M/S SAMALA MAREPPA and SONS vs K. THIPPERUDRAPPA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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CRL.A No. 100103 of 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD
th
DATED THIS THE 19 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 20
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE RAJESHWARI N.HEGDE
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 100103 OF 2015 (A)
BETWEEN:
M/S SAMALA MAREPPA AND SONS
A PROPRIETARY CONCERN,
R/BY ITS PROPRIETOR
S. RAMACHANDRA REDDY
OFFICE AT : 202/5,
RAYADURGA BUS STAND,
BENGALURU ROAD, BALLARI.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. B. CHIDANAND, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. K. THIPPERUDRAPPA
S/O K. SIDDAPPA
PROPRIETOR OF M/S. RAMESWARA AGENCIES
AGE: 45 YEARS,
R/AT: KAMMARACHEDU VILLAGE
BALLARI, TQ AND DIST: BALLARI.
2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS SPL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. H.R. DESHPANDE, ADVOCATE)
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED U/S 378(4) OF CR.P.C.
SEEKING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT RENDERED BY THE
COURT OF PRL. SESSIONS JUDGE BALLARI, IN
CRL.A.NO.07/2014, DATED 18.03.2015, FURTHER BE TO
RESTORE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION RENDERED BY III
ADDL. JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE (J.D.) FIRST CLASS, AT
ROHAN
HADIMANI
T
Digitally signed by
ROHAN HADIMANI T
Location: HIGH COURT
OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
Date: 2026.11.21
12:16:52 +0530
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CRL.A No. 100103 of 2015
BALLARI, IN C.C.NO.1827/2005 DATED 25.01.2014, FOR THE
OFFENCE U/S 138 OF NI ACT AND ETC.
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 29.09.2026 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED
THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE RAJESHWARI N.HEGDE
CAV JUDGMENT
1. The complainant, being aggrieved by the
judgment dated 18.03.2015 passed by the learned
Principal Sessions Judge, Ballari (for short, ‘the first
appellate Court’), in Crl.A. No.7/2014, whereby the appeal
filed by the accused was allowed and the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 25.01.2014 passed
by the learned III Additional JMFC, Ballari (for short, ‘the
Trial Court’), in C.C. No.187/2005 were set aside, has
preferred the present appeal seeking to set aside the
judgment of acquittal passed by the First Appellate Court
and to restore the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence passed by the Trial Court.
2. The Trial Court had convicted the accused for
the offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, ‘the NI Act’)
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CRL.A No. 100103 of 2015
and sentenced him to pay a fine of ₹8,00,000/-, in default,
to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year.
3. For convenience reference, parties are referred
as’ the complainant and ‘the accused’.
4. The complainant, M/s. Samala Mareppa and
Sons, a proprietary concern represented by its proprietor,
Sri S. Ramachandra Reddy, filed a private complaint on
25.04.1998 under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the Cr.P.C.’), before the Trial
Court, seeking to initiate proceedings against the accused
for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, ‘the NI Act’).
5. The case of the complainant, in brief, is that the
complainant is engaged in the business of supplying
fertilizers, pesticides, seeds and other agrochemicals. In
the course of its business, the complainant supplied
certain quantities of pesticides, fertilizers and seeds on
credit to the accused, who was also carrying on the
business of fertilizers, pesticides and seeds at
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CRL.A No. 100103 of 2015
Kammarachedu Village, Ballari Taluk. The accused was
maintaining a running account with the complainant.
5.1 It is further contended that, towards discharge
of the outstanding liability and other legally enforceable
dues payable to the complainant, the accused issued a
cheque bearing No.313834 dated 28.02.1998 for a sum of
₹4,00,000/-, drawn on Lakshmi Vilas Bank Limited, Ballari,
in favour of the complainant.
5.2 The complainant presented the said cheque for
encashment through its banker. However, the cheque was
dishonoured for the reason ‘Insufficient Funds’ in the
account of the accused, as evidenced by the bank
endorsement dated 02.03.1998.
5.3 Thereafter, the complainant issued a legal
notice dated 12.03.1998 to the accused, calling upon him
to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of
receipt of the notice. The said notice was served upon the
accused on 16.03.1998. Despite receipt of the notice, the
accused failed to pay the cheque amount. Hence, the
complainant, having no other alternative, was constrained
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to initiate proceedings against the accused by filing a
private complaint before the Trial Court.
6. The Trial Court, after recording the sworn
statement of the complainant, took cognizance of the
offence and issued summons to the accused. The accused
appeared before the Trial Court and pleaded not guilty to
the accusation made against him. Accordingly, the Trial
Court proceeded to conduct the trial.
7. In order to substantiate its case, the proprietor
of the complainant concern examined himself as PW-1 and
got marked documents as Exs.P-1 to P-12. After
completion of the complainant's evidence, the statement
of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of the
Cr.P.C. The accused did not choose to lead any oral
evidence in support of his defence. However, he got
marked documents as Exs.D-1 to D-18.
8. The Trial Court, after appreciating the oral and
documentary evidence available on record, proceeded to
convict the accused for the offence punishable under
Section 138 of the NI Act by judgment dated 25.01.2014
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CRL.A No. 100103 of 2015
and sentenced him to pay a fine of ₹8,00,000/-, in default
of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for a
period of one year.
9. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction
and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court, the
accused preferred an appeal in Crl.A. No.7/2014 before
the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court, upon
re-appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence
available on record, allowed the appeal and set aside the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by
the Trial Court. Consequently, the accused came to be
acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 138 of
the NI Act by judgment dated 18.03.2015.
10. Being aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal
passed by the First Appellate Court, the complainant has
preferred the present appeal on the following grounds:
GROUNDS
a. The First Appellate Court committed an error in
reversing the judgment of conviction passed by the Trial
Court. Though the accused admitted that the cheque in
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question belonged to him and bore his signature, the First
Appellate Court failed to assign proper and cogent reasons
for setting aside the judgment of conviction.
b. It is contended that there is no dispute
regarding the fact that the cheque in question belonged to
the accused and that the relationship between the
complainant and the accused was that of a seller and
purchaser. The accused had purchased materials from the
complainant on a credit basis.
c. The Trial Court, having regard to the fact that
the cheque belonged to the accused and bore his
signature, and further taking into consideration that the
defence raised by the accused was improbable, rightly
invoked the statutory presumption available in favour of
the complainant under the provisions of the NI Act and
convicted the accused. However, the First Appellate Court,
without properly appreciating the evidence on record,
erroneously reversed the judgment of conviction and
acquitted the accused.
d. It is further contended that the First Appellate
Court observed that the statement of accounts produced
before the Trial Court was not accompanied by a certificate
as contemplated under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872. However, the complainant had also produced
copies of the invoices during the course of the trial, which
formed part of the statement of accounts. The accused,
during the course of cross-examination, merely suggested
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CRL.A No. 100103 of 2015
that the said invoices did not bear his signature or the
signature of his authorised representative.
e. It is contended that there was no serious
dispute regarding the supply of materials to the accused.
However, the First Appellate Court, without properly
appreciating the documentary evidence produced by the
complainant, erroneously held that, in the absence of a
certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act,
the statement of accounts could not be considered in
evidence. It is further contended that the said provision
came into force with effect from 17.10.2000 and,
therefore, the First Appellate Court erred in applying the
said provision to the present case.
f. It is further contended that the First Appellate
Court recorded a finding that the cheque in question was
filled up by the complainant himself and that Section 20 of
the NI Act did not permit the complainant to fill up the
cheque. According to the complainant, the said finding is
contrary to law and is unsustainable.
11. On the aforesaid grounds, the
complainant/appellant seeks to allow the appeal by setting
aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the First
Appellate Court and restoring the judgment of conviction
and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court.
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CRL.A No. 100103 of 2015
12. In response to the notice issued by this Court,
the respondent/accused entered appearance through
learned counsel and contested the appeal.
13. The Trial Court records have been secured.
14. Heard Sri. B. Chidandand, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant/complainant, and Sri. H. R.
Deshpande, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent/accused.
15. Learned counsel for the appellant/complainant
has relied upon the following judgments in support of his
contentions:
a. Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao
Gorantyal and Others in Civil Appeal Nos.20825-
20826/2017.
b. Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh in SLP No.12802/2022
16. Learned counsel for the respondent/accused
has relied upon the following judgment in support of his
contentions:
a. Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa , reported in (2019)
5 SCC 418
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17. Perused the records.
18. The following point arises for consideration:
Whether the impugned judgment passed by the First
Appellate Court suffers from illegality or perversity and
warrants interference by this Court?
19. Learned counsel for the appellant/complainant
contended that the Trial Court, upon appreciation of the
oral and documentary evidence placed on record by both
parties, had rightly held that the complainant had
established that the accused had issued the cheque in
question towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt or
liability. When the said cheque was presented for
encashment, it was dishonoured, thereby attracting the
penal provisions of the NI Act.
20. However, the First Appellate Court, upon re-
appreciation of the evidence available on record, solely on
the ground that the complainant had not maintained a
manual statement of accounts and had not produced the
certificate as required under Section 65B(4) of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, disbelieved the documents marked as
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Exs.P-3 to P-5 and held them to be inadmissible in
evidence. Consequently, the First Appellate Court allowed
the appeal filed by the accused and set aside the judgment
of conviction passed by the Trial Court, holding that the
complainant had failed to establish that the cheque in
question had been issued towards discharge of a legally
enforceable debt or liability.
21. Learned counsel appearing for the complainant
further contended that the complainant had produced
copies of the invoices, which formed part of the statement
of accounts. Though the accused had disputed the said
invoices on the ground that they did not bear his
signatures, he had not specifically denied the supply of
materials by the complainant. It was further contended
that the accused had failed to rebut the statutory
presumption by placing any cogent evidence on record,
except by taking the defence that the cheque in question
had been issued for security purposes.
22. Learned counsel for the appellant/complainant
contended that the First Appellate Court had committed an
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CRL.A No. 100103 of 2015
error in law by discarding the documentary evidence
without properly appreciating the evidence available on
record. Accordingly, he prayed for setting aside the
impugned judgment passed by the First Appellate Court.
23. Per contra, learned counsel for the
respondent/accused contended that the accused had not
issued the impugned cheque to the complainant. According
to him, the cheque had been issued to the proprietor of
M/s. Samala Mareppa and Sons only for security purposes
and not towards discharge of any legally enforceable debt
or liability. It was further contended that the cheque
contained different handwriting and ink, indicating that the
complainant had filled up the cheque and misused the
same to initiate a false complaint against the accused.
24. Learned counsel for the respondent/accused
further contended that the Trial Court, without properly
appreciating the evidence available on record, had
erroneously convicted the accused. However, the First
Appellate Court had rightly re-appreciated the evidence
and arrived at the conclusion that the complainant had
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failed to establish the guilt of the accused. Accordingly, the
First Appellate Court had rightly allowed the appeal filed
by the accused and acquitted him of the offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. Hence, he
prayed for dismissal of the present appeal.
25. On perusal of the evidence available on record,
it is the specific case of the complainant that he is a dealer
in fertilizers, pesticides, seeds and other agrochemicals.
The accused, who was also carrying on a similar business,
used to purchase the aforesaid products from the
complainant on credit. It is further the case of the
complainant that the accused had been maintaining a
running account with him for several years and that,
towards the purchase of the aforesaid products, a sum of
₹4,00,000/- was outstanding. In order to discharge the
said outstanding liability, the accused allegedly issued the
cheque in question.
26. In order to substantiate his contention
regarding the outstanding liability and issuance of the
cheque towards discharge of the same, the complainant
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adduced oral evidence and produced documentary
evidence, including the credit bills marked as Exs.P-8 to P-
10.
27. At this juncture, it is relevant to mention that
Exs.P-11 and P-12 are not found in the Trial Court records.
Further, on perusal of the order sheet maintained by the
Trial Court in C.C. No.1827/1998, dated 25.07.2013, it is
noticed that Exs.P-8 to P-12 were treated as Exs.D-1 to D-
6.
28. The specific defence of the accused is that he
had not issued the cheque in question towards discharge
of any legally enforceable debt or liability. According to
him, the cheque had been issued only as security and the
complainant had subsequently misused the same.
29. Though the accused has taken the defence that
the cheque in question was issued only for security
purposes, except producing the documents marked as
Exs.D-1 to D-18, which are stated to be invoices, he has
not adduced any oral evidence to substantiate his
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contention that the cheque had been issued to the
complainant as security.
30. On perusal of the cross-examination of PW-1, it
is evident that a suggestion was put to PW-1 on behalf of
the accused that the cheque in question had been issued
only for security purposes. However, the said suggestion
was denied by PW-1.
31. At this juncture, it is relevant to mention that,
before initiating the complaint proceedings, the
complainant had issued a statutory legal notice to the
accused. The copy of the legal notice is marked as Ex.P-6,
and the postal acknowledgment evidencing service of the
said notice on the accused is marked as Ex.P-7. Despite
receipt of the statutory notice, the accused neither issued
any reply disputing the alleged liability nor repaid the
amount covered under the cheque.
32. In this regard, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Ashok Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,
reported in AIR 2025 SC 1931 , and the judgment in the
case of Kunte Gowda vs. Thurubaiah , in SLP
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No.2247/2024, decided on 04.08.2026 , held that the
accused is required to raise all such contentions at the
earliest opportunity, particularly after receipt of the
statutory notice issued by the complainant and before
filing of the complaint. If the accused has not raised any
such contention or defence in the reply to the legal notice,
he cannot subsequently seek to introduce such a defence
during the course of the trial.
33. In the present case also, the complainant had
issued a statutory legal notice to the accused before filing
the complaint. However, the accused did not issue any
reply to the said notice. Therefore, the subsequent
contention of the accused that the cheque had been issued
as a blank cheque for security purposes in respect of his
business transactions with the complainant and that the
same had been misused by the complainant requires
consideration in the light of the other evidence available
on record.
34. Though the mere failure to reply to the
statutory notice, by itself, cannot be treated as proof of
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the guilt of the accused, the same is a relevant
circumstance which can be taken into consideration along
with the other evidence available on record.
35. The Trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral
and documentary evidence, had accepted the case of the
complainant and held that the accused had committed the
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, ‘the NI Act’). However,
the First Appellate Court, without properly appreciating the
nature of the documentary evidence and the statutory
presumptions available in favour of the complainant,
proceeded to allow the appeal filed by the accused and set
aside the judgment of conviction, primarily on the ground
of non-production of the certificate under Section 65B of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
36. Learned counsel for the respondent/accused
has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa , reported
in (2019) 5 SCC 418, and contended that the complainant
had failed to establish the existence of a legally
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enforceable debt and that the accused had issued the
cheque towards discharge of such liability.
37. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
considered the nature and extent of the presumptions
under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act and the manner
in which the accused can rebut such presumptions. It was
held that the accused is required to raise a probable
defence and that the standard of proof for rebutting the
statutory presumptions is that of preponderance of
probabilities.
38. In the present case, the complainant has relied
upon the cheque in question and other documentary
evidence to establish the transactions between the parties.
Therefore, the evidence available on record, including the
defence taken by the accused, requires consideration in
the light of the statutory presumptions under Sections 118
and 139 of the NI Act.
39. Insofar as the requirement of a certificate under
Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act is concerned,
learned counsel for the appellant/complainant has placed
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reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal
and Others , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
that the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4)
is a condition precedent for the admissibility of secondary
electronic evidence and that such certificate can be
produced at a subsequent stage, subject to the facts and
circumstances of the case.
40. Learned counsel for the appellant further
contended that the transactions in question pertain to the
year 1996 and, therefore, the First Appellate Court ought
to have examined the nature of the documents and the
applicability of the requirement under Section 65B of the
Indian Evidence Act, instead of mechanically discarding
the documentary evidence produced by the complainant.
41. Further, learned counsel for the appellant has
placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh , wherein the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has explained the scope of the statutory
presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act
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and the burden cast upon the accused to raise a probable
defence.
42. It is contended that, in the present case, the
accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of
the Cr.P.C., denied the incriminating circumstances but
failed to offer a satisfactory explanation as to how the
cheque in question came into the possession of the
complainant. The accused also failed to substantiate his
defence that the cheque had been issued only for security
purposes.
43. On careful consideration of the rival
contentions and upon perusal of the oral and documentary
evidence available on record, it is evident that the First
Appellate Court has primarily proceeded on the ground of
non-production of the certificate under Section 65B(4) of
the Indian Evidence Act and, on that basis, discarded the
documentary evidence relied upon by the complainant.
44. The First Appellate Court was required to
examine the nature of the documents produced by the
complainant, whether the same constituted electronic
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records or computer outputs, and whether the
requirement of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act was
attracted. Further, it was required to consider the
statutory presumptions available under Sections 118 and
139 of the NI Act and whether the accused had
successfully rebutted the same by raising a probable
defence.
45. The First Appellate Court, without undertaking
such an exercise and without properly appreciating the
oral and documentary evidence available on record,
proceeded to allow the appeal filed by the accused and set
aside the judgment of conviction passed by the Trial
Court. Such an approach, in the facts and circumstances of
the case, cannot be sustained.
46. Therefore, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the appellant/complainant has made out
sufficient grounds for interference with the impugned
judgment passed by the First Appellate Court.
47. Accordingly, the point for consideration is
answered in the affirmative.
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48. In view of the above discussion, this Court
proceeds to pass the following:
ORDER
The appeal is allowed .
The impugned judgment dated 18.03.2015 passed by
the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Ballari, in Crl.A.
No.7/2014 is set aside .
The judgment of conviction and order of sentence
dated 25.01.2014 passed by the learned III Additional
JMFC, Ballari, in C.C. No.1827/2005 is confirmed .
Sd/-
(RAJESHWARI N.HEGDE)
JUDGE
AC
CT-CMU