Anil Langan & Anr vs M/S National Insurance Co Ltd & Ors
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~13
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
nd
% Date of decision: 02 July 2026
+ MAC.APP. 973/2018
ANIL LANGAN & ANR .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Vijay Kinger, Mr. Hemant, Mr.
Ashwani Gehlot and Ms. Roopa
Nagpal, Advocates
versus
M/S NATIONAL INSURANCE CO LTD & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Pradeep Gaur, Mr. Amit Gaur,
Ms. Sweta Sinha & Mr. Kaarrtikey
Parashar, Advs. for R-1
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL
JUDGMENT
ANISH DAYAL, J (ORAL)
th
1. This appeal assails award dated 04 August 2018 passed by the
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (West), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
(‘ MACT/Tribunal ’), in Case No.253/2017, whereby recovery rights have
been granted in favour of the Insurance Company/respondent no. 1 against
the appellants, who are the owner and driver of the offending vehicle.
2. In the impugned Award, the MACT has considered the issue of
apportionment of liability in paragraphs 36 to 42 . It has , inter alia , been
discussed that the Insurance Company led evidence to establish that, at the
time of the accident, the driver was driving a truck carrying LPG cylinders
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but did not possess an endorsement on his driving licence (‘ DL ) authorising
him to drive a vehicle carrying hazardous or dangerous goods. It has been
noted in the award that R3W1 , Insurance Company's witness, was cross-
examined, but no suggestion had been given to negate the assertion that the
offending vehicle was carrying hazardous goods. Since the testimony
remained uncontroverted, the MACT held that the Insurance Company was
entitled to recovery rights, as admittedly the driver's licence did not bear
the endorsement required under Rule 9(3) of the Central Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1989.
3. Appellants have raised a plea before this Court that there is nothing
in the evidence on record to establish that the offending vehicle was, in
fact, carrying any hazardous goods. It is submitted that no such fact
emerges from the FIR, the charge-sheet, the seizure memo, or the Detailed
Accident Report (‘ DAR’ ).
4. Mr. Kinger, counsel for appellants , has taken the Court through these
documents to press the point that even the seizure memo pertaining to the
offending truck does not record the seizure of any LPG cylinders.
5. Further, CM Appl. No. 46908/2023 was filed under Order XLI Rule
27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘ CPC’ ), seeking to place on
record additional evidence to show that the driver had undergone the
training for transporting of driving hazardous products vehicle and had
received the training certificate issued by Bharat Petroleum .
6. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Coordinate Benches of
this Court in Manish Garg and Anr. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
and Anr. 2025:DHC:4995 and Amit Sharma v. New India Assurance Co.
Ltd. and Ors. 2025:DHC:3878, where in similar situations the Court was of
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the view that in the absence of any evidence establishing that the vehicle
was carrying hazardous goods at the time of the accident, and where the
driver possessed a valid driving licence along with the training certificates,
the mere absence of an endorsement under the Central Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1989 would not be fatal to the driver or owner and recovery rights
would therefore, not be granted. These decisions, in turn, relied upon the
earlier judgment of this Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v.
Sonia Mittal (2017) SCC Online Del 11202, where a similar issue had been
taken into account.
7. Mr. Pradeep Gaur , counsel for Insurance Company, countered these
submissions by relying upon the decision of a Coordinate Bench of this
Court in Mangla Goods Carrier v. National Insurance Company Ltd.
2023:DHC:6745, wherein the court held where it was established that the
vehicle was carrying hazardous goods, the endorsement on the driving
licence was mandatory and that in the absence of such an endorsement
rendered the driver/owner liable, thereby granted the Insurance Company
right to recovery.
8. The decision in Mangla Goods ( supra ), in turn, relied upon the
decision of this Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Saminuddin
and Ors. (2019) SCC Online Del 10534 and a decision of the High Court
of Allahabad in Ramesh Chandra Tiwari v. Madan Singh and Ors. (2020)
1 AHC 36813.
9. Mr. Gaur presses the point that they had made a statement in the
testimony of R3W1 that there was no endorsement and the vehicle was
carrying hazardous goods, to which there was no rebuttal and no sufficient
cross-examination in order to displace the testimony.
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Analysis
CM 46908/2023
10. The decision in Manish Garg ( supra ) also considered the training
certificates which had been filed subsequently at the appeal stage and had
been permitted to be taken on record.
11. The Court has perused the training certificates placed on record by
way of the application under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC. These certificates
were issued by officials of Bharat Gas , operated under Bharat Petroleum ,
and included a refresher course card, which is appended along with it. The
application explains that these certificates could not be produced during the
pendency of the trial.
12. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the
decision in Manish Garg ( supra ), which contains a detailed analysis
regarding the acceptance of additional evidence of this nature, this Court
finds it appropriate to allow the application and take the training certificates
on record. Relevant paragraphs of Manish Garg ( supra ) are extracted as
under:
“ 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of
India vs. Ibrahim Uddin and Ors. : (2012) 8 SCC
148 held that while adjudicating an application
under Order XLI Rule 27, the admissibility of
additional evidence is not dependent upon the issue
of whether the applicant at an earlier stage had an
opportunity to lead evidence, but depends upon
whether the appellate court requires the said
evidence for adjudicating the pending appeal. The
relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced
hereunder:
“49. An application under Order 41 Rule
27 CPC is to be considered at the time of
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hearing of appeal on merits so as to find
out whether the documents and/or the
evidence sought to be adduced have any
relevance/bearing on the issues involved.
The admissibility of additional evidence
does not depend upon the relevancy to the
issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the
applicant had an opportunity for adducing
such evidence at an earlier stage or not,
but it depends upon whether or not the
appellate court requires the evidence
sought to be adduced to enable it to
pronounce judgment or for any other
substantial cause. The true test, therefore
is, whether the appellate court is able to
pronounce judgment on the materials
before it without taking into consideration
the additional evidence sought to be
adduced. Such occasion would arise only
if on examining the evidence as it stands
the court comes to the conclusion that
some inherent lacuna or defect becomes
apparent to the court. (Vide Arjan Singh v.
Kartar Singh [1951 SCC 178 : AIR 1951
SC 193] and Natha Singh v. Financial
Commr., Taxation [(1976) 3 SCC 28 : AIR
1976 SC 1053].)”
16. Further the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Sanjay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand : (2022) 7
SCC 247 held that if the additional evidence sought
to be adduced before the appellate court has a direct
impact on the main issue of the case, then such
application can be allowed and the additional
evidence can be relied upon by the appellate court to
pronounce its judgment. The relevant observations
are reproduced hereunder:
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“4. It is true that the general principle is
that the appellate court should not travel
outside the record of the lower court and
cannot take any evidence in appeal.
However, as an exception, Order 41 Rule
27 CPC enables the appellate court to
take additional evidence in exceptional
circumstances. It may also be true that the
appellate court may permit additional
evidence if the conditions laid down in this
Rule are found to exist and the parties are
not entitled, as of right, to the admission
of such evidence. However, at the same
time, where the additional evidence sought
to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt
over the case and the evidence has a direct
and important bearing on the main issue
in the suit and interest of justice clearly
renders it imperative that it may be
allowed to be permitted on record, such
application may be allowed. Even, one of
the circumstances in which the production
of additional evidence under Order 41
Rule 27 CPC by the appellate court is to
be considered is, whether or not the
appellate court requires the additional
evidence so as to enable it to
pronouncement judgment or for any other
substantial cause of like nature. As
observed and held by this Court in the
case of A. Andisamy Chettiar v. A.
Subburaj Chettiar, reported in (2015) 17
SCC 713, the admissibility of additional
evidence does not depend upon the
relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the
fact, whether the applicant had an
opportunity for adducing such evidence at
an earlier stage or not, but it depends
upon whether or not the appellate court
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requires the evidence sought to be
adduced to enable it to pronounce
judgment or for any other substantial
cause. It is further observed that the true
test, therefore is, whether the appellate
court is able to pronounce judgment on the
materials before it without taking into
consideration the additional evidence
sought to be adduced.”
17. In the present case, it is the contention of the
appellants that during the course of trial, the said
training certificates of Appellant No. 2 had been
misplaced and even after due diligence they could
not be recovered. Further, it was upon the advice of
their counsel that they did not lead any evidence
before the learned Tribunal.
18. In the present case, considering the beneficial
legislation of the MV Act as held by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of State of Arunachal
Pradesh v. Ramchandra Rabidas alias Ratan
Rabidas and another : (2019) 10 SCC 75, in the
opinion of this Court, the appellants ought to be
given an opportunity to adduce the said evidence on
record.
19. It is pertinent to note that Respondent No.
1/Insurance Company nowhere in their reply to the
present application has disputed or denied in any
way the authenticity of the said training certificates
and has only opposed the present application on
aspect of lapse by the appellants in not placing these
documents at the stage of trial .
*
22. The present appeal has been filed by the/
appellants challenging the recovery rights granted
to Respondent No. 1/Insurance Company. In the
opinion of this Court, for pronouncing the judgment
on the issue involved, the certificate evidencing that
the driver had undergone training programme for
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safe transportation of hazardous goods is relevant
and require consideration.
23. Therefore, in light of the observations made by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India vs.
Ibrahim Uddin and Ors. (supra) and Sanjay Kumar
Singh v. State of Jharkhand (supra) this court being
an appellate court finds reasons to exercise its
inherent power under Order XLI Rule 27 and take
the training certificates of Appellant No. 2 on
record.
(emphasis added)
13. Mr. Gaur submits that they are disputing the authenticity of the
training certificates. However, it is noticed that CM 46908/2023 under
Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC was filed in September 2023, and this Court, on
th
12 September 2023, issued notice, which was accepted by Mr. Pradeep
Gaur , counsel for the Insurance Company, and a time of four weeks was
granted to file a reply. The matter has thereafter been listed on several dates
over the last 3 years. However, the Insurance Company chose not to file
any reply to this application, therefore, persuading this Court to allow the
application as uncontested.
14. In view of the application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC having
been allowed, the training certificates are taken on record. A perusal of the
certificates shows that the driver, Kameshwar Ray , had successfully
undergone the prescribed training programme and was issued the
th
certification upon completion of the training conducted from 20 June 2014
nd
to 22 June 2014 and he was given a certificate to that effect which was
followed by refresher courses certified under the refresher cards which
th th th th
were 14 September 2016, 29 December 2016, 15 August 2017, 07 July
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th
2020 and 04 July 2021, showing that the gas company as well had
sufficient and complete reliance on this driver to be carrying hazardous
goods.
Endorsement for hazardous goods
15. The views expressed by this Court in Manish Garg ( supra ) and Amit
Sharma ( supra ), echoing the previous decision in Sonia Mittal ( supra ), are
persuasive. These decisions hold that, in the absence of any concrete
evidence establishing that the vehicle was carrying hazardous goods at the
time of the accident, the question of whether the driver possessed the
requisite endorsement or not will be irrelevant.
16. Even otherwise, consider a hypothetical situation. It could be that a
vehicle which otherwise carries hazardous goods is on the road for various
other reasons, including repair, servicing or just a commute for some
administrative purposes. In such circumstances, where the driver possesses
a valid licence to drive a Heavy Motor Vehicle (‘ HMV’ ), the absence of
endorsement would not, by itself, constitute a breach and would be
legitimate.
17. Relevant paragraphs of Manish Garg ( supra ) are extracted as under:
38. In the present case, there is no evidence on
record which shows that the offending oil tanker at
the time of the accident was carrying any hazardous
substance.
39. It is relevant to note that the Investigating
Agency, during the course of trial, failed to establish
that the offending vehicle driven by the appellant
driver was in fact carrying any combustible or
hazardous substance at the time of the incident. No
witness examined during trial made any assertion to
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that effect, nor was any suggestion put to the
witnesses during cross-examination indicating that
the vehicle was laden with hazardous material.
40. There is no mention of the offending tanker
containing oil or any hazardous substance, or of any
seizure, in the FIR or the charge sheet. The DAR is
conspicuously silent on this crucial factual aspect.
No evidence on this aspect had been led by
Respondent No. 1/Insurance Company to show that
the offending oil tanker was carrying any
combustible material at the time of the accident as
well. In the absence of such evidence, the
presumption that the vehicle was transporting
dangerous goods cannot be sustained.
41. The Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the case of
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmi, 2018 SCC
OnLine All 6122 held that the requirement of
endorsement arises only when a vehicle is actually
carrying goods of a hazardous or dangerous nature.
The Court held that an empty container or tanker, by
itself, cannot be treated as hazardous unless there is
evidence to prove that it contained or was carrying
such goods at the time of the accident. In the
absence of such evidence, no breach of Rule 9 of the
MV Rules can be presumed. The relevant portion of
the judgment is reproduced hereunder:
“10. The object behind the proviso is that
a person who is driving vehicle carrying
such goods must be trained enough so that
no causality of any kind takes place on
account of careless or negligent driving.
The purpose of endorsement on the license
is also same. The question, therefore, is as
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to whether empty container of such goods
by itself to be treated as dangerous or
hazardous to human life. In the opinion of
the Court an empty container or
cylindrical bottle cannot be termed as
goods dangerous or hazardous nature to
human life. Rule 9(3) makes endorsement
obligatory if one intends to carry goods
that are dangerous or hazardous by nature
to human life. So emphasis is that goods
by very nature should be dangerous or
hazardous to human life. A mere container
or bottle that might be used to contain
dangerous or hazardous goods cannot be
treated itself as dangerous or hazardous
by nature. It is quite possible that empty
containers are carried from one place to
another place and, therefore, unless
sufficient evidence is led by the parties
that those containers that were loaded on
a truck carried dangerous or hazardous
goods, the driver while driving such
vehicle with a valid license entitling him to
a drive transport vehicle will not get
rendered ineligible just for carrying empty
cylinders and in such circumstances the
insurance company will not get absolved
from its liability in a third party claim. It
could be a case where manufacturer
transports cylinders to the
industry/company and it could equally be
a case where containers are transported
from production unit to sale unit or to a
Godown at distant place. In such
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circumstances, transportation of such
empty cylinders or containers from one
place to another would not require driver
to have endorsement under proviso to
section 14 of Act, 1988. Since containers
or cylinders are not dangerous or
hazardous goods by nature, therefore, in
the event of a road accident involving
transport vehicle carrying such empty
cylinders/containers the insurance
company cannot get rid of its liability to
meet third party claim as per terms of
insurance policy.”
42. Even otherwise, Appellant No. 2/driver was
undisputably holding a valid driving license at the
time of the accident and had undergone the requisite
training for driving vehicles carrying hazardous
goods, a fact duly evidenced by a training certificate
which has not been disputed by Respondent No.
1/Insurance Company. The endorsement referred to
in Rule 9(3) of the MV Rules, is merely a ministerial
act to be performed by the licencing authority and
not a prerequisite that nullifies the competency or
training of the driver. A coordinate Bench of this
Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonia Mittal,
2017 SCC OnLine Del 11202 while deciding
somewhat similar issue, held as under:
“11. Coming to the defence taken by the
insurance company vis-à-vis the driver
and owner of the offending vehicle, what
distinguishes the case at hand is that the
driver of the offending vehicle had
undergone the requisite training which
had been duly certified. There is nothing
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on record to show that the insurance
company raises questions about the
validity of the training certificate. It is
insisting merely on the fact that there was
no endorsement secured from the
transport authority in terms of the
requirement under the rules. That,
however, ought not cut any ice. What is the
crucial requirement is the special training
for driving a vehicle meant for
transportation of hazardous goods. That
requirement had been fulfilled. Securing of
endorsement in wake of such certification
of the special skill was more of ministerial
nature. The rule of main purpose would
apply [see National Insurance Company v.
Swaran Singh (2004) 3 SCC 297]. The
plea of insurers for recovery rights is,
therefore, rejected.”
43. The reliance placed by the Insurance Company
on judgment in the case of Mangla Goods Carrier v.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra), in the opinion
of this Court, is misplaced, inasmuch as the said
judgment did not consider the earlier binding
decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonia
Mittal (supra), where as noted above, this Court
held that the absence of endorsement on the license,
despite the driver having the requisite certified
training, would not amount to a disqualification or
breach of policy conditions. The Court categorically
held that securing such an endorsement was a
ministerial act and the core requirement was
possession of specialised training and knowledge.
44. I find myself in agreement with the reasoning
adopted in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonia
Mittal (supra), which also drew strength from the
law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
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National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004)
3 SCC 297, wherein it was held that a breach must
be proved to be willful and fundamental to deny
indemnity to the insured and rule of main purpose
would apply. The relevant portion is reproduced
hereunder:
“Summary of findings
110. The summary of our findings to the various
issues as raised in these petitions is as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach
on the part of the insured concerning the policy
condition regarding holding of a valid license by the
driver or his qualification to drive during the
relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to
avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said
breach or breaches on the condition of driving
license is/are so fundamental as are found to have
contributed to the cause of the accident. The
Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would
apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of
“fundamental breach” to allow defences available
to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act.”
45. Therefore, in the present case, Appellant No.
2/driver had undergone requisite training and was in
possession of a valid driving license. Further, there
is no evidence that the tanker was carrying
hazardous goods at the relevant time, the mere
absence of endorsement under Rule 9(3) of the MV
Rules cannot be construed as a breach of statutory
conditions sufficient to grant recovery rights to the
insurer. At best, the absence of endorsement may
attract an administrative penalty under the
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applicable rules, but it does not render the license
invalid or the insurance policy inoperative vis-à-vis
third-party claims.”
(emphasis added)
18. Relevant paragraphs of Amit Sharma ( supra ) are extracted
as under:
15. However, a perusal of the record reveals that
there is no evidence to substantiate the assertion that
the vehicle in question was at the relevant time
carrying hazardous goods. It is a matter of common
experience and logic, as pointed out by learned
counsel for the appellants, that any oil tanker
entering an oil depot is likely to be empty after
unloading its contents or would be arriving to load a
fresh consignment. The DAR is conspicuously silent
on this crucial factual aspect. No employee or
representative of the concerned oil depot or any fuel
station was examined to affirm that the tanker was
carrying combustible material at the relevant time. I
have also perused the panchnama, superdari
documents, indemnity bond and seizure memo and
the same do not disclose that the tanker was filled
with any hazardous or flammable goods.
16. It is also relevant to note that the Investigating
Agency, during the course of trial, failed to establish
that the offending vehicle driven by the appellant
driver was in fact carrying any combustible or
hazardous substance at the time of the incident. No
witness examined during trial made any assertion to
that effect, nor was any suggestion put to the
witnesses during cross-examination indicating that
the vehicle was laden with hazardous material. In
the absence of such evidence, the presumption that
the vehicle was transporting dangerous goods
cannot be sustained.
17. In this regard, reliance placed by the appellant
on the judgment of the Hon’ble Allahabad High
Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmi :
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2018 SCC OnLine All 6122, is well-founded. The
Court in that case observed that the requirement of
endorsement arises only when a vehicle is actually
carrying goods of a hazardous or dangerous nature.
The Court held that an empty container or tanker, by
itself, cannot be treated as hazardous unless there is
evidence to prove that it contained or was carrying
such goods at the time of the accident. In the
absence of such evidence, no breach of Rule 9 of the
MV Rules can be presumed. The relevant portion of
the judgment is reproduced hereunder:
“10. The object behind the proviso is that
a person who is driving vehicle carrying
such goods must be trained enough so that
no causality of any kind takes place on
account of careless or negligent driving.
The purpose of endorsement on the license
is also same. The question, therefore, is as
to whether empty container of such goods
by itself to be treated as dangerous or
hazardous to human life. In the opinion of
the Court an empty container or
cylindrical bottle cannot be termed as
goods dangerous or hazardous nature to
human life. Rule 9(3) makes endorsement
obligatory if one intends to carry goods
that are dangerous or hazardous by nature
to human life. So emphasis is that goods
by very nature should be dangerous or
hazardous to human life. A mere container
or bottle that might be used to contain
dangerous or hazardous goods cannot be
treated itself as dangerous or hazardous
by nature. It is quite possible that empty
containers are carried from one place to
another place and, therefore, unless
sufficient evidence is led by the parties
that those containers that were loaded on
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a truck carried dangerous or hazardous
goods, the driver while driving such
vehicle with a valid license entitling him to
a drive transport vehicle will not get
rendered ineligible just for carrying empty
cylinders and in such circumstances the
insurance company will not get absolved
from its liability in a third party claim. It
could be a case where manufacturer
transports cylinders to the
industry/company and it could equally be
a case where containers are transported
from production unit to sale unit or to a
Godown at distant place. In such
circumstances, transportation of such
empty cylinders or containers from one
place to another would not require driver
to have endorsement under proviso to
section 14 of Act, 1988. Since containers
or cylinders are not dangerous or
hazardous goods by nature, therefore, in
the event of a road accident involving
transport vehicle carrying such empty
cylinders/containers the insurance
company cannot get rid of its liability to
meet third party claim as per terms of
insurance policy.”
18. Even otherwise, the appellant-driver was
holding a valid driving license at the time of the
accident and had undergone the requisite training
for driving vehicles carrying hazardous goods, a fact
duly evidenced by a training certificate which has
not been disputed by the insurer. The endorsement
referred to in Rule 9 of the MV Rules, is merely a
ministerial act to be performed by the licencing
authority and not a prerequisite that nullifies the
competency or training of the driver. A coordinate
Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
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Sonia Mittal : 2017 SCC OnLine Del 11202 while
deciding somewhat similar issue, held as under:
19. A perusal of Rule 9 of the MV Rules mandates
that the driver must have knowledge and training so
that no causality of any kind takes place on account
of careless or negligent driving — not necessarily a
formal endorsement whose purpose is also the same.
20. The circular dated 20.04.2022 relied upon by the
insurance company, issued by the Transport
Department of the GNCTD, merely directs licencing
authorities to make such endorsements henceforth. It
does not cast any burden upon existing license
holders to seek endorsements retrospectively nor
does it affect the validity of licenses or the training
already acquired by drivers.
21. The reliance placed by the Insurance Company
on judgment in the case of Mangla Goods Carrier v.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra), in the opinion
of this Court, is misplaced, inasmuch as the said
judgment did not consider the earlier binding
decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonia
Mittal (supra), where as noted above, this Court
held that the absence of endorsement on the license,
despite the driver having the requisite certified
training, would not amount to a disqualification or
breach of policy conditions. The Court categorically
held that securing such an endorsement was a
ministerial act and the core requirement was
possession of specialised training and knowledge.”
(emphasis added)
19. An embellishment has been further provided in Manish Garg
( supra ) and Amit Sharma ( supra ), wherein it has been held that the issue of
endorsement arises only when a vehicle is actually carrying goods of
hazardous or dangerous nature, relying upon the decision of the Allahabad
High Court in New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v Lakshmi (2018) SCC
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Online All 6122. Further reliance on Sonia Mittal ( supra ), where a view
was taken by this Court that securing an endorsement in wake of such
certification of the special skill in terms of getting a training certificate, was
more of a ministerial nature. The crucial requirement, even as per Sonia
Mittal ( supra ), is that the driver must have undergone the prescribed
specialised training for driving a vehicle meant for the transportation of
hazardous goods.
20. The decision in Mangla Goods ( supra ) was premised, as is evident
from paragraph 9 of the decision, on a finding that the vehicle was indeed
carrying LPG cylinders at the point of time of the accident, and therefore
distinguishable on facts.
Whether carrying hazardous goods
21. The Court has perused the FIR, charge sheet and the documents
appended therewith, including the DAR and seizure memo and finds that
there is absolutely no mention of any LPG cylinders being carried on the
said vehicle. Even the earlier set of documentation prepared post the
th
accident, dated 28 January 2017, notes that the truck is of an ‘ open body ’
which has ‘ Bharat Gas ’ written on the front and back, but does not record
any observation that it was carrying LPG cylinders. It is quite obvious that
in case a seizure had been made of a vehicle of this nature with LPG
cylinders, which are of a hazardous nature, seizure memo would have
recorded the same, or there would have been a subsequent reference at the
time of release of the vehicle to its owner. Nothing of this nature is found
on the record.
22. Mr. Kinger has drawn attention to the DAR, in particular Part IV,
where, in Serial No.33(i), there is a requirement to mention if it was a
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goods carriage and against which the entry is made “ commercial HTV ”. He
has further drawn attention of this Court to Serial No.76 in Part IX, where,
in sub-section (m), a mention has to be made under Section 177 Rule 29
whether it was carrying high/long load, to which the entry is ‘ No’ .
23. Notwithstanding the above, Mr. Pradeep Gaur submitted that R3W1 ,
an Assistant with the National Insurance Company, had deposed that " the
truck carrying LPG cylinders was being driven at the time of the alleged
accident ". To this, admittedly, there was no cross-examination which has
persuaded the MACT to grant recovery rights in favour of the Insurance
Company. However, it is also noted that the Insurance Company, in its
written statement, did not raise any such defence in any manner
whatsoever. In fact, there is not even a shred of mention of the fact that
there was no endorsement and that the truck was carrying LPG cylinders.
Since no such plea was raised in the pleadings, the driver and owner had no
occasion to lead evidence to establish that the vehicle was not carrying
LPG cylinders. A stray statement by R3W1 without any support cannot
sway the evidence in favour of Insurance Company.
24. Considering the MACT proceedings are in the nature of an inquiry,
strict rules of evidence do not apply. The burden of having not provided
proper testimony at that stage cannot militate against the actual record of
the police, which makes no mention of any hazardous goods being carried.
25. In this scenario, the Court is of the view that, there being no such
positive evidence of hazardous goods being carried, the question of
endorsement would not arise. Lack of endorsement as a valid defence for
the insurance company will not provide recovery rights, and the Court
resonates with the decisions in Manish Garg Sharma ( supra ) and Amit
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Sharma ( supra ) and, in turn, with Sonia Mittal ( supra ). In this regard, the
decision in Mangla Goods ( supra ) can be easily distinguished on the facts.
26. Accordingly, the impugned Award is set aside to the limited extent
that it grants recovery rights in favour of the Insurance Company against
the appellants.
27. Mr. Gaur however, informs that the decision in Amit Sharma ( supra )
has been challenged before the Supreme Court, and notice has been issued
th
in SLP No.24217/2025 by order dated 09 September 2025. He, however,
confirms that no stay has been granted.
28. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
29. Statutory deposit, if any, be refunded to appellant.
30. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.
(ANISH DAYAL)
JUDGE
JULY 02, 2026/sm/ bp
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