Reliance Realty Limited vs Altruist Customer Management India Pvt. L
- Court
- National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
- Case type
- Company Appeal(AT)(Ins)
- Decided on
- 09-03-2026
<div> <b>NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL </b><br /> <b>PRINCIPAL BENCH: NEW DELHI </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>[Arising out of the Order dated 05.09.2024, passed by the </b><br /> <b>‘Adjudicating Authority’ (National Company Law Tribunal, New </b><br /> <b>Delhi Bench) in CP (IB) No. 882/ND/2022)] </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>IN THE MATTER OF: </b> <b> </b><br /> <b>Reliance Realty Limited </b><br /> Registered Office at: <br /> st<br /> H- Block, 1 Floor <br /> Dhirubhai Ambani Knowledge City <br /> Navi Mumbai- 400710 <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>…Appellant/ </b><br /> <b>Operational Creditor </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>Versus</b> <br /> <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>Altruist Customer Management India Pvt. Ltd. </b><br /> Formerly known as Vertex Customer <br /> Management India Private Ltd <br /> Registered Office at: <br /> 151/B, Block CC, Shalimar Bagh, <br /> North West, New Delhi – 110088 <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>…Respondent/ </b><br /> <b>Corporate Debtor </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>Present: </b> <b> </b><br /> <b>For Appellant </b> <b>: </b> Mr. Krishnendu Datta, Sr. Advocate with Mr. <br /> Vaijayant Paliwal, Mr. Nikhil Mathur, Ms. Tanya <br /> Chib and Ms. Alina Merin Mathew, Advocates. <br /> <br /> <b>For Respondent </b> <b>: </b> Mr. Vishal Sharma, Sr. Standing Counsel and <br /> Mr. Manjit Singh, Advocates <br /> <br /> <b>J U D G M E N T </b><br /> <b>(Hybrid Mode) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>[Per: Arun Baroka, Member (Technical)] </b><br /> 1<br /> The present Appeal has been filed on behalf of Reliance Realty Limited <br /> (“Appellant/Operational Creditor”) under Section 61 of the Insolvency and <br /> <br /> 1<br /> Appellant - Operational Creditor: Reliance Realty Limited <br /> <br /> <br /><br /> Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Code”) assailing the order dated 05 September 2024 <br /> (“Impugned Order”) passed by Ld. National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi <br /> Bench (“Adjudicating Authority”) in an application filed by the Appellant <br /> under Section 9 of the Code (bearing number CP (IB) No. 882/ND/2022) <br /> (“Section 9 Application”) seeking for Initiation of Corporate Insolvency <br /> 2<br /> Resolution Process (“CIRP”) against Altruist Customer Management India <br /> Private Limited, (“Corporate Debtor”). <br /> <br /> 2. A petition CP (IB) No. 882/ND/2022) was filed by Reliance Reality Ltd. <br /> (Operational Creditor) to initiate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process <br /> (CIRP) against Altruist Customer Management India Pvt. Ltd. (Corporate <br /> Debtor), under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code for a total <br /> outstanding amount of Rs.24,34,59,787 before National Company Law <br /> Tribunal, New Delhi Bench. The Appellant had filed the Section 9 Petition on <br /> account of operational debt i.e., rental dues during the period between May <br /> 2019 to September 2022 (before filing of the Section 9 Petition) owed by the <br /> Corporate Debtor to the Appellant ("Default Period") for possession and <br /> occupation of Building No. A-8 situated in Sector 1, Plot No. MBP-2 at TTC <br /> Industrial area within the limits of Vill Mahape and Dist. Thane, Maharashtra <br /> 400710 comprising of ground plus 3 upper floors each admeasuring 11566 <br /> sq. mtrs. equivalent to 12447 sq. ft. ("Premises") under the License Agreement <br /> dated 29 March 2019 ("License Agreement"). NCLT Delhi dismissed the <br /> section 9 application inter alia on the grounds of pre-existing dispute between <br /> <br /> 2<br /> Respondent -Corporate Debtor: Altruist Customer Management India Private Limited <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>2</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> the parties relating to the question of percentage of debt liable to be paid to <br /> the Appellant by the CD as per the license agreement. <br /> <b>3</b><br /> <b>Submissions of the </b> <b>Appellant/Operational Creditor-RRL </b><br /> 3. The Appellant had filed the Section 9 Petition before the AA on account <br /> of operational debt i.e., rental dues during the period between May 2019 to <br /> September 2022 (before filing of the Section 9 Petition) owed by the <br /> 4<br /> Corporate Debtor – Altruist Customer Management India Pvt. Ltd. (ACMIPL) <br /> to the Appellant - Reliance Realty Limited (RRL) for possession and <br /> occupation of Building No. A-8 situated in Sector 1, Plot No. MBP-2 at TTC <br /> Industrial area within the limits of Vill Mahape and Dist. Thane, Maharashtra <br /> - 400710 comprising of ground plus 3 upper floors each admeasuring 11566 <br /> sq .mtrs. equivalent to 12447 sq. ft. ("Premises") under the License Agreement <br /> dated 29 March 2019 ("License Agreement"). <br /> <br /> 4. Section 9 Petition was dismissed on 05.09.2024 by the Adjudicating <br /> Authority on the ground of purported pre-existence of dispute over the <br /> operational debt payable by the Corporate Debtor to the Appellant on an <br /> erroneous ground that the issue regarding payment of rental dues to the <br /> Appellant by the Corporate Debtor alone or jointly with another entity <br /> (Reliance Communications Limited) is disputed in the present case. <br /> <br /> 5. The Appellant seeks payment of debt to the tune of INR 25,48,83,305/- <br /> as on 15 September 2022 as outstanding rent payable to the Appellant. <br /> <br /> 3<br /> Appellant/Operational Creditor is Reliance Realty Limited-RRL <br /> 4<br /> Respondent/Corporate Debtor is Altruist Customer Management India Private Limited formerly Vertex <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>3</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> Appellant contends that the Corporate Debtor has admitted its liability <br /> towards 20% of the rent payable each month to the Appellant. The said <br /> admission was also noted by the Adjudicating Authority. Appellant claims <br /> that even if only 20% of the rent is taken into account, the debt payable still <br /> crosses the threshold — beyond INR 1 crore and satisfies the condition for <br /> initiation of insolvency proceedings against the Corporate Debtor. The <br /> Impugned Order too records under "Analysis and Findings" that per the <br /> terms of MOS, MOU and LOU, the Corporate Debtor was liable towards 20% <br /> of the License Fee. Evidently, the Adjudicating Authority has failed to <br /> examine the consequences of its own observations made in the Impugned <br /> Order as well as the admissions made by the Corporate Debtor in its reply to <br /> the Section 9 Application, which categorically highlights that there is no <br /> dispute with respect to 20% of the amount being payable by the Corporate <br /> Debtor to the Appellant towards the License Fees under the License <br /> Agreement. Corporate Debtor has only made part payment towards License <br /> Fee and since April 2021, the Corporate Debtor has stopped making payment <br /> towards the License Fee. Thus, even if only the assumed 20% obligation of <br /> the Corporate Debtor to pay make payment towards License Fees is <br /> considered, the same crosses the minimum requirement of INR 1 crore under <br /> the Code. It is submitted that not only did the. Adjudicating Authority failed <br /> to recognise the admitted operational debt, but it did also not even consider <br /> that the License Agreement stood terminated and additional delay charges <br /> continue to accrue on the operational debt. <br /> <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>4</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> 6. Appellant contends that this Appellate Tribunal in <b>Manmohan Gupta </b><br /> <b>v MDS Digital Media Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., Company Appeal (AT) (INS) No. 202 </b><br /> <b>of 2023 (Ref para 4) </b> and <b> Nandamuri Meenalatha v Quality Steels and </b><br /> <b>Wire Products & Anr. Company Appeal (AT) (INS) No. 11 of 2023 (Ref para </b><br /> <b>78) </b> has held that the Adjudicating Authority ought to only look at the <br /> admitted debt whether it breaches the threshold of INR 1 crore under Section <br /> 4 of the Code and the question regarding the correct amount of debt ought <br /> to be looked at the time of collation of claim and not for the purpose of <br /> admission of application under Section 9 of the Code. Therefore, the <br /> observation of the Adjudicating Authority that the Corporate Debtor was not <br /> liable to pay the operational debt to the Appellant is erroneous in view of the <br /> admitted liability by the Corporate Debtor and settled position of law by this <br /> Appellate Tribunal. <br /> <br /> 7. The Adjudicating Authority has erred in relying on agreements which <br /> were executed prior to the registered License Agreement. Section 94 of the <br /> Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 ("BSA"), which corresponds to Section <br /> 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states that: <br /> “When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of <br /> property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in <br /> which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a <br /> document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such <br /> contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except <br /> the document itself or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which <br /> secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore <br /> contained” <br /> <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>5</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> 8. Thus, from a bare reading of the above, it is evident that the License <br /> Agreement ought to be considered as the primary document to adjudicate any <br /> purported dispute between the parties and reliance cannot be placed on <br /> earlier agreements between the parties or otherwise. (Ref: Para 17- <b>Roop </b><br /> <b>Kumar v. Mohan Thedani (2003) 6 SCC 595</b> ). In this regard, it is relevant <br /> to note that the License Agreement also includes the 'Entire Agreement <br /> Clause' Pg. 126-APB I/Appeal) which provided that the License Agreement <br /> would constitute the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the <br /> Premises and would supersede all oral and written understanding and <br /> agreements with respect thereto and shall also inter alia govern the <br /> enforcement of the said License Agreement. <br /> <br /> 9. The jurisprudence has been settled by the judgments of the Hon'ble <br /> Supreme Court in <b>Joshi Technologies International INC. v Union of India </b><br /> <b>& Ors. (2015) 7 SCC 728</b> where the Hon'ble Court had held that the intention <br /> behind the entire agreement clauses is to not look into any other document <br /> or correspondence which took placed between the parties before signing of <br /> the agreement (para 41, 42 and 47 of the judgment.) The Hon'ble Delhi High <br /> Court in <b>Thyssen Krupp Materials AG v Mr. Karan Luthra 2017 SCC </b><br /> <b>Online Del 7997</b> also held that the object of insertion of entire agreement <br /> clause in an agreement is to prevent either parties from raising any claims <br /> that are not encompassed in the executed agreement or which form part of <br /> the pre-negotiations. (Ref para 71-72 of the judgment). <br /> <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>6</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> 10. Further, it is trite law that the parties are bound by the terms of the <br /> contract and the court cannot transplant any equity to the same by re-writing <br /> the terms of the contract (Ref: Para 14; <b>Kunnel Engineers & Contractors </b><br /> <b>Pvt. Ltd., v New India Insurance Company Limited, (2023) 15 SCC 776 </b><br /> <b>and </b> (Ref: Para 10 <b> Oriental Insurance Company Limited v Narbheram </b><br /> <b>Power & Steel</b> <b>Pvt/ Ltd., (2018) 6 SCC 534</b> ). <br /> <br /> 11. Furthermore, the MOS stipulates the bifurcation of the rent payable <br /> whereby 80% is payable by RCOM on behalf of the Corporate Debtor to the <br /> Appellant and 20% of the rent is payable by the Corporate Debtor to the <br /> Appellant. However, no such bifurcation was provided in License Agreement. <br /> Thus, the Impugned Order fails to recognise the entire agreement clause in <br /> the License Agreement which provides that all agreements between the <br /> parties are subsumed on account of execution of License Agreement. Further, <br /> the Adjudicating Authority has also failed to appreciate that the distinct <br /> agreements relied upon in the Impugned Order i.e., namely the MOS, MOU <br /> and undated LOU do not form part and/or find reference in the License <br /> Agreement (which is a later agreement) under which the operational debt is <br /> payable to the Appellant. <br /> <br /> 12. In relation to reference placed by the Adjudicating Authority and the <br /> Corporate Debtor on the LOU, the said undated LOU does not refer to the <br /> License Agreement but refers to a Sub Lease Deed Dated 28 August 2018. <br /> This shows the non-application of mind with which the NCLT has rejected <br /> Section 9 Application. <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>7</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> 13. Even on a reading of the terms of the MOS, MOU and LOU, the liability <br /> to pay License Fee i.e., operational debt owed to Appellant rests on the <br /> Corporate Debtor, as a whole, regardless of the arrangement between Reliance <br /> Companies and the Corporate Debtor. In fact, in view of March Termination <br /> Notice, the Adjudicating Authority failed to apply its mind on the Corporate <br /> Debtor's admitted case that as per Clause a (vi) of the MOS even in the event <br /> of termination of the License Agreement assuming the terms of MOS are to be <br /> considered, it is not the Appellant but the Reliance Companies which ought <br /> to pay to the Corporate Debtor. <br /> <br /> <br /> 14. Assuming but not admitting, even if the Corporate Debtor was only <br /> liable to pay 20% of the License Fee, after initiation of CIRP against Rcom <br /> (original borrower), the liability to pay the entire License Fee fell on the <br /> Corporate Debtor. The License Agreement does not at any juncture envisage <br /> a creditor debtor relationship between Rcom and the Appellant and only forms <br /> a creditor/debtor relationship between the Appellant and the Corporate <br /> Debtor. There is no averment/submission which can contradict a clear <br /> creditor/debtor relationship between the Corporate Debtor and the Appellant <br /> and the fact that the Corporate Debtor was liable to pay the full amount due <br /> towards License Fees to the Appellant. <br /> <br /> 15. The NCLT has completely neglected the judgment of the Hon'ble <br /> Supreme Court in <b>Mobilox Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software </b><br /> <b>Private Limited (2018) I SCC 353 ("Mobilox Judgment"),</b> which expounds <br /> the true import and nature of the term 'dispute' and pre-existing dispute' as <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>8</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> provided under the Code. The Supreme Court had held that existence of <br /> 'dispute' needs to be established prior to issuance of demand notice and such <br /> dispute ought not to be hypothetical or illusory. <br /> <b> </b><br /> 16. <b>Section 5(6)</b> of the Code defines the term 'dispute' to refer to the <br /> pendency of proceedings initiated against the existence of amount of debt, <br /> quality of goods or service and breach of representation and warranty. In the <br /> absence of any such condition being fulfilled and no proceedings being <br /> initiated prior to the issuance of the Demand Notice, the NCLT ought not to <br /> have concluded the existence of a pre-existing dispute. <br /> <br /> <br /> 17. It is not the case that the Corporate Debtor did not admit to its liability <br /> under the License Agreement (even though towards 20%- which in itself <br /> would surpass the threshold of INR 1 crore). Thus, the NCLT has grossly erred <br /> in holding that there is a pre-existing dispute vis-à-vis the operational debt is <br /> payable to the Appellant. <br /> <br /> 18. The NCLT in the Impugned Order ("Analysis and Findings") made a <br /> vague reference to the eviction proceedings initiated by the Appellant against <br /> the Corporate Debtor before the Civil Court in Thane, Mumbai, (Commercial <br /> Suit No. 9 of 2020) without providing specifically on whether the said <br /> observation has had a role to play in the determination of a pre-existing <br /> dispute by the Adjudicating Authority in the present proceedings. Assuming <br /> such an observation has contributed towards the Adjudicating Authority <br /> finding the existence of an alleged pre-existing dispute, the said civil <br /> proceedings pertain to eviction of the Corporate Debtor from the Premises <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>9</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> which have been initiated for vacation of Premises which has been illegally <br /> occupied by the Corporate Debtor despite lack of payments being provided to <br /> it by the Appellant. It is axiomatic that such proceedings are separate from <br /> the creditor/debtor liability under which the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating <br /> Authority and cannot be deemed to fall under the definition of "dispute" under <br /> as contemplated under Section 5(6) of the Code as it does not pertain to (i) <br /> existence of the amount of debt i.e., License Fee payable by the Corporate <br /> Debtor; (ii) quality of good or service; (iii) breach of any warranty or <br /> representation. Section 9 Petition was erroneously dismissed by the <br /> Adjudicating Authority on the ground of purported pre-existence of dispute <br /> over the operational debt payable by the Corporate Debtor to the Appellant. <br /> The Appellant had filed the Section 9 Petition on account of operational debt <br /> i.e., rental dues during the period between May 2019 to September 2022 <br /> (before filing of the Section 9 Petition) owed by the Corporate Debtor to the <br /> Appellant ("Default Period"). In fact, the Corporate Debtor had admitted its <br /> liability, in the pleadings before the Adjudicating Authority as also recorded <br /> in the Impugned Order and in its reply filed in the Appeal, towards 20% of <br /> such rental dues as payable to the Appellant. Such admitted dues are <br /> evidently above the minimum threshold level of INR 1 crore, as provided under <br /> Section 4 of the Code. However, the Adjudicating Authority failed to consider <br /> the said admitted debt, which satisfies the conditions laid down under Section <br /> 9 of the Code for admission of a petition filed therein and proceeded to reject <br /> the same on erroneous grounds, as detailed in the captioned Appeal and <br /> herein below. <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>10</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> 19. The Adjudicating Authority has failed to consider that the debt admitted <br /> by the Corporate Debtor (in the Impugned Order itself) crosses the threshold <br /> of INR 1 crore, which is the only consideration mandated for admission of a <br /> petition filed under Section 9 of the Code. The Appellant and the Corporate <br /> Debtor had executed the License Agreement for the purpose of licensing of <br /> the Premises to the Corporate Debtor for consideration of INR 49,77,880/-, <br /> including GST and applicable tax at source, with the said rent to be escalated <br /> by 10% every three years ("License Fee"). Sometime in 2014, the Reliance <br /> Companies had engaged the services of the Corporate Debtor wherein on <br /> account of such services, there were some dues which were payable by the <br /> Reliance Companies to the Corporate Debtor. It is pertinent to highlight that <br /> the Appellant had not engaged any services provided by the Corporate Debtor <br /> and stood as a separate legal entity. Thereafter, these dues which were taken <br /> by the Reliance Companies were contemplated to be settled between the <br /> Corporate Debtor and the Reliance Companies. In view thereof, the Reliance <br /> Companies executed a Memorandum of Settlement dated 20 August 2018 <br /> ("MoS") with the Corporate Debtor towards settlement of dues payable to the <br /> Corporate Debtor by Reliance Companies. However, it is pertinent to note that <br /> the Appellant was not a party to such settlement agreement. As per the terms <br /> of the MoS, the debt payable by Reliance Companies to the Corporate Debtor <br /> would get settled by licensing the Premises to the Corporate Debtor for the <br /> rent amounting INR 4,97,788/-. It was inter alia further contemplated that <br /> RCom would pay 80% of the license fee (stipulated therein) to the Appellant <br /> and the balance 20% of the license fee was to be paid by the Corporate Debtor <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>11</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> to Appellant. Thereafter, a Memorandum of Understanding dated 20 August <br /> 2018 ("MoU") was executed between RCom, the Appellant and the Corporate <br /> Debtor, which reiterated the terms of the MoS. Even under the MoU INR <br /> 4,97,788 was to be paid as rent towards the Premises, i.e., 80% by Rcom to <br /> the Appellant and 20% by the Corporate Debtor to the Appellant. In view of <br /> this arrangement, a Sub Lease Deed dated 28 August 2018 was executed <br /> between the Appellant and the Corporate Debtor, which is also referred in the <br /> LoU (defined below). Further, an undated Letter of Understanding ("LoU") was <br /> addressed by the Reliance Companies and the Appellant to the Corporate <br /> Debtor. The said LoU merely recorded that in the event of conflict between the <br /> terms of the MoU, MoS and the Sub-Lease Deed agreement 28 August 2018, <br /> the terms of MoS would prevail. Notably, by way of a Sub Lease Cancellation <br /> letter dated 29 March 2019, the said Sub Lease Deed was mutually <br /> terminated by the parties. Evidently, the said Sub Lease Agreement was not <br /> in operation during the Default Period, against which the Appellant had filed <br /> the Section 9 Petition and thereafter, the present Appeal. Pertinently, the LoU <br /> refers to the Sub Lease Deed which has been erroneously equated by the <br /> Adjudicating Authority with that of the License Agreement. Accordingly, the <br /> event of conflict contemplated in the LoU pertained to Sub Lease Agreement <br /> and the MoS, not the License Agreement, as wrongly held by the Adjudicating <br /> Authority under the Impugned Order. It is the Corporate Debtor's case that <br /> the terms of the MoS and MoU. govern the rights of the parties in relation to <br /> rent payable towards the Premises. Thus, the Corporate Debtor was only <br /> liable to pay 20% of the License Fee to the Appellant. The Adjudicating <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>12</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> Authority has also erroneously relied upon the LoU and held that the LoU <br /> provides that in case of conflict, the terms of the MoS shall prevail between <br /> the parties. Based on the said interpretation, the Adjudicating Authority came <br /> to an incorrect conclusion that it is not a clear case of rent being due from <br /> the Corporate Debtor to the Appellant. Without prejudice to the contentions <br /> raised by the Appellant that the Corporate Debtor is liable to pay the entire <br /> dues towards the License Fee, it is crucial to highlight that the Adjudicating <br /> Authority has in an absurd fashion completely turned a blind eye towards the <br /> consequences of its own records in the Impugned Order as well as categorical <br /> admissions of debt by the Corporate Debtor under its Reply to the Section 9 <br /> Petition with respect to its liability towards 20% of the License Fee. The <br /> Impugned Order specifically in Para 2(II) while capturing the Corporate <br /> Debtor's contentions and further in Para4 (V) and para 4(VI) under the <br /> heading "Analysis and Findings" observes that as per the terms of the MoS, <br /> MoU and LoU, the Corporate Debtor was liable towards 20% of the License <br /> Fee. Further, in the reply filed by the Corporate Debtor to the Section 9 <br /> Petition at Para l(a), Para l(g) and 2(b) and the Reply to the present Appeal at <br /> para 3 and 4, the VII. Corporate Debtor expressly admits that 20% of the <br /> License Fee is payable by the Corporate Debtor. Pertinently, the Corporate <br /> Debtor has itself at Annexure R-8 (Detailed chart evidencing the total sum <br /> calculated by the Corporate Debtor as payable to it pursuant to deduction of <br /> License Fee as per purported 80:20 ratio) to its Reply before the Adjudicating <br /> Authority admitted that an amount of INR 1,39,38,062/- is payable to the <br /> Appellant. Thus, it is evident that the Adjudicating Authority has failed to <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>13</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> take note that even after accepting the contentions raised by the Corporate <br /> Debtor that it is only liable towards 20% of the License Fee, if such a <br /> calculation is to be considered, even then the assumed operational debt would <br /> cross the threshold of INR 1 Crore and the Section 9 Petition ought to be <br /> admitted. In fact, the Corporate Debtor has also admitted in its Reply to the <br /> Appeal that it was obligated to pay 20% of the License Fee. Further, the <br /> Corporate Debtor has not disputed the computation appended to the Appeal <br /> where the Appellant has set out the operational debt payable by the Corporate <br /> Debtor under the License Agreement. Therefore, the Corporate Debtor, has at <br /> all times, admitted its liability to pay 20% of the License Fee to the Appellant. <br /> However, and despite of such admission, the Corporate Debtor has <br /> deliberately failed to made payments towards the License Fee, even for 20% <br /> since April 2021 and the same has not been denied by the Corporate Debtor, <br /> at any stage of the proceedings i.e., neither before the Adjudicating Authority <br /> nor before this Hon'ble Tribunal. <br /> <br /> 20. Notably, even if the Corporate Debtor's liability of 20% to pay the <br /> License Fee is considered, the amount payable towards such operational debt <br /> still crosses the threshold - beyond INR 1 crore., as demonstrated below. The <br /> below table has been prepared based on the detailed computation annexed as <br /> Annexure A-6 to the Appeal. The below period accounts for the duration when <br /> the Corporate Debtor did not make any payment towards rent payable to the <br /> Appellant. <br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>Sr.No.</th><th>Period</th><th>Base Rendal Amount (INR)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1.</td><td>July 2020</td><td>4977880</td></tr><tr><td>2.</td><td>August 2020</td><td>4977880</td></tr></tbody></table><div><br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>14</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>3.</th><th>September 2020</th><th>4977880</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>4.</td><td>April 2021</td><td>4977880</td></tr><tr><td>5.</td><td>May 2021</td><td>4977880</td></tr><tr><td>6.</td><td>June 2021</td><td>4977880</td></tr><tr><td>7.</td><td>July 2021</td><td>4977880</td></tr><tr><td>8.</td><td>August 2021</td><td>4977880</td></tr><tr><td>9.</td><td>September 2021</td><td>5475668<br>Note: The rent was escalated as<br>per Article II (c) of the License<br>Agreement</td></tr><tr><td>10.</td><td>October 2021</td><td>5475668</td></tr><tr><td>11.</td><td>November 2021</td><td>5475668</td></tr><tr><td>12.</td><td>December 2021</td><td>5475668</td></tr><tr><td>13.</td><td>January 2022</td><td>5475668</td></tr><tr><td>14.</td><td>February 2022</td><td>5475668</td></tr><tr><td>15.</td><td>March 2022</td><td>5475668</td></tr><tr><td>16.</td><td>April 2022</td><td>5475668</td></tr><tr><td>17.</td><td>May 2022</td><td>5475668<br>Note: Without prejudice to the<br>contentions of the Appellant on<br>150% of the license fee to be<br>charged on account of termination<br>of the License Agreement, for the<br>purpose of the present calculation,<br>only base rental amount is being<br>considered.</td></tr><tr><td>18.</td><td>June 2022</td><td>5475668</td></tr><tr><td>19.</td><td>July 2022</td><td>5475668</td></tr><tr><td>20.</td><td>August 2022</td><td>5475668</td></tr><tr><td>21.</td><td>September 2022</td><td>5475668</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Total</td><td>11,10,06,724</td></tr></tbody></table><div><br /> (without admitting the same), it is clear that the rent payable to the Appellant, <br /> as on filing of the Section 9 Petition crossed INR 1 crore threshold, as required <br /> under Section 4 of the Code. In view of the same, is humbly submitted that <br /> the Appeal deserves to be allowed, and CIRP ought to be initiated against the <br /> Corporate Debtor. <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>15</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> 21. Appellant contends that it is settled law that where the admitted <br /> amount of the operation debt is in excess of the threshold of INR 1 crore, the <br /> Adjudicating Authority must admit the Section 9 Petition and the Corporate <br /> Debtor into CIRP, as held by this Hon'ble Tribunal in <b>Manmohan Gupta v </b><br /> <b>MDS Digital Media Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., Company Appeal (AT)(INS) No. 202 of </b><br /> <b>2023</b> . Further, this Appellate Tribunal in <b>Nandamuri Meena Latha v Quality </b><br /> <b>Steels and Wire Products & Anr., Company Appeal (AT)(CH)(INS) No. 11 </b><br /> <b>of 2023</b> has held that if the debt payable is more than the threshold limit <br /> provided Section 4 of the Code, the application filed under Section 9 of the <br /> Code must be admitted by an Adjudicating Authority. Thus, it is evident that <br /> the Adjudicating Authority has evidently failed to consider the settled law of <br /> admitting the undisputed debt (20% of the License Fee) which crosses the <br /> threshold of INR 1 crore. <br /> <br /> 22. Appellant again reiterates that no pre-existing dispute subsists between <br /> the parties qua the License Fee. The Corporate Debtor has alleged that the <br /> Adjudicating Authority has correctly dismissed the Section 9 Petition on <br /> ground that there was a pre-existing dispute between the parties and in order <br /> to settle the alleged pre-existing dispute, the MoS and the MoU were executed <br /> by the parties. Notably, the Adjudicating Authority has erroneously concluded <br /> in the Impugned Order that there was a 'pre-existing dispute' between the <br /> parties. The Adjudicating Authority has placed incorrect reliance on distinct <br /> agreements, namely MoS, MoU and the LoU, in order to ascertain whether the <br /> payment of License Fee can be attributed fully on the Corporate Debtor alone <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>16</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> in as much as large part of the License Fee i.e., 80% was allegedly payable by <br /> Reliance Companies on behalf of the Corporate Debtor to the Appellant. <br /> <br /> 23. Adjudicating Authority has grossly erred at holding that the parties <br /> have a pre-existing dispute in relation to the operational debt claimed under <br /> the Section 9 Petition. Firstly, Adjudicating Authority has failed to establish <br /> how the definition of dispute and conditions as stipulated under Section 5(6) <br /> of the Code stand fulfilled for the said interpretational issue to be deemed 10 <br /> as a pre-existing dispute. Crucially, the term "dispute" as contemplated under <br /> Section 5(6) of the Code refers to pendency of proceedings initiated against <br /> the existence of amount of debt, quality of goods or service and breach of <br /> representation and warranty. In the absence of any such condition being <br /> fulfilled and no proceedings being initiated prior to the issuance of the <br /> Demand Notice, the Adjudicating Authority ought not to. have concluded the <br /> existence of a pre-existing dispute. Secondly, one of such terms in the License <br /> Agreement contemplated the entire agreement clause which provided that the <br /> License Agreement would constitute the entire agreement between the parties <br /> with respect to the Premises and would supersede all oral and written <br /> understanding and agreement with respect thereto and shall also inter alia <br /> govern the enforcement of the said License Agreement. Adjudicating Authority <br /> failed to consider the above clause which makes it abundantly clear that the <br /> License Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties and <br /> does not, either implicitly or otherwise, incorporate the MoS, MoU or LoU, <br /> which the Adjudicating Authority has considered under the Impugned Order. <br /> Thus, any arrangement which is prior to the execution of the License <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>17</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> Agreement either would have been merged into the License Agreement and <br /> would have been reflected in the same or the terms of the License Agreement <br /> ought to be read in isolation. <br /> <br /> 24. Additionally, the Corporate Debtor alleged that the Appellant is bound <br /> by the principles of estoppel which binds it to the terms of the MoS and MoU <br /> and reference to the License Agreement is nothing but an act of fraud. <br /> Notably, the principle of estoppel, as alleged by the Corporate Debtor, is not <br /> applicable in the present case against the Appellant. In fact, the Corporate <br /> Debtor is bound by the principle of estoppel as pursuant to execution of the <br /> License Agreement and having agreed to the terms of the License Agreement, <br /> it cannot now renege from the same. <br /> <br /> 25. Moreover, the Corporate Debtor has alleged that the MoS which was <br /> executed between the Corporate Debtor and Rcom (parent company of the <br /> Appellant), binds the Appellant as well to execute a lease deed for the period <br /> of 7 years for the purpose of settlement of dues of the Corporate Debtor <br /> payable by the Reliance Companies. Thus, the Corporate Debtor contends <br /> that the bifurcation of payment of the rent towards the Premises, as <br /> contemplated in the MoS i.e., 20% payable by the Corporate Debtor and 80% <br /> payable by RCOM was agreed upon by the parties as rent/License Fee payable <br /> towards the Premise. The Corporate Debtor further alleged that the lease <br /> deed, referred therein, could not have been terminated unless the Reliance <br /> Companies paid the entire settlement amount to the Corporate Debtor. <br /> Arguendo, even if the submissions of the Corporate Debtor are considered and <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>18</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> the rights of the parties are presumed to be governed by the MoU, MoS and <br /> the LoU, a bare perusal of the License Agreement would make it evident that <br /> the bifurcation contended by the Corporate Debtor is not reflected or <br /> contemplated in the License Agreement. In fact, there is no reference to MoS <br /> or MoU or the LoU in the License Agreement which could have extended the <br /> arrangement in relation to bifurcation of the License Fee payable to the <br /> Appellant. Thus, it cannot be contended by the Corporate Debtor that the <br /> terms of the previous agreement, which have no reference in the subsequent <br /> agreement, would govern the rights and obligations of the parties <br /> contemplated in such subsequence agreement. In any event, the reference to <br /> payment of settlement amount on account of termination before the lock-in <br /> period is erroneous. As detailed in the Appeal, the License Agreement has <br /> been terminated in accordance with the terms of the License Agreement and <br /> these terms have not bene disputed by the Corporate Debtor. Instead, it relies <br /> on the terms of a separate agreement to state that the Appellant could not <br /> have terminated the License Agreement. Further, the terms of the MoS cannot <br /> be imposed on the Appellant who is not even a signatory to the said <br /> agreement. Thus, it is clear that the Adjudicating Authority failed to <br /> acknowledge the basic principle of interpretation of commercial contracts that <br /> the interpretation of any clause of a contract must be first done on the basis <br /> of the bare reading of such contract. However, the Adjudicating Authority <br /> failed to interpret the unambiguous tenns of the License Agreement, and also <br /> brought the terms of the MoS, MoU and LoU into the License Agreement which <br /> does not refer to such documents. <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>19</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> 26. While alleging material suppression of facts, the Corporate Debtor has <br /> failed to adduce any evidence demonstrating such material suppression of <br /> facts. Such bald statements, without showing any incidence of the alleged <br /> suppression, are merely being made to obfuscate this Appellate Tribunal from <br /> considering the clear error of law committed under the Impugned order. The <br /> Corporate Debtor also contends that the Appellant ought to have taken the <br /> recourse of arbitration which is contemplated under the MoS/MoU and the <br /> LoU. As stated above, the Appellant and the Corporate Debtor are bound by <br /> the terms of the License Agreement and in any event, the existence of an <br /> arbitration agreement does not preclude the Appellant from exercising its <br /> rights under the Code. <br /> <br /> 27. Pertinently, a bare reading of the License Agreement, in particular, <br /> Article II demonstrates that the liability and responsibility of payment of the <br /> License Fee rests upon the Corporate Debtor. The Corporate Debtor has <br /> admittedly only made part payment of the License Fee to the Appellant since <br /> May 2019 and from April 2021 onwards the Corporate Debtor has failed to <br /> make any payments towards its obligation for payment of the License Fee <br /> under the License Agreement. Thus, the Adjudicating Authority has failed to <br /> apply its mind on the overwhelming evidence produced by Appellant to <br /> establish the existence of an operational debt owed by the Corporate Debtor <br /> to Appellant. The Adjudicating Authority disregarded the abstruse terms of <br /> the License Agreement which contemplates 100% payment of the License Fee <br /> by the Corporate Debtor and instead relied upon the terms of the distinct, <br /> different and separate agreements, one of which does not even have the <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>20</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> Appellant as a party (MoS) and to an undated letter (LoU) which refers to a <br /> separate Sub Lease Deed and does not refer to the License Agreement. Thus, <br /> it is submitted that the Adjudicating Authority has erroneously held MoS, <br /> MoU and the LoU is the guiding document for the purpose of determining the <br /> License Fee. The non-application of mind is evident from the bare reading of <br /> the undated LoU which refers to Sub Lease Deed dated 28 August 2018. On <br /> the other hand, the present dispute relates to the non-payment of the <br /> operational debt accruing from the License Agreement dated 29 March 2019. <br /> Thus, without perusing the implication of documents, the Adjudicating <br /> Authority imposed the liabilities from several distinct agreements viz., MoS, <br /> MoU and LoU unto the Appellant. <br /> <br /> 28. Thus, the Adjudicating Authority has completely erred in holding that <br /> this is not a clear case of rent being due from the Corporate Debtor to the <br /> Appellant. The Adjudicating Authority arrived at the erroneous conclusions <br /> based on an incorrect reliance on the documents which were executed before <br /> the License Agreement. Admittedly and as recorded in the Impugned Order, <br /> the Appellant is not a party to the MoS which is the reference document for <br /> the purported arrangement on License Fee payment whereby 80% of the <br /> License Fee was to be paid by Rcom to the Appellant on behalf of the Corporate <br /> Debtor and 20% of the amount was to be paid by the Corporate Debtor. <br /> Pertinently, the said bifurcation of the payment is not stipulated under the <br /> License Agreement. Thus, the liability to make payment of the whole amount <br /> of the License Fee is solely on the Corporate Debtor as far as the Appellant is <br /> concerned. Given that the Appellant is not a party to the MoS, the <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>21</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> Adjudicating Authority imposing the implication and liabilities arising from <br /> an agreement to which the Appellant is not even a party is in clear violation <br /> of the settled principles of law and contours of the Code. <br /> <br /> 29. Thus, it is clear from the above, that the Adjudicating Authority has <br /> failed to appreciate the scope and intent of the MoU, MoS and the LoU vis-à-<br /> vis the terms of the License Agreement and completely turned a blind eye to <br /> the evidence produced by the Appellant to substantiate the debt and default <br /> in the said proceedings by merely accepting the illusory defence offered by the <br /> Corporate Debtor in contravention to the provisions of the Code. <br /> <br /> <br /> 30. Notably, the Corporate Debtor has constructed a baseless and false <br /> narrative on pre-existence of dispute in the present case. However, without <br /> appreciating the glaring evidence in favour of the obligation of the Corporate <br /> Debtor to pay the License Fee, the Adjudicating Authority has failed to grasp <br /> the true import and nature of the term 'dispute' as provided under the Code. <br /> In <b>Mobilox Innovations Private Limited Vs. Kirusa Software Private </b><br /> <b>Limited (2018) 1 SCC 353</b> , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a <br /> dispute is said to exist, as long as there is a real dispute as to payment <br /> between the parties that would fall within the inclusive definition contained <br /> in Section 5(6) of the Code. Particularly, Section 5(6) of the Code defines <br /> 'dispute' to include a suit or arbitration proceedings relation to (a) the <br /> existence of the amount of debt; (b) the quality of goods or services or (c) the <br /> reach of a representation or warranty. As stated above, the Adjudicating <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>22</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> Authority has failed to evaluate whether the purported defence raised by the <br /> Corporate Debtor qualifies as dispute under the Code. <br /> <br /> 31. Pertinently, the Adjudicating Authority plainly dismissed the Section 9 <br /> Petition on the ground that the Corporate Debtor is not liable to pay the <br /> operational debt in its entirety. The Adjudicating Authority did not examine <br /> the nature of the operational debt which towards non-payment of the rental <br /> dues to the Appellant sought under the License Agreement. Nor did the <br /> Adjudicating Authority evaluate the terms of the License Agreement which <br /> clearly stipulate that the Corporate Debtor is liable to pay the License Fee to <br /> the Appellant as consideration for occupying the Premises. It is not the case <br /> of the Corporate Debtor. that the License Agreement bifurcates the liability <br /> towards payment of rent with the ratio of 80:20 where the Corporate Debtor <br /> was only liable to pay 20% of the License Fee. In fact, the Corporate Debtor <br /> imported the terms of the distinct agreements (MoS, MoU and LoU) and <br /> merged the bifurcation towards payment of License Fee which is not <br /> stipulated in the License Agreement. Thus, it is clear that the Corporate <br /> Debtor has created a spurious, mere bluster and vexatious defence and have <br /> labelled the same as 'pre-existence' between the parties. <br /> <br /> 32. At this juncture, it is pertinent to highlight the judgment of this <br /> Appellate Tribunal in <b>IDBI Capital Markets & Securities Ltd v JBF </b><br /> <b>Petrochemicals Ltd., 2021 SCC Online NCLAT 4553</b> , where the Hon'ble <br /> Tribunal had examined the contours of pre-existence of a dispute and had <br /> inter alia held as follows: <br /> <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>23</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> "MEANING OF DISPUTE <br /> 46 It must be borne in mind that a 'Dispute' is not to be a just denial of the <br /> due payment. A 'Dispute' is to come within the definition of Section 5(6) of <br /> the I&B Code. The term 'includes' in the definition of 'Dispute' (as per <br /> Section 5(6) of the Code) is to be read as 'means' and not as 'include'. An <br /> 'Adjudicating Authority 'is to be subjectively satisfied that there exists a <br /> 'Dispute' and the same is not a frivolous or vexatious one. Also, it cannot <br /> be forgotten that an 'Adjudicating Authority' under the I&B Code is not the <br /> 'proper Forum' for deciding the disputed claims/triable issues of a given <br /> case, in the considered opinion of this 'Tribunal'. " <br /> <br /> 33. Similarly, this Appellate Tribunal in <b>Soham Polymers Private Limited </b><br /> <b>Vs. Flocksur India Private Limited Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. </b><br /> <b>924/2021</b> , has held that in proceedings under Section 9 of the Code, the <br /> Court has to be satisfied that a dispute truly exists in fact and is not spurious, <br /> hypothetical or illusory. While adjudicating an application under Section 9 of <br /> the Code, this Appellate Tribunal has held in <b>Deepak Modi Vs. Shalfeyo </b><br /> <b>Industries Private Limited, 2023 SCC Online NCLAT 169</b> that a "genuine" <br /> pre-existing dispute is a must in order to reject an application under Section <br /> 9 of the Code. Pertinently, the Corporate Debtor's limited defence remained <br /> that the earlier executed agreements, viz., MoS/MoU provided that the <br /> Corporate Debtor would only pay 20 % of the debt. However, the Corporate <br /> Debtor never refuted the binding nature of the terms and the obligations <br /> under the License Agreement. In fact, the Corporate Debtor never challenged <br /> the License Agreement or contended that the License Agreement was not <br /> executed by the Corporate Debtor. Thus, by importing the reference of <br /> separate agreements into the License Agreements, the Corporate Debtor is <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>24</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> only trying to create an illusory and moonshine defence of pre -existing <br /> dispute and the same deserves to be dismissed in view of the settled <br /> judgments of this Hon'ble Tribunal and the Hon'ble Supreme Court. <br /> <br /> 34. In view thereof, it is clear that the Adjudicating Authority has wrongly <br /> held that 80% of the License Fee was not payable by the Corporate Debtor. <br /> The Adjudicating Authority erred at relying on MoS, MoU and an undated LoU <br /> which was executed prior to the registered License Agreement. In fact, the <br /> License Agreement does not contain reference of MoS/MoU or LoU which <br /> evidently demonstrates the intention of the Appellant and Corporate Debtor <br /> to restrict their rights and liabilities to the License Agreement. Evidently, the <br /> 'Appellant's right in claiming the License Fee stems from the License <br /> Agreement and not MoS/MoU or LoU. Thus, placing reliance on these <br /> documents and not on the License Agreement when the Section 9 Petition has <br /> been based on the non-payment of License Fee, amounting to operational <br /> debt, is completely erroneous and against the ethos of the Code. The eviction <br /> suit filed by the Appellant does not qualify as a pre-existing dispute. <br /> Adjudicating Authority has erred in holding that the parties had a pre-existing <br /> dispute on account of eviction suit filed by the Appellant against the Corporate <br /> Debtor. Particularly, under the heading "Analysis and Findings", the <br /> Adjudicating Authority makes vague reference to the eviction proceedings <br /> initiated by the Appellant against the Corporate Debtor before the Civil Court <br /> in Thane, Mumbai, (Commercial Suit No. 9 of 2020, renumbered as <br /> Commercial Suit No. 2 of 2023) without providing specifically whether the <br /> said observation has had a role to play in the determination of a pre-existing <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>25</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> dispute by the Adjudicating Authority in the present proceedings. Assuming <br /> that the said observation has had an impact towards the finding of the <br /> Adjudicating Authority on the existence of a pre-existing dispute, it is crucial <br /> to highlight that the said proceedings have been initiated for vacation of the <br /> Premises which has been illegally occupied by the Corporate Debtor despite <br /> lack of any payments being provided by it to the Appellant. In contrast, the <br /> present proceedings have been initiated seeking for initiation of insolvency <br /> proceedings against the Corporate Debtor for continuous defaults in payment <br /> towards the License Fees. The definition of 'dispute' is clear and on bare <br /> reading of the same, it is evident that the subject matter of the eviction <br /> proceedings does not pertain to either (i) existence of the amount of debt i.e., <br /> License Fee payable by the Corporate Debtor; (ii) the quality of the good or <br /> service or (iii) breach of any warranty or representation. The civil suit is <br /> completely distinct from the subject matter of the present Section 9 <br /> Application and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, fall under any of the <br /> heads prescribed under the definition of "dispute" under the Code. Thus, it <br /> cannot be treated as a "pre-existing dispute" for the purposes of the Section <br /> 9 Application, particularly the manner in which the same has been considered <br /> under the Impugned Order by the Adjudicating Authority. Thus, it is clear <br /> that the Adjudicating Authority completely failed to consider the above <br /> arguments and passed the Impugned Order without application of mind and <br /> in gross violation of the Code. <br /> <br /> 35. The Appellant further submits and reiterates that the liability to pay the <br /> entire License Fee solely devolves upon the Corporate Debtor even as per the <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>26</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> terms of the MoS, MoU and LoU. In view of the above, it is clear that the <br /> Adjudicating Authority has ignored the settled provision of law laid down by <br /> the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Hon'ble Tribunal that (i) an application <br /> under Section 9 of the Code must be allowed when the admitted debt crosses <br /> the monetary threshold of INR 1 crore as prescribed under Section 4 of the <br /> Code; (ii) a moonshine defence cannot be considered for the purpose of <br /> examination of the 'pre-existence' of a dispute under Sections 8 and 9 of the <br /> Code; (iii) the interpretation of commercial contracts require literal <br /> interpretation; (iv) a civil suit filed in relation to eviction of the Corporate <br /> Debtor could not be considered as a pre-existing dispute between the parties. <br /> <br /> 36. Thus, in view of the above submissions, the Appellant humbly submits <br /> and prays that the Appeal deserves to be admitted and the Impugned Order <br /> ought to be set aside. <br /> <b>Submissions of the Respondent – Altruist Customer Management India </b><br /> <b>Pvt. Ltd. earlier Vertex Customer Management India Private Ltd</b> <br /> <b> </b><br /> 37. Adjudicating Authority has rightly appreciated that the appeal filed in <br /> NCLT was not maintainable in terms to Section 9 of the IBC 2016 due to pre-<br /> existing dispute between the parties evident from the conclusion made in para <br /> no 4, 11, 9 and 6 of the judgment at page no. 92 to 97 of the order dated <br /> 05.09.2024. The appellant is trying to mislead the Court from the fact that <br /> how the existence of landlord and tenant come into picture. Memorandum of <br /> settlement at page 284 of the appeal shows that for settling the dues of <br /> Rs.32,86,56,444/- the parental company Reliance Communication Limited <br /> agreed to let out the space to the Corporate Debtor by binding its subsidiary <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>27</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> company i.e. Appellant whereby it was agreed that the Appellant will execute <br /> a Lease Deed for the property situated at BLDG No. A-8, Sector No.1, Plot No. <br /> MBP2, TTC, Mhape, Navi Mumbai for a period of 7 years 4 months to settle <br /> the dues of their parental company. It was also agreed that the 20% of the <br /> rent will be paid by the Corporate Debtor to the Appellant directly and rest <br /> 80% shall be paid by the parental company i.e, Reliance Communication Ltd. <br /> to Appellant directly and the parental company to the extent of 80% will not <br /> deduct TDS evident at page no. 285 (III) of the said settlement deed. At Clause <br /> No. F of the said settlement deed at page no. 286 it is clearly mentioned that <br /> the terms of MOS is executed free of consent and to square of the debts and <br /> outstanding of the Corporate Debtor by reliance and its affiliates and Group <br /> Companies page no. 286. it is also mentioned in Clause R and page no. 287 <br /> for the settlement deed that in case of any dispute under the said MOS same <br /> shall be referred to Arbitration. <br /> <br /> 38. After the execution of Memorandum of Settlement on 20.08.2018 <br /> another Memorandum of Understanding subsequent was signed in which at <br /> page no. 291 it is categorically written that they are settling the disputes of <br /> the settlement amount specified in the Memorandum of Settlement and <br /> accepted the terms contained in the said Memorandum of Settlement and to <br /> give effect to the Memorandum of Settlement the Memorandum of <br /> Understanding was executed on the same day on dated 20.08.2018 whereby <br /> in Clause 1.2 and 1.7 the Appellant bind themselves for the making the <br /> payment of the settlement amount and also accepted the proportion of rent <br /> to be paid 20:80 ratio and in Clause 2 of the said Understanding parental <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>28</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> company agreed that the 80% amount paid to Appellant directly in terms to <br /> settled condition of MOS (Memorandum of Settlement). Even Appellant was <br /> party to the same clearly mentioned that the MOU shall read in conjunction <br /> with the MOS and in case any of term herein been contrary to the terms of <br /> MOS the terms of MOS shall prevail page no. 29l. Even on the same day a <br /> LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING dated 20.08.2018 which Annexure R-4, page <br /> no. 453 of the appeal clearly demonstrate that the Appellant undertakes that <br /> the terms of MOS, MOU and deed shall be read together and in case of any <br /> inconsistency therein term of MOS will prevail between Appellant, its parental <br /> company and its Group Companies and Corporate Debtor and which was duly <br /> signed by all parties. <br /> <br /> 39. Respondent contends that the present appeal challenging the Order <br /> dated 05.09.2024 is totally perverse and an attempt to misguide the Appellate <br /> Tribunal and an attempt to get something out of nothing as the Adjudicating <br /> Authority while passing the said order has rightly appreciated that the same <br /> appeal filed in NCLT was not maintainable in terms to Section 9 of the IBC <br /> 2016 due to pre-existing dispute between the parties evident from the <br /> conclusion made in para no 4, 11, 9 and 6 of the judgment at page no. 92 to <br /> 97 of the order dated 05.09.2024. <br /> <br /> 40. Respondent contends that the appellant is trying to mislead the Court <br /> from the fact that how the existence of landlord and tenant come into picture. <br /> It is evident from the Memorandum of settlement at page no. 98 of APB it is <br /> admitted fact that for settling the dues of Rs.32,86,56,444/- (Rs. Thirty Two <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>29</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> Crores Eighty Six Lacs Fifty Six Thousand Four Hundred and Forty Four Only) <br /> 5<br /> the parental company Reliance Communication Limited agreed to let out the <br /> space to the Corporate Debtor by binding its subsidiary company i.e. <br /> Appellant whereby it was agreed that the Appellant will execute a Lease Deed <br /> for the property situated at BLDG No. A-8, Sector No.1, Plot No. MBP2, TTC, <br /> Mhape, Nevi Mumbai for a period of 7 years 4 months to settle the dues of <br /> their parental company. It was agreed that the 20% of the tenant will be paid <br /> by the Corporate Debtor to the Appellant directly and rest 80% shall be paid <br /> by the parental company i.e, Reliance Communication Ltd. to Appellant <br /> directly and the parental company to the extent of 80% will not deduct TDS <br /> as per settlement deed. <br /> <br /> 41. Furthermore, at Clause No. f of the said settlement deed, it is clearly <br /> mentioned that the terms of MOS are executed free of consent and to square <br /> of the debts and outstanding of the Corporate Debtor by reliance and its <br /> affiliates and Group Companies page no. 286. It is also mentioned in Clause <br /> r of settlement deed that in case of any dispute under the said MOS same <br /> shall be referred to Arbitration. <br /> <br /> 42. After the execution of Memorandum of Settlement on 20.08.2018, <br /> another Memorandum of Understanding was signed where it is categorically <br /> written that they have settlement of the dispute of the settlement amount <br /> specified in the Memorandum of Settlement and accepted the terms contained <br /> in the said Memorandum of Settlement and to give effect to the Memorandum <br /> <br /> 5<br /> Clause (a) of MOS <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>30</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> of Settlement the Memorandum of Understanding was executed on the same <br /> day on dated 20.08.2018 whereby in Clause 1.2 and 1.7 the Appellant bind <br /> themselves for the making the payment of the settlement amount and also <br /> accepted the proportion of rent to be paid 20:80 ratio and in Clause 2 of the <br /> said Understanding parental company agreed that the 80% amount paid to <br /> Appellant directly in terms to settled condition of MOS (Memorandum of <br /> Settlement). <br /> <br /> 43. Appellant is trying to mislead the Appellate Tribunal by filing a vague, <br /> baseless appeal because as per Clause 6 of the said Memorandum of <br /> Understanding executed by Appellant and wherein even Appellant was party <br /> to the same clearly mentioned that the MOU shall read in conjunction with <br /> the MOS and in case any of term herein been contrary to the terms of MOS <br /> the terms of MOS shall prevail. <br /> <br /> 6<br /> 44. Even on the same day a Letter of Understanding dated 20.08.2018 <br /> which is at page no. 111 of the appeal clearly demonstrate that the Appellant <br /> undertakes that the terms of MOS, MOU and deed shall be read together and <br /> in case of any inconsistency therein, terms of MOS will prevail between <br /> Appellant, its parental company and its Group Companies and Corporate <br /> Debtor and which was duly signed by all parties. <br /> <br /> 45. Adjudicating Authority has rightly passed the order dated 05.09.2024 <br /> and there is no illegality or perversity and or non-application of judicious mind <br /> while rejecting the Section 9 application in terms to section 9(5)(2)(d) of the <br /> <br /> 6<br /> As per records it is undated letter of understanding <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>31</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> Appellants in terms to condition mentioned in MOA, MOU, Letter of <br /> Understanding executed between both parties on 20.08.2018.Order dated <br /> 05.09.2024 passed by Adjudicating Authority is absolutely legal and correct <br /> in terms to settled judgment of this AT passed in Company Appeal (AT) <br /> (Insolvency) No. 95 of 2025 titled " <b>Tirupati Drilling & Mining Services </b><br /> <b>Private Ltd vs Sadbhav Engineering Limited"</b> on the ground that in case <br /> there is pre-existing dispute between the parties, Section 9 petition is not <br /> maintainable which the Adjudicating Authority rightly appreciated. <br /> Adjudicating Authority passed the order by verifying all the facts and terms <br /> of MOS, MOU and letter of understanding which are conjoint with each other. <br /> Further only after signing Memorandum of Settlement and Memorandum of <br /> Understanding and letter of understanding between Appellant and parental <br /> company with Corporate Debtor the later agreed to settle his dues of recovery <br /> i.e. Rs Rs.32,86,56,444/- [Rs. Thirty Two Crores Eighty Six Lacs Fifty Six <br /> Thousand Four Hundred and Forty Four Only] and agreed to take the said <br /> premises on lease for the period of 7 years and 4 months in terms of the letter <br /> of understanding duly signed by Appellant and Corporate Debtor the <br /> existence of lease deeds comes. Lease deeds in question cannot be read in bits <br /> and pieces and standalone manner. <br /> <br /> 46. MOS, MOU and letter of understanding, were all executed on the same <br /> day i.e. 20.08.2018 to settle the dispute between the parental company which <br /> binds its Group Company i.e. Appellant to give the premises on rent in terms <br /> of 20:80 ratio for a period of 7 years 4 months to settle its outstanding towards <br /> Corporate Debtor. Further when it is duly signed by the Appellant Company <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>32</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> and acted on the same till 2020 by taking 20% rent from Corporate Debtor <br /> from 2018, Appellant in no way can say that the said dues of 80% is also a <br /> liability of the Corporate Debtor. At best they Appellant should have gone to <br /> Arbitration for the same and in no means Section 9 petition is maintainable <br /> until the dues and the duration for the which the MOS and MOU and letter <br /> of Understanding was signed between the parties is lapsed. Therefore, to <br /> demand the said 80% component of the rent from the Corporate Debtor is <br /> totally unfair and un warranted. <br /> <br /> 47. Moreover, once a legal notice for eviction notice is given, ignoring the <br /> terms of MOS and MOU and letter of understanding duly executed between <br /> the parties, the entire act of Appellant is nothing but violation of the terms of <br /> the said deeds and have no right to approach this forum as a recovery forum. <br /> On the contrary Appellant should have moved to Arbitration of Eviction <br /> proceedings, which they had already done by approaching or Eviction <br /> proceedings in District Thana Mumbai, which was objected by the Appellant, <br /> while moving an application u/s 11 of the Arbitration Act. District Court <br /> Mumbai vide order dated 11.03.2025 directed the Appellant to approach the <br /> concerned Arbitration for their eviction and recovery proceedings. According <br /> to law due to a pre-existing dispute they cannot treat NCLT as Recovery forum <br /> pre-existing dispute under Section 9 petition is maintainable basis the facts <br /> and evidence tendered by both the parties. Ld. Adjudicating Authority has <br /> rightly dismissed the petition of Appellant, while passing the order dated <br /> 05.09.2024 which is under appeal as not maintainable. <br /> <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>33</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> 48. Once a pre-existing dispute is there, which includes giving eviction <br /> notice by Appellant and duly replied by the Corporate Debtor prior to issue of <br /> Demand Notice under IBC Code 2016 the proceedings of Section 9 initiation <br /> under IBC are barred. <br /> <br /> 49. Further due to the fact that the Appellant was receiving the rent in <br /> 20:80 ratio from 2018 till 2020, this itself binds themselves with the terms of <br /> conditions of MOS, MOU and letter of understanding and principle of estopple <br /> by conduct. Moreover, refusing to accept the terms till the lapse of the period <br /> of 7 years, 4 months mentioned in the Memorandum of Settlement-on which <br /> the existence of the lease deeds comes into existence making a relationship of <br /> landlord and tenant between both the parties cannot be read independently <br /> therefore, it is nothing but an act of unjust enrichment on the part of the <br /> Appellant. <br /> <br /> 50. The present appeal filed by appellant is liable to be dismissed out rightly <br /> and there is no scope of interference in the order dated 05.09.2024 passed by <br /> Adjudicating Authority under Section 9(5)(2)(d) of IBC Code 2016 and also <br /> imposing exemplary costs on the Appellant for filing false, frivolous and <br /> baseless appeal in the interest of justice. <br /> <br /> 51. The order passed by the NCLT (Adjudicating Authority) dated <br /> 05.09.2024 is in consonance with Section 9 (5) (2) (d) as there was a pre-<br /> existing dispute between both the parties pertaining to lease property. Lease <br /> executed by the Appellant in favour of Corporate Debtor, was under the <br /> contractual obligation in terms to Memorandum of Settlement dated <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>34</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> 20.08.2018 which was conjoint with another documents i.e. Memorandum of <br /> Understanding and letter of Undertaking all executed on the same day dated <br /> 20.08.2018 so binds both parties to the amicable settlement for clearing the <br /> dues of the Corporate Debtor amounting to Rs.32,86,56,444/- which was due <br /> and payable and outstanding towards principal company of the Appellant. It <br /> was a contractual obligation of the Appellant Company to execute a lease deed <br /> in favour of Corporate Debtor for the period of 7 years 4 months for clearing <br /> the dues of their principal company to clear the outstanding of the Corporate <br /> Debtor by giving on lease the subjected property in question. So the existence <br /> of the lease deed executed between both parties came into existence only after <br /> the said principal documents including Memorandum of Settlement, <br /> Memorandum of Understanding and letter of undertaking were executed <br /> between all necessary parties so stating that the lease deed should be read <br /> independent for purpose of present petition is totally baseless and vague. <br /> <br /> 52. Memorandum of Settlement says about contractual obligations that <br /> says rent would be Rs.49,97,788/-, which was the total rent which was <br /> supposed to be charged after three months in proportion to 20:80 ratio and <br /> lock in period was one year. Same obligation Clause (a) of Article (ii) L&L <br /> Agreement of 29.03.2019 [@119 APB] which also proves the facts that lease <br /> is supposed to commence from 28.11.2018 which is much prior from the <br /> execution of the said lease documents. Therefore, claiming that lease has no <br /> reference of Memorandum of Settlement or other documents dated <br /> 20.08.2018 is totally wrong and baseless. As Contract of lease came into <br /> existence due to the existence of Memorandum of Settlement, Memorandum <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>35</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> of Understanding and Letter of Undertaking executed and therefore, Contract <br /> be implied by law or by the conduct of the parties creates legally binding <br /> obligation even without written and spoken terms in the said lease deed and <br /> had to read all the documents con-jointly not separately. <br /> <br /> 53. Once a disputed fact need to be appreciated on evidence under Indian <br /> Evidence Act and pre-existing dispute, the adjudicating authority’s role is <br /> limited to ascertaining if the genuine dispute is present or not. Even evidence <br /> such as an Arbitration notice or termination notice or reply to termination <br /> notice are signals of pre-existing disputes rightly held by this Tribunal and <br /> Hon’ble Supreme Court in <b>Mobilox Innovation Pvt. Ltd. (Supra)</b> and other <br /> judgments, which says the authority should not get involved in sifting through <br /> complex reliable contentions on giving a judgment on merits of the dispute. <br /> <br /> 54. That Adjudicating Authority cannot act as recovery forum once there is <br /> mentioning of Arbitration Clause or Eviction Suit already filed by the <br /> connected party on a demand letter dated 23.08.2022 of 100% amount which <br /> is objected and under dispute between both parties. <br /> <br /> 55. Hence the present petition u/s 9 is not maintainable and the Order <br /> passed by Adjudicating Authority dated 05.09.2024 by NCLT Delhi has no <br /> infirmity and within the Section 9 (5) (2) (d) of IBC code 2016 and relevant <br /> judgment filed by the respondent in their reply. Present petition filed by the <br /> Operational Creditor u/s 9 of IBC 2016 deserves to be dismissed as not <br /> maintainable and liable to be rejected u/s 9 (5) (2) (d) of IBC 2016. <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>36</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> <b>Appraisal</b> <br /> 56. This appeal arises out of the rejection of a Section 9 petition filed by <br /> Reliance Realty Limited-RRL-Appellant claiming operational debt against <br /> Altruist Customer Management India Pvt. Ltd.-ACMIPL- Respondent- <br /> Corporate Debtor formerly known as Vertex Customer Management India <br /> Private Ltd. relating to unpaid rentals under a License Agreement dated 29 <br /> March 2019. <br /> <br /> 57. We have heard counsel of both sides and perused the materials placed <br /> on record. The issue that arises for deciding this Appeal is whether dismissal <br /> of CP filed by the Appellant for invoking CIR Proceedings against the Appellant <br /> under Section 9 of the Code is sustainable due to an existence of dispute <br /> between the Appellant – OC – RRL and the CD – Altruist. <br /> <br /> 58. Before proceeding further, we find out the genesis of the “Operational <br /> debt”. We note that the debt in question, as per claims of the Appellant-RRL <br /> have risen pursuant to a License Agreement dated March 29, 2019, executed <br /> between Reliance Realty Limited and Altruist Customer Management India <br /> Pvt. Ltd. the Corporate Debtor. Under this agreement, the Corporate Debtor <br /> was granted possession and occupation of a Building. The Corporate Debtor <br /> agreed to pay monthly rental dues but some dues are outstanding. Appellant <br /> contends that these dues constitute an operational debt within the meaning <br /> of Section 5(21) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Accordingly, <br /> the Appellant issued a demand notice under Section 8 of the IBC for recovery <br /> of these dues, as per Section 9 of the Code. It is contended by the Appellant <br /> that there is no genuine dispute regarding the debt as the Corporate Debtor <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>37</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> itself had admitted liability for at least 20% of the monthly rent during <br /> relevant periods which itself exceeds the threshold limit of INR 1 crore <br /> prescribed in Section 4 of the IBC for initiating insolvency proceedings. The <br /> admitted liability itself suffices to demonstrate the existence of a debt and <br /> default warranting admission of the Section 9 petition, as held in <b>Nandamuri </b><br /> <b>Meenalatha v. Quality Steels and Wire Products, Company Appeal (AT) </b><br /> <b>(Insolvency) No. 11 of 2023. </b> Appellant further contends that <b> </b> the existence <br /> of the debt is further substantiated by the License Agreement, which is a <br /> registered contract containing an “entire agreement” clause. This agreement <br /> supersedes all prior arrangements, including the Memorandum of Settlement-<br /> MoS, the Memorandum of Understanding-MoU, and an undated Letter of <br /> Understanding-LoU executed between the parties or their related entities. <br /> Such prior agreements were entered into between Reliance group companies, <br /> including Reliance Communications Limited (RCom), which underwent <br /> insolvency proceedings, and the Corporate Debtor, as part of a larger <br /> consolidated settlement framework. <br /> <br /> 59. To determine the correctness of the outstanding dues per leave and <br /> license agreement, we find that it has historical linkage with the settlement of <br /> the past dues of Appellant as is noted in the demand notice issued by the <br /> rd<br /> Appellant dated 23 August 2023 in @185 onwards in the APB which states <br /> as follows: <br /> “… <br /> 2. You (Altruist Customer Management India Private Limited or <br /> 'Altruist' or 'you'), are in the business of providing BPO operations and <br /> connected services to various entities. Under a Registered Agreement of <br /> Leave and License dated 29th March, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as the <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>38</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> said 'Agreement) entered. between the Operational Creditor as the <br /> Licensor and you as the Licensee, the Operational Creditor permitted you, <br /> for the purpose of conducting your BPO operations in the said premises, <br /> on terms and conditions contained therein. The tenure of the Agreement <br /> was 60 months commencing from 28th August, 2018. The lock-in period <br /> was for a period of twelve (12) months commencing from 28th August, <br /> 2018 wherein the Licensee (You) shall not be entitled to terminate the <br /> Agreement. The (Operational Creditor Licensor had a lock-in-period of nine <br /> (9) months commencing after three months from 28th August, 2018. <br /> <br /> 3. Under the License Agreement, you have agreed to pay licensee less <br /> @ Rs.49,77,880/- per month plus GST as applicable subject to deduction <br /> of applicable taxes at sources as required by law. The Operational Creditor <br /> was entitled to charge interest @15% p.a. on the outstanding sum if the <br /> payment is made after 7th of each calendar month towards delayed <br /> payment up to 60 days. All the statutory payments were to be made by <br /> you. There was escalation of license fees @10% after the first three years <br /> starting from the date of commencement of the agreement i.e. 28th <br /> August, 2018. <br /> <br /> 4. Few of Reliance Entities i.e. Reliance Communications Limited <br /> ('RCOM) and its subsidiaries namely Reliance Communications <br /> Infrastructure Limited ('RCIL), Reliance Telecom Limited (RTL) and Reliance <br /> Web Service Limited ('RWSL) [Collectively RCOM, RTL, RCIL and RWSL are <br /> referred to as 'Group Companies'] had availed services from You (formerly <br /> known as Vertex Customer Solutions India Private Limited) under Master <br /> Services Agreement dated 01.09.2014 ('MSA). Vide a Memorandum of <br /> Settlement dated 20th August, 2018, four of the Group companies of the <br /> Operational Creditor had entered into a Settlement with your Company <br /> against the dues that were payable by them to your company for the <br /> services provided to them by you under the MSA. Under the Memorandum <br /> of Settlement, it was agreed by the Group Companies that the property of <br /> the Operational Creditor shall be let out by the Operational Creditor to <br /> your Company and towards the license fee, 80% of the monthly license <br /> fees shall be paid by RCOM to the Operational Creditor to adjust the <br /> outstanding dues of RCOM to your company, and the balance 20% was to <br /> be paid by your Company Lo the Operational Creditor directly. It is <br /> pertinent to note that the Operational Creditor was not a party to the <br /> Memorandum of Settlement Deed dated 20th August, 2018 that was <br /> executed between you and the Group Companies. <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>39</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> 5. You and the Operational Creditor have entered into a <br /> Memorandum Understanding of dated 20th August, 2018 wherein it was <br /> agreed by the parties that 80% of the License fees shall be paid by RCOM <br /> and you shall be paying 20% of the monthly license fees and other <br /> incidental charges to the Operational Creditor. This agreement in clear <br /> terms also provided the rights of the Operational Creditor to terminate the <br /> Leave and License Agreement and the consequences of termination of the <br /> Leave and License Agreement post the lock-in-period, whereby RCOM shall <br /> pay the balance unadjusted Settlement under their Memorandum of <br /> Settlement dated 20th August, 2018 to you. This means that there were <br /> no restrictions or embargo on the termination of the Leave and License <br /> Agreement and the Operational Creditor was at all times entitled to <br /> receive the entire license lees under the Leave and License Agreement. The <br /> Operational Creditor being a separate legal entity, was not in any way <br /> concerned about any dispute or settlement between the Group <br /> Companies and you and that was the reason that Operational Creditor had <br /> the right to terminate the Leave and License Agreement in case of breach <br /> of its provisions in terms of the Leave and License Agreement and the <br /> Memorandum of Settlement and Memorandum of Understanding, and the <br /> arrangement between you and the Group Companies was independent <br /> arrangement. <br /> <br /> 6. The Operational Creditor states that three of the companies to the <br /> said Memorandum of Settlement dated 20th August, 2018 went under the <br /> Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, the License fees committed by <br /> you through these companies stopped coming in, or the Operational <br /> Creditor was not receiving the entire License fees that was <br /> promised/undertaken to be paid by you through these companies, <br /> resulting in outstanding dues to the extent of Rs. 3,72,34,546/- as оn 9th <br /> January, 2020 unpaid by you. The Operational Creditor VII (1) the License <br /> accordingly in terms of Article of Agreement, issued a notice dated 9th <br /> January 2020 to you to remedy the breach within a period of 30 days <br /> thereof by making the payment of the outstanding License fees of Rs. <br /> 3,72,34,546/ that was due as on 9th January, 2020 along with the <br /> prescribed rate of interest as per the Agreement @15% p.a., within a <br /> period of 30 days thereof, failing which the Operational Creditor would be <br /> taking appropriate action against the you…” <br /> <br /> 60. Further, the details of the past dues are noted in the APB in the very <br /> beginning of the APB at pages 7 onwards noted as below: <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>40</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> <br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>01.09.2014</th><th>Reliance Group Companies (RCOM, RCIL, RTL, RWSL) availed services of<br>the Corporate Debtor under a Master Services Agreement. Bills mounted<br>to INR 32,86,56,444 owed to Vertex Customer Management India Private<br>Ltd now Altruist Customer Management India Pvt. Ltd.</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>20.08.2018</td><td>For setltement of debt amounting to INR 32,86,56,444 owed to the<br>Corporate Debtor (“MoS”), Group Companies and Corporate Debtor<br>entered a Memorandum of Setltement regarding dues payable, agreeing<br>that the Operational Creditor’s property would be let out to the<br>Corporate Debtor, with 80% license fees payable by RCOM and 20% by<br>the Corporate Debtor.</td></tr><tr><td>20.08.2018</td><td>Memorandum of Understanding dated 20 August 2018, (“MoU”)<br>executed between RCL, the Appellant and the Corporate Debtor which<br>reiterated the terms of MoS INR 4,97,788(0)7 as rent payable for the<br>Premises. The terms of the MoS were reiterated in MoU.</td></tr><tr><td>28.08.2018</td><td>Sub Lease Deed executed between Appellant and the Corporate Debtor<br>where the parties had agreed that the Premises would be licensed to the<br>Corporate Debtor by the Appellant on a monthly rent of INR 49,77,880 .</td></tr><tr><td>29.03.2019</td><td>The Appellant and the Corporate Debtor executed Sub Lease<br>Cancellation Letetr where the partei s mutually decided to terminate and<br>cancel the Sub Lease Deed dated 28 August 2018.</td></tr><tr><td>29.03.2019</td><td>A registered Leave and License Agreement was executed between the<br>Operational Creditor (Licensor) and Corporate Debtor (Licensee) at a<br>monthly license fee of ₹49,77,880/- plus GST.</td></tr><tr><td>06.11.2019</td><td>Appellant informed the Corporate Debtor that the License Fee for the<br>month of November 2019 i.e., INR 58,73,898 is payable by the Corporate<br>Debtor.</td></tr><tr><td>02.12.2019</td><td>Representative of the Appellant addressed another email to the<br>Corporate Debtor seeking payment of INR 58,73,898.</td></tr><tr><td>13.12.2019</td><td>Representative of the Appellant once again called upon the Corporate<br>Debtor to make full payment of License Fee to Appellant without<br>deducting 80% amount and to also pay any difefrential in the payments<br>made towards License Fee since 10 May 2019.</td></tr><tr><td>09.01.2020</td><td>Operational Creditor issued a notice to Corporate Debtor for breach due<br>to outstanding dues of ₹3,72,34,546/- and called for payment with<br>interest within 30 days.</td></tr><tr><td>28.01.2020</td><td>Corporate Debtor replied denying breach, claiming compliance with the<br>MoU and Setltement terms, while continuing to occupy the premises<br>without paying license fees.</td></tr></tbody></table><div><br /> <br /> 7<br /> We find this figure to be different than claimed later parts in the APB with one additional zero in the end <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>41</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>21.03.2022</th><th>Operational Creditor issued a terminatoi n notice under the Agreement,<br>requiring Corporate Debtor to vacate by 21.05.2022 and pay 150% of<br>license fee per day of delay.</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>25.03.2022</td><td>Corporate Debtor wrote to Operatoi nal Creditor and Group Companies,<br>stating RCOM must pay its unadjusted dues to Corporate Debtor before<br>eviction.</td></tr><tr><td>18.05.2022</td><td>Operational Creditor clarified that they were not a party to the<br>Setltement and had full contractual right to terminate and seek evictoi n.</td></tr><tr><td>21.05.2022</td><td>Corporate Debtor reiterated disputes under the Setltement and claimed<br>Operational Creditor could not terminate until those issues were<br>resolved.</td></tr><tr><td>26.05.2022</td><td>Operational Creditor replied that Corporate Debtor was bound only by<br>the Agreement and would be considered a trespasser if they failed to<br>vacate.</td></tr><tr><td>01.06.2022</td><td>Corporate Debtor contended that the Agreement could not be read in<br>isolation from the MoU and Setltement and refused eviction, indicating<br>arbitration would be invoked.</td></tr><tr><td>13.06.2022</td><td>Operational Creditor again asserted its right to terminate and demanded<br>outstanding payments or vacation of premises.</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Corporate Debtor’s outstanding dues stood at ₹ 19.89 crore license fees<br>and ₹24.34 crore including 15% interest, payable to Operational Creditor.</td></tr><tr><td>23.08.2022</td><td>Operational Creditor issued a demand notice in Form 3 under Sectoi n 9<br>of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.</td></tr></tbody></table><div><br /> and also extracts of chronology, it is clear that the leave and license agreement <br /> has a direct linkage with the LOS and MoU as mentioned in the APB itself. <br /> We note that the building was licensed to the Respondent for settlement of <br /> their past dues. And now apparently the settlement has failed in this case, <br /> due to peculiar circumstance as noted in the demand notice that <i>“three of the </i><br /> <i>companies to the said Memorandum of Settlement dated 20th August, 2018 </i><br /> <i>went under the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, the License fees </i><br /> <i>committed by you through these companies stopped coming in, or the </i><br /> <i>Operational Creditor was not receiving the entire License fees that was </i><br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>42</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> <i>promised/undertaken to be paid by you through these companies, resulting in </i><br /> <i>outstanding dues to the extent of Rs.3,72,34,546/- as on 9th January, 2020 </i><br /> <i>unpaid by you”. </i> In such a situation <i> </i> who is liable to pay rest 80% and then <br /> subsequent termination of the leave and license agreement by the Appellant-<br /> RRL are contractual disputes and Adjudicating authority cannot determine <br /> the debt and default - even to the extent of 20% of the rent and cannot be <br /> undisputedly fastened on the Respondents. <br /> <br /> 62. The Respondent claims that the License Agreement incorporates the <br /> terms of these prior agreements, including the liabilities of the related group <br /> companies, and that these cannot be excluded from the scope of the debt <br /> claim. Reliance Realty Limited, as a successor-in-interest and operational <br /> creditor, cannot evade responsibility for the debt underlying the License <br /> Agreement by invoking the insolvency status of other Reliance group <br /> companies. We may not enter into this question at this stage as we note from <br /> th<br /> the Leave and license agreement which was signed on 29 March, 2019 and <br /> th<br /> the tenure of the Agreement was 60 months commencing from 28 August, <br /> 2018 and the licensee fess was @ Rs.49,77,880/- per month. We note all this <br /> corresponds to the facts in the sublease deed signed on 28th August, 2018 <br /> pursuant to the MoS and MOU, culminating in the Sublease deed. We also <br /> note that subsequent contracts incorporating earlier obligations bind parties <br /> and related entities. <br /> <br /> 63. The Appellant relies on the judicial pronouncements of the Supreme <br /> Court, including <b>Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India, </b><br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>43</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> <b>(2015) 7 SCC 728 and Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani, (2003) 6 SCC 595</b> , <br /> which recognize the supremacy of a registered contract and prohibit the <br /> introduction of contradictory prior negotiations or agreements to diminish <br /> contractual liabilities. <b>Section 94 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, </b><br /> <b>2023</b> (formerly Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872) directly <br /> addresses the weight of such documents. The Appellant argues that the claim <br /> is not subject to any pre-existing dispute within the meaning of Section 8(2)(a) <br /> of the IBC. It is emphasized that the Corporate Debtor’s admissions and the <br /> license payments admitted demonstrate an undisputed sum sufficient to <br /> trigger the CIRP. The Appellant invokes <b>Mobilox Innovations Pvt. Ltd. v. </b><br /> <b>Kirusa Software Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 1 SCC 353</b> , which clarified that “a dispute <br /> must be genuine, not spurious,” and “must have existed at the time of the <br /> notice.” In summary, Appellant contends that the debt arises under a legally <br /> binding and registered License Agreement that absorbs prior settlements <br /> among the Reliance group entities. The liability admitted by the Corporate <br /> Debtor exceeds the threshold amount under Section 4 of the IBC, qualifying <br /> the operational creditor’s application for initiation of the CIRP. <br /> <br /> 64. We find that prior to the License Agreement dated 29 March 2019, the <br /> parties entered into several settlement documents including the <br /> Memorandum of Settlement (“MoS”), the Memorandum of Understanding <br /> (“MoU”), and an undated Letter of Understanding (“LoU”). These agreements, <br /> which involved the Appellant as well as related Reliance group companies, <br /> including Reliance Communications Limited (“RCom,” undergoing <br /> insolvency), explicitly settled and adjusted the liabilities pertaining to rental <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>44</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> dues, and such arrangements were implemented and acted upon, thus <br /> forming the true basis of the liabilities. We are inclined to agree with the <br /> Respondent that these settlement agreements are binding and constitute the <br /> true, operative contractual framework controlling the liabilities and <br /> obligations of the parties. But in the facts and circumstances of the case we <br /> not disputes which require interpretation of contractual obligations, and thus <br /> the determination of debt as claimed in the demand notice comes under cloud. <br /> We also observe that Respondent has strongly denied and disputes have been <br /> raised as noted below from page 218 APB in the reply of the Respondent to <br /> the Demand Notice: <br /> “…. <br /> a. As already communicated by us on multiple occasions, there already exists <br /> a dispute between the Parties as your Notice of termination notice 21st <br /> March, 2022 was Arbitrary against the understanding of the Agreements <br /> and due to this fact, Altruist disputed your termination. <br /> b. It is a matter of record that Leave and License Agreement dated 29th <br /> March 2019 (LLA) was executed between Altruist Customer Management <br /> India Private Limited (Altruist) and the first addressee being Reliance Realty <br /> Ltd in respect of building No A-8 at Sector 1, MBP 2, TTC Industrial Area <br /> Mahape Taluka Dist Thane Navi Mumbai ("Demised Premises). <br /> <b> </b><br /> c. The execution of the LLA was in reference to Memorandum of Settlement <br /> th<br /> ("MOS") dated 20 August, 2018 entered into with various Reliance <br /> entities namely a) Reliance Communications Limited, b) Reliance Telecom <br /> Limited, c) Reliance Web Services Limited and d) Reliance Communication <br /> Infrastructure Limited (collectively <b>"Reliance"). </b> A Memorandum of <br /> Understanding dated 20th August, 2018 <b>(MOU) </b> which was drawn from the <br /> terms of the Memorandum of Settlement dated20th August,2018 <b>(MOS) </b><br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>45</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> was signed by the Parties. You had agreed to abide by the terms of the <br /> MOS by signing the <b>MOU. </b><br /> <br /> d. As per clause a (vi) of the said MOS, in the event of termination of lease by <br /> Reliance Reality Limited, the unadjusted outstanding dues shall be payable <br /> to Altruist and all Reliance entities which had signed the MOS shall become <br /> liable to pay the dues to Altruist. By virtue of you having agreed upon the <br /> terms of the MOS, you are bound to follow the agreed terms of MOS, thus <br /> the due amounts from the Reliance share towards the rent for the Demised <br /> Premises should have been collected by you from them and besides that <br /> the due amounts to us towards our outstanding are also to be settled by <br /> you. Till date, Reliance is yet to clear the balance amounting to Rs. 14 . 46 <br /> crores due to Altruist Customer Management. <br /> <br /> e. As mentioned in our previous occasions, the terms of the MOS shall prevail <br /> over all other documents signed by the Parties in this regard. Therefore, <br /> any conditions which overrides the MOS shall become invalid. <br /> <br /> <br /> f. We are in no way in acceptance of your notice of termination which was <br /> arbitrary and without any merit and for other reasons stated herein. This <br /> is being a dispute between you and us. In terms of the MOU, MOS and <br /> Leave and License Agreement("Agreements"), any dispute or difference <br /> shall be settled through the process of Arbitration. <br /> <br /> g. You had also failed to deposit GST which was collected from us on certain <br /> months’ forms part of the dispute. <br /> <br /> h. Since there is a definitive dispute between the Parties as stated above, your <br /> alleged demand cannot be under the purv i ew of the IBC/NCLT. ..” <br /> <br /> 65. From the above, we note that Section 8 notice and subsequent <br /> Section 9 petition rely heavily on the leave and license agreement signed <br /> th<br /> between the Appellant – RRL and CD – Altruist on 29 March 2019. <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>46</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> Even though it is signed on 29.03.2019 but the <i>“license shall commence </i><br /> <i>from 28 Nov. 2018” </i> (Clause (a) of Article II relating to license fees) clearly <br /> stands out. A question arises that, if it has to be read as a standalone <br /> agreement why from a backdate of 28 Nov. 2018. Further, schedule of <br /> property mentioned herein in this L & L agreement is same as with any <br /> other documents i.e. MOS & MOU. Memorandum of Settlement says <br /> about contractual obligations and also states rent would be <br /> Rs.49,97,788/-, which was the total rent which was supposed to be <br /> charged after three months in proportion to 20:80 ratio and lock in <br /> period was one year. A similar obligation in Clause (a) of Article (ii) <br /> under leave and License Agreement of 29.03.2019 [@119 APB] also <br /> proves the facts that lease was supposed to commence from <br /> 28.11.2018, which is much prior from the execution of the said lease <br /> th<br /> documents. Therefore, we find that claiming that the lease of 29 March <br /> 2019 has no reference of Memorandum of Settlement or other <br /> documents dated 20.08.2018 is incorrect and needs further <br /> determination. We find that as contract of lease came into existence due <br /> to the existence of Memorandum of Settlement, Memorandum of <br /> Understanding and Letter of Undertaking executed. Therefore, contract <br /> will be implied by law or by the conduct of the parties and creates legally <br /> binding obligation even without written and spoken terms in the said <br /> lease deed and all the documents had to be read con-jointly not <br /> separately. <br /> <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>47</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> 66. We further note that the Appellant’s claim of an admitted 20% liability <br /> by the Corporate Debtor is only a part of the picture, with the Respondent <br /> disputing the balance as settled in the MoS and LoU. We note that only after <br /> signing Memorandum of Settlement and Memorandum of Understanding and <br /> letter of understanding between Appellant and parental company, the <br /> Corporate Debtor agreed to settle his dues of Rs Rs.32,86,56,444/- and <br /> agreed to take the said premises on lease. Thereafter lease deeds comes into <br /> existence and lease deeds in question cannot be read in bits and pieces and <br /> stand alone. The moment there is any conflict between the terms of MOS, <br /> MOU all executed on the same day i.e. 20.08.2018 and undated letter of <br /> understanding - to settle the dispute between the parental company which <br /> binds its Group Company i.e. Appellant to give the premises on rent to settle <br /> its outstanding towards Corporate Debtor and when it is duly signed by the <br /> Appellant Company and acted on the same till 2020 by taking 20% rent from <br /> Corporate Debtor from 2018, one cannot say that the said dues of 80% is also <br /> a liability of the Corporate Debtor. Respondent’s canvasses convincing <br /> arguments that Appellant’s should have gone to Arbitration for the same and <br /> not Section 9 until the dues and the duration for the which the MOS and MOU <br /> and letter of Understanding was signed between the parties is lapsed. We <br /> thus find that such disputes concerning admissibility and quantum of debt <br /> are to be adjudged outside the insolvency proceedings. <br /> <br /> <br /> 67. Further we note the MOS, MOU has been arrived at for settlement of <br /> the dues of Reliance Companies of about Rs. 32.87 Crores towards the CD. <br /> Now since the lease is being terminated by the Appellate, CD raises a ground <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>48</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> that its Rs.32.87 crores should be settled before they could be dispossessed. <br /> It is a dispute – which is pre-existing and prior to the issue of the demand <br /> notice. <br /> <br /> 68. The Respondent asserts that a genuine and bona fide dispute exists <br /> regarding the amount claimed by the Appellant. The dispute involves <br /> questions of the quantum of the debt, the effect of the previous settlement <br /> agreements, and the precise portion of liabilities admitted and payable by the <br /> Corporate Debtor. This dispute has been expressed through correspondence <br /> and existing legal and contractual documents. We find this dispute is not a <br /> moonshine or illusory and cannot be determined in the insolvency <br /> proceedings. Furthermore, we note that dispute is prior to the issuance of the <br /> demand notice under Section 8 of the IBC, thereby triggering the provisions <br /> under Section 9(5)(ii) of the Code which mandate the rejection of the Section <br /> 9 petition where there is a pre-existing dispute as to the debt or default. We <br /> note that the Hon’ble <b>Supreme Court in Mobilox Innovations Pvt. Ltd. v. </b><br /> <b>Kirusa Software Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 1 SCC 353</b> , expounded that a dispute <br /> must be existing and real, and mere plea or averment of dispute in the reply <br /> is insufficient unless it has existed prior to the demand notice. We find in this <br /> case that a disputed fact needs to be appreciated based on evidence under <br /> Indian Evidence Act, and in such a situation the adjudicating authority’s role <br /> is limited to ascertaining if the genuine dispute is present or not. Even <br /> evidence such as an Arbitration notice or termination notice or reply to <br /> termination notice are signals of pre-existing disputes and this Tribunal <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>49</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> should not get involved in sifting through complex contentions on giving a <br /> judgment on merits of the dispute. <br /> <br /> 69. We also note that the Adjudicating Authority in the impugned order has <br /> concluded as follows: <br /> “…. <br /> 4… <br /> <br /> VIII. From the above, it is apparent that this is not a clear <br /> case of rent being due from the Corporate Debtor to the <br /> Financial Creditor and not having been paid, therefore, <br /> constituting a debt and default. Since, in respect of <br /> settlement of the dues of the Corporate Debtor to <br /> the Group Companies through the rent amount payable to the <br /> Financial Creditor a large part i.e. 80% of the rent due was to <br /> be paid by another company, other than the Corporate Debtor. <br /> <br /> IX. The Letter of Understanding which has also been <br /> signed by the Financial Creditor, further goes to show that the <br /> liability for the entire rent cannot be placed upon the <br /> Corporate debtor and that the corresponding debt cannot be <br /> fully attributed to the Corporate Debtor. <br /> <br /> X. The contention of the Financial Creditor is that <br /> reliance be placed only on the Lease and License Agreement <br /> (which has been entered between the Financial Creditor and <br /> the Corporate Debtor) only and not on other Agreements <br /> such as the MoS, MoU and Letter of Understanding. <br /> <br /> XI. In our view, at this stage this contention is misplaced <br /> because in respect of other issues the Financial Creditor itself <br /> has relied upon provisions of the MoS, MoU, etc. Notably in <br /> respect of the payment of TDS which as per the MoS was to be <br /> done for the total rent amount including that of 80% which <br /> was to be paid by RCOM by the Corporate Debtor. The Letter <br /> of Understanding is also significant since the Financial Creditor <br /> is also a signatory to that and which clearly stipulates that in <br /> case of conflict amongst any of the Agreements/Lease deed, <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>50</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> the terms of the MoS shall prevail. It is also clear from the <br /> records that the Financial Creditor had full knowledge of <br /> all the Agreements entered into between the Group <br /> Companies and the Corporate Debtor including the MoS, <br /> MoU and Letter of Understanding. Hence, it is very clear <br /> that the dispute is deeply embedded in the matter with <br /> regard to payment of rent by the Corporate Debtor alone or <br /> jointly by the Corporate Debtor and another Group. <br /> <br /> 5. It is also noteworthy that for eviction of the Corporate Debtor <br /> from the premises, the Financial Creditor has filed a suit <br /> before the Civil Court in Thane, Mumbai. <br /> <br /> 6. In the light of the above observations, we are not inclined to <br /> agree with the submissions of the Operational Creditor that this <br /> is an Operational debt which the Corporate Debtor was liable to <br /> pay in its entirety, since other parties also had the responsibility <br /> for payment. This is a pre- existing dispute raised by the <br /> Corporate Debtor which is substantiated by the records and <br /> submissions.….” <br /> <br /> 70. We observe that the vehemently argues that the Corporate Debtor has <br /> admitted its liability towards 20% of the rent payable each month to the <br /> Appellant. Appellant claims that even if only 20% of the rent is taken into <br /> account, the debt payable still crosses the threshold — beyond INR 1 crore <br /> and satisfies the condition for initiation of insolvency proceedings against the <br /> Corporate Debtor. Corporate Debtor has only made part payment towards <br /> License Fee and since April 2021, the Corporate Debtor has stopped making <br /> payment towards the License Fee. Thus, even if only the assumed 20% <br /> obligation of the Corporate Debtor to pay make payment towards License <br /> Fees is considered, the same crosses the minimum requirement of INR 1 crore <br /> under the Code as of September 2022. We note that such an argument <br /> presumes that the Adjudicating Authority has to adjudicate on the amount <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>51</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> payable in the chequered background of the debt. It is plainly clear from the <br /> materials placed on record that claims cannot erase the original claim of the <br /> Corporate Debtor and which is the dispute which is much prior to section 8 <br /> demand notice and it the CD had raised it in its reply to the Section 8 demand <br /> notice which links the issue of original debt for the settlement for which MOS <br /> and LOU were signed and the present premises of the FC was allowed to be <br /> used on lease. We also observe that this is not a spurious or moonshine <br /> dispute but it is a substantive dispute, for which insolvency proceedings <br /> under Section 9 of the Code cannot be invoked. <br /> 71. Thus, we observe that the dispute is deeply embedded in the matter <br /> with regard to payment of rent by the Corporate Debtor alone or jointly by <br /> the Corporate Debtor and another group company. Also, for eviction of the <br /> Corporate Debtor from the premises, the Financial Creditor has filed a suit <br /> before the Civil Court in Thane, Mumbai. Thus, we have no hesitation in <br /> observing that this is a case of pre-existing dispute, raised by the Corporate <br /> Debtor, which is substantiated by the records and submissions and is not a <br /> spurious or moonshine dispute and the present appeal doesn’t merit <br /> consideration. <br /> <b>Conclusions </b><br /> 72. In the above facts and circumstances of the present case, we therefore <br /> don’t find any infirmity in the conclusions and the findings of the Adjudicating <br /> Authority. Adjudicating Authority correctly rejected the Section 9 petition due <br /> to the existence of a bona fide dispute. <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>52</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <br /><br /> <b>Orders</b> <br /> 73. The appeal filed by Appellant-Reliance Realty Limited is accordingly <br /> dismissed with no costs. All pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed <br /> of. Operational Creditor/petitioner is at liberty to pursue his claims before <br /> appropriate forum in accordance with the applicable law. <br /> <br /> <b>[Justice N Seshasayee] </b><br /> <b>Member (Judicial) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>[Arun Baroka] </b><br /> <b>Member (Technical) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>[Indevar Pandey] </b><br /> <b>Member (Technical) </b><br /> <b>New Delhi. </b><br /> <b>March 09, 2026. </b><br /> <br /> <br /> <i>pawan</i> <b> </b> <br /> <br /> <b><i>Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 2077 of 2024 </i></b> <i> </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> of </i> <b><i>53</i></b> <i> </i><br /> </div>