Chief Engineer Employees State Insurance Corporation vs Enarch Consultants Pvt Ltd
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~6
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ O.M.P. (COMM) 529/2024, I.A. 47511/2024 & I.A.
47514/2024
CHIEF ENGINEER EMPLOYEES
STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Siddharth, Standing
Counsel along with Ms.
Himanshi Girdhar and Mr.
Deepanshu Grover, Advs.
versus
ENARCH CONSULTANTS PVT LTD .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sonal Kumar Singh, Mr.
Ratik Sharma, Ms. Muskan
Agarwal, Mr. Parth Sindhwani,
Mr. Yashvardhan Singh & Ms.
Dimple Kathuria, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT(ORAL)
% 07.07.2026
I.A-47512/ 2024
1. Every objection predicated on limitation, in one sense, raises a
question anterior to the merits. However, at this stage, the Court is not
called upon to examine whether the challenge is well-founded or not,
but whether it is one which the statute permits within the permissible
period of limitation.
O.M.P. (COMM) 529/2024 Page 1 of 12
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
Signing Date:12.07.2026
16:40:24
2. The present petition has been preferred under Section 34 of the
1
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 , assailing the Arbitral Award
dated 19.08.2023 rendered by the learned Sole Arbitrator.
3. Along with the present petition, the Petitioner has filed I.A.
No.47512/2024 seeking condonation of delay of 22 days in filing the
petition under Section 34 of the Act.
4. The said application is vehemently opposed by the Respondent.
5. Learned Counsel for the Respondent Mr. Sonal Kumar Singh
submits that the petition is not merely delayed but is barred by the
mandate of Section 34(3) of the Act itself. It is contended that the
limitation commenced on 21.08.2023 when the learned Sole Arbitrator
transmitted a scanned signed copy of the Arbitral Award by electronic
2
mail to the parties. The period prescribed under Section 34(3),
including the additional period of thirty days contemplated under the
proviso thereto, consequently expired much before the institution of
the present proceedings. It is further urged that the initial filing before
the Registry was itself non-est in law, being replete with foundational
defects, and therefore incapable of arresting limitation.
6. Mr. Siddarth, learned Standing Counsel for the Petitioner
disputes the aforesaid objections. He submits that the limitation
could commence only upon receipt of the Arbitral Award in
1
“the Act” hereinafter
2
“e-mail” hereinafter
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Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
Signing Date:12.07.2026
16:40:24
terms of Section 31(5) of the Act, which, according to the Petitioner,
occurred only on 03.01.2024.
7. This Court has heard the learned Counsel for the parties and has
carefully perused the documents placed on record, the affidavit filed
by the Petitioner pursuant to the directions of this Court and the short
note filed on behalf of the Respondent.
8. The preliminary objection raised by the Respondent goes to the
very maintainability of the present petition. Before examining the
challenge to the Arbitral Award on merits, it is incumbent upon this
Court to determine whether the petition itself has been instituted
within the period prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act. If the
petition is found to be barred by limitation, the enquiry must
necessarily end there, as the Court cannot assume jurisdiction contrary
to the express legislative mandate.
9. The controversy in the present case essentially turns upon the
interpretation and interplay of Sections 31(5) and 34(3) of the Act. For
appreciating the rival submissions, it would be apposite to reproduce
the relevant statutory provisions:
“31. Form and contents of arbitral award.-
(5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be
delivered to each party.
34. Application for setting aside arbitral award-
3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three
months have elapsed from the date on which the party making
that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request
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Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
Signing Date:12.07.2026
16:40:24
had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that
request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within
the said period of three months it may entertain the application
within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”
10. The scheme of the statute is clear. Section 31(5) stipulates the
manner in which the Arbitral Award is to be delivered. Section 34(3),
in turn, links the commencement of limitation to the receipt of the
Arbitral Award. The two provisions are not independent of each other
but constitute an integrated statutory scheme. The expression “had
received the arbitral award” occurring in Section 34(3) necessarily
refers to receipt in the manner contemplated under Section 31(5).
11. The limitation under Section 34(3) commences only upon
delivery of the signed copy of the Arbitral Award in accordance with
Section 31(5). The requirement of delivery is not an empty formality
but a statutory safeguard intended to ensure certainty regarding the
commencement of limitation.
12. Equally well settled, however, is the principle that once the
statutory requirement of delivery stands satisfied, the commencement
of limitation cannot be deferred by reference to the internal
administrative functioning of a litigant. Section 34(3) does not
postpone limitation until the award reaches the officer competent to
sanction litigation, nor does it make limitation contingent upon
movement of files within a department. The statute speaks only of
receipt of the Arbitral Award in accordance with Section 31(5).
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Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
Signing Date:12.07.2026
16:40:24
13. In the present case, the material on record unmistakably
establishes that the learned Sole Arbitrator, by e-mail dated
21.08.2023, transmitted a scanned signed copy of the Arbitral Award
simultaneously to the parties and their respective learned counsel,
specifically recording that the communication was being issued in
compliance with Section 31(5) of the Act. The authenticity of the said
communication has not been disputed by the Petitioner. Nor has it
been suggested that the document attached thereto was anything other
than a scanned signed copy of the Arbitral Award.
14. The principal submission of the Petitioner is that
notwithstanding the aforesaid communication, limitation could
commence only upon receipt of the signed hard copy on 03.01.2024.
This submission cannot be accepted.
15. Section 31(5) requires delivery of a signed copy of the Arbitral
Award. It does not prescribe the mode through which such delivery
must necessarily be effected. The provision does not mandate that
delivery can only be by physical dispatch or by a certified hard copy.
Once the learned Arbitrator himself transmitted a scanned signed copy
of the Arbitral Award to the parties through the very mode adopted
during the arbitral proceedings, and the authenticity of such
communication remains unquestioned, the statutory requirement under
Section 31(5) stood duly complied with.
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Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
Signing Date:12.07.2026
16:40:24
16. As we move forward towards scrutinizing the contents of the
affidavit filed pursuant to the directions of this Court, we find that the
averments made therein does not in any manner advance the
Petitioner’s case. On the contrary, it records that the office of the
Chief Engineer became aware of the Arbitral Award in 22.11.2023,
and thereafter initiated internal administrative processes for obtaining
approvals, engaging counsel and collecting the hard copy of the
award. Even assuming the correctness of the chronology disclosed in
the affidavit to be a gospel truth, it merely demonstrates the
Petitioner's internal administrative movement after the award had
already been validly delivered on 21.08.2023. According to this Court,
such internal processes are wholly irrelevant for determining the
commencement of limitation under Section 34(3).
17. The contention that Mr. Yatesh Kumar Sharma was not the
competent authority to receive the Arbitral Award is equally
untenable. Learned Counsel for the Respondent also submits that
throughout the arbitral proceedings, communications issued by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal were consistently exchanged through the
very same e-mail address. Having accepted that mode of
communication during the arbitral proceedings, the Petitioner cannot
now be permitted to contend that delivery of the Arbitral Award
through the same channel did not constitute valid delivery under
Section 31(5). A litigant cannot approbate and reprobate in the same
breath.
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Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
Signing Date:12.07.2026
16:40:24
18. In the present case, there is no dispute that upon pronouncement
of the award, the learned Sole Arbitrator, by an e-mail dated
21.08.2023, forwarded a scanned signed copy of the Arbitral Award to
both the parties as well as to their learned Counsel. The said
communication specifically recorded that the transmission was being
effected in compliance with Section 31(5) of the Act.
19. It is also to be noted that the Petitioner is not denying the
communication of the Arbitral Award to Mr. Yatesh Kumar Sharma
nor has objected to receipt of the e-mail, which had the Arbitral
Award as an attachment. The principal endeavour of the Petitioner is
to contend that the communication dated 21.08.2023 cannot be treated
as valid delivery under Section 31(5), as the same was addressed to
Mr. Yatesh Kumar Sharma, who, according to the Petitioner, was not
the competent authority authorised to take a decision regarding
institution of proceedings under Section 34 of the Act.
20. This contention, in the considered opinion of this Court,
deserves to be rejected.
21. It is also to be noted that the learned Arbitrator did not transmit
the award to Mr. Yatesh Kumar Sharma alone. The communication
was simultaneously addressed to the learned counsel representing the
parties in the arbitral proceedings. The factum of receipt of the
communication has never been disputed. Indeed, the subsequent
conduct of the Petitioner itself indicates that it became aware of the
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Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
Signing Date:12.07.2026
16:40:24
award and initiated steps to challenge the same. The plea that the
communication did not reach the “competent authority” within the
Petitioner’s internal administrative hierarchy cannot postpone the
commencement of limitation envisaged under Section 34(3).
22. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that limitation under
Section 34(3) commenced on 21.08.2023, when the scanned signed
copy of the Arbitral Award was delivered by the learned Sole
Arbitrator in compliance with Section 31(5) of the Act.
23. Once the commencement of limitation is determined, the
consequences under Section 34(3) follow inexorably. The period of
three months prescribed by the statute, together with the further period
of thirty days contemplated by the proviso, constitutes the maximum
period within which the Court is empowered to entertain a petition
under Section 34. Beyond the said period, the jurisdiction of the Court
itself stands exhausted.
24. In the present case, the Registry notings disclose that the
present petition under Section 34 came to be instituted only on
25.04.2024. Thus, reckoned from 21.08.2023, the petition was
instituted long after the expiry of not only the prescribed period of
three months but also the further period of thirty days contemplated
under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act. The statutory embargo
engrafted in the expression “but not thereafter” therefore squarely
operates against the Petitioner.
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Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
Signing Date:12.07.2026
16:40:24
25. The legal position in this regard is no longer res integra . In
3
Union of India v. Popular Construction Co . , the Supreme Court held
that the expression “but not thereafter” contained in the proviso to
Section 34(3) amounts to an express exclusion of any power to
condone delay beyond the additional period of thirty days. The
principle has consistently been reaffirmed thereafter.
26. In My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality (P) Ltd. v.
4
Faridabad Implements (P) Ltd . , the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
the rigid language and statutory scheme of Section 34(3), read in the
light of Popular Construction Co. (supra) , leaves no room for
condonation of delay beyond the statutorily prescribed outer limit. The
Court reiterated that the legislative intent underlying Section 34(3) is
one of certainty and finality, and that the jurisdiction of the Court
cannot be enlarged on equitable considerations.
27. The same principle has been consistently applied by this Court,
holding that once the statutory outer limit prescribed under Section
34(3) stands crossed, the Court is rendered powerless to entertain the
petition.
28. Tested on the aforesaid principles, the explanation furnished by
the Petitioner regarding movement of files, internal approvals,
correspondence between departments, engagement of Counsel and
3
(2001) 8 SCC 470
4
(2025) 6 SCC 481
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Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
Signing Date:12.07.2026
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eventual collection of the hard copy cannot confer jurisdiction upon
this Court where the statute expressly withholds it. Administrative
delays within the organisation of a litigant cannot override an express
legislative mandate.
29. Accordingly, this Court holds that the scanned signed copy of
the Arbitral Award transmitted on 21.08.2023 constituted valid
delivery under Section 31(5) of the Act; limitation under Section 34(3)
commenced on that date; and the present petition, having been
instituted beyond the maximum period prescribed under the statute, is
barred by limitation.
30. Consequently, I.A. No.47512/ 2024 seeking condonation of
delay is dismissed.
31. As a necessary consequence, the petition under Section 34 of
the Act also stands dismissed as barred by limitation.
32. Since the application seeking condonation of delay in filing has
been rejected and the petition under Section 34 has been held to be
barred by limitation, no adjudication on the application seeking
condonation of delay in re-filing is warranted. The said application is
rendered infructuous and is disposed of accordingly.
33. Before parting, this Court wishes to record its resentment to the
recent alarming trend of Government Organization, like the petitioner
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Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
Signing Date:12.07.2026
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corporation and other authorities to assail Arbitral Award belatedly. In
most of these cases, this Court finds that although the government
might have had a good case on merits, but however due to
administrative lackadaisical and specific recalcitrance attitude at the
end of the handling officer, most of these government cases are lost on
technical grounds of limitation.
34. Although, the law of limitation as applicable for a challenge to
an Arbitral Award is well settled, this Court is unable to countenance
as to why time and again the Government keeps delaying the filing of
these proceedings, which obviously cannot be for any holy reasons.
The Government, which is the largest litigant has to pull up its socks
and put its own house in order, so as to take immediate corrective
measure, in order to avert further financial losses. This Court also
cannot be oblivious to the fact that immediate steps ought to be also
taken against all erring officers, who may be responsible for such a
delay.
35. In this regard, it is directed that the Secretary, Ministry of Law
& Justice constitute a high-level committee to examine the short
comings, including proposing departmental enquiries, so that these
kind of delay in filing objections to Arbitral Award, if any, is curtailed
to arrest further drain of public money.
36. The Registrar General of this Court is directed to send a copy of
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Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
Signing Date:12.07.2026
16:40:24
this judgment to the Secretary, Ministry of Law & Justice for its
necessary compliance.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J
JULY 7, 2026
ab
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Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
Signing Date:12.07.2026
16:40:24