
Court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and
more diligent duty on the Court.
14. In this regard, it would be seemly to
reproduce a passage from Kurukshetra University
[ Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana , (1977) 4
SCC 451 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 613] wherein Chandrachud, J.
(as his Lordship then was) opined thus : (SCC p. 451,
para 2)
“2. It surprises us in the extreme that the High
Court thought that in the exercise of its inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it
could quash a first information report. The police had not
even commenced investigation into the complaint filed
- 23 -
by the Warden of the University and no proceeding at all
was pending in any court in pursuance of the FIR. It
ought to be realised that inherent powers do not confer
an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act
according to whim or caprice. That statutory power has
to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the
rarest of rare cases.””
(emphasis supplied)
27. We are of the view that the High Court has
erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to
credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the
complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it
must be shown that there exists no prime facie case
against the accused persons. In the present case, from
the conjoint reading of the complaints and the FIR, it can
be seen that prime facie allegations of harassment and
demand of dowry are made out, despite that the High
Court quashed the FIR against the private respondents
primarily on the ground that the earlier two complaints
that were filed by the appellant did not mention the
specific instances that happened on 22.07.2021 and
27.11.2022 and the same were later on mentioned in the
FIR only as an afterthought and was a counterblast to the
legal notice sent by respondent no. 1/husband to the
appellant as she was not coming back to her matrimonial
home. This approach adopted by the High Court, in our
considered opinion, amounts to conducting a mini trial .”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
In the light of the afore-quoted judgments of the Apex Court and
the facts obtaining in the case at hand, this Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction, cannot interfere at this stage of proceedings to
obliterate the proceedings against the petitioner and it is for the
petitioner to come out clean in a full blown trial.
- 24 -
12. For the aforesaid reasons, finding no merit in the petition,
the petition stands dismissed.
Interim order operating if any, shall stand dissolved.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
BKP