THE STATE OF KARNATAKA vs MILAPCHAND S/O LATE JUGARAJ JAIN
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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HC-KAR
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WA No. 100205 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020069912025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD
RD
DATED THIS THE 23 DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
WRIT APPEAL NO. 100205 OF 2025 (KLR-RES)
BETWEEN:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
BENGALURU – 560 001.
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
BALLARI DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER, BALLARI – 583 101.
3. THE TAHASILDAR,
SANDUR TALUK,
OFFICE OF THE TAHASILDAR,
SANDUR, DIST: BALLARI – 583 101.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. RAKESH BILKI, GA)
AND:
Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench
MILAPCHAND S/O. LATE JUGARAJ JAIN,
AGE: 72 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE & BUSINESS,
R/O: NO.604 ‘C’ BLOCK, RAHEJA PARK,
MAGADI MAIN ROAD, BENGLAURU – 560 079.
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. K.L. PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR C/R)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S. 4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET-ASIDE THE ORDER DATED
16.11.2022 IN W.P.NO.104380/2022 (KLR-RES) PASSED BY THE
LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON’BLE COURT, AND DISMISS
THE WRIT PETITIONS IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
TO PASS ANY OTHER ORDER OR DIRECTION AS THIS HON’BLE
COURT DEEMS JUST AND PROPER UNDER THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE INCLUDING AWARD OF COST IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
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THIS WRIT APPEAL, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )
The appellant – State, being aggrieved by the order dated
16.11.2022 in Writ Petition No.104380/2022, is before us. The
order of the learned Single Judge is as follows:
“Petitioner claims to have purchased land bearing
survey No.134(part) measuring 1.33 acre situated at
Chikkanthapura of Sandur Taluk in Ballari district
through registered sale deed dated 18.01.2022 and in
pursuance of the same, the name of the petitioner was
mutated in the revenue records in respect of the
subject land.
2. Respondent No.2 initiated proceedings against
the petitioner for having purchased the subject land in
violation of Section 79A and 79B of the Karnataka Land
Reforms Act, 1961. The respondent No.2 by impugned
order dated 20.07.2015 declared the sale deed
executed in favour of the petitioner as null and void
and vested the land with the State Government free
from all encumbrance. Taking exception to the same
this writ petition is filed.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
submits that the lawful possession of the subject land
having not been taken, the impugned order passed by
the respondent No.2 stands abated in view of omission
of Section 79A and 79B of the Act with effect from
13.07.2020.
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4. Learned Additional Government Advocate
appearing for the respondent-State submits that
though several notices were issued to the concerned
Officer to furnish information as to whether lawful
possession has been taken or not, the Officer
concerned has not furnished. However, he submits that
the present petition is not maintainable, since the land
vested with the State Government free from all
encumbrances and the name of the Government is
mutated in the revenue records.
5. I have examined the submissions of learned
counsel for the parties.
6. Section 79A and 79B of the Karnataka land
Reforms Act, 1961 came to be omitted with effect from
13.07.2020 and respondents-State having not
produced any documents to establish that the lawful
possession of the subject land was taken, the
impugned order passed by the respondent No.2 stands
abated in view of the omission of the said provisions.
Even otherwise, the impugned order does not indicate
that the income of the petitioner or his family members
for the five years preceding the date of sale exceeds
more than 2 lakh per annum. Though the petitioner has
not the produced any documents the respondent No.2
in the absence of any material cannot hold that the
income of the petitioner or the average income of the
family members was more than 2 lakh per year for five
years preceding date of sale. Accordingly, I pass the
following:
ORDER
Writ Petition is allowed.
Impugned order the dated 20.07.2015 passed by
the respondent No.2 at Annexure-B is hereby quashed.
The respondent No.3 is hereby directed to delete the
name of the Government and restore the name of the
petitioner in the revenue records in respect of the
subject land within the 4 weeks from the date of receipt
of certified copy of this order.”
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2. Heard Sri. Rakesh Bilki, learned Additional
Government Advocate appearing for the appellants and Sri.
K.L. Patil, learned counsel appearing for the respondents and
have perused the material on record.
3. The order of the learned Single Judge is dated
16.11.2022. The subject appeal is preferred on 25.03.2025,
after a delay of 801 days. The application seeking condonation
of delay, initially preferred along with the appeal, reads as
follows:
“1. The above Appeal is filed by the Appellants/state
against the Order dated 16.11.2022 passed by the learned
Single Judgme of this Hon’ble High Court in
W.P.No.104380/2022 (KLR-RES)
2. It is submitted that, in the above appellants is
filed by challenged the order dated 16.11.2022 and
certificate the copy was applied on 21.11.2022 and after
obtaining the certificate copy of the legal opinion was sent
on 25.03.2023. After receipt of the said opinion letter was
sent 15.07.2023 for direction to Prl. Secretary regarding for
filing of writ appeal. On 29.08.2023 the Prl. Secretary
written a letter to Deputy Commissioner Ballary and on
26.09.2023 and 24.07.2024 the Government has sent
proposal to Deputy Commissioner Ballari for filing the
appeal and in pursuance of the said proposal on
10.12.2024, the Assistant Commissioner appointed LCO as
i.e., Government Order No.RD/131/LRA/2023 Bengaluru
dated 04.12.2024 and after that, the persons were sent to
file a writ appeal on 23.01.2025 and on work load the
appeal was not filed within time. In this process, some
delay has occurred in the present case.
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3. It is submitted that, the delay in filing the present
appeal is not intentional but due to the reasons stated
above.
4. It is submitted that, if the accompanying
application is not allowed, the Appellants will be put to
untold hardship and on the contrary, if the accompanying
application is allowed, the same will not cause any
prejudice to the Respondents.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court be
pleased to allow the application for condonation of delay
and condone the delay of 801 days in filing the above
appeal in the interest of justice and equity.”
4. This Court, on 30.06.2026, passed the following
order:
“I.A. No. 1/2025 filed for dispensation of production
of English translation copies of Annexures stated therein, is
allowed for the present.
I.A. No. 2/2025 filed for dispensation of production
of typed copies of Annexures stated therein, is allowed for
the present.
Learned counsel appearing for the caveator
requests for time to file objections to I.A. No. 3/2025.
The appellants to file better affidavit in terms of the
order dated 27.03.2026, copy of which to be served to
the counsel for the respondent.
Objections to I.A. No. 3/2025 to be filed within two
weeks from the date of receipt of such better affidavit.
Re-list the appeal on 20.07.2026.”
5. The State was directed to file a better affidavit
explaining the cause for delay of 801 days. The affidavit, which
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the State claims to be better than the one earlier filed, reads as
follows:
“I, Sri. Rajesha H.D. S/o Doddegouda, K.A.S, aged
42 years, presently working as Assistant Commissioner,
Ballari Sub-Division, Ballari, do hereby solemnly affirm
and state on oath as under;
I am the appellant No.2 in the above writ appeal
and as such I am convergent with the facts of the case
and the facts sworn to below;
1) In the writ petition No.104380/2022 filed by
Milapchand S/o Late Jugaraj Jain, the Hon'ble
Learned Single judge of this Hon'ble Court has set
aside the vesting order passed by the Assistant
Commissioner, Ballari in case No. Rev/LRM/79A &
79B/239/2011-12 dated 20.07.2015 for
transacting the impugned lands therein by
violating Sec.79A & 79B of the Karnataka Land
Reforms Act, 1961 and ordered R-3 to delete the
name of Government and restore the name of
petitioner in the revenue records.
2) Since, the said order of the learned Single Judge of
this Hon'ble Court is not consistent with the
amendment on saver clause provided under the
Government notification
No.DPAL/39/Shasana/2020 dated 13.07.2020 the
Government has decided to file writ appeal against
the said order.
3) Consequently, the G.O was issued granting
authorization to prefer writ appeal and the writ
appeal was filed and numbered as 100205/2025.
It has been communicated by the Government
Advocate through email dated 31.03.2026 that,
the matter was listed before the Hon'ble Court on
27.03.2026 and after hearing the Hon'ble Court
was pleased to direct to file better affidavit
explaining each day delay in filing the appeal,
hence this affidavit is filed.
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4) It is submitted that, the chronological events that
led to filing the writ appeal are as shown below;
Date Event
16.11.2022 Orders in W.P.No. 104380/2022 was
passed by the learned Single judge of
this Hon'ble Court
25.03.2023 The opinion of the Government
Advocate at Advocate General office at
Dharwad on fitness of appeal was
received.
15.07.2023 A letter was addressed by the Assistant
Commissioner to the Principal Secretary
Government and Head of the legal cell to
issue authorization for preferring writ
appeal against the orders of the Hon'ble
Learned Single Judge in the above writ
petition.
29.08.2023 Principal Secretary to Government
written the proposal with the direction to
sent the proposal through the Deputy
Commissioner Ballari is necessary.
26.09.2023
&
The Deputy Commissioner, Ballari
submitted proposal seeking
authorization of the Government to
prefer writ appeal.
24.07.2024
10.12.2024 The Government issued
G.O.No.RD/131/LRA/2023 appointing
the Assistant Commissioner, Ballari as
Litigation Conducting Officer and
authorizing to file writ appeal.
13.01.2025 Communication received through letter C
No.267214 directing the Assistant
Commissioner to take steps to file writ
appeal according to GO dated
10.12.2024.
25.03.2025 The Government Advocate, AG Office,
Dharwad filed the writ appeal and it was
number as FR 100174/2025 and later
numbered as WA No. 100205/2025.
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5) Therefore, it is humbly submitted that, the delay
of 801days in filing the above writ appeal is due to
official correspondences as narrated above in
seeking authorization from the Government to
prefer the writ appeal. Hence, it is submitted that,
the appellants have got highest regard and
reverence to the orders of this Hon'ble Court and
the delay caused is for the above explained
bonafide reason and there is no intentional delay
in preferring writ appeal after 801 days.
Therefore, it is humbly prayed to this Hon'ble
Court to kindly condone the delay caused in preferring
the writ appeal and the same may kindly be admitted
and taken up for consideration.”
6. The affidavit also does not take the cause of the
State any further. The writ petition is disposed on 16.11.2022.
Immediately thereafter, the Government is said to have
rendered an opinion of the case being fit to file an appeal.
Despite the Government Advocate of the Advocate General's
Office rendering the opinion, no action was taken for five
months. Communications then began from 26.09.2023 onwards
and finally reached the Advocate General's Office on
13.01.2025 and on 25.03.2025, two months thereafter, the
subject appeal was preferred. Therefore, there is delay at every
step, and the explanation for the said delay can hardly be said
to be satisfactory.
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7. The Apex Court, in its latest judgment rendered in
the case of STATE OF ODISHA v. MANAGING COMMITTEE
1
OF NAMATARA GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL , has observed that
the delay must be satisfactorily explained and not by lame
excuses, and has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
12. No cause, much less sufficient cause, has been
shown for exercise of discretion in favour of the State of
Odisha. The nature of explanation in the application for
condonation of delay is such that with much ado, the
proceedings could be closed.
13. However, since there is a long line of decisions
of this Court propounding the law that the expression
‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature in Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to enable
the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which
subserves the ends of justice and in view of the
submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have considered it
appropriate to consider the matter in some depth.
14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land
9
Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji , a coordinate Bench
noting that the justifiably liberal approach which this
Court has been adopting in matters instituted before it is
not being followed by the courts lower in the hierarchy,
mandated that a justice oriented approach is indeed
called for when a ‘State’ seeks condonation of delay as
distinguished from ‘a private party’.
15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon'ble
Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate
10
Bench in G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer had
1
2026 SCC OnLine SC 191
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referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14 and quoted the
following passage therefrom:
“When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have
vested right in injustice being done because of a
non-deliberate delay …
It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to legalise
injustice on technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is expected to
do so.”
Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it
was held as under:
15. In litigations to which Government is a
party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps,
cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by
Government are lost for such defaults, no person
is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate
analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions
of Government are collective and institutional
decisions and do not share the characteristics of
decisions of private individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the
same for a private citizen as for governmental
authorities. Government, like any other litigant
must take responsibility for the acts or omissions
of its officers. But a somewhat different
complexion is imparted to the matter where
Government makes out a case where public
interest was shown to have suffered owing to
acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its
officers or agents and where the officers were
clearly at cross-purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a
particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause” for
purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be
somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the
considerations that go into the judicial verdict,
these factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the
government. Governmental decisions are
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proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the
process of their making. A certain amount of
latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is
rightly said that those who bear responsibility of
Government must have “a little play at the
joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on
governmental functioning — of course, within
reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial
approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It
would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
government and private parties on the same
footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in
the very nature of governmental functioning is
procedural delay incidental to the decision-
making process. In the opinion of the High Court,
the conduct of the law officers of the Government
placed the Government in a predicament and that
it was one of those cases where the mala fides of
the officers should not be imputed to
Government. It relied upon and trusted its law
officers. …
16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were
consistently followed by this Court until adoption of a
different and seemingly strict approach while dealing with
applications for condonation of delay during the last
decade and a half became discernible starting with the
decision in Postmaster General v. Living Media India
11
Limited , where a delay of 427 days in filing the relevant
special leave petition was not condoned. University of
12
Delhi v. Union of India is another decision (of a three-
Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of 916 days was
not condoned. While upholding the decision of the
relevant high court under challenge refusing to condone
the delay of 5659 days in presentation of an appeal under
Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs
of a deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in Pathapati
13
Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA) very recently reiterated
that the law of limitation is founded on public policy, the
object is that a legal remedy is put to an end so that no
litigation remains pending for an indefinite period. It was
also held, departing from the earlier view, that the merits
of the case cannot be considered at the stage of
considering the application for condonation of delay.
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17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj
14
Singh v. Union of India authoring the judgment for a
coordinate Bench adopted the view taken in Katiji
(supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other
decisions following the same while not interfering with an
order of condonation of delay passed by the relevant high
court. However, it was observed that a distinction
ought to be drawn between an ‘explanation’ and an
‘excuse’ that is proffered as cause for condonation
of delay. It was also emphasized that a different
approach has to be adopted while this Court is
considering an application for condonation of delay
in presentation of an appeal/application and when
it sits in appeal over a discretionary order of the
high court granting the prayer for condonation of
delay. In the case of the former, whether to
condone or not would be the only question whereas
in the latter, whether there has been proper
exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the
prayer for condonation has to be examined.
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in
any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda
(supra) adopting a liberal approach is the exasperation
and consequent lament expressed by none other than
Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a
brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v.
15
Amateur Riders Club, Bombay and admonishing officers
of the “revenue” in not acting with promptitude. This
order was made within six years of the decision in
Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than quoting
the same in its entirety hereunder:
1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda,
learned senior counsel for the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on
November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. For
quite some time in the past, this Court has been
making observations as to the grave prejudice
caused to public interest by appeals brought on
behalf of the Government being lost on the point
of limitation. Such observations have been made
for over a few years in the past. But there seems
to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent
in the present petition which is filed in November
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1993. The explanation for the delay, had better
be set out in petitioner's own words:
“( g ) The Advocate-on-Record
got the special leave petition drafted
from the drafting Advocate and sent
the same for approval to the Board on
June 24, 1993 along with the case file.
( h ) The Board returned the case file to
the Advocate-on-Record on July 9,
1993 who re-sent the same to the
Board on September 20, 1993
requesting that draft SLP was not
approved by the Board. The Board
after approving the draft SLP sent this
file to CAS on October 1, 1993.”
3. This explanation is incapable of
furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for
condonation of delay. After the earlier
observations of this Court made in several cases
in the past, we hoped that the matters might
improve. There seems to be no visible support for
this optimism. There is a point beyond which
even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the
litigant is Government which is itself under the
shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having
regard to the law of limitation which binds
everybody, we cannot find any way of granting
relief. It is true that Government should not be
treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in
the case of the former the decisions to present
and prosecute appeals are not individual but are
institutional decisions necessarily bogged down
by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to
this also. Even with all this latitude, the
explanation offered for the delay in this case
merely serves to aggravate the attitude of
indifference of the Revenue in protecting its
common interests. The affidavit is again one of
the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible
to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem
to attach any importance to the need for
promptitude even where it affects its own
interest.
4. The application for condonation of delay
is, accordingly, dismissed. The special leave
petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by
time.
(emphasis ours)
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19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur
Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt
that it did not take much time for this Court to lose hope.
It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in
Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much
optimism that matters would improve. Their Lordships,
however, found no visible support for such
optimism and the Court's patience having been
tested to the extreme limit, held that there is a
point beyond which even the courts cannot help a
litigant even if the litigant labouring under the
shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the
Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be
utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before
the High Court but also before this Court.
Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as
time-barred by the High Court, this Court has been
approached by the State of Odisha four months
after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed
as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of
the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite
all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of
the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown
here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation
but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of
discretion has been set up.
22. The applications for condonation of delay in
filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay
in re-filing the same, thus, stand rejected, with the result
that the special leave petition stands dismissed as time-
barred.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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In the light of the afore-quoted judgment of the Apex Court and
in our considered view, the explanation of the State cannot but
be said to be lame, as for 801 days, the files were supposed to
be moving from one table to another. This cannot become a
ground to condone the delay merely because the State has
preferred the appeal before us.
8. For the aforesaid reasons, the application seeking
condonation of delay stands rejected . Consequently, the
appeal is rejected .
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE
RSH/CT: ASC
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 33