Dolly Raghav vs Uday Singh
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~21
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 17.04.2026
+ MAT.APP.(F.C.) 312/2024 & CM APPL. 56056/2024
DOLLY RAGHAV .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Samridhi Dohbal, Adv.
versus
UDAY SINGH .....Respondent
Through: Appearance not given.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act,
1984 is directed against the order dated 03.09.2024 passed by the
learned Principal Judge, Family Court, South West District, Dwarka
Courts, New Delhi in HMA No. 3668/2023 titled Uday Singh v. Dolly
Raghav , whereby the learned Family Court declined to take on record
the written statement filed by the appellant and, consequently, struck
off her defence on the ground that the same had been filed beyond the
prescribed period.
2. The relevant facts, in brief, are that the marriage between the
parties was solemnised according to Hindu rites and customs on
25.02.2006 and disputes thereafter arose between them, resulting in
them living separately. The respondent/husband instituted a petition
under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter
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‘HMA’) before the learned Family Court.
3. In those proceedings, as per the report of the process server,
summons was served upon the appellant/wife on 29.03.2024.
Thereafter, on 04.05.2024, the learned Family Court directed filing of
the written statement within a period of four weeks. The appellant
ultimately filed her written statement on 02.09.2024.
4. However, by the impugned order dated 03.09.2024, the learned
Family Court declined to take the written statement on record and
struck off the appellant’s defence on the ground that the same had
been filed beyond the permissible period reckoned from the date of
service of summons. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred
the present appeal.
5. Ms. Samridhi Dohbal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant submits that the appellant had appeared with her counsel
only on 04.05.2024, on which date the learned Family Court directed
her to file the written statement within a period of four weeks. It is
further submitted that the appellant, being a layperson and unfamiliar
with legal procedure, was under the bona fide impression that the
written statement was required to be filed pursuant to such direction
and was not aware that the same ought to have been filed earlier on
the first date of appearance.
6. It is submitted that the written statement came to be filed on
02.09.2024, which, according to the appellant, fell within the period of
120 days counted from 04.05.2024, which is the day, the learned
Family Court directed filing of the written statement within a period
of four weeks. It is submitted that the appellant, being a layperson and
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SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:24.04.2026
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unfamiliar with legal procedure, had no knowledge of the requirement
of filing of written statement, and therefore, the period of limitation
ought to be computed from the date of such direction rather than from
the date of service of summons.
7. It is submitted that the closure of appellant’s right to file the
written statement would result in irreparable prejudice, inasmuch as
the appellant would be effectively deprived of placing her defence on
record in a matrimonial dispute and any adjudication in the absence of
such defence would seriously affect her rights. In these circumstances,
learned counsel for the appellant prays that the impugned order
deserves to be set aside.
8. Per Contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent submits that the learned Family Court has rightly declined
to take the written statement on record and proceeded to strike off the
appellant’s defence as the written statement was admittedly filed
beyond the prescribed period of 120 days from the date of service of
summons. It is submitted that the appellant was duly served and had
sufficient opportunity to file her written statement within time but
failed to do so without any cogent explanation.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused
the record.
10. At this stage, it becomes necessary to examine the legal position
governing the timeline for filing of a written statement and the extent
of the Court’s discretion. In Kailash v. Nanhku and Ors. (2005) 4
SCC 480, the Supreme Court held that though the timeline prescribed
under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
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(hereinafter ‘CPC’) must ordinarily be honoured and extensions
cannot be granted in a routine manner, the provision is nevertheless
procedural and directory in nature.
11. The Court emphasized that departure from the prescribed
schedule is permissible only by way of exception, upon reasons being
assigned by the defendant and recorded by the court, where the
circumstances are shown to be exceptional, beyond the party’s control
and where refusal of extension would result in grave injustice. The
relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
42. Ordinarily, the time schedule prescribed by
“
Order VIII, Rule 1 has to be honoured. The
defendant should be vigilant. No sooner the writ of
summons is served on him he should take steps for
drafting his defence and filing the written
statement on the appointed date of hearing without
waiting for the arrival of the date appointed in the
summons for his appearance in the Court. The
extension of time sought for by the defendant from
the court whether within 30 days or 90 days, as the
case may be, should not be granted just as a matter
of routine and merely for asking more so, when the
period of 90 days has expired. The extension can
be only by way of an exception and for reasons
assigned by the defendant and also recorded in
writing by the Court to its satisfaction. It must be
spelled out that a departure from the time schedule
prescribed by Order VIII, Rule 1 of the Code was
being allowed to be made because the
circumstances were exceptional, occasioned by
reasons beyond the control of the defendant and
such extension was required in the interest of
justice, and grave injustice would be occasioned if
the time was not extended.”
The Court further held:
“45. However, no straitjacket formula can be laid
down except that the observance of time schedule
contemplated by Order VIII Rule 1 shall be the
rule and departure therefrom an exception, made
for satisfactory reasons only. We hold that Order
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SINGH NEGI
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VIII Rule 1, though couched in mandatory form, is
directory being a provision in the domain of
processual law.”
12. The Supreme Court further held that the Court may impose
costs for dual purpose, firstly, to deter the defendant from seeking any
extension of time just for the asking and secondly, to compensate the
plaintiff for the delay and inconvenience caused to him.
13. Having emphasized that the timeline for filing of a written
statement must be ordinarily observed, the Court went on to clarify
that procedural law cannot be interpreted so rigidly as to defeat
substantive justice. The court held as under:
28.All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of
justice. The language employed by the draftsman
of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but
the fact remains that the object of prescribing
procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an
adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be
denied the opportunity of participating in the
process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled
by express and specific language of the statute, the
provisions of CPC or any other procedural
enactment ought not to be construed in a manner
which would leave the court helpless to meet
extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. The
observations made by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sushil
Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar [(1975) 1 SCC 774]
are pertinent: (SCC p. 777, paras 5-6)
“The mortality of justice at the hands
of law troubles a judge's conscience
and points an angry interrogation at
the law reformer.
The processual law so dominates in
certain systems as to overpower
substantive rights and substantial
justice. The humanist rule that
procedure should be the handmaid,
not the mistress, of legal justice
compels consideration of vesting a
residuary power in judges to act ex
debito justitiae where the tragic
sequel otherwise would be wholly
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SINGH NEGI
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inequitable. … Justice is the goal of
jurisprudence — processual, as
much as substantive.”
14. While the Family Court may draw upon the procedural
framework of the CPC, it is not rendered powerless to adopt a less
formal and more facilitative procedure suited to the nature of family
disputes. Section 10(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 makes the
provisions of the CPC applicable to proceedings before the Family
Court. However, Section 10(3) also clarifies that nothing in sub-
sections (1) and (2) shall prevent the Family Court from laying down
its own procedure in order to arrive at a settlement or at the truth of
the facts alleged by one party and denied by the other. Section 20 of
the Family Courts Act strengthens this position by giving overriding
effect to the provisions of the Act. The abovementioned sections are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 10. Procedure generally.— (1) Subject to the
other provisions of this Act and the rules, the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908) and of any other law for the time
being in force shall apply to the suits and
proceedings [other than the proceedings under
Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974)] before a Family Court and for
the purposes of the said provisions of the Code, a
Family Court shall be deemed to be a civil court
and shall have all the powers of such court.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and
the rules, the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or the rules made
thereunder, shall apply to the proceedings under
Chapter IX of that Code before a Family Court.
(3) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)
shall prevent a Family Court from laying down its
own procedure with a view to arrive at a
settlement in respect of the subject-matter of the
suit or proceedings or at the truth of the facts
alleged by the one party and denied by the other.
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*
20. Act to have overriding effect.— The
provisions of this Act shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any other law for the time being in
force or in any instrument having effect by virtue
of any law other than this Act.
15. As a general rule, the timelines prescribed for filing a written
statement are to be followed, so that proceedings are not unnecessarily
delayed. Any extension beyond the stipulated period is not to be
granted routinely and can be allowed only in exceptional
circumstances, where sufficient cause is shown and reasons are
recorded.
16. However, closure of the right to file the written statement has
serious consequences, as it effectively deprives the appellant of
placing her defence on record in a proceeding which concerns her
marital rights and status. In such matters, an adjudication on merits is
ordinarily to be preferred, unless the conduct of the defaulting party is
such as to warrant denial of that opportunity altogether.
17. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the summons were
received by the appellant on 29.03.2024 and the written statement
came to be filed on 02.09.2024. The written statement was thus filed
beyond the statutory period of 120 days from the date of service of
summons and is time barred.
18. The appellant has pleaded that she is unemployed, has no
independent source of income, and is dependent upon her father even
for her rental expenses @ Rs. 18,000 /- per month. She further pleaded
that her father was hospitalised and as he was already incurring his
medical expenses and her rental expenses, she could not ask her father
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SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:24.04.2026
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for more expenses for the legal proceedings. These circumstances,
taken cumulatively, cannot be brushed aside altogether. In the given
circumstances, closure of right to file written statement would result in
grave prejudice and will be unreasonable. Financial constraints of a
wife, precluding her to contest the case, effectively, are found to be
sufficient cause by us, to condone the delay.
19. In these circumstances, this Court is of the view that while the
delay is evident and cannot be overlooked, the ends of justice would
be better served by permitting the written statement to be taken on
record, subject to appropriate terms.
20. In the present case, the prejudice caused to the respondent on
account of the delayed filing can be adequately compensated by
imposition of costs, whereas refusal to take the written statement on
record would result in far graver consequences for the appellant.
21. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 03.09.2024 passed by
the learned Family Court in HMA No. 3668/2023 is set aside. The
written statement filed by the appellant shall be taken on record,
subject to payment of costs of Rs. 25,000/- to the respondent within a
period of four weeks from today before the Family Court. Upon such
costs being paid, the learned Family Court shall proceed with the
matter in accordance with law.
22. The present appeal is accordingly allowed in the aforesaid
terms. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. The parties are
directed to appear before the Family Court on 18.05.2026.
23. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on
the merits of the claims and all rights and contentions of the parties are
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SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:24.04.2026
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left open to be decided by the learned Family Court in accordance
with law.
VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J
RENU BHATNAGAR, J
/pr /ka/kp
APRIL 17, 2026
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Signed By:BABINDER
SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:24.04.2026
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