SRI VINITH NARAYAN NAIK vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

Court
Karnataka High Court

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CRL.P No. 4597 of 2024


IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

TH
DATED THIS THE 6 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026


BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K

CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 4597 OF 2024


BETWEEN:

SRI VINITH NARAYAN NAIK
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
S/O NARAYAN DHONDOPANTU NAIK
R/AT OO4/E WING, GEETANJALI,
GEETHANAGAR PHASE 2, NEAR OLD PETROL
THUNGA HOSPITAL, MIRA ROAD EAST,
BHAYANDER, THANE -401 107
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. ARUNA SHYAM, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. SUYOG HERELE E, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH CYBER CRIME PS,
REPRESENTED BY SPP,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BUILDING, BENGALURU -560 001

2. SRI. J SARAVANAN
S/O S JAYAPALAN
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
TH
R/AT NO. 20/3, 4 MAIN,
SRIRAMPURAM
BENGALURU -560 021
…RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. B.N. JAGADEESH B.N, SPP I ALONG WITH
SRI. MAHESHA P, SSP FOR R1,
R2 NOTICE SERVED BUT UNREPRESENTED)













Digitally signed
by PANKAJA S
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA

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CRL.P No. 4597 of 2024


THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO
QUASH THE FIR AND COMPLAINT IN CR.NO.17/2024
REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT CYBER CRIME POLICE
STATION FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 66(C) OF INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY ACT AND SEC. 153-A OF IPC, PENDING ON THE
FILE OF XLV ADDL.C.M.M., NRUPATHUNGA ROAD, BENGALURU
AND ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT THERETO,
PRODUCED AS DOCUMENT NO.1 AND 2.

THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS
ON 30.10.2026 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY,
THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K

CAV ORDER

This petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C seeking
to quash FIR and further proceedings against the petitioner -
accused in Crime No.17/2024 registered by Cyber Crime Police
Station, Bengaluru, for the offences punishable under Section
153A of IPC and section 66(C) of Information Technology Act,
2000 (for short, "the I.T Act"), presently pending on the file of
45th ACMM, Bengaluru (for short, 'the learned Magistrate').
2. The brief facts of the case are that respondent No.2
lodged a complaint before respondent No.1-Police on
29.04.2024, alleging that some unknown persons had been
posting tweets on the social media platform Twitter (X), from
22.04.2024 onwards, through an account bearing the ID
“BhikuMhatre (Modi’s Family) @MumbaichaDon”. The said

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account had published a message stating, “Throw this in face of
Every Liberal & Every Piddi who was arguing that CONgress
Menifesto doesn't mention ‘Mu$£ims’ specifically & it includes
SC/STs Also”, along with a photograph of the then Chief
Minister of Karnataka delivering a speech. It was further
alleged that the said post was published with an intention to
promote hatred between the Hindu and Muslim communities,
disturb public peace and bring disrepute to the Congress Party.
Hence, respondent No.2 lodged the complaint before the
respondent No.1-police.

3. On the basis of the said complaint, respondent
No.1-Police registered an FIR against the petitioner for the
aforementioned offences. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner
has preferred the present petition.
4. Heard the learned senior counsel for the petitioner
and learned HCGP for respondent No.1-state. There is no
representation for respondent No. 2.
5. The primary contention of the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner is that, on a plain reading of the FIR
and complaint averments, the ingredients of Section 153A of
IPC are not attracted against the petitioner. It is contended that

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the only allegation against the petitioner is that he had
criticised/commented upon the Congress manifesto by posting
a photograph of the then Chief Minister of Karnataka, along
with his byte to the electronic media channel TV9. As such, the
petitioner has neither humiliated any particular community nor
made any statement with an intention to incite hatred or
violence against any group or community on the basis of its
identity.
6. Placing reliance on the photograph of the news byte
of the then Chief Minister of Karnataka telecast by TV9, the
learned Senior Counsel submitted that the said electronic media
had disseminated a breaking news item with a headline stating
that the then Chief Minister had remarked that the wealth of
the nation would be distributed to Muslims, along with his
photograph. The petitioner had merely reposted the said
photograph of the breaking news on his Twitter account, which,
by itself, does not prima facie attract the provisions of Section
153A of IPC.
7. It is further contended that respondent No.1-Police,
without conducting any investigation into the genuineness of
the said news item, could not have implicated the petitioner

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merely on the ground that he had reposted the same on his
Twitter account. The learned Senior Counsel would further
submit that respondent No.2, being a worker/president of the
Indian National Congress Party from Gandhinagar Constituency,
had lodged the complaint with an ulterior motive to wreak
vengeance against the petitioner. It is also contended that
respondent No.1-Police, acting upon the complaint of
respondent No.2, hurriedly registered the FIR and arrested the
petitioner.
8. Lastly, the learned Senior Counsel contended that
the complaint averments do not disclose the requisite intention
on the part of the petitioner to attract the offence punishable
under Section 153A of IPC. Hence, the continuation of the
criminal proceedings against the petitioner would amount to an
abuse of the process of law. Accordingly, he prays for allowing
the petition and quashing the FIR.
9. To buttress his argument he relied on the following
judgments:
i. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
- (1997) 7 SCC 431.

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ii. Javed Ahmad Hajam vs. State of Maharashtra
and another - (2024) 4 SCC 156.
iii. Manik Taneja vs. State of Karnataka - (2015)
7 SCC 423
10. Per contra , learned SPP appearing for respondent
No.1-State opposed the prayer sought by the petitioner. Placing
reliance on the translated copies of the headline, anchor's
introduction and the byte of the then Chief Minister of
Karnataka, he contended that the then Chief Minister of
Karnataka had stated that the wealth of the nation would be
distributed even to the Muslim community. However, TV9,
while disseminating the said news item as breaking news, had
published a headline, along with the photograph of the then
Chief Minister, stating that the Chief Minister would distribute
the wealth of the nation to Muslims.
11. It is further contended that the petitioner, with an
intention to create communal hatred, took a photograph of the
said news clip and posted the same on his Twitter account with
a write-up alleging that the Congress Party intended to take
away the wealth belonging to Hindus and distribute it only to
Muslims. According to the learned SPP, such a post has the
potential to adversely affect society and provoke or incite

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hatred and violence against the targeted community, thereby
attracting the provisions of Section 153A of IPC.
12. The learned SPP would further contend that the
investigation is still at its nascent stage and, at this juncture, it
cannot be concluded that no prima facie case is made out
against the petitioner. Accordingly, he seeks dismissal of the
petition.
13. To buttress his argument he relied on the following
judgments:
i. Amish Devgan vs. Union of India - (2021) 1
SCC 1.
ii. Vishwanath vs. State of Karnataka - 2020 SCC
OnLine Kar 501.
iii. Tehseen S. Poonawalla vs. Union of India -
(2018) 9 SCC 501
14. I have given my anxious consideration to the
submission made by the learned senior counsel for the
petitioner and the learned SPP for respondent No.1-state so
also perused the entire materials on record.
15. At the outset, the complaint came to be lodged on
29.04.2024 by a worker/president of the Indian National

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Congress Party, Gandhinagar Constituency, against unknown
persons in respect of a Twitter post dated 22.04.2024. On
careful scrutiny of the complaint averments, it is alleged that
certain unknown persons had posted a photograph of the
speech of the then Chief Minister of Karnataka, as disseminated
by TV9 media, along with a write-up stating, “Throw this in face
of Every Liberal & Every Piddi who was arguing that CONgress
Menifesto doesn't mention ‘Mu$£ims’ specifically & it includes
SC/STs Also.”
16. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has
placed before this Court the Twitter post made by the
petitioner, which contains a photograph of the speech of the
then Chief Minister of Karnataka, as disseminated by TV9
media, along with the aforesaid write-up. On perusal of the said
photograph, it is evident that the caption carries the headline
“Big Breaking – ”, along with the
ೇಶದ ಸಂಪತು ಮು ಮೆ ಹಂಚು ೆ ೕೆ
English caption, “I will share the wealth of the nation to
Muslims: CM Siddaramaiah”. The learned Senior Counsel
further submitted that the said news item continues to circulate
on social media platforms.

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17. The contention of the learned SPP that the then
Chief Minister of Karnataka had stated that the wealth of the
nation would be distributed even to Muslims and that the said
statement was wrongly disseminated by TV9 media is
concerned, the fact remains that the said news item was
published by the said electronic media. Admittedly, no
investigation has been conducted to ascertain the genuineness
or otherwise of the said news item. Therefore, the allegation
against the petitioner, at this stage, is confined to the act of
reposting the said photograph on his Twitter account along with
the aforesaid write-up.
18. In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts and
circumstances, this Court has to examine whether the
allegations made in the FIR, if taken at their face value, would
attract the ingredients of the alleged offence or whether
continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of
the process of law. In this regard, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in
BILAL AHMED KALU (supra), while considering the ingredients
of Sections 153A and 505 of IPC, has held that there
must be being promotion of feeling of enmity, hatred or ill-
will between different religious or racial or linguistic or
regional groups or caste and communities and it is

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necessary that atleast two such groups or communities should
be involved. Merely inciting the feeling of one community or
group without any reference to any other community or group
cannot attract.
19. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner, in
the write-up accompanying the photograph of the then Chief
Minister of Karnataka, has not specifically referred to or made
any statement promoting enmity or hatred between two
distinct communities or groups. Hence, the essential
requirement of promoting enmity between two groups or
communities, as contemplated under Section 153A of IPC,
requires consideration in the light of the aforesaid principles.
20. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while interpreting Section
153A of IPC in the case of JAVEED AHMED AJAM (supra), has
held that section 153A of IPC will attract only when an act is
committed which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony
between different religious, racial, language or regional groups
or caste or communities and which disturbs or is likely to
disturb the public tranquility. As discussed supra, the write-up
posted by the petitioner on his Twitter account does not make
any reference to two distinct groups or communities. Further,

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the materials on record does not disclose any such tendency or
likelihood of disturbing public tranquillity.
21. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in a catena of
judgments, has held that the right to dissent in a legitimate
and lawful manner is an integral part of the rights guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. Every
individual is required to respect the right of others to dissent.
The right to express dissent in a lawful manner must also be
treated as an integral part of the right to lead a dignified and
meaningful life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India. However, such right is subject to reasonable
restrictions imposed in accordance with Article 19(2) of the
Constitution of India.
22. In the instant case, the petitioner had merely
reposted a news item disseminated by TV9 media, along with
the photograph of the then Chief Minister of Karnataka,
expressing his dissent through the accompanying write-up. In
the absence of any specific reference to two distinct groups or
communities, such an act, by itself, would not attract the
ingredients of Section 153A of IPC.

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23. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in AMISH DEVGAN (supra),
while dealing with the issue of hate speech and controversial
expressions, has held that penal action would be justified where
the speech travels beyond permissible limits and is of such a
nature as to defame, stigmatise or insult a targeted group,
thereby provoking violence or psychosocial hatred. The content
of the speech must reflect hatred tending to vilify, humiliate or
incite hatred or violence against a targeted group on the basis
of its identity, beyond and besides the subject matter of the
speech.
24. In the instant case, the subject matter of the
complaint does not relates to an hate speech and the contents
of the write-up posted by the petitioner on his Twitter account,
when considered in the light of the principles laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court, do not prima facie disclose any such
intention or tendency to vilify, humiliate or incite hatred or
violence against any targeted group or community.
Consequently, the allegations made against the petitioner do
not satisfy the essential ingredients of Section 153A of IPC.
25. Admittedly, respondent No.2, who is stated to be a party
worker, has not appeared before this Court despite service of

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notice. In the aforesaid circumstances, the contention of the
petitioner that the complaint was lodged with an ulterior motive
and out of political vengeance also requires consideration. The
MOHAMMED ALI AND
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
OTHERS VS. STATE OF UP - 2023 (15) SCC 488 in paragraph
No.11 to 14 held as under:
"11. The entire case put up by the first informant on
the face of it appears to be concocted and
fabricated. At this stage, we may refer to the
parameters laid down by this Court for quashing of
an FIR in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
AIR 1992 SC 604. The parameters are:-
“(1) Where the allegations made in the
first information report or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make
out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if
any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose
a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do
not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR
or complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused. (6)
Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious

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redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and
with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.” We are of the view
that the case of the present appellants
falls within the parameters Nos. 1, 5 and 7
resply of Bhajan Lal (supra).
12. At this stage, we would like to observe
something important. Whenever an accused comes
before the Court invoking either the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal
proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that
such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or
vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the
Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and
a little more closely. We say so because once the
complainant decides to proceed against the accused
with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal
vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the
FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the

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necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure
that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are
such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not
be just enough for the Court to look into the
averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary
ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are
disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious
proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into
many other attending circumstances emerging from
the record of the case over and above the
averments and, if need be, with due care and
circumspection try to read in between the lines.
The Court while exercising its jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the
Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage
of a case but is empowered to take into account the
overall circumstances leading to the
initiation/registration of the case as well as the
materials collected in the course of investigation.
Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs
have been registered over a period of time. It is in
the background of such circumstances the
registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance,
thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance
out of private or personal grudge as alleged.

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13. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga
Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522, a two-Judge Bench of
this Court elaborated on the types of materials the
High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court
drew a fine distinction between consideration of
materials that were tendered as evidence and
appreciation of such evidence. Only such material
that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the
FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The
Court held:-
“5. …Authority of the court exists for
advancement of justice and if any
attempt is made to abuse that authority
so as to produce injustice, the court has
power to prevent such abuse. It would be
an abuse of the process of the court to
allow any action which would result in
injustice and prevent promotion of
justice. In exercise of the powers court
would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation or
continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the
ends of justice. When no offence is
disclosed by the complaint, the court may
examine the question of fact. When a
complaint is sought to be quashed, it is

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permissible to look into the materials to
assess what the complainant has alleged
and whether any offence is made out
even if the allegations are accepted in
toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR
1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239, this
Court summarised some categories of
cases where inherent power can and
should be exercised to quash the
proceedings : (AIR p. 869, para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears
that there is a legal bar against
the institution or continuance
e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the
first information report or
complaint taken at its face value
and accepted in their entirety do
not constitute the offence
alleged;
(iii) where the allegations
constitute an offence, but there is
no legal evidence adduced or the
evidence adduced clearly or

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manifestly fails to prove the
charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is
important to bear in mind the distinction
between a case where there is no legal
evidence or where there is evidence
which is clearly inconsistent with the
accusations made, and a case where
there is legal evidence which, on
appreciation, may or may not support the
accusations. When exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code, the High
Court would not ordinarily embark upon
an enquiry whether the evidence in
question is reliable or not or whether on a
reasonable appreciation of it accusation
would not be sustained. That is the
function of the trial Judge. Judicial
process, no doubt should not be an
instrument of oppression, or, needless
harassment. Court should be circumspect
and judicious in exercising discretion and
should take all relevant facts and
circumstances into consideration before
issuing process, lest it would be an
instrument in the hands of a private
complainant to unleash vendetta to
harass any person needlessly. At the

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same time the section is not an
instrument handed over to an accused to
short-circuit a prosecution and bring
about its sudden death…..” (Emphasis
supplied)
14. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby
allowed. The impugned order passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad is hereby set aside.
The criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 127 of
2022 dated 04.06.2022 registered at Police Station
Mirzapur, Saharanpur, State of U.P. are hereby
quashed."
26. It is well settled that continuation of the criminal
proceedings against any person on the basis of a frivolous or
vexatious complaint is something very serious. This would
tarnish the image of the person against whom false, frivolous
and vexatious allegations are leveled. The Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P. reported in
2023 SCC OnLine SC 951 , held that whenever an accused
comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C or extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of constitution to get the FIR or criminal
proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such
proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted

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with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such
circumstance, Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care
and a little more closely. It will not be just enough for the Court
to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for
the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients
to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. On the
other hand, the Court owes a duty to look into many other
attending circumstance emerging from the record of the case
over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care
and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court
while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C or
Article 226 of Constitution need not restrict itself only to the
stage of a case, but is empowered to take into a count the
overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of
the case as well as the materials collected in the course of
investigation.
27. In view of the foregoing discussion, particularly with
regard to the essential ingredients of Section 153A of IPC and
the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, I am of the
considered view that, even if the entire allegations made in the
complaint and FIR are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety, no offence is made out against the petitioner.

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Therefore, the continuation of FIR and further proceedings
against the petitioner would amount to abuse of process of
court. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER

i. The petition is allowed .

ii. The FIR and further proceedings against the
petitioner - accused in Crime No.17/2024
registered by Cyber Crime Police Station,
Bengaluru, for the offences punishable under
Section 153A of IPC and section 66(C) of
Information Technology Act, 2000 (for short,
"the I.T Act"), presently pending on the file of
45th ACMM, Bengaluru, is hereby quashed.



SD/-
(RAJESH RAI K)
JUDGE











PKS/K