R.Thanigai Arasu vs M.K.Balamurugan

Court
Madras High Court

CRL A.No.1435 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF MADRAS
Reserved on : 22.09.2026
Pronounced on : 13.11.2026
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE M.NIRMALKUMAR
CRL.A.No.1435 of 2025

R.Thanigai Arasu ... Appellant / Complainant

Vs.
M.K.Balamurugan ... Respondent / Accused

PRAYER: Criminal Appeal filed under Section 419(4) of BNSS, to
call for the entire records connected with the order passed by the
learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai, in Crl.A.No.277 of 2017,
dated 03.12.2024 in which the order of conviction and sentence
passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, FTC-II, Egmore at
Allikulam, Chennai in C.C.No.17 of 2010, dated 29.08.2017,
convicting the Respondent / Accused under Section 138 of N.I.Act,
1881, sentenced him to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of
one year and to pay a compensation of Rs.40,89,011.46, to the
complainant within one month was set aside and confirm the
Judgment passed by the trial Court in C.C.No.17 of 2010, dated
29.08.2017.

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For Appellant : Mr.K.Thilageswaran

For Respondent : Mr.V.V.Sairam
For Mr.S.Nagarajan
JUDGMENT
The complainant in C.C.No.17 of 2010, on the file of the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court-II, Egmore at Allikulam,
Chennai, is the appellant herein, while the accused in the said case is
the respondent herein. By judgment dated 29.08.2017, the trial Court
found the respondent guilty of the offence punishable under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to
as “the N.I. Act”), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of one year under Section 255(2) Cr.P.C.
The trial Court also directed the respondent to pay a sum of
Rs.40,89,011.46 as compensation to the complainant under Section
357(3) Cr.P.C. read with Section 138 of the N.I. Act, within a period of
one month, failing which, directed to undergo simple imprisonment
for a further period of three months.
2. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and sentence, the
respondent preferred an Appeal in Crl.A.No.277 of 2017, before the
learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai. The appeal was initially
dismissed by Judgment, dated 24.07.2018, thereby, confirming the
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CRL A.No.1435 of 2025
conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court. However, this
Court, by order dated 28.06.2024 in Crl.R.C.No.590 of 2019, set
aside the said Judgment and remitted the appeal to the learned
Principal Sessions Judge for fresh consideration, on the limited
ground that the respondent not afforded an opportunity of being
heard in the Appeal. Upon remand, the learned Principal Sessions
Judge, by Judgment dated 03.12.2024, allowed the Appeal, set aside
the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the respondent of the
charge under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Aggrieved by the order of
acquittal, the complainant has preferred the present appeal.
3. The case of the complainant, in brief, is as follows:
(i) The complainant is an Engineer and runs a workshop under
the name and style of “Padmini Engineers” at No.2-A/9, Tank Bund
Road, Ottery, Chennai. The accused is his college mate. In the year
2004, the accused approached the complainant and requested
financial assistance to meet the expenses of his marriage.
Accordingly, the complainant met the marriage and related expenses
of the accused by using his credit cards and availing personal loans.
An add-on card linked to the complainant’s credit card account was
also made available to the accused. On another occasion, the accused
persuaded the complainant to assist him in meeting the initial
expenses of a new venture styled “India Projects”, for which purpose
the complainant raised funds from other sources. The accused
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CRL A.No.1435 of 2025
undertook to repay the amounts so incurred, together with interest
charged by the banks.
(ii). The accused failed to repay the amounts. When the banks
issuing the credit cards sent reminders regarding the outstanding
dues, the complainant called upon the accused to settle both the
credit card dues and the amounts advanced for “India Projects”. As
the accused failed to do so, the complainant lodged a complaint
before the Commissioner of Police on 12.10.2007, which was
forwarded to the Ayanavaram Police Station. During this period, the
accused issued two cheques, bearing Nos.893051 for
Rs.13,44,505.73 and 893052 for Rs.7,00,000/-, both dated 14.02.2009
and drawn on United Bank of India, Nungambakkam Branch, towards
partial discharge of the liability. Both cheques were returned unpaid
for want of sufficient funds, when presented. When the complainant
informed the accused of the dishonour, the accused came and took
back the said cheques and issued a fresh cheque bearing No.893053,
dated 10.08.2009, for Rs.20,44,505.73, drawn on United Bank of
India, Nungambakkam Branch, assuring the complainant that the
cheque would be honoured.
(iii) . The complainant presented the Cheque (Ex.P1) for
collection through his banker, Indian Bank, Ayanavaram Branch, on
23.09.2009. However, the cheque returned unpaid on 24.09.2009
with an endorsement “Insufficient Funds” (Ex.P2), and the return
memo received by the complainant on 25.09.2009. Thereafter, the
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CRL A.No.1435 of 2025
complainant, through his counsel, issued a statutory notice, dated
08.10.2009 (Ex.P3), through Registered Post With Acknowledgement
due, calling upon the accused to pay the cheque amount within
fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice. The notice
delivered at the accused’s address on 10.10.2009 and received by a
person at his residence, as evidenced by the acknowledgement card
(Ex.P4). The accused neither paid the cheque amount nor sent any
reply to the notice. Consequently, the complainant lodged the
complaint on 07.11.2009 before the learned V Metropolitan
Magistrate, Egmore. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the
complaint and subsequently made over the case to the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court-II, Egmore, for trial.
4. When the accused appeared, the substance of the accusation
explained to him, he pleaded not guilty.
5. To prove the case, the complainant examined himself as PW1
and marked Exs.P1 to P11, namely, the cheque (Ex.P1), return memo
with debit advice (Ex.P2), statutory notice (Ex.P3), acknowledgement
card (Ex.P4), his income tax statements for different periods (Exs.P5
to P8), e-mail communications between himself and the accused
(Ex.P9), his credit card statement (Ex.P10) and his loan account
statement (Ex.P11).
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CRL A.No.1435 of 2025
6. When examined under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C. with
reference to the incriminating circumstances appearing against him,
the accused merely denied the evidence as false and stated that the
documents produced by the complainant had no connection with the
case. He did not examine any witness on his behalf, despite having
afforded ample opportunity to do so. However, during cross-
examination of P.W.1, the accused marked Exs.D1 to D11, namely, the
complaint lodged by the complainant before the Commissioner of
Police on 12.10.2007 (Ex.D1); the petition filed under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. (Ex.D2); the F.I.R. registered in Crime No.154 of 2008 on the
file of K-2 Ayanavaram Police Station, for offences under Sections
406, 418 and 420 IPC (Ex.D3); the orders passed by this Court in
Crl.O.P.Nos.13663 of 2008 and 16348 of 2009 (Exs.D4 and D6); the
police notice intimating the closure of the F.I.R. (Ex.D5); the closure
report (Ex.D7); the protest petition filed by the complainant (Ex.D8);
the order accepting the closure report (Ex.D9); and two statutory
notices dated 28.07.2009 issued by the complainant (Exs.D10 and
D11).
7. The defence of the accused, as emerging from the cross-
examination of P.W.1 and the submissions made on his behalf, is that
he was a friend of the complainant and used the complainant’s office
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CRL A.No.1435 of 2025
and computers for his business purposes. According to him,
differences arose between them in the year 2007, following which he
stopped visiting the complainant’s office. He further claimed that,
while leaving the office, he left behind certain signed cheques, which
subsequently misused by the complainant. The accused also
contended that the complainant failed to establish the alleged
lending, which was not reflected in his income tax returns, credit
card statements or loan statements. He further pointed out that the
earlier police complaint closed as a mistake of fact; no material
produced to establish the alleged add-on card facility; the statutory
notice not served on him, as the acknowledgement card bore the
signature of one Rajeswari and not his own.
8. The learned Magistrate held that the statutory requirements
for attracting Section 138 of the N.I. Act had satisfied and the notice
was deemed to have been duly served on the accused. The accused
not disputed his signature on Ex.P1 and, consequently, the statutory
presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act stood
attracted. Holding that the accused failed to rebut those
presumptions, the learned Magistrate placed reliance on the e-mails
(Ex.P9), in which the accused allegedly acknowledged his liability to
pay the complainant and expressed his willingness to settle the same.
The learned Magistrate also found that the defence relating to the
alleged abandonment of signed cheques neither satisfactorily
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CRL A.No.1435 of 2025
explained nor established and the accused not issued any reply to the
statutory notice. On these grounds, the learned Magistrate convicted
and sentenced the accused as stated above.
9 . The learned Principal Sessions Judge, upon remand, took a
different view. The learned Principal Sessions Judge held that the
statutory notice not duly served on the accused, since it had received
by a woman named Rajeswari, whose relationship with the accused,
particularly that she was his mother, had not established. He further
held that the defence of the accused that the cheque had misused by
the complainant was probable and, therefore, acceptable. The
learned Principal Sessions Judge also observed that the complainant
not produced any documents or books of account to substantiate the
alleged lending. The credit card statements stood in the name of the
complainant and the e-mails relied upon by the complainant did not
amount to an admission of liability. The complainant had taken
inconsistent stands in the documents marked as Exs.D1 to D8. The
learned Principal Sessions Judge also observed that the legal
proposition laid down in K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan could not be
disputed. On the aforesaid points, he allowed the appeal, set aside
the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the accused.
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CRL A.No.1435 of 2025
10. Mr.K.Thilageswaran, learned counsel for the appellant,
would submit that the address to which Ex.P3 sent is the accused’s
own address and never denied. The very same address is given by the
accused in his earlier revision and in the appeal, and it is the address
at which the Court notices served when he remained absent in the
appeal. The notice sent by registered post with acknowledgement
due and was delivered. The finding that service not proved is,
therefore, erroneous and the decision of the three-Judge Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in C.C.Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed
(MANU/SC/2263/2007) , which supports the complainant on service
of notice, was misread. A decision of a three-Judge Bench binds the
Benches of lesser strength, and any decision to the contrary is per
incuriam.
11. The learned counsel would further submit that the accused
never denied that Mrs.Rajeswari is his mother. The F.I.R. (Ex.D3) and
the petition under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. (Ex.D2), marked by the
accused himself, name Kannan, as the father and Rajeswari, wife of
Kannan, as the mother, all residing at No.15, Bala Arunachala Street.
The accused did not put even a single question to PW1 about the
service of notice during an elaborate cross-examination. The
signature on Ex.P1 is admitted. The accused has not entered the
witness box, not lodged any police complaint about the alleged loss
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CRL A.No.1435 of 2025
or misuse of the cheques, and has not issued any stop-payment
instruction to his bank. He has not explained why signed cheques left
at the complainant’s office. The finding that the version of the
accused is more probable is, therefore, unsustainable.
12. It is his further submission that the loan, the marriage and
“India Projects” never denied. The complainant proved his case
through Exs.P1 to P11. The Income Tax statements (Exs.P5 to P8),
including Ex.P8 which reflects the loan to the accused, the e-mails
(Ex.P9) in which the accused admitted his liability and promised to
clear the dues, and the credit card statement (Ex.P10), which shows
the add-on card in the accused’s name, establish the liability. The
learned Principal Sessions Judge failed to treat Ex.P9 as an
admission, mechanically held that the non-production of books of
accounts favoured the defence, and ignored the statutory
presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act laid down in
K.N.Beena v. Muniyappan and another reported in 2001 (8) SCC
458 . The cheque was presented within its validity, the notice issued
within thirty days with fifteen days’ time to pay, and the complaint
filed within time. As the accused not entered the witness box, an
adverse inference has to be drawn against him.
13 . Mr.V.V.Sairam, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent, would submit that the statutory notice not served on the
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CRL A.No.1435 of 2025
respondent, as the acknowledgement card bears the signature of
Rajeswari and there is no proof that the notice was received by the
respondent himself. The cheque in question was one among the
signed cheques allegedly left behind by the respondent at the
complainant’s office after their relationship became strained and the
complainant subsequently misused the same. According to the
learned counsel, the complainant failed to establish the alleged
lending or the circumstances in which the substantial amount of
Rs.20,44,505.73 advanced to the respondent. The credit card
statements stood in the complainant’s name, the alleged add-on card
facility and the use of the same by the respondent not satisfactorily
established The complainant not produced the relevant books of
account or other supporting documents to establish that the amounts
claimed under the cheque actually incurred or advanced for the
benefit of the respondent. The earlier complaint lodged by the
complainant has closed as a mistake-of-fact and the documents
marked as Exs.D1 to D8 disclose inconsistencies in the complainant’s
version. The e-mails relied upon by the complainant do not constitute
an admission of the liability covered by the cheque. In support of his
submissions, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajaram Sriraulu Naidu (Since
Deceased) Through L.Rs. v. Maruthachalam (Since Deceased)
Through L.Rs., reported in AIR 2023 Supreme Court 471 , and
the judgment in Jayamma and Another v. State of Karnataka and
Lachma s/o Chandyanaika and Another v. State of Karnataka,
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CRL A.No.1435 of 2025
arising out of Criminal Appeal Nos.758 of 2018 and 573 of 2016,
respectively. He therefore submitted that the complainant failed to
establish the legally enforceable liability underlying the cheque and
the acquittal recorded by the learned Principal Sessions Judge did
not warrant interference.

14. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the
learned counsel for the respondent and perused the materials
available on record.
15. The following points arise for consideration:
(i) Whether the complainant complied
with the statutory requirements under the proviso
to Section 138 of the N.I. Act, and in particular
whether the statutory notice (Ex.P3) stands served
on the accused in law?
(ii) Whether the accused rebutted the
presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the
N.I. Act by raising a probable defence, and whether
the findings of the learned Principal Sessions Judge
to the contrary are perverse or contrary to law?
(iii) Whether the order of acquittal is
liable to be set aside, and if so, what sentence and
compensation should follow?
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16. This is an appeal against a judgment of acquittal rendered
by the lower appellate Court, which reversed the conviction recorded
by the trial Court. This Court is conscious that an order of acquittal
reinforces the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and
that, where two reasonable views are possible on the evidence on
record, the view favourable to the accused ought not to be disturbed.
However, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Chandrappa and Others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC
415 , the appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and
reconsider the evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded
and to arrive at its own conclusions on questions of fact and law.
Interference is warranted where the findings are perverse, based on
a misreading or disregard of material evidence, or founded on an
erroneous application of law. In the present appeal, which arises from
a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the Court must also
examine whether the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and
139 of the N.I. Act, once attracted, have been correctly applied and
whether the respondent has rebutted those presumptions in
accordance with law.
17. Section 138 of the N.I. Act makes the dishonour of a
cheque, drawn by a person on an account maintained by him for the
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CRL A.No.1435 of 2025
discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, an
offence if the cheque is returned unpaid for insufficiency of funds or
where the amount exceeds the arrangement made with the bank. The
offence is subject to the conditions stipulated in the provisos to the
section, namely, presentation of the cheque within its period of
validity, issuance of a written demand notice to the drawer within
thirty days of receipt of information regarding dishonour, and failure
of the drawer to make payment within fifteen days of receipt of the
notice. Under Section 142(1)(b), the complaint must be filed within
one month from the date on which the cause of action arises, namely,
upon expiry of the fifteen-day period stipulated in proviso (c) to
Section 138, subject to the Court's power to condone the delay for
sufficient cause.
18. Section 118(a) of the N.I. Act raises a presumption, until
the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or
drawn for consideration. Section 139 further raises a presumption,
unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received it
for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. In
Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 , a three-Judge Bench
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the presumption under
Section 139 includes the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability. The Court also clarified that the observations in Krishna
Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54 , to the
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CRL A.No.1435 of 2025
contrary were not correct to that extent. The presumptions under
Sections 118(a) and 139 are rebuttable. The accused is not required
to rebut them beyond reasonable doubt; it is sufficient if the accused
raises a probable defence on the standard of preponderance of
probabilities. In doing so, the accused may either adduce evidence or
rely upon the materials already available on record, including the
evidence elicited during the cross-examination of the complainant. A
mere denial of the liability, without anything on record rendering the
defence probable, would not suffice. Further, in Basalingappa v.
Mudibasappa reported in (2019) 5 SCC 418 , the Hon’ble Supreme
Court reiterated that once the accused raises a probable defence and
thereby rebuts the statutory presumption, the evidential burden
shifts back to the complainant to establish the legally enforceable
debt or liability.
19 . The dates are not in dispute. Ex.P1, dated 10.08.2009, was
presented on 23.09.2009, well within its period of validity of three
months, and returned unpaid on 24.09.2009 with the endorsement
“Insufficient Funds” (Ex.P2). The statutory notice (Ex.P3) issued on
08.10.2009, within thirty days of receipt of information regarding the
dishonour, demanding payment of the cheque amount of
Rs.20,44,505.73 within fifteen days of its receipt. The
acknowledgement card (Ex.P4) evidences delivery at the accused's
address on 10.10.2009. The period of fifteen days expired on
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25.10.2009, and the complaint was filed on 07.11.2009, within one
month from the date on which the cause of action arose. Thus, the
requirements of Section 138 and Section 142 of the N.I. Act stand
satisfied on the face of the record, subject to the question of service
of the statutory notice.
20 . The learned Principal Sessions Judge rejected the
complainant's case of service on the ground that the
acknowledgement card bore the signature of one Rajeswari and her
relationship with the accused, particularly as his mother, not
established. This approach, overlooks the settled legal position laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty
Muhammed, reported in (2007) 6 SCC 555 . A three-Judge Bench
held that where a notice is sent by registered post, correctly
addressed to the drawer of the cheque, the statutory requirement
under proviso (b) to Section 138 stands complied with, and a
presumption of service arises under Section 27 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897, read with Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
The presumption is rebuttable, and the burden is on the drawer to
establish that the notice was not served, that the address was
incorrect, or that the letter was never tendered or delivered. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that a drawer who claims
non-receipt of notice but, upon receiving summons in the complaint,
fails to make payment within fifteen days cannot thereafter rely upon
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such non-receipt to contend that the statutory requirement was not
complied with. The learned Principal Sessions Judge was bound by
this declaration of law. Any contrary view expressed by a Bench of
lesser strength could not prevail over the decision of the three-Judge
Bench.
21 . In the present case, the material on record provides further
support for the complainant's case regarding service. The address in
Ex.P3 is No.15, Bala Arunachala Street, Washermanpet, Chennai-21.
The same address is shown as the address of the accused in the
cause title of the complaint, in the summons served on him, and in
the F.I.R. and the petition under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. (Exs.D3 and
D2 respectively), both of which were marked by the accused himself.
The appellant pointed out that the same address furnished by the
accused in the revision and the appeal filed by him. The accused not
disputed that he resided at the said address or that the address
mentioned in Ex.P3 was incorrect. The learned Magistrate was,
therefore, justified in taking note of the fact that the notice had been
sent to the accused's admitted address and that there was no
material to rebut the presumption arising from such dispatch and
delivery.
22. As regards the identity of the person who received the
notice, the finding of the learned Principal Sessions Judge does not
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take into account the material available in the accused's own
documents. The accused himself marked Ex.D3, the F.I.R. in Crime
No.154 of 2008, which identifies the respondent as accused No.1,
Kannan as accused No.2 and “Rajeswari, W/o. Kannan” as accused
No.3, all residing at No.15, Bala Arunachala Street, Washermanpet.
The petition under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. (Ex.D2), also marked by the
accused, describes the respondent as the son of M.Kannan and
arrays “K.Rajeswari, W/o.Kannan” as one of the respondents residing
at the very same address. The complainant had also stated in that
petition that he had informed the respondent's father, mother and
wife about the dues. These documents, emanating from the accused
himself, lend support to the complainant's case that Rajeswari was a
member of the respondent's family residing at the address to which
the statutory notice sent. Significantly, nothing was elicited from
P.W.1 in cross-examination to suggest that the notice not delivered at
the accused's residence or that Rajeswari not a member of his family.
Nor was such a specific circumstance put to the accused in his
examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The acknowledgement card
(Ex.P4), therefore, cannot be considered in isolation. Read along with
Exs.D2 and D3, it supports the inference that the notice sent to the
accused's admitted residential address was delivered to a member of
his household. The accused not examined himself or the postman, or
adduce any other evidence to rebut that inference. In these
circumstances, the finding that service of notice not established is
unsustainable.
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23. It is also relevant that the accused did not issue any reply to
the statutory notice disputing the liability or alleging that the cheque
misused. Though the absence of a reply, by itself, cannot establish
service or prove the liability, it is a circumstance that may be
considered along with the other materials on record. As rightly noted
by the learned Magistrate, the plea of non-service not even put to
P.W.1 during cross-examination. The cumulative effect of the admitted
address, acknowledgement card and accused's own documents
identifying Rajeswari as a member of the family residing at the same
address leads to the conclusion that the statutory notice duly served.
Accordingly, Point No.(i) is answered in favour of the complainant. I
hold that the statutory notice stands served on the accused and the
preconditions relating to notice under Section 138 of the N.I. Act
have been satisfied.
24. Further, the accused never disputed his signature on Ex.P1,
and the trial Court specifically recorded that the signature not in
dispute. Consequently, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and
139 of the N.I. Act operate in favour of the complainant. The
evidential burden of rebutting those presumptions was, therefore, on
the accused. The complainant, in addition to relying upon the
statutory presumptions, furnished a consistent account of the origin
of the liability in the complaint, the police complaint lodged in 2007
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(Ex.D1), the petition under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. (Ex.D2), his proof
affidavit and his cross-examination. He also produced documents in
support of his version.
25. The defence put forth by the accused is that the cheque was
one among the signed cheques allegedly left behind by him at the
complainant's office after their relationship became strained in 2007
and the complainant subsequently misused it. On an examination of
the evidence and the circumstances on record, this defence does not
appear probable, for the following reasons: (a) Though the accused
not required to enter the witness box or adduce independent
evidence and could have relied upon the materials elicited during the
cross-examination of P.W.1, no material brought out in such cross-
examination to lend support to his plea of misuse. (b) The accused
not lodged any police complaint or issue any stop-payment
instruction alleging loss or misuse of the signed cheques, despite the
alleged circumstances in which they were said to have left behind. (c)
He offered no explanation as to why signed cheques were left in the
complainant's office in the first place. (d) The cheque in question is
dated 10.08.2009, whereas, according to the defence, the
relationship between the parties broken down in 2007. There is no
explanation as to how a cheque bearing a date nearly two years later
came to be misused by the complainant. Nor did the accused offer
any explanation as to how the amount of Rs.20,44,505.73,
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representing the exact aggregate of the two earlier cheques for
Rs.13,44,505.73 and Rs.7,00,000/-, came to be filled in. (e) The
complainant's specific version that the two earlier dishonoured
cheques replaced by the present cheque not effectively challenged by
the accused. (f) The accused not issued any reply to the statutory
notice disputing the liability or alleging misuse of the cheque. These
circumstances, considered cumulatively, not supportted the defence
of misuse. The finding of the learned Principal Sessions Judge that
the version of the accused was more probable is not borne out by the
materials on record. I am, therefore, unable to accept that the
accused has raised a probable defence to rebut the statutory
presumptions.
26. The learned Principal Sessions Judge also erred in holding
that the liability not proved. The complainant's case regarding the
financial assistance extended towards the accused's marriage
expenses in 2004 and the subsequent expenditure incurred for the
venture known as "India Projects" not effectively challenged in the
cross-examination of P.W.1. More importantly, Ex.P9, the e-mails
exchanged between the parties, contains statements attributed to the
accused acknowledging that he had to pay the complainant and
assuring that the dues would be cleared. The e-mails were marked
without objection, and the accused not offered any explanation
regarding those communications when examined under Section 313
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Cr.P.C. The contents of Ex.P9, when read in their entirety and in the
context of the other evidence, constitute relevant admissions against
the accused. The learned Principal Sessions Judge erred in failing to
consider their evidentiary value. The credit card account statement
(Ex.P10), the loan account statement (Ex.P11) and the income tax
statements (Exs.P5 to P8) also lend corroboration to the
complainant's version regarding the financial transactions and the
expenditure allegedly incurred for the benefit of the accused. It is
true that there is no separate documentary evidence specifically
establishing the issuance or use of the add-on card by the accused.
However, that circumstance cannot be considered in isolation or
treated as sufficient to discard the complainant's entire case,
particularly when Ex.P9 and the other documents are considered
cumulatively. The suggestion that add-on cards are available only to
blood relatives not supported by any evidence and, in any event, does
not displace the other material relied upon by the complainant.
27. The learned Principal Sessions Judge also found fault with
the complainant for not producing his books of accounts and for the
absence of any specific reflection of the alleged loan in his income tax
statements. It is true that where the accused raises a probable
defence by questioning the financial capacity of the complainant and
supports such challenge with material on record, the complainant
may be required to explain his financial capacity. However, in the
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present case, the accused not brought on record any material
sufficient to establish that the complainant lacked the means to incur
the expenditure or extend the financial assistance in question. On the
contrary, the complainant produced his income tax statements and
the financial statements relating to his workshop in support of his
financial capacity. The mere absence of a specific entry relating to
the transaction in the income tax statements, by itself, does not
establish that no such liability existed. The question whether a
particular transaction was duly disclosed to the income tax
authorities is distinct from the question whether the cheque issued
towards a legally enforceable debt or liability. The learned Magistrate
considered this aspect, whereas the learned Principal Sessions Judge,
in insisting upon the production of books of accounts without first
finding that the accused raised a probable defence on the question of
financial capacity, failed to give due effect to the statutory
presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the N.I. Act.
28. The learned Principal Sessions Judge further found that the
complainant taken a "prevaricating" stand in Exs.D1 to D8,
apparently on the ground that the amount claimed or the manner in
which the expenditure incurred had stated differently in the earlier
proceedings. Exs.D1 to D9 relate to the police complaint, the F.I.R.
registered for the offences under Sections 406, 418 and 420 IPC, the
closure report and the proceedings culminating in the acceptance of
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the closure report. A reading of these documents, however, shows
that the complainant consistently asserted that he had incurred
expenditure through his credit cards towards the accused's marriage
and also advanced money for the venture known as "India Projects";
that the accused failed to repay the amounts; and the amount due,
together with the bank charges, was Rs.13,44,505.73 as on
09.10.2007. Significantly, this is the very amount for which the first
cheque, bearing No.893051, subsequently issued. The closure of the
F.I.R. as a mistake of fact does not, by itself, determine whether the
cheque in question issued towards a subsisting debt or liability. The
adjudication of a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is
independent of the police investigation into the earlier complaint, and
the conclusion reached by the Investigating Officer does not bind the
Court in deciding the liability arising out of the cheque. The learned
Magistrate was, therefore, justified in considering the earlier
proceedings in the context of the complainant's explanation for the
transactions, rather than treating the closure of the F.I.R. as a
circumstance conclusively disproving the liability.
29. The learned Principal Sessions Judge referred to the
principle laid down in K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan and Another,
reported in (2001) 8 SCC 458 , namely, that once the statutory
presumptions arise, the burden is on the accused to rebut them by
raising a probable defence. However, the learned Principal Sessions
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CRL A.No.1435 of 2025
Judge failed to give effect to that principle while appreciating the
evidence in the present case. The statutory presumptions under
Sections 118(a) and 139 of the N.I. Act, as explained in Rangappa v.
Sri Mohan reported in (2010) 11 SCC 441 , operate in favour of the
complainant, and the accused required to rebut them on the standard
of preponderance of probabilities. As reiterated in Basalingappa v.
Mudibasappa, reported in (2019) 5 SCC 418 , the accused could
have discharged that burden either by adducing evidence or by
relying upon the materials already available on record. However, on
an overall consideration of the evidence, I find that the accused has
not raised a probable defence sufficient to rebut the statutory
presumptions. The complainant's evidence, the documentary
materials and the admissions contained in Ex.P9, considered
cumulatively, establish the liability underlying the cheque. The
complainant has, therefore, proved the offence under Section 138 of
the N.I. Act beyond reasonable doubt. The findings of the learned
Principal Sessions Judge, being contrary to the evidence on record
and resulting from an erroneous application of the statutory
presumptions, are unsustainable. Point No.(ii) is answered
accordingly.
30 . The offence committed in the year 2009, the cheque for
Rs.20,44,505.73, and the complainant deprived of his money for more
than sixteen years. The trial Court imposed a sentence of simple
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imprisonment for one year and directed the accused to pay
compensation of Rs.40,89,011.46, being twice the cheque amount. It
is well settled that the object of the provisions relating to dishonour
of cheques is not merely punitive but also compensatory and
restitutive. In R.Vijayan v. Baby, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 260,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that the compensation
awarded should be practical and realistic, taking into account the
cheque amount and reasonable interest thereon. Having regard to
the amount involved, the considerable period for which the
complainant has been deprived of the money, and the circumstances
in which the accused contested the proceedings, I find that the
sentence and compensation awarded by the trial Court are neither
excessive nor disproportionate. I, therefore, find no ground to
interfere with the same. The default sentence of simple imprisonment
for three months is also reasonable and warrants no interference.
31. It is made clear that, If any amount is lying in deposit to
the credit of C.C.No.17 of 2010 on the file of the trial Court, whether
pursuant to an order under Section 148 of the N.I. Act or otherwise,
the same shall not be refunded to the accused. The amount so
deposited shall be adjusted towards the compensation payable by the
accused and released to the complainant, subject to the overall
liability under the compensation order. If the amount in deposit is
less than the compensation awarded, the accused shall remain liable
to pay the balance.
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32. In the result,
(i) The Criminal Appeal in Crl.A.No.1435 of 2025 is
allowed. The judgment dated 03.12.2024 passed by the learned
Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai, in Crl.A.No.277 of 2017,
acquitting the respondent, is set aside.
(ii) The judgment of conviction and sentence dated
29.08.2017 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate,
Fast Track Court-II, Egmore at Allikulam, Chennai, in
C.C.No.17 of 2010, convicting the respondent for the offence
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881,
sentencing him to undergo simple imprisonment for one year,
and directing him to pay a compensation of Rs.40,89,011.46 to
the complainant, and in default to undergo simple
imprisonment for a further period of three months, is
confirmed.
(iii) The trial Court is directed to secure the
respondent/accused to undergo the sentence imposed.
However, in the event of the respondent/accused coming
forward to resolve the issue and settle the matter acceptable to
the complainant. the trial Court may consider the request for
compounding the offence in accordance with Section 147 of the
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N.I. Act.
(iv) The compensation amount shall be paid to the
appellant/complainant. The bail bond, if any, executed by the
respondent/accused shall stand cancelled.

13 . 11.2026
Index : Yes/No
Internet : Yes / No
mpk


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CRL A.No.1435 of 2025

To
1. The Principal Sessions Judge,
Chennai.
2. The Metropolitan Magistrate,
Fast Track Court-II,
Egmore at Allikulam,
Chennai.
3. The Section Officer,
Criminal Section,
High Court, Madras.


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M.NIRMALKUMAR, J.
mpk
Pre-Delivery Judgment made in
CRL.A.No.1435 of 2025
13.11.2026

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