Sarr Freights Corporation & Anr. vs Argo Coral Maritime Ltd
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on: 02.06.2026
Date of decision: 18.09.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010124872026
+ FAO(OS) 40/2026 & CM APPL. 19846/2026
SARR FREIGHTS CORPORATION & ANR. .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Saurabh Seth, Mr. Shantanu
Aggarwal, Mr. Sukrit Seth, Mr. Sumer
Dev Seth, Ms. Neelampreet Kaur, Mr.
Abhiroop Rathore, Mr. Kabir Dev &
Mr. Sukhbir Singh, Advs.
versus
ARGO CORAL MARITIME LTD. .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sandeep Sethi, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Arvind K Gupta, Ms. Tripti Sharma,
Mr. Krishna Gambhir, Ms. Shreya
Sethi, Mr. Abhiesumat Gupta, Mr.
Ashish Singh, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
J U D G M E N T
1. Plaintiffs/appellants have filed the present appeal against order dated
13.03.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in I.A. No.30141 of 2025 in
CS (OS) 868 of 2025, rejecting their interim anti-arbitration injunction
application.
2. The relevant facts are that plaintiffs/appellants were required to
transfer military cargo for United Nation Peace Keeping Force from New
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Delhi to Sudan, which, in transit, was to be shipped from Nhava Sheva Port,
Mumbai to Port Sudan. For such transit, broker/agent of appellants, Pirama,
and booking agent of the respondent, Ocean7, negotiated terms through
exchanged emails/Fixture Recap dated 04.04.2023, followed by a final
Booking Note dated 04.04.2023, signed on 05.04.2023 by SARR Freights
Corporation/appellant no.1 and the agent of defendant/respondent. Clause 23
of the emails/Fixture Recap provided ―English law and London arbitration‖
to apply. However, the Booking Note only applied additional rider Clause
20 to 41, attached to it. The Booking Note has five pages annexed to it,
containing Clauses 1 to 43, of them 41 to 43 appearing on the last page, and
this entire set is signed at the bottom of each page, including at the end,
below Clause 43, by the appellant, party in person, and Ocean7, booking
agent of the respondent. There is no arbitration provided till Clause 41 and
the same appears only in Clause 43, providing ―Bimco Dispute Resolution
Clause latest edition to apply, subject to English Law and LMAA Terms and
Procedures‖ . No bill of lading was issued in the present matter.
3. On 18.04.2023, the United Nations released an advisory declaring
cargo movements through all ports of Sudan as unsafe. Thus, appellants
cancelled the Booking Note invoking force majeure events. A dispute arose
and defendant/respondent gave notice invoking arbitration under Clause 43
of the Booking Note. The plaintiffs/appellants agreed for arbitration subject
to their right to dispute the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
4. The disputes arising out of the Booking Note became subject matter
of two arbitration references. The first arbitration was commenced by the
respondent through Notice of Arbitration dated 27.07.2023. However,
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during the course of such proceeding, the LMAA by its order dated
22.11.2024 found, that, though the respondent assert that the arbitration
stand commenced against charterer i.e., SARR Freights, the Booking Note is
signed by SARR Freights Corporation, while the appointment of the
arbitrator is made only on behalf of SARR Freights Limited. Therefore,
Tribunal was prima facie of the view, that it appeared to be constituted only
between the respondent and SARR Freights Limited/appellant no.2 and
would thus only bind SARR Freights Limited/appellant no.2, and not SARR
Freights Corporation/appellant no.1. Consequently, the respondent issued a
fresh Notice of Arbitration dated 06.12.2024, also invoking fresh arbitration
against SARR Freights Corporation, without prejudice to the earlier notice
dated 27.07.2023. Both references were directed to be consolidated and
heard concurrently for determination of the common preliminary issues.
5. After exchange of pleadings, four preliminary issues were framed,
two relevant for the present appeal are:-
―1. Was any arbitration agreement agreed between the
parties, in either or both the fixture recap dated 4 April
2023, or the booking note dated 4 April 2023, such that
this tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the disputes in this
reference, and if so, in what terms?
2. Should the booking note be rectified by substituting
the words ―clause 20–43‖ for ―clause 20–41‖?‖
6. By a partial award dated 18.10.2025, while one member of the
Tribunal held in favour of plaintiffs/appellants, other two, forming majority
view of the Tribunal, applying English Common law, held that the parties
had agreed to English law and London arbitration under the Fixture Recap
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and, on a true construction of the Booking Note consistent with business
common sense, that disputes were to be referred to London arbitration under
Clause 43 of the additional rider clauses attached. They further held that the
―BIMCO Law and Arbitration Clause London 2020‖ is the ―latest edition‖
for the purposes of Clause 43 and provides for LMAA arbitration in London
by a tribunal of three arbitrators, with English law governing the same. They
also held that the reference to „41‟ is a typographical error and ought to be
rectified to „43‟, in accordance with the parties‟ intention as reflected in the
Fixture Recap. Aggrieved by the arbitration proceedings commenced by the
defendant/respondent in London before the LMAA, the plaintiffs/appellants
approached the learned Single Judge of this Court by way of the present suit
seeking an anti-arbitration injunction and also such an interim injunction.
7. The learned Single Judge, has relied upon Judgments of the Supreme
Court in Govind Rubber Limited v. Louis Dreyfus Commodities Asia
Private Limited , (2015) 13 SCC 477; and Trimex International FZE
Limited, Dubai v. Vedanta Aluminium Limited, India , (2010) 3 SCC 1,
which hold that an agreement even if not signed by the parties, can be spelt
out from the correspondence exchanged between the parties. Applying the
said principle, the learned Single Judge held that as per intention of parties
as ascertained from the Fixture Recap, Clauses „20-41‟ in the Booking Note
is an inadvertent error and an oversight, which should be „20-43‟. The
learned Single Judge held that looking into the facts of the present case,
parties agreed for an arbitration clause in the Fixture Recap, though the same
is absent in the Booking Note. Consequently, the learned Single Judge by
the impugned order held that a valid arbitration agreement can be read from
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Clause 43 and thus, rejected the application for interim anti-arbitration
injunction. The learned Single Judge also held that this Court at Delhi has
jurisdiction as fundamental and substantial part of the cause of action has
arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
8. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Dayan Krishnan, appearing on behalf of
the appellants, submits that the part of cause of action has arisen in Delhi as
the Booking Note is signed in Delhi, by the appellants based in Delhi and
the cargo was required to be transported from Delhi in the first instance.
Therefore, this Court would have jurisdiction in the present dispute. He
further submits that the Booking Note is the final agreement duly signed
between the parties and it contemplates all the terms and conditions which
are finally agreed by them. It expressly provides that it shall prevail over any
previous arrangements and thus, must prevail over earlier Fixture Recap. It
is submitted that the Special Terms box of the Booking Note records that
additional rider Clauses „20-41‟ attached will apply. It leaves out Clauses 1
to 19 and again Clauses 42 and 43, which contains the arbitration clause. He
further submits that the reference to Clauses „20-41‟is deliberate, and more
than one clause in the Standard Form of the Booking Note stands modified
in the signed Booking Note. He points out that Clauses 41, 42 and 43 appear
on the same page of the additional riders, which is also the last page of the
Booking Note and is signed at the bottom by the parties, as also done on the
entire set. Merely signing at bottom of Clauses 42 and 43 will not apply
them upon parties as they have specifically provided which clauses are to
apply. It is, therefore, submitted that the reference to Clauses „20-41‟ cannot
be treated as a mistake or mere typographical error. It is submitted that there
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is no scope for the Court or the Tribunal to rewrite the agreement of parties
by substituting „20-43‟ for „20-41‟, when there is no ambiguity in the same.
It is submitted that Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
squarely covers the dispute and there is neither any reason nor scope to
apply the English Law, and anti-arbitration injunction ought to be granted.
Reliance is placed upon Kamla Devi v. Takhatmal , AIR 1964 SC 859 ;
BSES Ltd. v. Fenner India Ltd . , (2006) 2 SCC 728; Mcdonald's India
Private Limited v. Vikram Bakshi & Ors ., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3949; DR
Bina Modi v. Lalit Kumar Modi & Ors , 2020:DHC:3729-DB; Union of
India v. Kishorilal Gupta and Bros. , 1959 SCC OnLine SC 6; Roop Kumar
v. Mohan Thedani , (2003) 6 SCC 595; and Joshi Technologies
International Inc. v. Union of India , (2015) 7 SCC 728.
9. Per contra , learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Sandeep Sethi, appearing on
behalf of the respondent, firstly raises an objection to the jurisdiction of this
Court to entertain the present dispute and submits that this Booking Note
was for movement of cargo from Mumbai to Sudan. Therefore, in India, it is
the Courts of Mumbai which would have jurisdiction. He further submits
that the terms were finalized between the parties by the Fixture Recap,
which were to be carried over to the Booking Note, and the Fixture Recap
and Booking Note cannot be read in isolation. The Fixture Recap,
exchanged prior to the Booking Note, in Clause 23 provides ―English law
and London arbitration‖. The Booking Note issued pursuant to and in
continuation of the Fixture Recap is supposed to contain the same. It is
further submitted that parties have signed below the Clause 43 and in fact
recording of Clause „20-41‟ is a typographical error. Clause 43 of the
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Booking Note containing the arbitration clause is intended to be part of the
contractual arrangement between the parties. It is lastly submitted that the
Court or the Tribunal can substitute „20-43‟ for „20-41‟. Reliance is placed
upon Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pty. Ltd. v. MMTC Ltd. , (2021)
3 SCC 308, and the following foreign judgments, namely, FSHC Group
Holdings Limited v. Glas Trust Corporation Limited , [2019] EWCA Civ
1361; Electrosteel Castings Limited v. Scan-Trans Shipping & Chartering
SDN BHD , [2002] EWHC 1993 (Comm); and Poralu Marine Australia Pty
Ltd v. MV Dijksgracht, [2023] FCAFC 147.
10. We have heard learned Senior Counsel for the parties at length and
have perused the record. They have raised the following issues before us.
(i) whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present dispute.
(ii) whether as per law applicable, it is the Booking Note which is the
final agreement between the parties and/or whether the Court can
modify the same by reading into the earlier exchanged
emails/Fixture Recap, if so, under what circumstances.
(iii) whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the matter or an
anti-arbitration injunction ought to be granted ?
11. So far as the issue of jurisdiction of this Court is concerned, the
learned Single Judge found that the Booking Note is signed in Delhi by the
plaintiffs, based in Delhi. Further, the cargo was required to be transported
from Delhi in the first instance, and enforcement proceedings, if any, would
necessarily be also pursued in Delhi. Thus, learned Single Judge held that
this Court at Delhi has jurisdiction in the present matter, as fundamental and
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substantial part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction
of this Court.
12. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent could not dispute that
appellants have their permanent office in Delhi, signed the Booking Note in
Delhi and the enforcement proceedings would also be put in force against
the appellants, if required, at Delhi only. We, thus, find force in the
submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants and the findings
of the learned Single Judge. Once a substantial part of the cause of action
has occurred in Delhi, the Courts at Delhi would have jurisdiction to
entertain the suit. The learned Single Judge has at length considered all the
facts and the law applicable on this issue, which we approve and do not find
any necessity to repeat the same. Merely because multiple courts can have
jurisdiction, including that of Mumbai, Courts in Delhi would not lose to
have jurisdiction, when admittedly part of cause of action has arisen within
its jurisdiction.
13. So far as jurisdiction of Indian Courts with regard to validity or
existence of arbitration agreement is concerned, a Division Bench of this
Court in Mcdonald's (supra), held: -
―52. It is also important to note that although the
competence-competence principle was applicable and
the arbitral tribunal had the requisite competence to
determine its own jurisdiction, the courts in England
retained the jurisdiction to determine the issue as to
whether there was ever an agreement to arbitrate. In
our view, the same principle would apply insofar as the
courts in India are concerned. The courts in India
would certainly have the jurisdiction to determine the
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question as to whether an arbitration agreement was
void or a nullity .‖
(emphasis added)
14. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view of the Division Bench
and find that this Court has jurisdiction in the present dispute.
15. Now, the second issue raised, whether as per law applicable, it is the
Booking Note which is the final agreement between the parties and/or
whether the Court can modify the same by reading into the earlier
exchanged emails/Fixture Recap, if so, under what circumstances. Relevant
sections of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, for our purposes are:-
― 91. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other
dispositions of property reduced to form of document.
––When the terms of a contract , or of a grant, or of any
other disposition of property, have been reduced to the
form of a document , and in all cases in which any matter
is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document,
no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such
contract , grant or other disposition of property, or of such
matter, except the document itself , or secondary evidence
of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is
admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained.
…
92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement. ––When the
terms of any such contract , grant or other disposition of
property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to
the form of a document, have been proved according to
the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or
statement shall be admitted , as between the parties to any
such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the
purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or
subtracting from, its terms :
…
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Proviso (6). –– Any fact may be proved which shows in
what manner the language of a document is related to
existing facts.
93. Exclusion of evidence to explain or amend
ambiguous document. –– When the language used in a
document is, on its face, ambiguous or defective, evidence
may not be given of facts which would show its meaning or
supply its defects.
94. Exclusion of evidence against application of
document to existing facts. ––When language used in a
document is plain in itself, and when it applies accurately
to existing facts, evidence may not be given to show that it
was not meant to apply to such facts.
95. Evidence as to document unmeaning in reference to
existing facts. ––When language used in a document is
plain in itself, but is unmeaning in reference to existing
facts, evidence may be given to show that it was used in a
peculiar sense.‖
(emphasis added)
16. The law on this subject can be traced as far back as in Ottoman Bank
of Nicosia v. Ohanes Chakarian, AIR 1938 PC 26, where the Privy Council
held:-
―10. …if the contract is clear and unambiguous, its true
effect cannot be changed merely by the course of conduct
adopted by the parties in acting under it.‖
17. In Ganga Saran v. Ram Charan Ram Gopal , 1951 SCC 1053, the
Supreme Court held:-
―12. …Since the true construction of an agreement must
depend upon the import of the words used and not upon
what the parties choose to say afterwards, it is
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unnecessary to refer to what the parties have said about
it.‖
18. In Kamla Devi v. Takhatmal (supra), the Supreme Court held:-
―8. …
Sections 94 to 98 of the Indian Evidence Act afford
guidance in the construction of documents; they also
indicate when and under what circumstances extrensic
evidence could be relied upon in construing the terms of a
document. Section 94 of the Evidence Act lays down a
rule of interpretation of the language of a document when
it is plain and applies accurately to existing facts. It says
that evidence may be given to show that it was not meant
to apply to such facts. When a Court is asked to interpret
a document, it looks at its language. If the language is
clear and unambiguous and applies accurately to
existing facts, it shall accept the ordinary meaning, for
the duty of the Court is not to delve deep into the
intricacies of the human mind to a certain one's
undisclosed intention, but only to take the meaning of
the words used by him, that is to say his expressed
intentions. Sometimes when it is said that a Court should
look into all the circumstances to find an author's
intention, it is only for the purpose of finding out whether
the words apply accurately to existing facts. But if the
words are clear in the context of the surrounding
circumstances, the Court cannot rely on them to
attribute to the author an intention contrary to the plain
meaning of the words used in the document. ‖
(emphasis added)
19. In Roop Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court held:-
― 13. Section 91 relates to evidence of terms of contract,
grants and other disposition of properties reduced to
form of document. This section merely forbids proving the
contents of a writing otherwise than by writing itself; it is
covered by the ordinary rule of law of evidence,
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applicable not merely to solemn writings of the sort
named but to others known sometimes as the "best
evidence rule". It is in reality declaring a doctrine of the
substantive law, namely, in the case of a written
contract, that of all proceedings and contemporaneous
oral expressions of the thing are merged in the writing
or displaced by it. (See Thaver's Preliminary Law on
Evidence p. 397 and p. 398; Phipson Evidence 7th Edn.
p. 546; Wigmore's Evidence p. 2406.) It has been best
described by Wigmore stating that the rule is no sense a
rule of evidence but a rule of substantive law.
*
17. It is likewise a general and most inflexible rule that
wherever written instrument are appointed, either by the
requirement of law or by the contract of the parties, to
be the repositories and memorials of truth, any other
evidence is excluded from being used either as a
substitute for such instruments, or to contradict or alter
them. This is a matter both of principle and policy. It is
of principle because such instruments are in their own
nature and origin, entitled to a much higher degree of
credit than parol evidence. It is of policy because it
would be attended with great mischief if those
instruments, upon which men's rights depended, were
liable to be impeached by loose collateral evidence. (See
Strake on Evidence p. 648).
*
21. The grounds of exclusion of extrinsic evidence are :
(i) to admit inferior evidence when law requires superior
would amount to nullifying the law , and (ii) when
parties have deliberately put their agreement into
writing, it is conclusively presumed, between themselves
and their privies, that they intended the writing to form
a full and final statement of their intentions, and one
which should be placed beyond the reach of future
controversy, bad faith and treacherous memory. ‖
(emphasis added)
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20. Again, the Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Industrial
Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development
Corpn. Ltd. , (2013) 5 SCC 470, taking into consideration the long-settled
law, held:-
― IV. Interpretation of the terms of contract
23 . A party cannot claim anything more than what is
covered by the terms of contract, for the reason that
contract is a transaction between the two parties and has
been entered into with open eyes and understanding the
nature of contract. Thus, contract being a creature of an
agreement between two or more parties, has to be
interpreted giving literal meanings unless, there is some
ambiguity therein. The contract is to be interpreted giving
the actual meaning to the words contained in the contract
and it is not permissible for the court to make a new
contract, however reasonable, if the parties have not made
it themselves. It is to be interpreted in such a way that its
terms may not be varied. The contract has to be interpreted
without any outside aid. The terms of the contract have to
be construed strictly without altering the nature of the
contract, as it may affect the interest of either of the
parties adversely. [Vide United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Harchand Rai Chandan Lal [(2004) 8 SCC 644 : AIR 2004
SC 4794] and Polymat India (P) Ltd. v. National Insurance
Co. Ltd. [(2005) 9 SCC 174 : AIR 2005 SC 286] ]‖
(emphasis added)
21. In Mangala Waman Karandikar v. Prakash Damodar Ranade ,
(2021) 6 SCC 139, the Supreme Court held:-
― 14. The High Court in order to answer the question
utilised Section 95 of the Evidence Act, which reads as
under:
― 95. Evidence as to document unmeaning in reference to
existing facts.— When language used in a document is plain
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in itself, but is unmeaning in reference to existing facts,
evidence may be given to show that it was used in a peculiar
sense.
Illustration
A sells to B, by deed, ―my house in Calcutta‖.
A had no house in Calcutta, but it appears that he had a
house at Howrah, of which B had been in possession since
the execution of the deed.
These facts may be proved to show that the deed related to
the house of Howrah.‖
Aforesaid section is part of Chapter VI, which deals with ―Of the
exclusion of oral by documentary evidence‖ containing Sections
91 to 100. Section 92 reads as under:
― 92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement.— When the
terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of
property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the
form of a document, have been proved according to the last
section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement
shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such
instrument or their representatives in interest, for the
purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting
from, its terms:
*
Proviso (6).—Any fact may be proved which shows in what
manner the language of a document is related to existing
facts.
15. It is manifest from these two sections that it isonly in
cases where the terms of the document leave the question
in doubt, then resort could be had to the proviso . But when
a document is a straightforward one and presents no
difficulty in construing it, the proviso does not apply . In
this regard, we may state that Section 95 only builds on
Proviso (6) of Section 92.‖
(emphasis added)
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22. In Annaya Kocha Shetty (Dead) through Lrs. v. Laxmibai Narayan
Satose Since Deceased through Lrs. and Others , 2025 SCC OnLine SC
758, the Supreme Court recently held:-
―16…. At the outset, let us refer to the ratio of this Court
in Provash Chandra Dalui (supra) on the construction of
the basic agreement between the plaintiff and the
defendant. This Court held that the court must look at
the words used in the contract unless they are such that
one may suspect that they do not covey the intention
correctly. If the words are clear, there is very little the
court can do about it . In constructing a deed, looking at
the surrounding circumstances and subject matter is
legitimate only if the words used are doubtful.
17. The guide to the construction of deeds and tools
adopted can broadly be summarised as follows:
17.1 The contract is first constructed in its plain,
ordinary and literal meaning. This is also known as the
literal rule of construction.
17.2 If there is an absurdity created by literally reading
the contract, a shift from literal rule may be allowed. This
construction is generally called the golden rule of
construction.
17.3 Lastly, the contract may be purposively constructed
in light of its object and context to determine the purpose
of the contract. This approach must be used cautiously.‖
23. The Indian law is codified and long-settled. Once the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to the form of a document, signed by the
parties, and are clear and unambiguous, the terms of such agreement are to
be proved from the document itself, and no evidence of prior negotiations,
correspondence or communications is admissible for the purpose of
contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from its terms. The parties,
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during negotiations, are free to alter or modify the terms. However, once
they have reduced their agreement into a written and signed agreement, the
same governs the terms agreed between them. Where the language used in
the document is plain in itself and applies accurately to the existing facts, no
evidence can be given to show that it was not meant to apply to such facts. It
is only where the language is not clear, ambiguous or defective that the
surrounding circumstances or other evidence may be looked into, to explain
or supply its meaning. The Court is, therefore, barred from relying upon
prior negotiations, correspondence or communications to contradict, vary,
add to or subtract, from clear and unambiguous terms of the written
agreement. The true construction of the contract must depend upon the
import of the words used therein, and the intention of the parties is to be
ascertained from the language of the agreement itself.
24. In Anglo American Metallurgical (supra), the Supreme Court held:-
―38. The approach of the Singapore Court of Appeal has
our broad approval, being in line with the modern
contextual approach to the interpretation of
contracts. When Proviso (6) and Illustration (f) to
Section 92, Section 94 and Section 95 of the Evidence Act
are read together, the picture that emerges is that when
there are a number of documents exchanged between the
parties in the performance of a contract, all of them must
be read as a connected whole, relating each particular
document to ―existing facts‖, which include how
particular words are used in a particular sense, given the
entirety of correspondence between the parties. Thus,
after the application of Proviso (6) to Section 92 of the
Evidence Act, the adjudicating authority must be very
careful when it applies provisions dealing with patent
ambiguity, as it must first ascertain whether the plain
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language of a particular document applies accurately to
existing facts . If, however, it is ambiguous or
unmeaning in reference to existing facts, evidence may
then be given to show that the words used in a
particular document were used in a sense that would
make the aforesaid words meaningful in the context of
the entirety of the correspondence between the parties.‖
(emphasis added)
25. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent places strong emphasis on
the opening lines of paragraph 38 and submits that the approach adopted by
the Singapore Court of Appeal is approved by our Supreme Court, and on
this premise tries to read into the other judgments of Common law to
support his case. We find such submission to be misplaced. The law settled
is not one line in a judgment but a continuous flow of judicial thought,
spread over a period of time and affirmed by different judgments. From
1938 to the present, the legal position on the aforesaid subject has remained
well-settled. Even a reading of the entire judgment in Anglo American
Metallurgical (supra) shows that the Supreme Court only affirmed the
long-standing view of Indian Courts that if the language of the contract is
clear and unambiguous, the same has to be given effect to. It is only where
the language is ambiguous or unmeaningful in reference to the existing facts
that the Court may examine the surrounding circumstances to ascertain its
true meaning. The very language of paragraph 38 itself says “ as it must first
ascertain whether the plain language of a particular document applies
accurately to existing facts‖ . The judgment further proceeds to affirm the
earlier case laws on this issue including Kamla Devi (supra). In the given
facts, if the Court finds any ambiguity in any clause of the Booking Note in
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its application to the existing facts, then this paragraph is to be read. The
same is also provided under Proviso (6) to Section 92 and Section 95 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872. However, where the language of the Booking
Note is clear and unambiguous in the existing facts, there is no occasion to
invoke Proviso (6) to Section 92 or Section 95. In such a case, Sections 91,
92 and 94 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 govern the interpretation, and
the Court must give effect to the plain meaning of the terms agreed between
the parties.
26. So far as judgments of foreign courts relied upon by the learned
Senior Counsel for the respondent is concerned, in cases, where the Indian
law is well-settled and there is no ambiguity with regard to the same, there is
no occasion to rely upon foreign judgments. In BSES Ltd. v. Fenner India
Ltd (supra), the Supreme Court in paragraph 14 conclusively held that
―when the law in India is clear, settled and without any deviation
whatsoever, there is no occasion to rely upon foreign case-law‖. The
question before us is with regard to law as applicable in India. It has to
examined in the light of the Indian codified law and judgments of Indian
Courts, and not foreign courts. Nevertheless, since reliance has been placed
upon these foreign judgments, we proceed to consider them.
27. In FSHC Group (supra), the Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Royal
Courts of Justice, London, held:-
―51. The jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to correct
mistakes in written instruments by rectification can be
traced back to its roots in canon and Roman law. Cases
in which the remedy was recognised can be found in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the middle of the
eighteenth century, in Henkle v Royal Exchange
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Assurance Co (1749) 1 Ves S 317, 318, Lord Hardwicke
LC sitting in the Court of Chancery was in ―no doubt,
that this court has jurisdiction to relieve in respect of a
plain mistake in contracts in writing as well as against
frauds in contracts: so that if reduced into writing
contrary to intent of the parties, on proper proof that
would be rectified .‖ In Shelburne v Inchiquin (1784) 1
Bro CC 336, 341, on a claim to rectify a written
agreement made in contemplation of marriage, Lord
Thurlow LC considered it ―impossible to refuse, as
incompetent, parol evidence, which goes to prove, that
the words taken down in writing were contrary to the
current intention of all parties.‖ These statements of
principle were approved by Lord Eldon LC in Townshend
v Stangroom (1801) 6 Ves 328, 333. Half a century later
in Fowler v Fowler (1859) 4 De G & J 250, 264, Lord
Chelmsford LC said:
―The power which the court possesses of
reforming written agreements where there has
been an omission or insertion of stipulations
contrary to the intention of the parties and under
a mutual mistake is one which has been frequently
and most usefully exercised.‖
*
141. We find this analysis illuminating. Applying the
distinction between the two forms of rectification, it can
be seen that the judges who at one time espoused the view
that it was necessary to find a prior concluded contract
before an order for rectification could be made were
treating the only permissible form of rectification for
common mistake as the first form of rectification
described by Lord Hoffmann, based on the principle that
the court should give effect to what the parties have
contractually agreed to record in their document . This
explains the dictum of James V-C in Mackenzie v Coulson
(1869) LR 8 Eq 368, 375, that:
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― Courts of Equity do not rectify contracts; they
may and do rectify instruments purporting to
have been made in pursuance of the terms of
contracts .‖‖
(emphasis added)
28. In Poralu Marine Australia (supra) , the Australian Federal Court
following English Common law, held:-
―57. In our opinion, the primary judge erred in
rejecting Poralu‘s argument that the second recap was
the contract of carriage. That is because, in our
opinion, the second recap concluded the contract of
carriage. Mr Gires‘ filling out and returning of the
booking note form on 8 November 2019 can only be
viewed as an attempt to proceed consistently with the
first category of cases identified in Masters 91 CLR at
360 (and see too Lloyd LJ‘s fourth principle in Pagnan
[1987] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep at 619; RTS Flexible [2010] 1
WLR at 773 [49]), being where ―the parties have
reached finality in arranging all the terms of their
bargain and intend to be immediately bound to the
performance of those terms, but at the same time
propose to have the terms restated in a form which
would be fuller or more precise but not different in
effect‖. Despite the inaccuracies in how the agreement
between the parties was recorded in the booking note,
those inaccuracies did not evidence or result from any
act or intention of the parties to change the terms
already agreed in the second recap.
*
184. The existence and terms of an informal contract is
determined objectively as a question of fact:
Realestate.com.au Pty Ltd v Hardingham [2022] HCA
39; (2022) 406 ALR 678 at [15]- [17] (Kiefel CJ and
Gageler J), [43]-[45] (Gordon J), [82]-[87] (Edelman
and Steward JJ); Crown Melbourne Ltd v
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Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd [2016] HCA 26;
(2016) 260 CLR 1 at [27] (French CJ, Kiefel and Bell
JJ), see, also, [54] (Gageler J, dissenting), [131]
(Keane J), [196] (Nettle J), [245]-[246] (Gordon J,
dissenting); Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets
Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 234; (2009) 261 ALR 382 at
[90] (and the cases cited therein) (Campbell JA, Allsop
P and Basten JA, agreeing). Consideration of
surrounding circumstances and post-contractual
conduct is permissible when the existence or terms of
an informal contract are in issue : County Securities
Pty Ltd v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2008]
NSWCA 193 at [20]. The consideration of evidence of
these matters does not involve interpreting the terms
the parties have agreed, but, rather the question of
whether the parties have made an agreement and, if
so, on what terms. There are no words to interpret;
the question is what words were used to express the
agreement or 'what did the parties agree?' : County
Securities at [7].‖
(emphasis added)
29. Same view is taken in Electrosteel Castings (supra). From the
aforesaid judgments, it falls, that, under the English Common law, which is
also followed in Australia, where the parties have already reached an
agreement, be it oral or by exchange of documents or correspondence, and a
written instrument is thereafter executed to record the terms of such
agreement, the Court may examine the prior oral agreement, negotiations,
communications or surrounding circumstances to determine whether the
written instrument correctly records the prior agreement between the parties.
Where there has been an omission or insertion in the written instrument
contrary to the prior common intention of the parties and such mistake is
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established, the Courts under the English Common law may rectify the
instrument so as to give effect to the prior agreement which the parties had
actually reached. The Court does not rectify the agreement itself, but only
the written instrument which purports to record the terms of the agreement.
Thus, the English Common law permits the Court, in an appropriate case, to
look beyond the written instrument and examine the prior negotiations and
communications for the purpose of determining whether the instrument
correctly records the parties‟ prior agreement and, if not, to rectify the
instrument accordingly.
30. Thus, the English Common law is materially different from the above
noted position under the codified Indian law, under which, once the terms
have been reduced into a written and signed agreement, prior negotiations,
correspondence or communications cannot be relied upon for contradicting,
varying, adding to or subtracting from the terms of the written agreement,
unless they are ambiguous or defective.
31. Thus, not merely, as noted above, the Indian law is well-settled,
having no ambiguity whatsoever, but the same is materially different from
the foreign law and, therefore, this Court cannot rely upon any such foreign
law judgment for the purposes of the present case.
32. So far as reliance placed by the learned Single Judge, on Govind
Rubber (supra) and Trimex (supra) is concerned, the relevant para of Govind
Rubber (supra) read:-
―12. There may not be any dispute with regard to the
settled proposition of law that an agreement even if not
signed by the parties can be spelt out from
correspondence exchanged between the parties .
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However, it is the duty of the court to construe
correspondence with a view to arrive at the conclusion
whether there was any meeting of mind between the
parties which could create a binding contract between
them. It is necessary for the court to find out from the
correspondence as to whether the parties were ad idem to
the terms of contract‖
(emphasis added)
The relevant para of Trimex (supra) read:-
―60. It is clear that in the absence of signed agreement
between the parties , it would be possible to infer from
various documents duly approved and signed by the
parties in the form of exchange of emails, letter, telex,
telegrams and other means of telecommunication.‖
(emphasis added)
33. In both the aforesaid cases, there was no signed written agreement
between the parties. Therefore, the correspondence exchanged between them
was examined to ascertain whether the parties had arrived at a consensus and
intended to be bound by the terms thereof. The position is materially different
in the present case, where the parties, after negotiations, finally executed a
written agreement, which is duly signed and the same categorically states that
it shall prevail over any previous arrangements. Thus, both the aforesaid
judgments are also not applicable to the facts of the present case.
34. We now proceed to examine the Booking Note on the basis of the
aforesaid settled law.
35. A perusal of the Standard Form of the Booking Note of Ocean7,
booking agent of respondent, shows that the Special Terms box in normal
course provides ―Special terms, if agreed‖ and ―As per additional rider
clause 20-41 in attached‖. Thus, the arbitration clause contained in Clause
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43 does not find place in the Standard Form. This shows that an arbitration
clause is not part of standard business practice and the same has to be
specifically agreed upon by the parties. The same appears to be also
reasonable, as parties from all over the world enter into agreements with the
booking agent of the respondent. The arbitration clause can only be with the
consent of the parties. They may agree for an arbitration or may not; they
have option for a particular arbitration forum in one country or another; and
they have option with regard to the laws applicable to such arbitration
proceedings. Therefore, no arbitration clause finds place in the Standard
Form of the Booking Note as the same, including the forum and the
jurisdiction, has to be agreed by the parties specifically. The Ocean7,
booking agent of the respondent, is required to fill their said Standard Form,
for different agreements with parties from different countries, day in and
out. In every case, if the parties agree for an arbitration clause, forum and
applicable law, the same has to be specifically filled in the Special Terms
box. Thus, it is difficult to accept that the booking agent of respondent
committed a mistake in doing something which was part of its daily course
of conduct.
36. Now coming to the Booking Note entered into between the parties, in
addition to the aforesaid Standard terms, the Special Terms box in the signed
Booking Note is specifically filled in by the parties with four additional
terms, namely:-
― Special terms, if agreed
-24 hours reversible grace time in case of berthing/port
congestion.
-Any delays due to swell not to count as detention.
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-Any slings/wires/cradles/saddle/spreaders/bars etc., not
already onboard the vessel, are to be arranged by owners
considering very normal break bulk cargo and max
weight 18 tons.
-Carrier to give noon position report daily, including
course, speed, direction and latitude & longitude location
as desired by client.
As per additional rider clause 20 - 41 in attached ‖
37. Thus, the parties did not merely adopt the Standard Form
mechanically, but they specifically applied themselves to the Special Terms
and filled in and modified the Special Terms box, and, while retaining the
reference to „20-41‟, added further clauses to the same. This demonstrates
that the parties consciously filled in all the Special Terms agreed at that
moment and the arbitration clause was not one of them. We further find that
in a separate box thereafter, the following term is found, in both the
Standard Form as well as the Booking Note signed by the parties, which
reads ―It is hereby agreed that this Contract shall be performed subject to
the terms contained on Page 1 and 2 hereto which shall prevail over any
previous arrangements and which shall in turn be superseded (except as to
deadfreight) by the terms of the Bill of Lading‖. Thus, Ocean7, the booking
agent of the respondent, on whose Standard Form parties acted and signed
the Booking Note was fully aware that the terms settled in the same would
prevail over and supersede any previous agreement, except as to deadfreight
or bill of lading, which admittedly in the present case are not applicable.
Therefore, prima facie it is difficult to believe that the booking agent of the
respondent who was filling up the said Booking Note day in and out, with
different parties across the world, could be under any confusion while filling
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up this particular Booking Note. It is also worthwhile to note that earlier
emails are between the agents of the parties, and this Booking Note is signed
by the appellant, the party in person and Ocean7, the booking agent of the
respondent.
38. There are also other differences between the emails/Fixture Recap and
the signed Booking Note. With regard to the Vessel, while the Fixture Recap
provides for ―Mv Pelagica/ Mv Panthera J or sub, in Carriers option‖, the
Booking Note provides on the first page and under Clause 20 for ―Mv
Pelagica or Sub‖ and further contains a provision regarding substitution of
the vessel which provides ―The Carrier shall at any time prior to the
expiration of laydays/laycan, be entitled to substitute the above vessel with
another vessel of equivalent capability and capacity‖. There is also a
material difference with regard to detention. While Clause 4 of the Fixture
Recap provides for detention only in specified events, Clause 22 of the
Booking Note provides for detention in a wider range of specified events
and “and/or any other reason whatsoever”. While filling the Special Terms
in the Booking Note, the parties have gone to the minute details, to the
extent that, while in Clause 22 of additional riders, the swell is provided as a
reason for detention, the same is overridden and the Special Term provides
―Any delays due to swell not to count as detention‖. Thus, parties went in
detail with regard to the additional riders attached to the Booking Note and
variance therefrom is noted in the Special Terms box of the Booking Note.
The above shows that the parties applied their conscious mind to the terms
agreed and their variance from additional riders or otherwise, while filling
up the Special Terms in the Booking Note. In these circumstances, it cannot
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be said that the Booking Note is merely a reproduction of the emails/Fixture
Recap. We find that, while finalising the Booking Note, the parties
consciously modified, reframed and re-settled several terms of the
emails/Fixture Recap as well as that of the additional riders.
39. In addition to the above, we also find that with regard to the
arbitration clause, Clause 23 of emails/Fixture recap is entirely different
from Clause 43 of additional riders. Clause 23 of the Fixture Recap provides
for ―English law and London arbitration‖, whereas Clause 43 of the
Booking Note provides for ―Bimco Dispute Resolution Clause latest edition
to apply, subject to English Law and LMAA Terms and Procedures‖ , which
is a forum having specific and detailed set of rules and procedures, which
the parties never agreed even as per the emails/Fixture Recap.
40. As already discussed above, the Booking Note is the final written
agreement signed between the parties and contains a specific clause
overriding any previous arrangements, i.e., ―It is hereby agreed that this
Contract shall be performed subject to the terms contained on Page 1 and 2
hereto which shall prevail over any previous arrangements and which shall
in turn be superseded (except as to deadfreight) by the terms of the Bill of
Lading‖. The impact of such supersession and overriding clause is
considered by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Kishorilal (supra),
wherein it held :-
―8. Uninfluenced by authorities or case-law, the logical
outcome of the earlier discussion would be that the
arbitration clause perished with the original contract.
Whether the said clause was a substantive term or a
collateral one, it was nonetheless an integral part of the
contract, which had no existence de hors the contract. It
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was intended to cover all the disputes arising under the
conditions of, or in connection with, the contracts. Though
the phraseology was of the widest amplitude, it is
inconceivable that the parties intended its survival even
after the contract was mutually rescinded and substituted
by a new agreement. The fact that the new contract not
only did not provide for the survival of the arbitration
clause but also the circumstance that it contained both
substantive and procedural terms indicates that the parties
gave up the terms of the old contracts, including the
arbitration clause. The case-law referred to by the learned
counsel in this connection does not, in our view, lend
support to his broad contention and indeed the principle on
which the said decisions are based is a pointer to the
contrary.‖
(emphasis added)
The aforesaid principle is also followed in Young Achievers v. IMS
Learning Resources (P) Ltd ., (2013) 10 SCC 535, in paragraph 7. The same
reads:-
― 5. We are of the view that survival of the arbitration
clause, as sought by the appellant in the agreements dated
1-4-2007 and 1-4-2010 has to be seen in the light of the
terms and conditions of the new agreement dated
1-2-2011. An arbitration clause in an agreement cannot
survive if the agreement containing arbitration clause has
been superseded/novated by a later agreement. The
agreement dated 1-4-2010 contained the following
arbitration clause:
―20. Arbitration.—All disputes and questions whatsoever
which may arise, either during the substance (sic
subsistence) of this agreement or afterwards, between the
parties shall be referred to the arbitration of the Managing
Director of IMS Learning Resources (P) Ltd. or his nominee
and such arbitration shall be in the English language at
Mumbai. The arbitration shall be governed by the
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provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or
any other statutory modification or re-enactment thereof for
the time being in force and award or awards of such
arbitrator shall be binding on all the parties to the said
dispute.‖
*
7. The exit paper would clearly indicate that it is a
mutually agreed document containing comprehensive
terms and conditions which admittedly does not contain an
arbitration clause. We are of the view that the High Court
is right in taking the view that the case on hand, is not a
case involving assertion by the respondent of accord a
satisfaction in respect of the earlier contracts dated
1-4-2007 and 1-4-2010. If that be so, it could have referred
to the arbitrator in terms of those two agreements going by
the dictum in Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta and
Bros. [AIR 1959 SC 1362] This Court in Kishorilal Gupta
case [AIR 1959 SC 1362] examined the question whether
an arbitration clause can be invoked in the case of a
dispute under a superseded contract. The principle laid
down is that if the contract is superseded by another, the
arbitration clause, being a component part of the earlier
contract, falls with it. But where the dispute is whether such
contract is void ab intio, the arbitration clause cannot
operate on those disputes, for its operative force depends
upon the existence of the contract and its validity. The
various other observations were made by this Court in the
abovementioned judgment in respect of ―settlement of
disputes arising under the original contract, including the
dispute as to the breach of the contract and its
consequences.‖
(emphasis added)
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41. In Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India , (2015) 7
SCC 728, the Supreme Court held:-
―41. In order to appreciate this argument, we shall have to
traverse through the PSCs dated 20-2-1995 which were
ultimately signed between the Government and the
appellant. We would like to mention here that when this
argument was being advanced by the learned Senior
Counsel for the appellant, the Court asked him to produce
the copy of PSCs, which were otherwise not brought on the
record as the Court wanted to find out as to whether there
was any such intention expressed in the agreement, namely,
to incorporate the provisions of MPSC or the
correspondence exchanged between the parties earlier to
the signing of this agreement. On our asking, the appellant
has placed on record the copy of these PSCs. On going
through the same, we find that the intention expressed is just
to the contrary. It is rather made crystal clear in the
agreement that this agreement is the sole repository of the
terms on which it is signed and nothing else would be
looked into for this purpose. It is so reflected in the
following clauses in the agreement:
―(5) The Government has agreed to enter into this
contract with the companies with respect to the area
referred to in Appendices A and B of this contract on
the terms and conditions herein set forth.‖
―Article 1. In this contract, unless the context requires
otherwise, the following terms shall have the meaning
ascribed to them hereunder:
*
Article 1.18. ‗Contract‘ means this agreement and the
appendices mentioned herein and attached hereto and
made an integral part hereof and any amendments
made thereto pursuant to the terms hereof.
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Article 32. entire agreement, amendments, waiver and
miscellaneous
32.1. This contract supersedes and replaces any
previous agreement of understanding between the
parties, whether oral or written, on the subject-matter
hereof, prior to the effective date of this contract.
32.2. This contract shall not be amended, modified,
varied or supplemented in any respect except by an
instrument in writing signed by all the parties, which
shall state the date upon which the amendment or
modification shall become effective.
32.3. No waiver by any party of any one or more
obligations or defaults by any other party in the
performance of this contract shall operate or be
construed as a waiver of any other obligations or
defaults whether of a like or of a different character.
32.4. The provisions of this contract shall enure to the
benefit of and be binding upon the parties and their
permitted assigns and successors-in-interest.
32.5. In the event of any conflict between any
provisions in the main body of this contract and any
provision in the appendices, the provision in the main
body shall prevail.
32.6. The headings of this contract are for convenience
of reference only and shall not be taken into account in
interpreting the terms of this contract.‖
42. Intention behind the aforesaid clauses is more than
apparent, namely, not to look into any other document or
correspondence which took place between the parties prior
to the signing of this agreement. Not only this, even the
so-called ―understanding‖ between the parties is to be
ignored as well. It is, therefore, impermissible for the
appellant to take the aid of MPSC or the clauses contained
therein while construing the terms of PSCs. Therefore, it
was not even open to the Income Tax Authorities to go
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beyond the stipulations contained in the PSCs while making
the assessment and had to exclusively remain within the
provisions of the agreement.‖
(emphasis added)
42. Once the parties executed the Booking Note, expressly providing that
it would prevail over the previous arrangements, there is no occasion to refer
back to the Fixture Recap for determining the terms of this final agreement.
The Booking Note is the subsequent and final written agreement, executed
and signed between the parties, and has to prevail over any previous
arrangement and to be read as it is.
43. Looking at the issue from another aspect i.e., if the parties, after the
exchanged emails/Fixture Recap, agreed not to have an arbitration clause
and applicability of the English law, what course would be available to
them? We feel that the only course available could be to omit a clause with
regard to arbitration and applicable law, and to have a specific clause
providing that any previous arrangements or exchange of documents
between the parties would not have any applicability, and the Booking Note
would prevail over any previous arrangements or exchanged documents.
This is exactly what the parties have done in the present case.
44. Thus, in the Booking Note signed by the parties, the Special Terms
box records ―As per additional rider clause 20-41 in attached‖ . The
language is clear, unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, namely,
that Clauses 20 to 41 of the additional riders are to apply. There is neither
any reference to Clauses 42 or 43, nor is there any language which can
reasonably be construed to incorporate Clause 43. Merely because Clauses
41, 42 and 43 appear on the same page of the additional riders, and the
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signatures of parties are below Clause 43, it cannot result in Clause 43
becoming part of the Booking Note. The parties specifically chose to
incorporate only Clauses 20 to 41 and thus only the same shall apply. We
also find that the learned Senior Counsel for respondent, could not show
even a single line in the entire Booking Note where the language is either
defective or ambiguous. To the contrary, the language of each clause of the
Booking Note is not merely specific but clarifies each aspect of the matter
and prevails and supersedes any earlier exchange of emails/Fixture Recap.
There is no ambiguity in reflecting the intention of the parties in the
Booking Note.
45. We also find, that, the entire argument of the respondent is that, what
was agreed by exchanged emails/Fixture Recap i.e., prior to the Booking
Note, is not reflected in the Booking Note and thus, there is a mistake in
recording the earlier intention of the parties in the Booking Note. The same
may be a sound argument under the English Common law but cannot stand
under the Indian codified law as detailed above.
46. In view of the above, we do not find any ambiguity or mistake in the
signed Booking Note. It is held that there is no mistake, ambiguity or
defective language used in the Booking Note, and that, there does not exist
any arbitration agreement between the parties.
47. Therefore, in view of the above findings, the impugned order dated
13.03.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside.
48. Once it is held that there is no arbitration agreement between the
parties, the very foundation for continuation of the arbitration proceedings
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does not exist. A Division Bench of this Court in McDonald’s (supra),
held:-
― 49 . The decision in Excalibur Venture LLC v. Texas
Keystone Inc : 2011 EWHC 1624 (Comm) was also
referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents as
another instance of an anti-arbitration injunction. One of
the issues, which arose for consideration in Excalibur
(supra) was whether the court had jurisdiction to grant
an injunction restraining Excalibur (supra) from
proceeding with the arbitration proceedings against the
Gulf defendants.
*
51 . It is pertinent to note that this case, that is, Excalibur
(supra) stresses upon the difference of approach between
a normal anti-suit injunction and an injunction
restraining arbitration proceedings. We are also in
agreement with this view. There must be a distinction
between an anti-suit injunction and an anti-arbitration
injunction. The principles which apply to an anti-suit
injunction will not necessarily apply to an
anti-arbitration injunction. It is further important to note
that the exceptional cases where arbitrations could be
injuncted upon holding that the arbitration proceedings
would be oppressive or unconscionable were regarded
as those circumstances which would include the
situation where the very issue was whether or not the
parties had consented to the arbitration or where there
was an allegation that the arbitration agreement was a
forgery just as in the case of Albon (supra).‖
(emphasis added)
49. A Division Bench of this Court in DR Bina Modi (supra), relying
upon Mcdonald’s (supra), held:-
― 85 . On a conspectus of the paragraphs extracted
hereinabove, it is evident that, the Division Bench in
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Mcdonald's India Private Limited (supra) proceeded to
hold that, the Court would have jurisdiction to grant
anti-arbitration injunction, where the party seeking the
injunction can demonstrably show that the agreement is
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed . The learned Single Judge having observed
that in Mcdonald's India Private Limited (supra), the
Court expressed reluctance to denude itself of
jurisdiction, for the fear of such denudation of
jurisdiction in future coming in the way of granting relief
in a deserving case, erroneously declined to exercise
jurisdiction vested in the Court, to determine the
question, as to whether the subject arbitration agreement
was null and void and/or oppressive and vexatious, on the
untenable ground that, it would result in the Courts being
flooded with cases, seeking the relief of injuncting
arbitration; thereby failing to determine even prima facie
on merits the issue articulated by the Appellants that, the
provisions of Section 16 of the Arbitration Act were not
attracted since the disputes between the parties were not
arbitrable and the arbitration clause was invalid and
inoperative by implication, on the ground of being
opposed to Public Policy. In so doing, the impugned
judgement also fails to appreciate that, the Court is
under a duty to consider the validity of an arbitration
agreement in the facts and circumstances of the case,
and the issue that ―in case of foreign arbitration
enormous expenses and efforts get involved and as such
the legislature in its wisdom has thought that the
question relating to the validity of arbitration
agreement, its cooperativeness and capability of being
performed should be examined by the Court itself
instead of leaving those in the hands of an Arbitrator in
a foreign land .‖
(emphasis added)
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50. In the present case, this Court has already found that there does not
exist any arbitration agreement between the parties. Consequently, the
arbitration proceedings before the LMAA cannot continue between the
parties. The present case, therefore, falls within the exceptional
circumstances recognized by this Court warranting the grant of an
anti-arbitration injunction.
51. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed and the impugned order
dated 13.03.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in I.A. No. 30141 of
2025 in CS (OS) 868 of 2025, is set aside. An anti-arbitration injunction is
accordingly granted restraining the defendant/respondent, Argo Coral
Maritime Ltd., from continuing, pursuing or taking any steps in the LMAA
arbitration titled ―Argo Coral Maritime Ltd. v. SARR Freights Ltd/SARR
Freights Corporation‖ .
52. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
VIVEK CHAUDHARY
(JUDGE)
RENU BHATNAGAR
(JUDGE)
SEPTEMBER 18, 2026
Nishant
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