Shabbir Fidahusain Kachwala And Anr vs Purushottam Chalvayya Shetty

2026:BHC-AS:22195
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.15535 OF 2022
Shabbir Fidahusain Kachwala and Anr. ...Petitioners
V/s.
Purushottam Chalvayya Shetty ...Respondent
________________
Mr. Sanjiv Sawant with Mr. Abhishek Matkar & Mr. Malhar Bageshwar
for the Petitioners.
Mr. S.N. Chandrachood with Mr. A.V. Pitre for the Respondent.
________________
CORAM: SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
Reserved on: 29 APRIL 2026.
Pronounced on: 08 MAY 2026.
JUDGMENT:
1) Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. With the consent of the
learned counsel appearing for parties, the Petition is taken up for final
disposal.
2) Petitioners/landlords have filed the present Petition challenging
the judgment and decree dated 16 March 2022 passed by the District
Judge-22, Pune, dismissing Regular Civil Appeal No.371 of 2015 and
confirming the judgment and order dated 11 June 2015 passed by the
Additional Judge, Small Causes Court, Pune in Civil Suit No.419 of
2007. The Trial Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s Suit seeking eviction of
the Respondent-Defendant on the grounds of nuisance /annoyance,
bonafide requirement and arrears of rent. Aggrieved by the concurrent
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findings recorded by the Trial and the Appellate Courts on the issues
of nuisance and annoyance, default in payment of rent and bonafide
requirement, the Petitioners have filed the present Petition under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
3) The premises on (i) ground floor comprising of three rooms,
passage of hall admeasuring 2500 sq.ft. (ii) first floor comprising of
eight rooms, one hall, two bathrooms, two water closets admeasuring
3000 sq.ft. and (iii) second floor comprising of 8 big rooms, one large
hall, 2 bathrooms and two toilets admeasuring 3,000/- sq.ft. in
building located at House No. 1922 at Budhwar Peth, Pune are the ‘suit
premises’. The building in which suit premises are located was
originally owned by late Fidahusain Kachwala, father of Plaintiff No.1-.
Father of Plaintiff No.1 inducted Defendant’s father as monthly tenant
in respect of the suit premises. Defendant’s father commenced the
business of ‘Shriraj Lodge’ in the suit premises. After death of his
father, Plaintiff claimed the status of landlord in respect of the suit
premises. After death of his father, Defendant is the tenant in respect
of the suit premises, who is operating the business of ‘Shriraj Lodge’.
Plaintiffs reside on the fourth floor of the building, in which suit
premises are located.
4)
Plaintiffs instituted Civil Suit No.419 of 2007 in the Court of
Small Causes, Pune, seeking recovery of possession of the suit
premises from the Defendant on the ground that acts of the Defendant
caused nuisance and annoyance. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant was
using the passages in the building for allowing his customers to sleep
and that Defendant’s customers used to consume liquor and indulged
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in frequent quarrels. The Defendant also alleged that the suit premises
were being misused by the Defendant for immoral purposes by renting
the rooms for two hours. The Plaintiff also alleged default in payment
of rent by the Defendant. After issuing notice dated 30 June 2007,
Plaintiff instituted the Suit seeking recovery of possession of the suit
premises and also demanded arrears of rent of Rs.76,800/-. The
Defendant appeared in the Suit and filed written statement contesting
the claim of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff amended the Suit by
incorporating additional pleadings relating to nuisance/annoyance.
The Plaintiff also added the ground of bonafide requirement of his son
for commencing hotel, lodging and boarding business. The Defendant
filed additional written statement. Based on the pleadings, the Trial
Court framed issues inter-alia relating to default in payment of rent,
nuisance/annoyance, bonafide requirement, comparative hardship, etc.
The mother of Plaintiff No.1 was added as Plaintiff No.2 in the Suit.
Parties led evidence in support of their respective claims. Plaintiff
No.1-Shabbir examined himself as PW1. Defendant- Purushottam
Challwayya Shetti examined himself as DW1 in addition to examining
Shriram Govind Vishnuprad as DW2, Ramkrishna Govind Jadhav as
DW3 and Dagdu Sulbha Dhokale as DW4.
5)
After considering the pleadings, documentary and oral evidence,
the Trial Court proceeded to dismiss the Suit by judgment and order
dated 11 June 2015 answering the issues of default in payment of rent,
nuisance and annoyance and bonafide requirement against the
Plaintiff. Petitioners/Plaintiffs filed Regular Civil Appeal No.371 of
2015 in the Court of District Judge, Pune, challenging the decree of the
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Trial Court. However, by judgment and order dated 16 March 2022, the
Appellate Court has proceeded to dismiss the Appeal preferred by the
Petitioners. Aggrieved by the decree passed by the Appellate Court
confirming the judgment and order of the Trial Court, the Petitioners
have filed the present Petition.
6) Mr. Sawant, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners
would submit that the Trial and the Appellate Courts have grossly
erred in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ Suit. He has mainly pressed the
grounds of nuisance and annoyance and bonafide requirement for
assailing the orders of the Trial and the Appellate Courts. Mr. Sawant
would submit that the Plaintiffs had clearly proved cause of nuisance
and annoyance by acts of Defendant. That Defendant is operating
Lodge in the suit premises and has been permitting the same to be
used for illegal and immoral purposes. That rooms in the lodge are
proved to be let out for couple of hours for immoral purposes. That
police action has been taken in respect of such use on several
occasions. He submits that passages in the building are used for
sleeping by the customers of the Defendant. That the acts of the
Defendant are proved by production of photographs, which are
admitted by the Defendant. Mr. Sawant has placed before me relevant
photographs, which are admitted by the Defendant. That despite clear
demonstration of nuisance /annoyance, the Trial and the Appellate
Courts have erroneously rejected the said ground. He relies on
judgments of this Court in M/s. Impex (India) Limited V/s. Mr.
1
Dinashah Jal Daruwala and Ors. and Gulam Husain Mirza V/s.
2
Laxmidas Premji and Another in support of his contention that
1 Writ Petition No.2748 of 2004, decided on 4 April 2024.
2 1984 Mh.L.J. 215
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indecency and unpleasurable behaviour amounts to nuisance and
annoyance. He also relies on judgment of this Court in Mahadevo
3
Murlidhar Ambekar V/s. Smt. Padmini wd/o. Venkatesh Joshi and Ors.
7) Mr. Sawant further submits that mere compromise of the
previous suit bearing Civil Suit No.502 of 1990 does not mean that the
ground of nuisance / annoyance is closed forever for the Plaintiffs.
That in respect of acts caused subsequent to compromise of previous
suit, fresh suit is maintainable on the ground of annoyance/nuisance.
He relies on judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanahaiya Lal
4
Arya V/s. Md. Ehshan and others in support of his contention that a
compromise decree does not mean that landlord has given up his
rights in eviction proceedings in future.
8) So far as the ground of bonafide requirement is concerned, Mr.
Sawant submits that the Trial and the Appellate courts have
egregiously erred in rejecting the said ground. That mere compromise
of Civil Suit No.502 of 1990 by father of Plaintiff No.1 does not mean
that the Plaintiffs are debarred from raising the ground of bonafide
requirement in future. That the bonafide requirement pleaded in the
previous Suit was that of Plaintiff No.1 whereas an altogether different
need of son of Plaintiff No.1 was pleaded and demonstrated in the
current Suit. He submits that the son of Plaintiff No.1 is desirous of
operating a business of hotel, lodging and boarding and there are no
other premises available for conducting the said business of his son.
He submits that the Trial Court has erroneously rejected the ground of
bonafide requirement on account of non-disclosure of possession of
3 1995 SCC OnLine Bom 468.
4 2025 SCC OnLine SC 432
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residential premises. That the Plaintiffs are not expected to disclose
possession of premises, which cannot be put to use for the purpose for
which the Suit is filed. He relies on judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) Thr. His LR Atul Kumar Aggarwal V/s.
5
Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) Thr. LRs and Ors. in support of his
contention that bonafide requirement also covers requirement of
family members of landlord. He relies on judgment of this Court in
6
Balwant P. Doshi V/s. Shantaben Dhirajlal Shah and another in
support of his contention that the landlord need not establish dire
necessity and demonstration of some need in respect of the premises
is sufficient.
9) Lastly Mr. Sawant relies on judgment of this Court in Bansilal
7
Dattatraya Madiwale V/s. Dhondopant Balkrishana Kulkarni in
support of his contention that tenant cannot dictate terms to the
landlords about management of subject premises. On above broad
submissions, Mr. Sawant would pray for setting aside the orders passed
by the Trial and the Appellate Courts and for decreeing the Suit.
10) Mr. Chandrachood, the learned counsel appearing for
Respondent opposes the Petition submitting that the Trial and the
Appellate Courts have concurrently rejected all the three grounds of
default in payment of rent, nuisance/annoyance and bonafide
requirement. That there is no warrant for interference in concurrent
findings recorded by both the Courts. That in exercise of writ
jurisdiction, this Court is not expected to re-appreciate the evidence or
5 Civil Appeal No.4275 of 2017 decided on 24 April 2025.
6 2002 SCC OnLine Bom 585
7 2005 SCC OnLine Bom 811
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to arrive at a finding different than the one recorded by the Trial and
the Appellate Courts. That there is no perversity in the findings
recorded by the two Courts. In support, he relies on judgments of the
Apex Court in Babhubhai Raichand Oswal V/s. Laxmikant R. Tarte and
8 9
Another and Ajay Singh V/s. Khacheru and Others
11) Mr. Chandrachood further submits that the Plaintiffs
approached the Court with false case of bonafide requirement. That
earlier suit filed in the year 1990 expressing same bonafide
requirement has been compromised by father of Plaintiff No.1. That
therefore the Plaintiffs are precluded from setting forth the same
bonafide requirement of son of Plaintiff No.1. That the Defendant
cannot be subjected to multiple suits expressing bonafide requirement
of operation of business of son and grandson of original landlord. He
submits that the Trial and the Appellate Courts have rightly held that
the Plaintiffs are in possession of several other premises, which were
deliberately suppressed. That it is Plaintiffs’ duty to disclose
possession of all the premises when bonafide need is pleaded. Without
prejudice, he submits that the Plaintiffs have secured possession of
the entire building at CTS No.186, Budhwar Peth. He relies on
possession receipt in respect of premises admeasuring 1500 sq.ft. at
CTS No.186 Budhwar Peth. That the said premises are commercial and
can be used for operating hotel business. However, instead of
commencing the hotel business by Plaintiff’s son, the Plaintiffs have
given the units in the said building by executing seven leave and
8 AIR 1975 SC 1297
9 (2025) 3 SCC 266
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license agreements to third parties showing absence of any bonafide
need.
12) So far as the ground of nuisance/annoyance is concerned, Mr.
Chandrachood submits that the ground was mischievously raised by
the Plaintiffs. That the complaint was not filed with any authorities or
with the Defendant in respect of alleged nuisance/annoyance and the
ground was directly raised in the Plaint. That the suit premises are
being used for the business of running lodge for several years. That the
premises are located in one of the busiest areas in Pune city and
patrons of the Defendant have not caused any nuisance or annoyance
to the Plaintiffs. That same ground of nuisance/annoyance was given
up by compromising Suit No.502 of 1990 by father of Plaintiff No.1.
That fresh Suit based on same allegations could not have been filed.
He submits that mere admission of photographs does not mean that
contents thereof are admitted. That in any case, photographs do not
indicate cause of any nuisance/annoyance. Mr. Chandrachood
accordingly prays for dismissal of the Petition.
13) Rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties now fall for my
consideration.
14) The Plaintiffs instituted Suit for recovery of possession of the
suit premises from Defendant on three grounds of default in payment
of rent, nuisance/annoyance and bonafide requirement. All the three
grounds are concurrently rejected by the Trial and the Appellate
Courts. Mr. Sawant has not canvassed any submissions with regard to
the rejection of ground of default in payment of rent. His criticism to
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the findings recorded by the Trial and the Appellate Courts essentially
revolve around the grounds of bonafide requirement and
nuisance/annoyance. I accordingly proceed to examine the challenge
raised by the Petitioners to the concurrent findings recorded by the
Trial and the Appellate Courts on the grounds of bonafide requirement
and nuisance/annoyance.
15)
So far as the ground of bonafide requirement is concerned, the
same was not originally raised when the Suit was filed in the year 2007.
The ground of bonafide requirement was added by amending the
Plaint. After amending the Plaint, the Plaintiff No.1 pleaded that his
th
son Mohammed Shabbir Kachwala was studying in 12 standard and
was desirous of commencing hotel, lodging and boarding business
after securing education in Hotel Management. It appears that father
of Plaintiff No.1 had also filed Suit No.502 of 1990 seeking eviction of
father of the Defendant. At that time bonafide requirement of the
Plaintiff No.1 was pleaded by stating that Plaintiff No. 1 was desirous
of conducting lodging business in the suit premises. However, Civil
Suit No.502 of 1990 was compromised thereby giving up the ground of
bonafide requirement of the Plaintiff No.1 to conduct lodging business
in the suit premises. However, merely because Civil Suit No.502 of
1990 was compromised, such compromise did not prevent the Plaintiff
from setting up an altogether different need of his son to conduct
business in the suit premises. However, it appears that the Plaintiff
No.1 did not examine his son for proving son’s bonafide requirement.
The Trial Court has accused Plaintiffs of withholding the best evidence
in the form of deposition of the person, who needed the premises for
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bonafide requirement. It also appears that no evidence was produced
to prove that the son of Plaintiff No.1 secured degree in Hotel
Management. In the Plaint it was vaguely pleaded that son of Plaintiff
th
No.1 was in the 12 standard and was desirous of securing degree in
Hotel Management.
16) It is well settled position that bonafide requirement of Plaintiff
must continue throughout currency of proceedings. The
Respondent/Defendant has brought on record possession receipt dated
5 February 2026 executed by Hitendra and Shailesh Prataprai Mehta,
who are proprietors of M/s. P.D. Brothers and who have surrendered
possession of shop admeasuring 1500 sq.ft. at CTS No.186 Budhwar
Peth to the Plaintiffs. It appears that the Plaintiffs had filed Suit
No.289 of 2007 against M/s. P.D. Brothers for recovery of possession of
the said premises. M/s. P.D. Brothers lost upto this Court and
thereafter gave up possession of the premises on 5 February 2026. Mr.
Sawant has not disputed the fact that possession of the premises of
M/s. P.D. Brothers is secured by the Plaintiffs. Mr. Chandrachood has
also placed on record copies of Leave and License Agreements
executed by the Plaintiffs by which smaller portions of recovered
premises from M/s. P.D. Brothers are granted on leave and license by
the Plaintiffs. Here again, Mr. Sawant fairly does not dispute the
position that Plaintiffs had granted licenses in respect of the premises
secured from M/s. P.D. Brothers. Thus, the son of Plaintiff No.1 had an
opportunity of commencing lodging business in the premises
recovered from M/s. P.D. Brothers. However, instead of doing so,
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Plaintiffs have granted licenses in respect of the said recovered
premises, showing absence of any real need for his son’s business.
17) Considering the above position, it does not appear that there is
any genuine need of the Plaintiffs in respect of the suit premises.
What is expressed in the Plaint is a mere fanciful wish or a mere ipse
dixit. I am therefore, not inclined to interfere in the concurrent
findings relating to issue of bonafide requirement and comparative
hardship.
18) Coming to the ground of nuisance/annoyance, it is seen that this
was the main ground raised by the Plaintiffs in the Suit right since
inception. The Plaintiffs reside on the fourth floor of the building in
which Defendant conducts lodging business on ground, first and
second floors. The Plaintiffs specifically pleaded the case of
availability of only one staircase to lead to their residence and how
acts of the Defendant and his patrons caused obstruction, nuisance
and annoyance to the Plaintiffs and his family members. The Plaintiffs
also pleaded that Defendant is permitting his patrons to occupy
passage area and other common spaces in the building for sleeping in
the night. They also complained of several illegal and immoral
activities by the patrons of the Defendant. They pleaded that
Defendant’s patrons used to bring girls in the rooms, which are let out
on two hourly basis. They also pleaded that Defendant’s patrons
consumed liquor in the common passages, played cards and quarreled
in loud noise. Plaintiffs complained that the mother, wife and
unmarried daughter reside in the suit premises and that they face
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inconvenience, nuisance/annoyance on account of conduct of the
Defendant and his patrons. By amending the Suit, the Plaintiffs added
several other facets of nuisance /annoyance caused by the Defendant
and his patrons. The Plaintiff No.1 examined himself and led evidence
about acts of the Defendant and his patrons. Additionally, he produced
photographs in respect of the suit premises and the building. Though
he did not examine the photographer, the Defendant admitted that the
photographs are of the suit premises. Thus, ample evidence was
available before the Trial Court for examining the ground of nuisance /
annoyance.
19) The Trial Court has recorded contradictory findings about the
photographs produced by the Plaintiffs. In paragraph 70 of the
judgment, the Trial Court has held that except his oral testimony,
there was no evidence to prove that photographs were taken by the
Plaintiff through his own device and or that they are of the suit
premises. It is held in paragraph 70 as under:
70] The plaintiff though filed the photographs (Exh. 172 to 197 and
Exh. 121 to 125), still he has not proved the same, (Exh. 172 to 197)
as per the provisions of the Evidence Act. He though deposed that,
he himself has drawn that photographs, still except his oral
testimony, there is nothing on record, to prove that, the same were
drawn by him, by his own devise and they are of the suit premises.
Moreover, during his cross-examination, the plaintiff Shabbir has
candidly admitted that, from the photographs filed below list Exh.
161, it is difficult to say that, the said photographs are of which
place. He though voluntarily stated that, they are the photographs of
suit premises, but there is nothing on record to support his said
version, and there is also no pleadings in this respect.
20) However, in paragraph 72 of the judgment, the Trial Court has
recorded finding about the Defendant not only admitting the
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photographs but also the fact that they pertain to the suit premises. It
is held in paragraph 74 as under:-
74) The Defendant though admitted the photographs (Exh.121 to
125), and stated that, they are of the suit premises, still after going
through the said photographs also, it is crystal clear that, they
nowhere disclosed any fact of obstruction or nuisance, on the part of
the defendant. Therefore, they are also not helpful to the plaintiff,
though they are admitted one.
21) Mr. Sawant has placed before me the concerned photographs,
which were produced during the course of trial. Photographs indicate
persons sleeping in the passages. The photographs also indicate cots
being placed in the common areas. Photographs also indicate large
volume of litter being thrown in various portions of common spaces.
There are disturbing photographs of persons lying/sleeping in the
toilets. Photographs depict the manner in which the suit premises are
used by the Defendant and his patrons. That the suit premises are
supposed to be used for operation of lodge. One photograph shows at
least 7 persons sleeping on mattresses in an extremely narrow space.
22) It is shocking that despite inviting attention of the Trial Court to
those photographs, it has proceeded to record a finding that the
photographs by themselves do not prove any act of obstruction or
nuisance on the part of the Defendant. More shocking are the findings
recorded by the Trial Court in paragraph 66 of the judgment, in which
the Trial Court has held that once the suit premises are let out for
operation of lodge, the Plaintiffs must bear the acts of Defendant’s
patrons. It is held in paragraph 66 of the judgment as under:-
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66. It is necessary to mention here that, the father of the plaintiff
had given the suit premises on rent, to the father of defendant, for
doing the business of lodging. It means that, the father of plaintiff
was well aware, about the future consequences if any to be happened,
in the lodge, still he let out the suit premises for the said purpose,
and thereafter also made compromise, with him in the suit, by
enhancing the rent. Therefore this fact itself speak volumes, about
the intention of the father of the plaintiff, so also the present
plaintiff, and therefore, I do not find any substance, in the evidence
adduced by the plaintiff, in this respect.
23) The Trial and the Appellate Courts ought to have appreciated
that any act of the Defendant or his patrons, which generates an
unpleasant feeling for Plaintiffs or their family members would
constitute nuisance or annoyance. In M/s. Impex (India) Limited
(supra) this Court has discussed ratio of several judgments on the
issue of nuisance and annoyance. In that case, even the act of
constructing a wall in the open land behind tenanted premises thereby
blocking access of Plaintiff therein and enjoyment of open land was
treated as nuisance and annoyance. By relying on judgment of this
Court in Gulam Husain Mirza (supra) this Court held that any material
interference with the ordinary comfort of existence would constitute
nuisance and the act that disturbs the reasonable peace of ordinary
person and leads to unpleasurable feeling would be annoyance. This
Court held in paragraphs 92(iv) and 93 as under:
92)
iv. Mr. Khambata has relied on judgment of this Court in Gulam
Husain Mirza (supra), in which a Single Judge of this Court has dealt
with validity of eviction decree passed against the tenant under
Section 13(1)(c) of the Bombay Rent Act. The landlords in that case
were occupants of second floor premises in the same building and
the tenant occupied three rooms on the third floor and one room
called the terrace room on the top floor. The landlord complained of
the tenant trespassing on the entire terrace on the top floor of the
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building and alleged that the tenant was using the entire terrace as a
part of his exclusive property by putting stones, mud, flowering
plants etc. The question before the Single Judge of this Court was
whether such conduct was covered by the words “nuisance” or
“annoyance”. This Court held in paras-13, 14, 16 and 19 as under :
13. In Walter v. Gelfe, 20 LJ Ch 435, Knight-Bruce V.C.
observed that the nuisance is an inconvenience
materially interfering with the ordinary comfort
physically of human existence, not merely according to
elegant or dainty modes and habits of living, but
according to plain and sober simple notions among the
English people. This test was approved in the case of
Tod-Heatley v. Benham, 40 Ch.D. 80, Talbot, J. in Gunard
and Wife v. Antifyre Ltd., (1933) 1 KB 555 observed that
private nuisance could be confined to that which is
injurious to property. In Read v. Lyons & Co. Ltd., (1945)
KB 216, Winfield's proposition that the nuisance is the
unlawful interference with a person's use of enjoyment
of land, or some right over or in connection with it was
cited with approval and was further affirmed in other
cases, such as Howard v. Walker, (1947) 2 All ER 197, and
Newcastle- under Lyne Corporation v. Wolstanton Ltd.,
(1947) Ch. 92. In Buller v. Standard Telephones and
Cables Ltd., (1940) 1 KB 399 injurious encroachment by
the roots of a tree going underneath a house was treated
to be an actionable nuisance. In Harrison v. Good, LR 11
Eq. 338 Becon V.C. observed that unless the nuisance
complained of is one for which an indictment would lie,
or an action could be maintained, it is no nuisance
within the terms of the convenient which was being
considered and further found that the establishment of
a national school with playground for boys in the
vicinity of a residential property would not be a
nuisance, though it would be an annoyance. Lindley L.J.
in Tod-Heatley v. Benham referring to those cases
thought that the term appeared to be restrictively
interrupted while Bowen L.J. doubted the correctness of
the interpreted. The decision of the learned Lord Justice
in Tod-Heatley v. Benhman, goes to show that the term
"annoyance" is also of very side amplitude. Cotton, Lord
Justice asked now what is the meaning of annoyance?
The meaning is that which annoys, that which raises
objection after and unpleasant feeling. Anything which
raises an objection, in the minds of reasonable men may
be an annoyance within the meaning of the covenant,
while Bowen Lord Justice observed that it implies more,
as it seems, then nuisance and further stated that it was
clear that if annoyance and nuisance were put together
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in a convenient of the kind which was being considered,
it should mean something different from each other.
The learned Lord Justice further observed :
"Any material interference with the ordinary comfort of
existence; that would be a nuisance... "Annoyance" is a
wider term than nuisance, and if you find a thing which
reasonably troubles the mind and pleasure, not of a
fanciful person or of a skilled person who knows the
truth, but of the ordinary sensible English inhabitant of
a house-if you find there is anything which disturbs his
reasonable peace of mind, that seems to me to be
annoyance although it may not appear to amount to
physical detriment to comfort."
14. Therefore, whatever causes material interference
with the ordinary comfort of existence would be
nuisance and anything that disturbs the reasonable
peace of ordinary person and leads to unpleasurable
feeling, would be annoyance. Jessel M.R. In Watson v.
Loasington College, 25 SJ 30, said that it might perhaps
be difficult to appreciate the difference between
"nuisance" and "annoyance", but as both words were
used, "annoyance," evidently meant something less than
"nuisance", while Tod-Heatley v. Benham (supra),
"annoyance" was treated to have a wider meaning than
"nuisance".
16. Thus, the legal comprehension that encompasses
these terms appears to be well-settled. Though the
terms are of very wide amplitude covering variety of
circumstances and cannot be fenced by any definite
meaning, whatever causes material interference with
the ordinary comfort of human existence would, surely
be the nuisance, while that which annoys, irritates or is
offensive and has tendency that would evoke reasonable
injection and leading to unpleasant feeling amongst
persons, would be annoyance.
19. As the section itself shows, it is the conduct that
thereunder comes in issue. While considering nuisance
and annoyance, that conduct on behaviour complained
of will have to be objectively appreciated. It may have
relation either to the rights and enjoyment of the
property or other rights and entitlements of persons
who, as ordinary men, are entitled to have peaceful,
trouble free and ordinarily comfortable situation. These
entitlements are basic in human society. These are to be
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judged by the given standard or norms available in such
society, a given conduct adversely affects such
entitlement or encroaches there upon, then the conduct
would be within the mischief of the clause. One must
hasten to add that the phrase employed by the statute
being of wider amplitude, there is always a possibility of
overstraining the meaning so as to
include even the trifle and trivial matters. That is why
every conduct should be judged in the context, and
fairly. Without being elaborate and exhaustive, it can
safely be said that all that conduct which is offensive,
quarrelsome or violent, unethical in just a position of
peaceful, civil and by ordinary standard unethical would
be within the mischief. Matters of physical assaults by
one against other would attract squarely the clause so
also to other types of subtle assaults that offend human
senses. Such acts may affect the peace and interfere
with the pleasurable enjoyment of the property and,
consequently, be within them mischief. Similarly, cases
where property is trespassed upon and appropriated to
one's own use to the exclusion of others' entitlement
would be within the mischief of nuisance. Whenever
question arises under the clause, first the conduct or
behaviour that is in issue should be fairly and
objectively ascertained and then, secondly, its effect in
relation either to the property or the persons occupying
the property should be taken into account All this
should be done in keeping with the social background of
the given society, having norms of reasonable peace,
comfort and enjoyment as well as in the light of the
entitlements of the occupiers regarding the specific
property. Having considered all these three aspect, if the
conclusion is reached that the conduct was such which
affected or tended to affect the reasonable entitlements
of ordinary normal expectations of life, then all that this
clause intends would be clearly answered.
Thus in Gulam Husain Mirza, this Court by referring to various
English cases held that the term “nuisance” is of wide amplitude.
This Court therefore held that whatever causes material interference
with the ordinary comfort of human existence would be nuisance
and acts that disturbs the reasonable peace of ordinary person and
leads to unpleasant feeling, would be annoyance. This Court further
held that cases where property is trespassed upon and appropriated
to one’s own use to the exclusion of others’ entitlement, would be
within the mischief of nuisance. This Court therefore held that the
conduct of tenant in trespassing on the entire boundaries and
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putting the same to his exclusive use caused nuisance and
annoyance to the landlord.
93) Thus, from various judgments cited on the issue of nuisance and
annoyance, it can be inferred that every act of tenant which
interferes with landlord’s right to use or occupy his property would
amount to actionable nuisance. In Gulam Husain Mirza this Court
has gone to the extent of holding that every act of a tenant which
disturbs the reasonable peace of ordinary person and which leads to
unpleasurable feeling would constitute nuisance or annoyance. No
doubt in Awabai Muncharji Cama the Single Judge of this Court
( S.K. Desai, J.) has struck a sort of discordant note qua the
observations in Gulam Husain Mirza, but the learned Judge himself
has clarified that his observations are obiter. It therefore cannot be
contended that in Awabai Mansarji Cama, S.K. Desai, J. disagreed
with the view taken by Masodkar, J. in Gulam Husain Mirza. Infact,
A.M. Khanwilkar, J. has subsequently followed Gulam Husain Mirza’s
decision in D.V. Panse. I am therefore of the view that every act of
tenant which seeks to interfere with landlord’s peaceful use and
occupation of his property would constitute nuisance and
annoyance, especially when the landlords property adjoins that of
tenanted premises. A tenant cannot trespass upon landlord’s
property, obstruct him from using his own property and then
contend that the same does not constitute nuisance or annoyance. A
tenant has no business to interfere with landlord’s use and
enjoyment of his own property and if he does so, his act would be
covered in the mischief of nuisance and annoyance.
(emphasis added)
24) The judgment in Impex (India) Limited is followed by this Court
10
in Jayprakash Dnyaydeo Narkar V/s. Damji Ramji Shah and Ors. in
which this Court has held that even the act of tenant organising
demonstrations/morcha would constitute acts of nuisance and
annoyance. This Court held in paragraph 23 of the judgment as under:

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25) In the present case, the Plaintiffs have proved by production of
cogent evidence that the Defendant and his patrons have caused
nuisance and annoyance to the Plaintiffs and to their family members.
The Trial and the Appellate Courts have committed gross errors in
turning a blind eye to the voluminous evidence on record and have
erroneously expected the Plaintiffs to examine supporting or
independent witnesses. If nuisance is suffered by the Plaintiff No. 1
himself, why he should produce any ‘independent’ witness is
incomprehensible. Deposition of Plaintiff No. 1 about acts of nuisance
and annoyance would be direct evidence.
26) In their pleadings and evidence, the Plaintiffs have given
following instances of nuisance and annoyance and had relied on
documents in support, which are recorded in paragraphs 53 to 55 of
the Trial Court’s order:
53] He further stated that, the defendant used to give the rooms to
the customers, for two hours for immoral purpose, and has kept the
counter and water tank, in the way of his house, and has created
obstruction. The lodgers used to wander in the lodge, in few clothes
on their person, which has caused nuisance to him and his family
members. Therefore he is suffering great mental agony and is unable
to find the match for his daughter to fix her marriage. He has drawn
the photographs of the articles, and the lodgers, by his own mobile
phone. The act of the defendant is constant source of nuisance and
annoyance to him, and his family members.
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54] To support his testimony, he also filed on record the certified
copy of arrest panchanama (Exh. 73, 74), copy of chargesheet
(Exh.75), photographs (Exh. 121 to 125 and 172 to 197), news item
(Exh. 210), complaint made to commissioner (Exh. 167 and 170),
acknowledgment (Exh. 168), under posting certificate (Exh. 169),
information received from information officer – Article 32 to 37.
Notice issued by Corporation to defendant (Exh. 201) etc.
55] The Learned counsel for the plaintiff also argued that, the
defendant is allowing the lodgers to do immoral activities, in the
lodge. The lodgers used to gamble in the lodge and used to make
hue and cry. They also wanders with less clothes on their person,
and used to keep the bottles of liquor in the passage. The defendant
has also kept his counter and the dustbin in the passage, and caused
obstruction and inconvenience to the plaintiff and his family
members, in using the staircase. All these acts on the part of the
defendant are nuisance and annoyance. The plaintiff himself has
snapped the photographs of the same, and has proved the same.
Therefore, it is duly proved that, the defendant has caused nuisance
and annoyance to the plaintiff, and his family members.
27) Instead of examining whether there is an element of truth in the
allegations levelled by the Plaintiffs, the Trial Court essentially looked
into the allegations through the prism of the act of father of Plaintiff
No.1 in filing Civil Suit No. 502 of 1990 and compromising the same.
The act of father of Plaintiff No.1 compromising the Civil Suit No. 502
of 1990 is considered as the main ground for not accepting the
allegations of nuisance and annoyance. This is clear from following
findings of the Trial Court in paragraphs 64 and 65:
64] Therefore considering the document (Exh. 93) filed on record,
which is also admitted to the plaintiff, it is crystal clear that, the
father of the plaintiff, though had alleged the act of nuisance and
annoyance, against the father of defendant, still had relinquished his
claim of possession, on the count of enhancement of rent. Therefore
it is clear that, the earlier suit was filed only with intent to get more
rent from the defendant's father, and infact there was no instance of
nuisance and annoyance. If really, there was such nuisance and
annoyance, then certainly, on the count of enhancement of rent only,
the father of the defendant, would not have withdrawn that suit.
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Therefore, it is clear that, the pleadings in respect of nuisance and
annoyance were made, only for the sake of making ground for
eviction of the father of the defendant.
65] As in the present suit also, same instances have been repeated in
verbatim, therefore it is crystal clear that, the ground of nuisance
and annoyance has been pleaded by the plaintiff, only to create
ground, for filing the present suit for eviction, and nothing more
than that. Therefore this fact itself is sufficient, to accept the defence
and the evidence, put forth by the defendant.
28) Civil Suit No. 502 of 1990 was compromised on 16 August 1994
whereas Civil Suit No.419 of 2007 was filed 13 yrs later on 21 July 2007.
Mere withdrawal of the earlier suit raising the ground of nuisance /
annoyance cannot be a reason enough for inferring that the ground of
nuisance/annoyance is given up forever. Civil Suit No. 419 of 2007 has
been filed in respect of acts of nuisance and annoyance committed
after compromise of the earlier Suit. In that view of the matter, the
Trial Court could not have laid emphasis on the factum of father of
Plaintiff No.1 filing previous Suit and compromising the same on 16
August 1994. It is another matter that the parties to the said Suit were
also entirely different. That suit was filed by father of Plaintiff No.1
against Defendant’s father and accordingly the acts of
nuisance/annoyance upto the period of 1990 were relatable to
Defendant’s father. As against this, Civil Suit No. 419 of 2007 is filed
against Defendant in respect of acts committed by him and his patrons
after compromise of Civil Suit No. 502 of 1990. Thus, the entire
approach of the Trial Court in dealing with the ground of nuisance and
annoyance is totally faulty.
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29) There is a jurisdictional error committed by the Trial Court in
not deciding the grounds of nuisance and annoyance purely on the
basis of evidence appearing before it and by rejecting the same only on
the count of compromise of the previous suit by father of Plaintiff
No.1 in the year 1994. It was the duty of the Trial Court to decide the
ground of nuisance and annoyance only on the basis of evidence
produced before it and exercise of jurisdiction by the Trial Court is
clearly with material irregularity. Instead of correcting the error
committed by the Trial Court, the Appellate Court has decided the
Appeal relating to the ground of nuisance and annoyance in a
perfunctory manner. It expected the Plaintiffs to examine other
witnesses (apart from the Plaintiff No. 1) to prove the ground of
nuisance. This expectation by the Appellate Court (and by the Trial
Court as well) is misplaced when Plaintiff No. 1 himself has suffered
nuisance and annoyance. Under Section 16(1)(c) of the Maharashtra
Rent Control Act, 1999 (MRC Act) the tenant attracts ground for
eviction if he is held guilty of conduct which is nuisance or annoyance
to the adjoining or neighbouring occupiers. Section 16(1) (c) of the
MRC Act provides thus:-
16. When landlord may recover possession.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to
the provisions of section 25, a landlord shall be entitled to recover
possession of any premises if the court is satisfied-
xxx
(c) that the tenant, his agent, servant, persons inducted by tenant
or claiming under the tenant or, any person residing with the
tenant has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or annoyance
to the adjoining or neighboring occupier, or has been convicted of
using the premises or allowing the premises to be used for immoral
or illegal purposes or that the tenant has in respect of the premises
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been convicted of an offence of contravention of any of the
provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 394 or of
section 394A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, or of sub-
section (1) or of section 376 or of section 376A of the Bombay
Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, or of section 229 of
the City of Nagpur Municipal Corporation Act, 1948; or of section
280 or of section 281 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar
Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965; or
30) It is well settled position that the expression ‘adjoining or
neighboring occupier’ used in Section 16(1)(c) includes even the
landlord if he is occupying the neighbouring or adjoining premises.
Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of this Court in
12
Sorab Jamshed Irani and Ors. V/s. Hiraji C. Mistry and Others . In
fact, in Impex (India) Ltd. (supra), this Court has held that even if
landlord holding adjoining property, though not physically residing in
the adjoining property, he can complain of nuisance and annoyance
caused by the tenant. In the present case, Plaintiffs are residents of
fourth floor of the building in which the suit premises are situated.
The building is mainly occupied by the Defendant-tenant as the suit
premises are spread across ground, first and second floors of the
building. The acts of nuisance/annoyance described above are also
suffered by Plaintiffs themselves. Therefore, no corroboration is
necessary in respect of sufferance of nuisance and annoyance by the
Plaintiffs themselves.

31) The Appellate Court has also erroneously discarded the
photographs on the ground that the photographer is not examined,
which finding goes against the position that the Defendant has
admitted that the photographs pertain to the suit premises. This is
12 MANU/MH/0611/1981
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how despite availability of direct evidence in the form of testimony of
the Petitioner supported by the photographs, the Trial and the
Appellate Courts have turned a blind eye to the same and are swayed
by the factum of Defendant operating lodge in the suit premises for 50
years and father of Plaintiff No.1 withdrawing the previous Suit filed
against Defendant’s father.
32) Plaintiffs are the owners of the suit premises and are residents
of the same building. When the landlord residing in the same building
approaches the Court with the complaint that the acts of the
Defendant have caused nuisance/annoyance and that the Plaintiff is a
sufferer of such acts, the Courts need to lean in favour of the Plaintiff
once there is some evidence to support the allegations. Sufferance of
nuisance/annoyance by a person is a state of mind. Everything that
affects the ordinary comfort of a person would be nuisance. Every act
of tenant which interferes with landlord’s right to use or occupy his
property would amount to actionable nuisance and every act of a
tenant which disturbs the reasonable peace of ordinary person and
which leads to unpleasurable feeling would constitute nuisance or
annoyance. A particular act may be acceptable for one person but may
cause inconvenience or unpleasant feeling for another. In the present
case, Plaintiffs have been continuously suffering the acts attributable
to the Defendant and his patrons where they are found to be sleeping
in the corridors, obstructing passages/staircases, consuming liquor in
the common corridors, playing cards, indulging in immoral activities
etc. Merely because Defendant has been operating the lodge for 50
years, the same cannot be a justification for insisting that Plaintiffs
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must continue to suffer the acts of the Defendant. Plaintiffs ultimately
are the owners of the suit premises. On account of rent control
protection, Defendant is able to occupy substantially large premises on
payment of paltry rent of Rs.2350/- inclusive of property taxes.
Defendant is thus profiteering by operating a lodge and by renting out
suit premises to outsiders at the cost of the Plaintiffs. He may be
entitled in law to do so. But the least that is expected of the Defendant
is to strictly observe the terms and conditions of tenancy. If in the
process of his profit-making activities, Defendant causes nuisance and
annoyance to the Plaintiff, he must be directed to vacate possession of
the premises. In the present case, the acts of the Defendant
undoubtedly constitute a continuous source of nuisance and mental
disturbance for the Plaintiffs and for their family members. Despite
clearly establishing the acts of nuisance/annoyance on the part of the
Defendant, the Trial and Appellate Courts have erroneously rejected
the same bv exercising their jurisdiction with material irregularity.
33) Mr. Chandrachood has attempted to impress upon this Court
that concurrent findings cannot be disturbed in exercise of writ
jurisdiction and has relied on judgment of the Apex Court in Ajay
Singh (supra) and Babhubhai Raichand Oswal (supra). However, in the
present case, the findings of the Trial and Appellate Courts on the
issue of nuisance/annoyance are not being reversed by this Court by
undertaking the exercise of re-appreciation of evidence. This Court
has arrived at the conclusion that exercise of jurisdiction by both the
Courts is faulty. The findings recorded by them are such that no fair-
minded person would ever record the same. The findings recorded are
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not plausible findings. Despite being presented with voluminous
evidence of Defendant and his patrons continuously committing the
acts of nuisance and annoyance, both the Courts have ignored the vital
evidence on record and have recorded perverse findings. The
photographs indicate the manner in which the lodge is operated by the
Defendant. The photographs indicate that Defendant and his patrons
sleep in the corridor/staircase, throw litter in the common areas, etc
which acts constitute nuisance and annoyance to the Plaintiffs and
family members residing on fourth floor of the same building.
Therefore, for arriving at the finding of establishment of ground of
nuisance/annoyance, exercise of reappreciation of evidence is not
necessary. The manner in which the enquiry is conducted by both the
Courts is faulty and therefore this Court would be justified in
interfering in perverse and implausible findings recorded by the Trial
and the Appellate Courts on the issue of nuisance/annoyance.
34) Mr. Chandrachood has relied on judgment of Gujarat High Court
13
in Gaurishankar Vs. Bhikhalal Chhaganlal and others in which it is
held that quarrels between wives of tenants did not amount to
nuisance or annoyance. The judgment has no application to the facts
of the present case where nuisance and annoyance is caused by the
Defendant and his customers by various acts of sleeping in the
corridors/staircase, throwing litter in common spaces, indulging in
consumption of liquor, playing cards and other immoral activities both
inside and outside the lodge as well as in the common areas.
13 AIR 1978 Gujarat 72
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35) Considering the overall conspectus of the case I am of the view
that the concurrent findings recorded by the Trial and the Appellate
Courts on the issue of default in payment of rent and bonafide
requirement do not warrant interference. However, the findings
recorded by the both the Courts on the issue of nuisance/annoyance
clearly warrants interference by this Court. The ground of
nuisance/annoyance is clearly established for the purpose of decreeing
the Suit of the Plaintiffs. To that extent, the judgments and orders
passed by the Trial and the Appellate Court need to be set aside.
36) I accordingly proceed to pass the following order:
(i) Judgment and order dated 11 June 2015 passed by
Additional Judge, Small Causes Court, Pune in Civil Suit
No.419 of 2007 and judgment and order dated 16 March
2022 passed by the District Judge-22, Pune, in Regular
Civil Appeal No.371 of 2015 are set aside.
(ii) Civil Suit No. 419 of 2007 is decreed on the ground of
nuisance and annoyance under Section 16(1)(c) of the
MRC Act.
(iii) Defendant/Respondent shall accordingly handover
possession of the suit premises to the Plaintiffs within a
period of 3 months.
37) With the above direction, the Writ Petition is allowed. Rule is
made absolute. However, considering the facts and circumstances of
the case, there shall be no orders as to costs.
.
[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
Page No. 27 of 27
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Signed by: Megha S. Parab
Designation: PA To Honourable Judge
Date: 08/05/2026 20:41:22