National Highway Authority Of India N.H.No.26 (Kha) vs Sanjay Kumar

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:52159
1 AA-36-2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DEEPAK KHOT
th
ON THE 15 OF JULY, 2026
ARBITRATION APPEAL No. 36 of 2020
NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA N.H.NO.26 (KHA)
Versus
SANJAY KUMAR
Appearance:
Shri Mohan Sausarkar - Advocate for the appellant.
Shri Pradeep Kumar Sharma- Advocate for the respondent through
VC.
ORDER
Heard on I.A. No. 6731/2022 filed on 24.06.2022, an application for
condonation of delay.
2. From the perusal of the application, it is found that the application
has been filed to show sufficient cause because of which the appellant was
prevented from filing the appeal within time. The cause shown in paragraph
3 is that the counsel who was appearing before the Civil/Commercial Court
and prosecuting the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act never intimated the appellant about the status of the case
and also the fact that the matter was rejected for want of deficit court fees.
However, it is submitted that when such knowledge was gathered, the
counsel has intimated the office, and thereafter, upon receiving the said
information, the present appeal has been filed. In the grounds itself, two
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Signed by: LALIT SINGH
RANA
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:52159
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contradictory pleadings have been made with regard to the information not

tendered by the counsel and intimated by the counsel.
3. From perusal of the record, it is transpired that the appeal has been
filed on 19.10.2020 with delay of 298 days, as reported by the Registry.
However, the application for condonation of delay was filed with further
delay of 2 years i.e. on 24.06.2022. No explanation with regard to not filing
the application for condonation of delay along with the appeal has been
tendered in the application. The appeal, being time barred, cannot be treated
as an appeal in the eye of law unless the delay is condoned. Therefore, in
practical and legal sense, the appeal would be said to have been filed along
with the application in the year 2022, when the application for condonation
of delay was filed. However, from the perusal of the application, no reason
has been assigned as to why such an application could not have been filed
along with the appeal in the year 2020 and no sufficient cause has been put
forth to explain why such application was filed belatedly after about 4 years
from the disposal of the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act. As pointed out hereinabove, the reason which has been
assigned is that knowledge was gathered only when the counsel has
intimated the office, which is a self contradictory statement made by the
appellant that the appellant was not aware of the rejection of the application
because the counsel had never intimated it about the same. Therefore, in the
opinion of this Court, the appellant was not diligent in prosecuting the
application under Section 34 as well as in filing the present appeal within
time. No sufficient cause has been shown before this Court to condone the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: LALIT SINGH
RANA
Signing time: 22-07-2026
11:38:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:52159
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delay.

4. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh
Vs. Ramkumar Choudhary, in Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No.
48636/2024, decided on 29.11.2024 has categorically held that delay caused
due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials
functioning in the State machinery and directed to fix the responsibility of
the official because of whom such delay, deviation, lapses, etc. have been
caused and to value the loss caused to the Government. The relevant
paragraphs are reproduced hereinunder:-
"5. The legal position is that where a case has been
presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner
has to explain the Court as to what was the “sufficient
cause” which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the Court within
limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi4, it
was held by this Court that even though limitation may
harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied
with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A
reference was also made to the decision of this Court in
Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram5 wherein, it was held as
follows:

“13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14
SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a case
has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the
court as to what was the “sufficient cause”
which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to
be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:52159
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part in the facts and circumstances of the
case, or found to have not acted diligently or
remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No
court could be justified in condoning such
an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to
be decided only within the parameters laid
down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the
High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing
the delay condonation application of the present
appellant.”
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone
the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts
and circumstances of each case and that, the expression
‘sufficient cause’ cannot be liberally interpreted, if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed
to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy
(D) through his legal heir6, wherein, one of us (J.B.
Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various
decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms
observed by this Court that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity and rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the
opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is
profitably extracted below:


“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we
made it very clear that we are not going to
look into the merits of the matter as long as
we are not convinced that sufficient cause
has been made out for condonation of such a
long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India
when it comes to condoning the gross delay
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:52159
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of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses
to approach the court long after the lapse of
the time prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot turn
around and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being
condoned. This litigation between the
parties started sometime in 1981. We are in
2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed.
However, till date the respondent has not
been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It
would be a mockery of justice if we condone
the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once
again ask the respondent to undergo the
rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the
delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it
appears that they want to fix their own
period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a
party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own
inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to
be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be
heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering
the plea for condonation of delay, the court
must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It
is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the
litigant and the opposition of the other side
is equally balanced that the court may bring
into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should
not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging

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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:52159
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over the head of the respondent for
indefinite period of time to be determined at
the whims and fancies of the appellants.
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34. In view of the aforesaid, we have
reached to the conclusion that the High
Court committed no error much less any
error of law in passing the impugned order.
Even otherwise, the High Court was
exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court,
it has been said that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity.
Rendering substantial justice is not to cause
prejudice to the opposite party. The
appellants have failed to prove that they
were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the
matter and this vital test for condoning the
delay is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal
fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be
no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the
present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court
correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed
the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was
not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was
shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put
forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject
this petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the
delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to
callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the
officials functioning in the State machinery. Though
the Government adopts systematic approach in
handling the legal issues and preferring the
petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due
to the fault on the part of the officials in merely
communicating the information on time, huge revenue
loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The
present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay
of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second
appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials
functioning under the State, though valuable
Government lands were involved. Therefore, we
direct the State to streamline the machinery touching
the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases

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RANA
Signing time: 22-07-2026
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:52159
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before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility
on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s),
who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc.,
if any, to the value of the loss caused to the
Government. Such direction will have to be followed
by all the States scrupulously. .
5. In view of the above enunciation of law and analysis of the facts

relating to the sufficient cause pleaded, it is found that the appeal has been
filed with delay, which has not been sufficiently explained by the appellant
in the application. The application filed for condonation of delay contains
contradictory statements with regard to the lack of information and receiving
such information. Therefore, the application i.e. I.A. No. 6731/2022 being
devoid of merits and is not showing any sufficient cause for condonation of
the delay, is hereby rejected.
6. Moreover, from perusal of impugned order, it is evident that t he
Court held that the Commissioner/Arbitrator rightly determined
compensation by considering not only the guideline value but also the
market value, location, nature of the land, and losses suffered by the
landowners due to acquisition. The National Highways Authority of India
failed to produce any material to justify reducing the compensation for the
first 500 sq. m. of land in Lokipar village or to establish that the award
suffered from illegality, violation of law, fraud, corruption, or conflict with
the public policy of India. Relying on ONGC v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5
SCC 705, the Court observed that an arbitral award can be set aside under
Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 only on
limited grounds, none of which were established. As the award was passed
after giving both parties adequate opportunity to lead evidence, no
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:52159
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interference under Section 34 was warranted. Accordingly, the award dated

13.07.2016 was upheld and NHAI's application under Section 34 was
dismissed.
7. Accordingly, Arbitration Appeal is also dismissed.
(DEEPAK KHOT)
JUDGE
L.R.

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: LALIT SINGH
RANA
Signing time: 22-07-2026
11:38:25