PSBB LEARNING LEADERSHIP ACADEMY vs MRS.BARNALI ROUT

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®

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

ST
DATED THIS THE 1 DAY OF JUNE, 2026

BEFORE


THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ

WRIT PETITION NO. 11351 OF 2020 (GM-RES)

BETWEEN

PSBB LEARNING LEADERSHIP ACADEMY
NO.52, SAHARA DEEPIKA ROAD,
LAKMIPURA, OFF BANNERGHATTA ROAD,
SAKALVARA POST, JIGANI HOBLI
BANGALORE-560083
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL
MRS MAHALAXMI KUMAR

...PETITIONER

(BY SHRI. B.K. SAMPATH KUMAR., SR. ADVOCATE FOR
SHRI. SURAJ SAMPATH., ADVOCATE)

AND


1. MRS.BARNALI ROUT
W/O DEBABRATA ROUT
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
RESIDING AT FLAT NO.111
RAJ PARADISE APTS, BILAKAHLALI
BANNERGHATTA ROAD,
BANGALORE-560076


2. THE STATE COMMISSIONER
OFFICE OF THE STATE COMMISSIONER FOR
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, KARNATAKA
ND
NO.55 ABHAYA SANKEERNA, 2 FLOOR
KARNATAKA SLUM DEVELOPMENT BOARD BUIDLING
RISALDAR STREET (PLATFORM ROAD,)
SHESHADRIPURAM BANGALORE-560020

…. RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. JAINA KOTHARI., SR. ADVOCATE FOR











Digitally signed
by SHWETHA
RAGHAVENDRA
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA

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SHRI: ROHAN KOTHARI., C/R1;
SHRI. MAHANTESH SHETTAR., AGA FOR R2)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION QUASHNG
THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 12.06.2020 BEARING CASE NO.
ND
21/19-20 (ANNEXURE-A HEREIN) PASSED BY THE 2 RESPONDENT
AND ETC.

THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND HAVING
BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 11.12.2025, THIS DAY, THE
COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ

CAV ORDER


1. The Petitioner-School is before this Court seeking for
the following reliefs:
i. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or
direction quashing the impugned order dated
12.06.2020 bearing Case No.21/19-20 (Annexure-A
nd
herein) passed by the 2 Respondent.

ii. Direct the Respondents to pay the costs of this
petition; and

iii. Issue such other writs, directions, or orders, which
this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper under
the facts and circumstances of the case.


2. The petitioner claims to be a premier educational
institution, rated among the best schools in India for
providing value-based education. It's part of a group
of schools affiliated to the Central Board of

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Secondary Education, (CBSE), New Delhi and is
among the few in the world to bring technology right
into the classroom and transform the learning
experience for students. It is claimed that the
primary aim of the school is to integrate academic
excellence, with value education with respect to rich
cultural heritage and ethos.

3. Respondent No.1 had applied for a teaching post in
the Petitioner school and was selected for the post of
primary teacher (hereinafter referred to as
‘ teacher ’), as regards which, an offer of
appointment was issued on 8.7.2008. After
completion of the probationary period, her
appointment was confirmed on 13.7.2009.
Subsequent to which, the teacher was bound by the
School's Contract of Service and Service Rules for
teaching and administrative staff as per CBSE
Bylaws, in terms of which, her services could be
terminated by giving three months' notice in writing
or three months' salary in lieu of notice period.

4. On 22.8.2013, a Class VI student had changed her
marks in some subject papers, and this led to an
enquiry by the teachers. Out of fear of being caught
in the enquiry, the student stepped out under the

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windowsill of the school building, located between
the ground and the first floor, and threatened to
jump off.

5. Various teachers and other staff informed the
administrative staff and the physical education
teachers as per the safety protocol of the school, and
as per the Standard Operating Procedure, the
administrative staff, the physical education teachers
and other staff members reached the ground floor
and engaged the student in conversation so as to
talk with her and refraining her from taking such an
extreme step.

6. It is alleged that respondent No.1-teacher voluntarily
without direct or indirect instructions and/or
knowledge of anyone of the fellow staff members of
the school management attempted to go onto the
windowsill to save the student in a daring and
reckless manner. While attempting to do so,
respondent No.1 - teacher lost her footing and fell to
the ground floor which resulted in grave injuries. On
seeing this, the student also panicked and jumped,
thereby undermining the efforts of the school
authorities and staff members. However, steps
having been taken to protect the student, her

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injuries were minimal. If respondent No.1 - teacher
had also followed the protocol, the actions on part of
the school management would have been fruitful,
and they might have succeeded in preventing the
student from jumping. Instead of that happening,
respondent No.1 - teacher also fell down, resulting in
injuries to her.

7. Immediately thereafter, the school followed all
medical protocols and provided immediate first aid
by a qualified nurse, admitted her to the nearest
super speciality hospital, namely Fortis Hospital at
Bannerghatta Road for treatment on 22.8.2013. The
school also made payment of the entire hospital bill
of a sum of Rs.6,03,603/-.

8. An internal inquiry was conducted into the matter in
2013 itself when the other staff members have
confirmed that the school protocol had been strictly
followed and respondent No.1 - teacher had not
followed the same. It is claimed that even after the
discharge of respondent No.1 - teacher from the
hospital, the school continued to retain her on the
rolls and continued to pay her monthly salary out of
goodwill and compassion and on that basis, it is
contended that a sum of Rs.5,58,476/- has been paid

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to respondent No.1 - teacher even though she did
not discharge any teaching activities. Taking into
account the expenses in the hospital, it is claimed
that a total sum of Rs.11,62,079/- had been
incurred. Numerous communications to respondent
No.1 - teacher having gone un-replied, the school
offered her a teaching assignment for a period of six
months.

9. Since she failed to communicate her decision,
School, vide its email dated 14.5.2015, had indicated
that it had waited patiently for respondent No.1 -
teacher to resume duty, since she had not done so, it
was indicated that she could take on a retainer role
for six months at her convenience.

10. It is contended that after delay of almost four years,
the School was shocked to receive a notice from
respondent No.2 - the State Commissioner, Office of
the State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Commissioner of
Disabilities’ ) as regards the proceedings initiated by
the teacher in Case No.21/2019-20, the complaint
having been filed, calling upon the School to make
payment of all the accruals without setting out any
specific demands.

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11. As regards which, School submitted its reply stating
that it was ready and willing to continue the
employment of the teacher as an administrative
support staff with a consolidated pay of Rs.15,000/-.
It is contended that respondent No.1 submitted a
rejoinder on 28.8.2019 seeking for Rs.60 lakhs as
compensation, towards which the petitioner filed a
surrejoinder. The Commissioner of Disabilities on
12.6.2020 passed an award directing School to make
payment of a sum of Rs.10 lakhs towards the
medical expenses and future expenses within 45
days. It is challenging the same, School is before this
Court.

12. Submission of Shri B.K.Sampath Kumar, learned
Senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner is that:

12.1. School has done everything that it could in its
capacity. The action on part of the teacher was
contrary to the Standard Operating Procedure.
If the teacher had followed the Standard
Operating Procedure, there would have been no
injury, which would have been caused. The
teacher cannot even if her intentions were bona
fide and her intentions were in the interest of
the student claim compensation for actions

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which are contrary to the Standard Operating
Procedure.

12.2. The teacher had suppressed the fact that
School had offered to continue the employment
of the teacher in the administrative capacity
since she could not discharge teaching
functions which the teacher could have
accepted. The same not having been accepted,
School could not have been directed to make
payment of a sum of Rs.10 lakhs towards
medical expenses and future expenses when
the School had already made payment of a sum
of Rs.6,03,603/- on account of medical
expenses, still her discharge from the hospital,
apart from a sum of Rs.5,58,476/- as salary
during the time that she did not present herself
at the School.

12.3. His submission is that the teacher could not
have approached the Commissioner of
Disabilities, but a remedy was only under the
Karnataka Education Act by filing an appeal
against the termination of services within three
months. The termination of services had been
accepted, the complaint was filed before the

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Commissioner of Disabilities almost four years
after the termination of services.

12.4. It is knowing fully well that an appeal under the
Karnataka Education Act, 1983 was not
maintainable, and only barred that, the teacher
has approached the Commissioner of
Disabilities. Even if the Commissioner of
Disabilities had jurisdiction, he submits that the
teacher having approached the Commissioner
of Disabilities after four years of the event, the
same was barred by limitation and as such, he
submits that the Commissioner of Disabilities
could not have entertained the claim of the
teacher.

12.5. His submission is that under Article 137 and
113 to the Schedule of Limitation Act, 1963,
even when no period of limitation is prescribed
or provided for anywhere, the proceedings
must be filed within 3 years from date when
right to apply/sue, if any, accrues and in the
present factual matrix the complaint filed
before Respondent No.2 is squarely barred by
Limitation.

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12.6. The teacher has suppressed various facts and
has not approached the Commissioner with
clean hands. By making an attempt to gain
misplaced sympathy, suppression of material
facts of making payment of medical bills,
making payment of salaries, an offer made to
retain her in administrative capacity has not
been disclosed when the initial complaint was
filed. It is only thereafter that School brought
the same to the notice of the Commissioner
which has not been properly appreciated by the
Commissioner. His submission is that the award
passed by the Commissioner is purely on
sympathetic reason and not on the basis of law
and is required to be set aside.

12.7. The suppression of material facts, he submits,
would not entitle the teacher for equitable
consideration and in this regard, he relies upon
the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead)
by LRs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by LRs and
1
others , more particularly para no.5 thereof
which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:

1
(1994) 1 SCC 1

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5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent
error. The short question before the High Court
was whether in the facts and circumstances of this
case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree
by playing fraud on the court. The High Court,
however, went haywire and made observations
which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with
the High Court that "there is no legal duty cast
upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case
and prove it by true evidence". The principle of
"finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the
extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an
engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants.
The courts of law are meant for imparting justice
between the parties. One who comes to the court,
must come with clean hands. We are constrained
to say that more often than not, process of the
court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-
evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other
unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the
court-process a convenient lever to retain the
illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to
say that a person, who's case is based on
falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He
can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the
litigation.

12.8. The action on the part of the petitioner school is
proper and correct. The school has acted in as
humane a manner as possible. All that the
school could do, the school has done. The
teacher not being able to discharge her
functions as a teacher due to her severe
disability, there could not have been an order of
reinstatement of the teacher made. Such a
reinstatement will act contrary to and will not
be in the interest of the students concerned

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since with the disability that she suffers, the
teacher will not be able to discharge her duties
in a proper manner, thereby impinging on the
future of the students.

12.9. His submission is that though there is a
requirement for every establishment to provide
equal opportunity, to all including persons with
disabilities, the role in which a person with
disability could be absorbed would have to be a
role which would not create any harm for any
other individual. The rights of both the person
with disability and other persons and the
students are required to be balanced. The
providing of equal opportunity to a person with
disability cannot result in causing harm and
injury to any other person.

12.10. His submission is also that in terms of Section
89 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act,
2016 (for short, ‘Disabilities Act of 2016’ ).
Any contravention of the Disabilities Act of
2016 is punishable with fine which may extend
to Rs.10,000/- and for any subsequent fine,
which shall not be less than Rs.50,000/- but
which may extend to Rs.5 lakhs. There being

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only one offence allegedly committed by
School, at the most a fine of Rs.10,000/- could
have been imposed.

12.11. The School could not have been directed to
reinstate the teacher as also to make a
payment of a sum of Rs.10 lakhs as medical
expenses. The accident having occurred on
22.08.2013 and the separation letter having
been issued on 31.5.2015, it is the Persons with
Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 which
would be applicable and not the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities Act of 2016 which
came into effect on 19.4.2017 which would be
applicable. The said Act had been gazetted on
15.06.2017. The applicability of the Karnataka
State Rights of Persons with Disability Rules,
2019 which was notified only on 30.8.2019 is
also unsustainable.

12.12. Thus, he submits that the Statute which would
be applicable being the Act of 1995, the entire
order which was passed by the Commissioner
on the basis of the Disabilities Act of 2016 and

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Rules of 2017 as well as the Rules of 2019 are
completely unsustainable.

12.13. His submission is that even if for the sake of
argument one assumed that a private school
falls within the purview of the Act, an “equal
opportunity policy” can only be published once
the appropriate Government has had a dialogue
with the private sector in order to help disabled
people secure employment as per Paragraph 50
of the National Policy for Persons with
Disabilities bearing No. 3-1/1993-DD.III dated
10.02.2006.

12.14. Under Section 81 of the Disabilities Act of 2016,
assuming that it applies, only a
recommendation can be made by the
Commissioner. No order could be passed in the
manner as done. It was for the appropriate
authority to accept the said recommendation
within a period of three months in terms of
Section 81. In the present order, the
Commissioner has only provided 45 days, which
is impermissible. The School having offered
suitable alternative role for the teacher
considering her physical limitations, the

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impugned order is completely unsustainable.
His submission is also that an establishment
under the Act is a public establishment, and a
private establishment cannot be a subject
matter of any proceedings under the Disabilities
Act of 2016. His submission is that there cannot
be a reservation for employment and or the
policy of non-discrimination in employment be
made applicable to a private. In this regard, he
submits that Section 20 of the Disabilities Act of
2016 only applies to a government
establishment. Said Section 20 is reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
20. Non-discrimination in employment .—(1) No
Government establishment shall discriminate against
any person with disability in any matter relating to
employment:
Provided that the appropriate Government may,
having regard to the type of work carried on in any
establishment, by notification and subject to such
conditions, if any, exempt any establishment from the
provisions of this section.
(2) Every Government establishment shall provide
reasonable accommodation and appropriate barrier
free and conducive environment to employees with
disability.
(3) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely
on the ground of disability.

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(4) No Government establishment shall dispense with
or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a
disability during his or her service:
Provided that, if an employee after acquiring disability
is not suitable for the post he was holding, shall be
shifted to some other post with the same pay scale
and service benefits:
Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the
employee against any post, he may be kept on a
supernumerary post until a suitable post is available
or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is
earlier.
(5) The appropriate Government may frame policies
for posting and transfer of employees with disabilities.

12.15. He refers to Section 21 of the Disabilities Act of
2016 to contend that equal opportunity is
required to be only provided by a government
establishment or a public establishment and not
by a private establishment. Section 21 is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
21. Equal opportunity policy .—(1) Every
establishment shall notify equal opportunity policy
detailing measures proposed to be taken by it in
pursuance of the provisions of this Chapter in the
manner as may be prescribed by the Central
Government.
(2) Every establishment shall register a copy of the
said policy with the Chief Commissioner or the State
Commissioner, as the case may be.

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12.16. He thus submits that a conjoined reading of the
Disabilities Act of 2016 including its preamble,
the National Policy for Persons with Disabilities,
and the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities which was
came into force in 2008 would only indicate
that the onus lies on the State to facilitate the
protection of rights of disabled and a private
entity will not be subject matter of proceedings
under the Disabilities Act of 2016 for
implementation thereof.

12.17. By referring to Section 35 of the Act, he
submits, that it is only when incentives are
made available to employers under private
sector that some of the requirements of the Act
as provided to be followed by the private sector
are to be followed. There are no incentives
which have been made available by the
appropriate government or local authorities to
the petitioner private school and as such, there
is no obligation on part of a private school to
comply with the mandates of the Disabilities Act
of 2016 which are applicable only to public
institution or government institutions.

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12.18. He also submits that the Respondent No.1 -
Teacher has neither approached the
government for aid or placement, nor has the
government offered any aid or employment to
her although it is the State’s duty to ensure
welfare of its citizens.

12.19. Section 35 of the Disabilities Act of 2016 is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:-
35. Incentives to employers in private sector .—
The appropriate Government and the local
authorities shall, within the limit of their economic
capacity and development, provide incentives to
employer in private sector to ensure that at least
five per cent. of their work force is composed of
persons with benchmark disability.

12.20. His submission is that the State Government
has not given any incentives to the Petitioner
despite it being a statutory duty and that the
accommodations sought for by the Respondent
are outside the Petitioner’s financial capacity
and are impossible to perform without
governmental support. He submits that the
Government has not even notified a Special
Employment Exchange as required under
Section 36. The Respondent without applying

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under Section 38 of the Act is trying to harass
the petitioner.

12.21. His submission is that the teacher now being
unable to render the services, as required, she
not being in a position to discharge the duties
towards the students, there would have to be
an additional support teacher appointed along
with the teacher to conduct the classes, which
will make the same inequitable to the other
teachers and lead to poor morale among the
teachers. The petitioner being a private
educational institute has a right to terminate
the employment of the teacher who did not
respond and did not attend the school for a
period of 21 months.

12.22. At the most, in terms of the contract of Service,
the school is required to give a three months’
notice or three months’ salary in lieu thereof.
The services being terminable in nature, the
Contract for Service not being specifically
enforceable, the direction which has been
issued by the Commissioner is contrary to the
applicable law.

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12.23. The teacher having gone abroad to avail of
medical treatment of her own free will and
choice and incurred huge expenses, those
medical expenses could not have been directed
to be paid by the school on account of the order
of the Commissioner. The School has made
payment of all necessary benefits, emoluments,
etc. as per the applicable contract.

12.24. Even as per the original complaint which had
been filed, the claim which had been made by
the teacher was only as regards the accrued
salaries, without setting out any specific
demands and only in the rejoinder that the
claim for medical expenses of Rs.60 lakhs
incurred abroad had been made, which was an
improvement on the case of the teacher. The
expenses incurred by a teacher outside the
country cannot be directed to be paid by the
school.

12.25. In this regard, he relies on the decision of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of North
Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. v.
2
Ashok Paper Mill (Assam) Ltd., more

2
AIR 2024 SC 439

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particularly Paras 17, 22, 23 and 30.2 thereof,
which are reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
17. The above description of the powers of either the
Code or CrPC clearly testifies to the intent of the State
Legislature to specifically restrict the application of both
the said Codes, to only the extent provided. The
principle of statutory interpretation: expression unius
est exclusion alterius (the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of the other) supports such a view. We also
notice this Court holding International Asset
Reconstruction Co. of India v. Official Liquidator
[International Asset Reconstruction Co. of India v.
Official Liquidator, (2017) 16 SCC 137 : (2018) 2 SCC
(Civ) 724] as extracted below : (SCC p. 140, para 9)
“9. The fact that the Tribunal may be vested with some
of the powers as a civil court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, regarding summoning and enforcing
attendance of witnesses, discovery and production of
the documents, receiving evidence on affidavits, issuing
commission for the examination of witnesses or
documents, reviewing its decisions, etc. does not vest in
it the status of a court. Section 22(1), in fact, provides
that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedures
under the Code, and can regulate its own procedures in
accordance with natural justice.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. Having come to the conclusion as above, we are
required to consider, whether the instant appeal, filed
against the order of the Commissioner of Payments is
maintainable or not? Prior to delving into such a
question, we would also need to examine as to whether
in the absence of an expressly prescribed limitation, can
an appeal from an order passed by the Commissioner of

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Payments, be entertained, irrespective of passage of
time?
23. This dispute concerns the exercise of a statutory
right. The issue of no express limitation being provided
in regard to the exercise of a right to assail the order
has captured the attention of this Court, earlier, on
certain occasions. We may refer to some decisions
hereinbelow.
30.2. In the absence of any particular period of time
being prescribed to file an appeal, the same would be
governed by the principle of “reasonable time”, for
which, by virtue of its very nature, no straitjacket
formula can be laid down and it is to be determined as
per the facts and circumstances of each case. In the
present lis, having regard to the sequence of events, as
taken note of above, the appellant claimants cannot be
said to have transgressed the boundaries of reasonable
time in filing their appeal before the District Judge.”

12.26. By relying on North Eastern Chemicals
2
Industries (P) Ltd’s case he submits that
where the statute does not prescribe any
specific period of limitation for filing an appeal
or for assailing an order, the exercise of such
statutory right is nevertheless required to be
undertaken within a reasonable time. According
to him, the Hon’ble Apex Court has
categorically held that the absence of an
express limitation provision does not imply that
the remedy may be invoked at any point of
time without restriction; rather, the Court must

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examine whether the remedy has been
exercised within a reasonable period, having
regard to the facts and circumstances of the
case and the sequence of events. He therefore
contends that the maintainability of the present
proceedings must also be tested on the
touchstone of the doctrine of reasonable time,
and that any belated invocation of the statutory
remedy beyond such reasonable period would
be impermissible in law.

12.27. He relies on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala,
Arvind Bhushan Pandey v. Vinesh Kumar
3
Bhasin more particularly Paras 11 and 13
thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for
easy reference:
11. Under the Rules, an officer of the Bank, shall retire
on completion of thirty years of service. The
respondent was accordingly retired on completion
of thirty years. He was not denied any retiral
benefits. He was not entitled, as of right, to
continue beyond thirty years of service. In fact, he
did not want to continue in service, as his
grievance was that he ought to have been
permitted to retire under the exit policy scheme.
The grievance of the respondent had apparently
nothing to do with his being a person with a
disability. Prima facie, neither Section 47 nor any
other provision of the Disabilities Act was

3
(2010) 4 SCC 368

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attracted. But, the Chief Commissioner chose to
issue a show-cause notice on the complaint and
also issued an ex parte direction not to give effect
to the order of retirement. He overlooked and
ignored the fact that the retirement from service
was on completion of the prescribed period of
service as per the service regulations, which was
clearly mentioned in the letter of retirement dated
17-11-2006; and that when an employee was
retired in accordance with the Regulations, no
interim order can be issued to continue him in
service beyond the age of retirement. The Chief
Commissioner also overlooked and ignored the fact
that as an authority functioning under the
Disabilities Act, he has no power or jurisdiction to
issue a direction to the employer not to retire an
employee. In fact, under the scheme of the
Disabilities Act, the Chief Commissioner (or the
Commissioner) has no power to grant any interim
direction.
13. It is evident from the said provisions, that neither
the Chief Commissioner nor any Commissioner
functioning under the Disabilities Act has power to
issue any mandatory or prohibitory injunction or
other interim directions. The fact that the
Disabilities Act clothes them with certain powers of
a civil court for discharge of their functions (which
include the power to look into complaints), does
not enable them to assume the other powers of a
civil court which are not vested in them by the
provisions of the Disabilities Act. In All India Indian
Overseas Bank SC and ST Employees' Welfare
Assn. v. Union of India [(1996) 6 SCC 606], this
Court, dealing with Article 338(8) of the
Constitution of India (similar to Section 63 of the
Disabilities Act), observed as follows:
It can be seen from a plain reading of clause (8)
that the Commission has the power of the civil
court for the purpose of conducting an
investigation contemplated in sub-clause (a) and
an inquiry into a complaint referred to in sub-
clause (b) of clause (5) of Article 338 of the
Constitution…..All the procedural powers of a

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civil court are given to the Commission for the
purpose of investigating and inquiring into these
matters and that too for that limited purpose
only. The powers of a civil court of granting
injunctions, temporary or permanent, do not
inhere in the Commission nor can such a power
be inferred or derived from a reading of clause
(8) of Article 338 of the Constitution……..”
3

12.28. By relying on case
Vinesh Kumar Bhasin’s
he submits that where a statutory authority is
conferred only limited powers akin to those of a
civil court for specific purposes, such
conferment cannot be construed as vesting the
authority with the entire jurisdiction or powers
of a civil court. According to him, the Hon’ble
Apex Court has clearly held that the grant of
certain procedural powers—such as summoning
witnesses, receiving evidence, or conducting
inquiries—does not authorise such authority to
issue mandatory or prohibitory injunctions or
other interim directions, unless such power is
expressly provided under the statute itself. He
therefore contends that the mere fact that an
authority is vested with certain procedural
powers of a civil court does not entitle it to
assume substantive judicial powers which the
statute has not expressly conferred.
Consequently, any exercise of jurisdiction

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beyond the limited statutory mandate would be
without authority of law.

12.29. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court
in the case of Managing Director, Bangalore
Metropolitan Transport Corporation,
4
Bangalore vs. Sumitra and Another , more
particularly Paras 4, 7 to 13, which are
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
4 . Having regard to the submissions made by the
learned advocates and the record of the case, point
for consideration is “Whether the Commission has
the power to issue direction for reinstatement of the
employee and for extension of all service/monetary
benefits?
7 . It can be seen from S.9 that the Commission has
been authorized to take up the study in respect of
economic, educational and health situation of women
and make its recommendations to the State
Government. Further, the Commission is competent
to look into complaints or suo-motu issue notice in
respect of matters specified in S.9(1)(f). Clause (d)
of sub-Section (1) of S.9 of the Act provides that the
Commission shall review, from time to time, the
existing provisions of the Constitution and other laws
affecting the women and recommend amendments
thereto so as to suggest remedial legislative
measures to meet any lacunae or inadequacies or
shortcomings in such legislations. The Commission
has been assigned the role of assisting non
governmental organizations in the State in legal
counselling on power of women and enabling such
women to get legal aid. As per clause (i) of sub-
Section (1) of S.9, the Commission is authorized to
inspect or cause to be inspected a jail, remand home,

4
Writ Petition No. 48227 of 2012, DD 10.11.2026

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women’s institution or other place of custody where
women are kept as prisoners or otherwise and take
up with the concerned authorities for remedial action,
wherever found necessary. The Commission has
been assigned the role of helping the women in
distress as a friend and guide in enforcement of their
legal rights. No power or authority has been given to
the Commission to adjudicate or determine the rights
of the parties.
8 . Sri H.P. Gangesh Gowda, learned advocate submitted
that the Commission having been conferred with the
powers of a Civil Court under Civil Procedure Code in
trying a suit as per S.10 and a complaint having
been lodged by respondent No.1 concerning
deprivation of her rights by the petitioner and the
Commission having authority to decide the
complaint, passed the order vide Annexure-A, in
exercise of the powers under S.9(1)(f) of the Act.
9. The Act, in my opinion has not entrusted the
Commission with the power to take up the role of a
Court/Tribunal and determine the rights of the
parties, in as much as, it is not discharging the
functions of a Court/Tribunal.
10 . The reading of S.10 makes it apparent that the
Commission shall, while investigating any matter for
the purposes of the Act have all the powers of a Civil
Court under Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (Central Act
5 of 1908) in trying a suit and in particular, in
respect of the matters specified as per clauses (a) to
(f) therein and not for other purposes. The
Legislature has not conferred the jurisdiction on the
Commission to pass an order of the nature as at
Annexure-A. The Commission has exceeded the
authority in passing the order as at Annexure-A,
which is ultra vires the provisions of the Act.
11. Dealing with the powers of the Chief Commissioner
and the Commissioners under the Persons with
Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights
and Full Participation) Act, 1995 and the rules made
thereunder, Apex Court, in STATE BANK OF PATIALA
Vs. VINESH KUMAR BHASIN, (2010) 4 SCC 368, has
held as under:

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"18. It is evident from the said provisions, that
neither the Chief Commissioner nor any
Commissioner functioning under the Disabilities
Act has power to issue any mandatory or
prohibitory injunction or other interim
directions. The fact that the Disabilities Act
clothes them with certain powers of a civil court
for discharge of their functions (which include
the power to look into complaints), does not
enable them to assume the other powers of a
civil court which are not vested in them by the
provisions of the Disabilities Act."
12. Dealing with the powers of State Commission for
Women in Orissa, Apex Court in the case of,
BHABANI PRASAD JENA Vs. ORISSA STATE
COMMISSION FOR WOMEN, (2010) 8 SCC 633,
has held as follows:
"11. Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee, learned counsel for
Respondent 2 submitted that once a power has
been given to the State Commission to receive
complaints including the matter concerning
deprivation of women of their rights, it is implied
that the State Commission is authorised to
decide these complaints. We are afraid, no such
implied power can be read into Section 10(1)(d)
as suggested by the learned counsel. The
provision contained in Section 10(1)(d) is
expressly clear that the State Commission may
receive complaints in relation to the matters
specified therein and on receipt of such
complaints take up the matter with the
authorities concerned for appropriate remedial
measures. The 1993 Act has not entrusted the
State Commission with the power to take up the
role of a court or an adjudicatory tribunal and
determine the rights of the parties. The State
Commission is not a tribunal discharging the
functions of a judicial character or a court."
13. In W.P.No.83554/2010, Karnataka Vetemary Animal
and Fisheries Sciences University vs. Sunil Kumar
Shindhe and another, respondent No.1 was a
contractual assistant of the petitioner - University
and had approached the Commissioner for Persons

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with Disabilities to direct the petitioner to give the
post of Assistant in the University by regularizing the
services and extend the consequential benefits. The
Commissioner having directed the petitioner to
continue the complainant by giving contractual work,
writ petition was filed by the University. Considering
the rival contentions, which were similar in nature
and taking note of the ratio of law laid down in
Vinesh Kumar Bhasin’s case (supra), writ petition
was allowed and the impugned order was quashed.
In view of the above, it is clear that the Commission
has exercised power not vested in it in the matter of
passing the impugned order. Hence, the Order at
Annexure-A being ultra vires and illegal is quashed,
with no order as to costs. Petition allowed.”
4

12.30. By relying on Sumitra’s case he submits that
statutory commissions constituted under special
enactments, though vested with certain powers
of a civil court for the limited purpose of
conducting inquiries or investigations, do not
possess adjudicatory jurisdiction to determine
the rights of parties or to grant substantive
reliefs such as reinstatement or monetary
benefits, unless such powers are expressly
conferred by the statute. He contends that this
Court has categorically held that the
conferment of limited procedural powers under
the Civil Procedure Code does not transform
such a commission into a court or tribunal
exercising judicial powers, and consequently
the commission cannot assume authority to
pass orders affecting service rights or directing

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reinstatement. He therefore submits that where
the statute merely empowers the commission
to receive complaints, examine grievances and
recommend remedial measures, any order
purporting to determine rights or grant binding
relief would be ultra vires the provisions of the
Act and without jurisdiction.

12.31. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon’ble
High Court of Delhi in the case of Guru Gobind
Singh Indraprastha University vs. Kamal
5
Jant Agarwal more particularly Paras 1, 3
and 4 which are reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:-
1. By this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioner/University
impugns the order dated 09.04.2013 passed by the
Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities, New Delhi
(vested with power of Civil Court under the Persons
with Disability (Equal Opportunity, Protection of
Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995) whereby,
the Commissioner has effectively passed a judgment
and issued directions for giving benefits to the
respondent of seniority, promotion and monetary
claims along with the back wages. The operative
portion of the impugned order reads as under:-
"7 (ix) The argument of the University that they found
Sh. Kamal Kant Aggarwal suitable for the post of
Laboratory Assistant Grade-I and could not find him
suitable for the post of Technical Assistant/Workshop
Instructor based on the same aspects of technical
know-how appears to be quite intriguing. The

5
Laws (DLH) 2015 (3) 588

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reliance put on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex
Court that an oral test is important to judge overall
intellectual and personal qualities like alertneess,
resourcefulness, dependability, capacity for
discussion, ability to take decisions, quality of
leadership etc does not appear to be fully relevant in
this case as the requirement of the job of a Technical
Assistant/Workshop Instructor may be well tested by
a written examination which was held and in which
the petitioner secured a total of 44 marks (i.e. 55%
marks). He was not selected and candidates securing
less marks were selected in the General Category.
There is no doubt that an oral test is important from
the point of view of ascertaining suitability of the
candidate for a post; however the requirement for
each post is different and in any case the selection
cannot be based entirely on the basis of the
performance in the oral test. The requirement of the
job of Lab Assistant Grade-I and Technical
Assistant/Workshop Instructor may not be very much
different as both require the same aspects of
technical know-how as asserted by the University
themselves and therefore rejecting the candidature
of Sh. Kamal Kant Aggarwal is not justified. The
petitioner should not have been interviewed at part
with general category candidates. He should have
been selected on relaxed standard to fill up the
vacancy reserved for PH category as he (the
petitioner) was otherwise fit having secured 55%
marks in the written examination.
7 (x) In conspectus of the matter I am of the considered
view that the petitioner is entitled to be appointed to
the post of Technical Assistant/Workshop Instructor
advertised by the University for Physically
Handicapped Persons. The University is therefore
directed to consider the case of Sh. Kamal Kant
Aggarwal in view of the instructions/guidelines of the
Government of India on the subject; requirement of
the reasonable accommodation as also provided u/s
38 of the Persons with Disabilities Act 1955 and the
orders/judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India and the Hon'ble High Court. He will also be
given all the consequential benefits of seniority,
promotion and monetary emoluments from the date

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others joined through the selection process
conducted by the University in 2008 i.e. he would be
treated as having joined along with his batchmates
for purpose of determination of his seniority,
promotion and monetary benefits. In so far the
monetary benefits/backwages for the past are
concerned; since the petitioner has been working as
Lab Assistant Grade-I the petitioner would be entitled
to all benefits for the past also less the amount
received by the petitioner in the course of his
employment. The arbitrariness on the part of the
University is such that it cannot be argued by the
respondent (the University) that the petitioner should
not be given benefit of the past as he has not worked
on the post. If the petitioner has not worked it is also
the responsibility of the respondent as they have
defied the mandate of the Parliament as provided
under the Persons with Disabilities (Equal
Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full
Participation) Act 1995. The petitioner was the only
candidate in the category of physically handicapped
persons against one post advertised by the
University as reserved for PH category. 7(xi) Ordered
accordingly."

3. The Supreme Court in the case of Vinesh Kumar
Bhasin (supra) has relied upon the earlier judgment
of the Supreme Court in the case of All India Indian
Overseas Bank SC and ST Employees' Welfare Assn.
and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (1996) 6 SCC
606 wherein the Supreme Court has observed and
laid down the ratio that a Commissioner acting under
specific provisions of law, cannot dehors those
provisions start acting like a court and issue
directions or injunctions etc . In view of the above, it
is clear that the impugned order dated 09.04.2013
passed by the Commissioner for Persons with
Disabilities is without jurisdiction.
Learned counsel for the respondent sought to place
reliance on Geetaben Ratilal Patel Vs. District Primary
Education Officer (2013) 7 SCC 182, however,
reference to this judgment shows that the said
judgment did not deal with the issue of whether the

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Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities has
jurisdiction to pass a judgment or order or directions
or injunction etc etc. In fact assuming that the
judgment in case of Geetaben Ratilal Patel (Supra)
holds that the Commissioner for Persons with
Disabilities has power to pass any directions, though
the said judgment does not so hold, the said
judgment will not be the law inasmuch as it has now
been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that the
later judgment of a Division Bench of equal number
of Judges cannot pronounce upon differently than
what is held earlier by a Division Bench of equal
number of Judges of the Supreme Court. The
judgment in case of Vinesh Kumar Bhasin (Supra) is
of a Division Bench of two Judges of the Supreme
Court and judgment in case of Geetaben Ratilal Patel
(Supra) is also of a Division Bench of two Judges of
the Supreme Court, and therefore, it is the judgment
in the case of Vinesh Kumar Bhasin (Supra) which
will bind this Court and not judgment in the case of
Geetaben Ratilal Patel (Supra).
4. In view of the above, the impugned order of the
Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities is set
aside.
5

12.32. By relying on Kamal Jant Agarwal’s case he
submits that the Commissioner for Persons with
Disabilities, though vested with certain powers
of a civil court for the limited purpose of inquiry
under the statute, cannot assume the role of a
court and issue binding directions determining
service rights such as appointment, seniority,
promotion or grant of back wages, unless such
authority is expressly conferred by the statute.
He contends that the Delhi High Court,
following the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble

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3

Supreme Court in Vinesh Kumar Bhasin’s
case, has categorically held that the
Commissioner cannot act dehors the statutory
provisions and issue mandatory directions akin
to a judicial adjudication. According to him, any
such order directing appointment, grant of
consequential benefits or monetary relief would
therefore be without jurisdiction and liable to be
set aside, as the statutory authority is only
empowered to inquire into complaints and
make appropriate recommendations within the
confines of the statute.

12.33. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court
in the case of State Bank of India vs. The
Chief Commissioner for Persons with
6
Disabilities and another more particularly
Paras 4 to 9 which are reproduced hereunder
for easy reference:
4. The impugned order passed in the year 2019 is only a
narration of factual aspects with no reasons at all.
Respondent No.1/Chief Commissioner has directed
the Petitioner/Bank to reinstate the Respondent No.2
and give extension of two years’ probation period.
There is no reference under which provision, the
Commissioner has exercised the power. Though it is
true that the cases of persons with disabilities must
be handled with sensitivity and that procedural
technicalities should not come in the way of granting

6
WP No.116/2023 dtd 1.7.2024

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them relief, issue raised before us is about the
Jurisdiction of Respondent No.1 Commissioner.
5. The functions of the Commissioner are listed under
Section 75 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Act, 2016 which are as under:
"75. Functions of Chief Commissioner. (1) The Chief
Commissioner shall-
(a) identify, suo motu or otherwise, the provisions of
any law or policy, programme and procedures, which
are inconsistent with this Act and recommend
necessary corrective steps:
(b) inquire, suo motu or otherwise, deprivation of rights
of persons with disabilities and safeguards available
to them in respect of matters for which the Central
Government is the appropriate Government and take
up the matter with appropriate authorities for
corrective action:
(c) review the safeguards provided by or under this Act
or any other law for the time being in force for the
protection of rights of persons with disabilities and
recommend measures for their effective
implementation;
d) review the factors that inhibit the enjoyment of rights
of persons with disabilities and recommend
appropriate remedial measures;
(e) study treaties and other international instruments on
the rights of persons with disabilities and make
recommendations for their effective implementation;
(f) undertake and promote research in the field of the
rights of persons with disabilities;
(g) promote awareness of the rights of persons with
disabilities and the safeguards available for their
protection;
(h) monitor implementation of the provisions of this Act
and schemes, programmes meant for persons with

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(i) monitor utilisation of funds disbursed by the Central
Government for the benefit of persons with
disabilities and
(i) perform such other functions as the Central
Government may assign.
(2) The Chief Commissioner shall consult the
Commissioners on any matter while discharging its
functions under this Act."
6. The Commissioner has to thereafter make
recommendation under Section 76 of the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 as follows:
"76. Action of appropriate authorities
recommendation of Chief Commissioner.-
Whenever the Chief Commissioner makes a
recommendation to an authority in pursuance of
clause (b) [of sub-section (1)] of section 75, that
authority shall take necessary action on it, and
inform the Chief Commissioner of the action taken
within three months from the date of receipt of
the recommendation: Provided that where an
authority does not accept a recommendation, it
shall convey reasons for non-acceptance to the
Chief Commissioner within a period of three
months, and shall also inform the aggrieved
person."
These provisions, do not confer the
Commissioner with the powers to direct rain
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank
of Patiala (supra) had considered the powers of the
Commissioner for Disabilities. In this case an
employee of the State Bank of Patiala made a
complaint to the Commissioner of Persons with
Disabilities seeking a direction to the Bank to give
relief under 'Exit Option Scheme' of the Bank. The
Commissioner issued interim directions. The Bank
filed objection contending that the complaint was not
maintainable and also on merits. Since the direction
of the Commissioner was not complied with, the
employee approached the High Court. The High Court
also issued an ex-parte interim order that direction of

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the Commissioner be complied with. Since, the order
was not complied with, a contempt petition was filed.
Challenging these orders, the Bank approaches the
Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
considered the provisions of Section 58 and 59 of the
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities,
Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995.
The Supreme Court observed that the grievance of
persons with complaint of disabilities though have to
be looked at by the Courts and the Authorities with
compassion and understanding, the provisions of the
Act cannot be pressed in service to pass orders not
contemplated under the Act.
8. The Petitioner has also relied on the order passed by
the learned Single Judge in the case of Kerala Public
Service Commission (supra), wherein the Single Judge
has also taken a view that reading of the power of the
Commissioner under the Act of 2016 would only
indicate that it has power to advise and make
recommendations to a appropriate authority.
9. The learned counsel for the Petitioner Bank submitted
that under the provision of the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities Act, 2016 is more restricted than the Act
of 1995. The impugned order does not refer to any
specific provision conferring such power. There is also
no reason whatsoever as to why the order is being
passed, that too mandatory direction and not a
recommendation.
6

12.34. By relying on State Bank of India’s case he
submits that the statutory scheme of the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 does not
confer adjudicatory powers on the Chief
Commissioner to issue mandatory directions
such as reinstatement, continuation in service,
or grant of service benefits. According to him, a
reading of Sections 75 and 76 of the Act clearly

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indicates that the role of the Chief
Commissioner is essentially investigatory and
recommendatory in nature, namely to inquire
into complaints regarding deprivation of rights
of persons with disabilities and thereafter take
up the matter with the appropriate authority for
corrective action by making recommendations.

12.35. He therefore contends that the statute does not
authorise the Commissioner to pass binding or
enforceable directions affecting service rights,
and that any such order directing reinstatement
or extension of service would travel beyond the
statutory mandate and be without jurisdiction.
It is his submission that this Court has
accordingly held that the Commissioner cannot
exercise powers akin to those of a court or
tribunal, and that the authority is confined only
to making recommendations to the appropriate
authority, which may thereafter consider and
act upon such recommendations in accordance
with law.

12.36. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon’ble
High Court of Kerala in the case of Kerala
Public Service Commission vs. State

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7
Disability Commissioner and others more
particularly Paras 5, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 22,
which are reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:-
(5) The Commissioner accordingly gave the following
directions:
nd
(1) The additional 2 respondent-Law Secretary,
Government of Kerala shall compute the backlog
vacancies of Legal Assistant Gr.II of the hearing
impaired category in his department during the
period from 7/2/1996 to till the date of receipt of
a copy of this order in his office and report one of
such vacancies to the 1st respondent Secretary
of the Kerala Public Service Commission for
giving appointment to the petitioner as Legal
Assistant Gr.II within 30 days from the above
said date.
(2) If it is found that there is no regular vacancy for
accommodating the petitioner as Legal Assistant
Gr.ll in the Law Department at present, she will
be accommodated in a supernumerary post
vacancy arises. and be accommodated in the
regular service as the junior most Legal Assistant
Gr.II as and when a vacancy arises.
st
(3) The 1 respondent Secretary, Kerala Public
Service Commission shall issue advise memo for
the appointment of the petitioner in the post of
Legal Assistant Gr.Il in the Law Department,
Government of Kerala treating that the Ext.P3 as
a valid (additional/supplementary) rank list
within 30 days from the date of getting
communication from the 2nd respondent vide (1)
or (2) as above.
(4) The 2nd respondent shall issue posting order to
the petitioner as Legal Assistant Gr.II in the Law
Department in a vacancy as specified in

7
Laws (KER) 2023 (5) 23

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(1) or (2) above within 30 days from the date of
receipt of communication from the 1st
respondent regarding the compliance 3rd above.
(5) The respondents 1 and 2 will file action taken
report before the State Commissionerate for
Persons with Disabilities as per Sec. 81 of the
RPWD Act, 2016.
Aggrieved by the said Ext.Pl order of the State
Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities,
Kerala, the Kerala PSC has filed this writ petition.
(17.) Though the petitioner-Public Service Commission has
raised various legal and factual grounds in the writ
petition to impugn Ext.P1 order, the prime argument
raised is regarding the powers and functions of the
1st respondent-State Disability Commissioner and
the incompetence of the 1st respondent to pass an
order in the nature of Ext.P1.
(18.) The 1st respondent-State Disability Commissioner is
appointed under the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities Act, 2016. The Act, 2016 is intended to
provide full participation and equality of the people
with disabilities. The Act gives rights and
entitlements to persons with disability and provides
for education, skill development, employment, social
security, health, rehabilitation and recreation, etc.
The Act also contemplates appointment of State
Disability Commission by State Governments.
(19.) Sec. 80 of the Act, 2016 lays down functions of
State Commissions. Sec. 80 reads as follows:
80. Functions of State Commissioner - The State
Commissioner shall -
(a) identify, suo motu or otherwise, provision of
any law or policy, programme and procedures,
which are in consistent with this Act, and
recommend necessary corrective steps;
(b) inquire, suo motu or otherwise deprivation of
rights of persons with disabilities and safeguards
available to them in respect of matters for which
the State Government is the appropriate

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Government and take up the matter with
appropriate authorities for corrective action;
(c) review the safeguards provided by or under
this Act or any other law for the time being in
force for the protection of rights of persons with
disabilities and recommend measures for their
effective implementation;
(d) review the factors that inhibit the enjoyment of
rights of persons with disabilities and recommend
appropriate remedial measures:
(e) undertake and promote research in the field of
the rights of persons with disabilities,
(f) promote awareness of the rights of persons
with disabilities and the safeguards available for
their protection;
(g) monitor implementation of the provisions of
this Act and schemes, programmes meant for
persons with disabilities;
(h) monitor utilisation of funds disbursed by the
State Government for the benefits of persons with
disabilities; and
(i) perform such other functions as the State
Government may assign.
(20.) Sec. 81 provides that whenever the State
Commissioner makes a recommendation to an
authority in pursuance of Sec. 80(b), that authority
shall take necessary action on it, and inform the
State Commissioner of the action taken within three
months from the date of receipt of recommendation.
The State Commission has been given certain powers
under Sec. 82 to summon and enforce the
attendance of witnesses, to require discovery and
production of documents, to requisition public
records from any court or office, to receive evidence
on affidavits and to issue Commissions for
examination of witnesses. A reading of Ss. 80 to 83
would show that the State Disability Commissioner
has power only to advise and make
recommendations to appropriate authorities. In

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Ext.P1, the Ist respondent-Disability Commissioner
has exceeded its jurisdiction and has given
mandatory directions to effect appointment of the
2nd respondent as Legal Assistant Grade- II in the
Law Department. Ext.P1 therefore is not legally
sustainable.
(22) Sec. 15 of the Act, 1985 provides that the
Administrative Tribunal for a State shall exercise all
the jurisdictions, powers and authority in relation to
recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to
any civil service of the State or to any Civil Post
under the State. Sec. 28 states that no court except
the Supreme Court or any interstate Tribunal, Labour
Court or other authority constituted under the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other
corresponding law for the time being in force shall
have or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction,
powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or
matters concerning such recruitment or such service
matters. The 1st respondent-State Disability
Commissioner therefore cannot make an adjudication
on a service matter and direct appointment of a
person to civil services of the Central Government or
the State Government.

12.37. By relying on Kerala Public Service
7
Commission’s case he submits that under the
scheme of the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities Act, 2016, the State Commissioner
for Persons with Disabilities is vested only with
advisory and recommendatory functions, and
does not possess the jurisdiction to issue
mandatory directions affecting recruitment or
service matters.

12.38. He contends that the Hon’ble High Court of
Kerala, upon a detailed examination of Sections

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80 to 83 of the Act, has categorically held that
the powers conferred upon the State
Commissioner are confined to inquiring into
complaints regarding deprivation of rights of
persons with disabilities and making
appropriate recommendations to the competent
authorities. According to him, although the
Commissioner is conferred with certain
procedural powers akin to those of a civil court
for the limited purpose of inquiry, such
conferment does not authorise the
Commissioner to assume adjudicatory powers
or to pass binding orders directing
appointment, creation of supernumerary posts,
or grant of service benefits.

12.39. He therefore submits that the Kerala High Court
has held that the Commissioner cannot
adjudicate upon service disputes or direct
appointment to civil posts, particularly in
matters relating to recruitment to public
services, which fall within the jurisdiction of
competent statutory authorities or tribunals.
Consequently, any order passed by the
Commissioner issuing mandatory directions
regarding appointment or service matters

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would be beyond the scope of the statutory
powers and therefore without jurisdiction and
legally unsustainable.

12.40. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of
8
Union of India vs. Rajender Singh , more
particularly Paras 3 and 4, which are
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
3. The issue in the present case is fully covered in
favour of the petitioner in terms of the judgment
of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of
Patiala and Others Vs. Vinesh Kumar Bhasin
(2010) 4 SCC 368, The relevant observations of
the Supreme Court in the case of Vinesh Kumar
Bhasin (supra) are contained in paras 12 to 19,
and which paras read as under:-
"12. Under the Rules, an officer of the Bank,
shall retire on completion of thirty years of
service. The respondent was accordingly
retired on completion of thirty years. He was
not denied any retiral benefits. He was not
entitled, as of right, to continue beyond thirty
years of service. In fact, he did not want to
continue in service, as his grievance was that
he ought to have been permitted to retire
under the exit policy scheme. The grievance
of the respondent had apparently nothing to
do with his being a person with a disability.

13. Prima facie neither Section 47 nor any other
provision Disabilities Act was attracted. But
the Chief Commissioner chose to issue a show
cause notice on the complaint and also issued
an ex parte direction not to give effect to the
order of retirement. He overlooked and

8
WP (C) No.7689/2015 dtd 17.1.2017

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ignored the fact that the retirement from
service was on completion of the prescribed
period of service as per the service
regulations, which was clearly mentioned in
the letter of retirement dated 17-11-2006;
and that when an employee was retired in
accordance with the Regulations, no interim
order can be issued to continue him in service
beyond the age of retirement.

14. an authority functioning under the Disabilities
Act, he has no power or The Chief
Commissioner also overlooked and ignored
the fact that as jurisdiction to issue a
direction to the employer not to retire an
employee. In fact, under the Scheme of the
Disabilities Act, the Chief Commissioner (or
the Commissioner) has no power to grant any
interim direction.

15. The functions of the Chief Commissioner
Sections 58 and 59 of the Act. Section 58
provides that the Chief Commissioner shall
have the following functions:

"58. (a) coordinate the work of the
Commissioners;

(b) monitor the utilisation of funds disbursed
by the Central Government;
(c) take steps to safeguard the rights and
facilities made available to persons with
disabilities;
(d) submit reports to the Central Government
on the implementation of the Act at such
intervals as the Government may prescribe."

16. Section 59 provides that without prejudice
to the provisions of Section 58, the
Commissioner may of his own motion or on
the application of any aggrieved person or
otherwise look into complaints and take up
the matter with the appropriate authorities,
any matters relating to (a) deprivation of
rights of persons with disabilities; and (b)

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non-implementation of laws, rules, bye-laws,
regulations, executive orders, guidelines or
instructions made or issued by the
appropriate Governments and the local
authorities for the welfare and protection of
rights of persons with disabilities. The
Commissioners appointed by the State
Governments also have similar powers under
Section 61 and 62.

17. Section 63 provides that the Chief
Commissioner and the Commissioners shall,
for the purpose of discharging their functions
under this Act, have the same powers as are
vested in a court under the Code of Civil
Procedure while trying a suit, in regard to the
following matters:

"63.(a) summoning and enforcing the
attendance for witnesses;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of
any document;
(c) requisitioning any public record or copy
thereof from any court officer;
(d) receiving evidence on affidavits; and
(e) issuing commissions for the examination of
witnesses or documents."

Rule 42 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal
opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full
Participation) Rules, 1996 lays down the
procedure to be followed by the Chief
Commissioner.

18. It is evident from the said provisions, that
neither the Chief Commissioner nor any
Commissioner functioning under the
Disabilities Act has power to issue any
mandatory or prohibitory injunction or other
interim directions. The fact that the
Disabilities Act clothes them with certain
powers for discharge of their functions (which
include power to look into complaints), does
not enable them to assume the other powers
of a civil court which are not vested in them

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by the provisions of the Disabilities Act. In All
India Indian Overseas Bank SC and ST
Employees' Welfare Assn v. Union of India,
this Court, dealing with Article 338(8) of the
Constitution of India (similar to Section 63 of
the Disabilities Act), observed as follows:

"5. It can be seen from a plain reading of
clause (8) that the Commission has the power
of the civil court for the purpose of
conducting an investigation contemplated in
sub-clause (a) and an inquiry into a complaint
referred to in sub-clause (b) of clause (5) of
Article 338 of the Constitution

*
10. …….All the procedural powers of a civil court
are given to the Commission for the purpose
of investigating and inquiring into these
matters and that too for that limited purpose
only. The powers of a civil court of granting
injunctions, temporary or permanent, do no
inhere in the Commission nor can such a
power be inferred or derived from a reading
of clause (8) of Article 338 of the
Constitution."

19. The order of the Chief Commissioner, not to
implement the order of retirement was illegal
and without jurisdiction."

(underlining added)

4. In view of the ratio of the judgment of the
Supreme C the case of Vinesh Kumar Bhasin
(supra), and which holds that the authorities
acting under the Act do not have powers to issue
directions or injunctions or pass a judgment like a
court of law for compliance, this writ petition is
allowed and the impugned order of the Deputy
Chief Commissioner dated 31.12.2014 is set aside.
Parties are left to bear their own costs.

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8

12.41. By relying on Rajender Singh’s case he
submits that the authorities functioning under
the Persons with Disabilities (Equal
Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full
Participation) Act, 1995 do not possess
adjudicatory powers to issue binding directions,
injunctions, or orders in the nature of a
judgment affecting service matters. He
contends that the Delhi High Court, following
the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in State Bank of Patiala, Arvind
3
Bhushan Pandey v. Vinesh Kumar Bhasin’s
case, has categorically held that the Chief
Commissioner or the Commissioner under the
Disabilities Act is empowered only to look into
complaints and take up the matter with the
appropriate authorities, and the conferment of
certain procedural powers of a civil court is
merely for the limited purpose of conducting
inquiry or investigation.

12.42. He therefore submits that such authorities
cannot assume the powers of a court to grant
mandatory or prohibitory directions, including
orders restraining retirement, directing
continuation in service, or granting other

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substantive reliefs. According to him, any such
order passed by the Commissioner purporting
to determine rights or grant enforceable relief
would be beyond the scope of the statutory
powers and consequently without jurisdiction,
and liable to be set aside.

12.43. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Bombay in
the case of The Shipping Corporation of
India vs. Shri.Haripada Shaileshwar
9
Chaterjee , more particularly Paras 3, 15, 16,
17, 18 and 19, which are reproduced hereunder
for easy reference:
3. By this petition under Article 227 of Constitution of
India, the Petitioner is challenging the order dated
17.10.2012 passed by the Commissioner for Persons
with Disabilities, Maharashtra State, Pune holding that
termination order passed by the Petitioner dated
04.12.2010 of Respondent's services as null and void
and directing the petitioner to reinstate the
Respondent in service within 90 days and pay him his
all benefits.
15. I heard both the sides at length. The issue involved
in the present proceeding is whether the
Commissioner under provision of the said Act can set
aside the termination letter dated 04.12.2010 issued
by the Petitioner and can direct the petitioner to
reinstate the Respondent in service with full back
wages. Bare reading of Section 62 of the said Act
shows that Commissioner has power to investigate
and take up the matter with the appropriate

9
W.P.No.10307/2015 dtd 18.8.2016

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Authorities. The said Act do not permit the
Commissioner to pass an order in the form of
mandatory direction.
16. In the present proceeding, after following due
process of law, the petitioner terminated the
Respondent's service by letter dated 04.12.2010 and
paid him entire compensation to the tune of
Rs.9,36,192/- as per clause 26 of the agreement
dated 15.02.2008. Even the Apex Court in the
matter of State Bank of Patiala & Ors (supra), in the
matter of Bhabani Prasad Jena (supra) and Delhi
High Court in the matter of Baljeet Singh (supra)
categorically held that the Commissioner has no
right to pass a mandatory orders.
17. It is to be noted that the issue involved in the
present proceeding is fully covered by the decision
of the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of
Vaishali Walmik Bagul V/s. Secretary, Prerna Trust,
Aurangabad reported in 2013 (5) Mh. L. J. 221.
Paragraph 24, reads. thus:
"24. Aforesaid provisions of the Disabilities Act
refer to taking up the matter/complaint with the
appropriate government by the Commissioner,
Handicap Welfare. The provisions of the Disabilities
Act as are quoted do not appear to confer power to
issue directions on the Commissioner i.e.
competent authority. His role is to take up the
matter with appropriate authority. Thus, the
direction issued under order dated 10-8-2009
exceeds the functions under the provisions of
sections 61 and 62 of the Disabilities Act."
18. In the present proceeding, the Commissioner set
aside the termination letter issued by the Petitioner
and also directed the petitioner to reinstate the
Respondent which is contrary to the provision of the
said Act. Hence, the same is required to be set
aside. As the order passed by the learned
Commissioner is beyond his jurisdiction and same is
required to be set aside, it is necessary in the
interest of justice, an opportunity is required to be
granted to the Respondent to take appropriate steps

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according to law, if it is available to protect his
interest.
19 . In view of the above mentioned facts, the following
order is passed:
a) Writ Petition is allowed.
b) The impugned order passed by the Commissioner
for Persons with disabilities, Maharashtra State,
Pune in complaint under Sections 62 & 63 of the
said Act dated 17.10.2012 is set aside.
c) Liberty granted to the Respondent to take
appropriate steps according to law, if it is
available to protect his interest.
d) No order as to costs

12.44. By relying on Haripada Shaileshwar
9
Chaterjee’s case he submits that under the
scheme of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal
Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full
Participation) Act, 1995, the Commissioner for
Persons with Disabilities is empowered only to
inquire into complaints and take up the matter
with the appropriate authorities, and does not
possess the jurisdiction to issue mandatory
directions such as setting aside termination
orders, directing reinstatement, or granting
service benefits.

12.45. He contends that the Hon’ble Bombay High
Court has categorically held that the statutory
provisions merely enable the Commissioner to

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investigate grievances and recommend
appropriate action, and the statute does not
authorise the Commissioner to pass orders in
the nature of binding adjudications affecting
service rights. According to him, the
conferment of certain procedural powers of a
civil court for the purpose of inquiry does not
transform the Commissioner into a judicial
authority competent to determine service
disputes. Consequently, any order passed by
the Commissioner directing reinstatement or
setting aside termination would be beyond the
scope of the statutory powers and therefore
without jurisdiction, and liable to be set aside.

12.46. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok
Kumar Sonkar vs. Union of India &
10
others , more particularly Paras 34 to 37,
which are reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
34. The principles of equity in a case of this nature, in
our opinion, will have no role to play. Sympathy, as
is well known, should not be misplaced.
35. In Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal [(2005) 2 SCC 638
: 2005 SCC (L&S) 308] a Division Bench of this

10
(2007) 4 SCC 54

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Court, wherein one of us was a member, noticing
some decisions, observed: (SCC pp. 654-55, paras
44-45)
“44. While construing a statute, ‘sympathy’ has no
role to play. This Court cannot interpret the
provisions of the said Act ignoring the binding
decisions of the Constitution Bench of this Court
only by way of sympathy to the workmen
concerned.
45. In A. Umarani v. Registrar, Coop. Societies
[(2004) 7 SCC 112 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 918] this
Court rejected a similar contention upon noticing
the following judgments: (SCC pp. 131-32, paras
68-70)
‘68. In a case of this nature this Court should not
even exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of
the Constitution of India on misplaced sympathy.
69. In Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh
[(2004) 2 SCC 130] it is stated: (SCC p. 144,
paras 36-37)
36. We have no doubt in our mind that sympathy or
sentiment by itself cannot be a ground for passing
an order in relation whereto the appellants
miserably fail to establish a legal right. It is further
trite that despite an extraordinary constitutional
jurisdiction contained in Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, this Court ordinarily would not
pass an order which would be in contravention of a
statutory provision.
37. As early as in 1911, Farewell, L.J. in Latham v.
Richard Johnson & Nephew Ltd. [(1913) 1 KB 398 :
(1911-13) All ER Rep 117 : 108 LT 4 (CA)]
observed: (All ER p. 123 E) ‘We must be very
careful not to allow our sympathy with the infant
plaintiff to affect our judgment. Sentiment is a
dangerous will o’ the wisp to take as a guide in the
search for legal principles.' ”
10

12.47. By relying on Ashok Kumar Sonkar’s case
he submits that equitable considerations or

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sympathy cannot override the clear mandate of
law. According to him, the Hon’ble Apex Court
has categorically held that sympathy or
sentiment, however compelling, cannot be a
ground to grant relief in the absence of a legally
enforceable right.

12.48. He contends that the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has emphasised that while exercising judicial or
statutory powers, courts and authorities must
act strictly in accordance with the statutory
framework and binding legal principles, and
cannot mould relief merely on humanitarian
considerations. It is therefore his submission
that even in cases where the grievance of an
individual may evoke sympathy, no relief can
be granted unless the claimant establishes a
legal entitlement under the governing statute
or rules. Consequently, any order granting
relief solely on compassionate or sympathetic
considerations, without a corresponding legal
basis, would be contrary to settled principles of
law.

12.49. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat

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Sanchar Nigam Limited & anr., vs.
11
G.Sarvothaman , more particularly Para 13,
which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference
13. The Chief Commissioner under Section 59 of the
1995 Act has got only the power to examine the
matters relating to “deprivation of rights” of
persons with disabilities. The Commissioner can
only examine whether the persons with disabilities
have been deprived of any “rights” for which the
Commissioner has to first examine whether the
complainant has any “rights” under the laws. The
Commissioner cannot confer or create any right
for the appellants. The respondent could not
establish that any right has been conferred on
him and such right has been denied to him by the
Department. The respondent wanted conferment
of a right which was extended only to specific five
categories of posts on the basis of the report of a
High-Powered Committee. The Chief
Commissioner has no power to direct inclusion of
one more category among the identified
categories and to grant the benefit. Under Section
59(b) the Chief Commissioner has got the power
to look into the complaints with respect to the
matters relating to non-implementation of laws,
rules, bye-laws, regulations, executive orders,
guidelines or instructions made or issued by the
appropriate Government and the local authorities
for the welfare and protection of rights of persons
with disabilities. It is not the case of the
respondent that the Department has failed to
implement either any laws, rules or regulations.
The respondent prayed for positive direction,
claiming certain rights, which had not been
conferred on him either by any law, regulations or
orders. Consequently, the directions given by the
Chief Commissioner for the inclusion of TOA cadre
among the identified categories cannot be

11
(2013) 10 SCC 489

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sustained and the Commissioner while passing
such order has exceeded the powers conferred on
him under Section 59 of the 1995 Act.
11

12.50. By relying on G.Sarvothaman’s case he
submits that the powers of the Chief
Commissioner under the Persons with
Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 are
limited to examining complaints relating to the
deprivation of rights of persons with disabilities
and to ensure implementation of the statutory
protections already conferred by law.

12.51. He contends that the Hon’ble Apex Court has
categorically held that the Commissioner cannot
create, confer, or expand rights which are not
otherwise provided under the statute, rules, or
executive instructions. According to him, the
jurisdiction of the Commissioner is confined to
examining whether an existing legal right has
been denied and, if so, to take up the matter
with the appropriate authority. Therefore,
where a complainant seeks the creation or
extension of a right not recognised by the
governing legal framework, the Commissioner
would have no jurisdiction to grant such relief.

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12.52. He accordingly submits that any direction
issued by the Commissioner granting benefits
or recognising rights not otherwise provided by
law would amount to an excess of jurisdiction
and would be liable to be set aside.

12.53. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Hon’ble High Court of Bombay (At:
Aurangabad) in the case of Vaishali Walmik
12
Bagul vs. Secretary Prerna Trust , more
particularly Paras 23 and 24, which are
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
23 .Aforesaid provisions of the Disabilities Act refer to
taking up the matter/complaint with the
appropriate government by the Commissioner,
Handicap Welfare. The provisions of the Disabilities
Act as are quoted do not appear to confer power to
issue directions on the commissioner i.e.,
competent authority. His role is to take up the
matter with appropriate authority. Thus, the
direction issued under order dated 10.8.2009
exceeds the functions under the provisions of
Sections 61 and 62 of the Disabilities Act.
24 .If it is to be considered that the post in which Smt.
Suryawanshi was working, was lying vacant, the
question that will have to be addressed to is as to
what respondent No.4 did all through out till 2008
and while Smt. Suryawanshi was under
employment and for a long period thereafter. He
had kept silence for over 9 years. His action is
belated and suffers laches.

12
Laws (Bom-2013-1-228)

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12

12.54. By relying on Vaishali Walmik Bagul’s case
he submits that the statutory framework of the
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities,
Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act,
1995 does not confer adjudicatory powers upon
the Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities
to issue binding directions determining rights of
parties. According to him, the Hon’ble High
Court has categorically held that the role of the
Commissioner is confined to examining
complaints and taking up the matter with the
appropriate authorities, and the statute does
not empower the Commissioner to issue
mandatory directions affecting service rights.

12.55. He further submits that the said judgment also
recognises that claims raised after an inordinate
and unexplained delay are liable to be rejected
on the ground of laches, particularly where the
aggrieved party has remained silent for a
considerable period of time. He therefore
contends that where a complaint is instituted
after a long lapse of time without satisfactory
explanation, the proceedings would be vitiated
by delay and laches, and any relief sought
therein would not be liable to be granted.

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12.56. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of North
Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. v.
13
Ashok Paper Mill (Assam) Ltd. and anr.,
more particularly, Paras, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25 and
27, which are reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
17. The above description of the powers of either the
Code or CrPC clearly testifies to the intent of the
State Legislature to specifically restrict the
application of both the said Codes, to only the extent
provided. The principle of statutory interpretation:
expression unius est exclusion alterius (the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other)
supports such a view. We also notice this Court
holding International Asset Reconstruction Co. of
India v. Official Liquidator [International Asset
Reconstruction Co. of India v. Official Liquidator as
extracted below:
“9. The fact that the Tribunal may be vested with
some of the powers as a civil court under the
Code of Civil Procedure, regarding summoning
and enforcing attendance of witnesses, discovery
and production of the documents, receiving
evidence on affidavits, issuing commission for
the examination of witnesses or documents,
reviewing its decisions, etc. does not vest in it
the status of a court. Section 22(1), in fact,
provides that the Tribunal shall not be bound by
the procedures under the Code, and can regulate
its own procedures in accordance with natural
justice.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. Having come to the conclusion as above, we are
required to consider, whether the instant appeal,

13
AIR 2024 SC 436

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filed against the order of the Commissioner of
Payments is maintainable or not? Prior to delving into
such a question, we would also need to examine as
to whether in the absence of an expressly prescribed
limitation, can an appeal from an order passed by
the Commissioner of Payments, be entertained,
irrespective of passage of time?
23. This dispute concerns the exercise of a statutory
right. The issue of no express limitation being
provided in regard to the exercise of a right to assail
the order has captured the attention of this Court,
earlier, on certain occasions. We may refer to some
decisions hereinbelow.
23.1. In State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop.
Milk Producers Union Ltd. [State of Punjab v.
Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union
Ltd., (2007) 11 SCC 363] this Court observed
that : (SCC p. 367, para 18)
“18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been
prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its
jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What,
however, shall be the reasonable period would
depend upon the nature of the statute, rights
and liabilities thereunder and other relevant
factors.”
The principle stands reiterated in SEBI v. Sunil
Krishna Khaitan [SEBI v. Sunil Krishna Khaitan,
(2023) 2 SCC 643]
23.2. In Jagdish v. State of Karnataka [Jagdish v.
State of Karnataka, (2021) 12 SCC 812 : (2023)
2 SCC (Civ) 654] , this Court referred to a
number of decisions to reiterate that where the
statute in question does not prescribe a
limitation, the rights conferred therein must be
exercised within reasonable time.
23.3. This aspect of reasonable time was recently
discussed by this Court in Madras Aluminium Co.
Ltd v. T.N. SEB [Madras Aluminium Co. Ltd v.
T.N. SEB, (2023) 8 SCC 240] , having referred a
three-Judge Bench decision in SEBI v. Bhavesh
Pabari [SEBI v. Bhavesh Pabari, (2019) 5 SCC

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90] stating that the concept is to be applied and
judged in each case per its own peculiar facts.
24 .We further refer to observations made in Ajaib Singh
v. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service
Society Ltd. [Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-
cum-Processing Service Society Ltd., (1999) 6 SCC
82 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1054] to the effect that courts
should be wary of prescribing specific period of
limitation in cases where the legislature has refrained
from doing so. It was further observed that where
the defence of delay is employed in a situation where
no limitation is prescribed vide statute, the exact
prejudice or loss suffered by the party if such a delay
is condoned, must be shown on facts. In other
words, in the absence of a specific limitation it would
be improper for courts to dismiss a plea is solely on
the ground of delay without having examined the
nature of laws order prejudice caused to the other
party in the facts and circumstances of the case at
hand. The holding in Ajaib Singh [Ajaib Singh v.
Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service
Society Ltd., (1999) 6 SCC 82 : 1999 SCC (L&S)
1054] was affirmed by a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Purohit & Co. v. Khatoonbee [Purohit & Co.
v. Khatoonbee, (2017) 4 SCC 783 : (2017) 2 SCC
(Civ) 697 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 479] .
25 .In light of above discussion, it is clear that when a
court is seized of a situation where no limitation
stands provided either by specific applicability of the
Limitation Act or the special statute governing the
dispute, the Court must undertake a holistic
assessment of the facts and circumstances of the
case to examine the possibility of delay causing
prejudice to a party. When no limitation stands
prescribed it would be inappropriate for a court to
supplant the legislature’ s wisdom by its own and
provide a limitation, more so in accordance with what
it believes to be the appropriate period. A court
should, in such a situation consider in the facts and
circumstances of the case at hand, the conduct of the
parties, the nature of the proceeding, the length of
delay, the possibility of prejudice being caused, and
the scheme of the statute in question. It may be

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underscored here that when a party to a dispute
raises a plea of delay despite no specific period being
prescribed in the statute, such a party also bears the
burden of demonstrating how the delay in itself
would cause the party additional prejudice or loss as
opposed to, the claim subject-matter of dispute,
being raised at an earlier point in time.
27 .When a statute, either general or specific in
application, provides for a limitation within which to
file an appeal, the parties interested in doing so are
put to notice of the requirement to act with
expedition. However, opposite thereto, in cases such
as the present one where neither statute provides for
an explicit limitation, such urgency may be absent.
While it is still true that, as held in Ajaib [Ajaib Singh
v. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service
Society Ltd., (1999) 6 SCC 82 : 1999 SCC (L&S)
1054] , this does not entitle the parties to litigate
issues decades later, however shorter delays, in such
circumstances, would not attract delay and laches.
13

12.57. By relying on Ashok Paper Mill’s case he
submits that where a statute does not prescribe
any specific period of limitation for invoking a
statutory remedy, the same must nevertheless
be exercised within a reasonable time, the
determination of which depends upon the facts
and circumstances of each case.

12.58. He contends that the Hon’ble Apex Court has
reiterated that when a statute confers certain
powers upon an authority and does not
expressly provide a limitation period, the court
must undertake a holistic assessment of the
surrounding circumstances, including the

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conduct of the parties, the nature of the
proceedings, the length of delay and the
likelihood of prejudice being caused to the
opposite party. According to him, the Court has
further held that absence of a statutory
limitation does not permit parties to revive stale
claims after an inordinate lapse of time, short
or reasonably explained delays would
automatically attract the doctrine of delay and
laches.

12.59. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dalco
Engineering Private Limited, Fancy
Rehabilitation Trust vs. Union of India,
14
Satish Prabhakar Padhye more particularly
Paras 4, 5, 13, 15, 16 and 18, which are
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
4. The employee relies on Section 47 which provides
that no establishment shall dispense with, or reduce
in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during
his service. Section 47 of the Act is extracted below:
“47. Non-discrimination in government
employment.—(1) No establishment shall
dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee
who acquires a disability during his service:
Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring
disability is not suitable for the post he was

14
(2010) 4 SCC 378

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holding, could be shifted to some other post with
the same pay scale and service benefits:
Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust
the employee against any post, he may be kept
on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is
available or he attains the age of
superannuation, whichever is earlier.
(2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely
on the ground of his disability:
Provided that the appropriate Government may,
having regard to the type of work carried on in
any establishment, by notification and subject to
such conditions, if any, as may be specified in
such notification, exempt any establishment from
the provisions of this section.”
The term “establishment” employed in Section 47
is defined in Section 2(k) of the Act as follows:
“2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,—
*
(k) ‘establishment’ means a corporation established
by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or
an authority or a body owned or controlled or
aided by the Government or a local authority or a
government company as defined in Section 617
of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) and
includes Departments of a Government;”
5. The question is, having regard to the definition of the
word “establishment” in Section 2(k) of the Act,
whether the requirement relating to non-
discrimination of employees acquiring a disability
during the course of service, embodied in Section 47,
is to be complied with only by authorities falling
within the definition of “State” (as defined in Article
12 of the Constitution), or even by private
employers. This leads us to the following two
questions:

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(i) Whether a company incorporated under the
Companies Act (other than a government
company as defined in Section 617 of the
Companies Act, 1956) is an “establishment” as
defined in Section 2(k) of the Act?
(ii) Whether the respondent in the first case and the
appellant in the second case are entitled to claim
any relief with reference to Section 47 of the
Act?
13 . There is yet another indication in Section 47 that
private employers are excluded. The
caption/marginal note of Section 47 describes the
purport of the section as non-discrimination in
government employment. The word “government” is
used in the caption broadly to refer to “State” as
defined in Article 12 of the Constitution. If the
intention of the legislature was to prevent
discrimination of persons with disabilities in any kind
of employment, the marginal note would have simply
described the provision as “non-discrimination in
employment” and sub-section (1) of Section 47
would have simply used the word “any employer”
instead of using the word “establishment” and then
taking care to define the word “establishment”. The
non-use of the words “any employer” and “any
employment” and specific use of the words
“government employment” and “establishment” (as
defined), demonstrates the clear legislative intent to
apply the provisions of Section 47 only to
employment under the State and not to employment
under others. While the marginal note may not
control the meaning of the body of the section, it
usually gives a safe indication of the purport of the
section to the extent possible. Be that as it may.
15. We agree that the socio-economic legislations
should be interpreted liberally. It is also true that
courts should adopt different yardsticks and
measures for interpreting socio-economic statutes,
as compared to penal statutes and taxing statutes.
But a caveat. The courts cannot obviously expand
the application of a provision in a socio-economic
legislation by judicial interpretation, to levels
unintended by the legislature, or in a manner which

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militates against the provisions of the statute itself or
against any constitutional limitations. In this case,
there is a clear indication in the statute that the
benefit is intended to be restricted to a particular
class of employees, that is employees of enumerated
establishments (which fall within the scope of “State”
under Article 12). Express limitations placed by the
socio-economic statute cannot be ignored, so as to
include in its application, those who are clearly
excluded by such statute itself. We should not lose
sight of the fact that the words “corporation
established by or under a Central, Provincial or State
Act” is a term used in several enactments, intended
to convey a standard meaning. It is not a term which
has any special significance or meaning in the
context of the Disabilities Act or any other socio-
economic legislations. It is a term used in various
enactments, to refer to statutory corporations as
contrasted from non-statutory companies. Any
interpretation of the said term, to include private
sector, will not only amount to overruling the clear
enunciation in Dhanoa [(1981) 3 SCC 431 : 1981
SCC (Cri) 733 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 6] which has held
the field for nearly three decades, but more
importantly lead to the erasure of the distinction
maintained in the Constitution between statutory
corporations which are “State” and non-statutory
bodies and corporations for the purposes of
enforcement of fundamental rights. The
interpretation put forth by the employee would make
employees of all companies, public servants,
amenable to punishment under the provisions of the
Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act; and
would also result in all non-statutory companies and
private sector companies being included in the
definition of “State” thereby requiring them to
comply with the requirements of non-discrimination,
equality in employment, reservations, etc.
16. The appellant next contended that the scheme of
the Act does not confine its applicability to
government or statutory corporations. Reference is
invited to some provisions of the Act to contend that
obligations/duties/responsibilities are fixed with
reference to persons with disabilities, on

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establishments other than those falling under Section
2(k) of the Act. It was submitted that Section 39
casts an obligation on all educational institutions, to
reserve not less than three per cent of the seats for
persons with disabilities. In fact, it is not so. Though,
the marginal note of Section 29 uses the words “all
educational institutions” with reference to reservation
of seats for persons with disabilities, the section
makes it clear that only government educational
institutions and educational institutions receiving aid
from the Government shall reserve not less than
three per cent seats for persons with disabilities. It is
well recognised that an aided private school would be
included within the definition of “State” in regard to
its acts and functions as an instrumentality of the
State. Therefore, care is taken to apply the
provisions of the Act only to educational institutions
belonging to the Government or receiving aid from
the Government and not to unaided private
educational institutions. Further, Section 39 of the
Act does not use the word “establishment”.
Reference is next made to Section 44 which requires
non-discrimination in transport. This section requires
establishments in the transport sector to take special
measures (within the limits of their economic
capacity) to permit easy access to persons with
disabilities. The employee contends that this would
mean that all establishments whether statutory
corporations falling under the definition of Section
2(k) of the Act or non-statutory corporations, or even
individuals operating in the transport sector should
comply with Section 44 of the Act. We do not
propose to consider whether Section 44 applies to
non-statutory corporations in the transport sector, as
that issue does not arise in this case. Further the use
of the words “within the limits of their economic
capacity” makes it virtually directory. Be that as it
may.
18. Therefore, CA No. 1886 of 2007 is allowed and CA
No. 1858 of 2007 is dismissed resulting in the
dismissal of the respective writ petitions. This will not
come in the way of employee of any private
company, who has been terminated on the ground of

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disability, seeking or enforcing any right available
under any other statute, in accordance with the law.

12.60. By relying on Dalco Engineering Private
14
Limited’s case he submits that the
protections contemplated under Section 47 of
the Persons with Disabilities (Equal
Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full
Participation) Act, 1995 are applicable only to
establishments falling within the statutory
definition provided under the Act, and not to all
employers indiscriminately.

12.61. He contends that the Hon’ble Apex Court has
categorically held that the term “establishment”
used in Section 47 must be understood strictly
in accordance with the definition contained in
Section 2(k) of the Act, which confines its
application to government establishments,
statutory corporations, authorities, bodies
owned or controlled or aided by the
Government, government companies, and
government departments. According to him,
the Supreme Court has further clarified that the
provision relating to non-discrimination in
employment for persons acquiring disability
during service is intended to apply only to

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employment under the State or entities falling
within the ambit of Article 12 of the
Constitution, and not to private employers who
do not fall within the statutory definition.

12.62. He therefore submits that even though the
Disabilities Act is a socio-economic legislation
warranting liberal interpretation, the courts
cannot expand the scope of the statute beyond
the clear legislative intent or extend the benefit
of a provision to categories of employers or
establishments which the legislature has
consciously excluded. Consequently, where an
employer does not fall within the statutory
definition of “establishment”, the protections
under Section 47 cannot be invoked against
such employer.

12.63. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deddappa
and ors., vs. Branch Manager, National
15
Insurance Co. Ltd., more particularly Para
27, which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
27 . A beneficial legislation as is well known should not
be construed in such a manner so as to bring within

15
(2008) 2 SCC 595

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its ambit a benefit which was not contemplated by
the legislature to be given to the party. In Regional
Director, ESI Corpn. v. Ramanuja Match Industries
AIR 1985 SC 278, this Court held:
“We do not doubt that beneficial legislations
should have liberal construction with a view to
implementing the legislative intent but where
such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its
own there is no warrant for the Court to travel
beyond the scheme and extend the scope of the
statute on the pretext of extending the statutory
benefit to those who are not covered by the
scheme.”
We, therefore, agree with the opinion of the High
Court.
15

12.64. By relying on Deddappa and ors’s case he
submits that even in the case of beneficial or
welfare legislations, the scope of the statute
cannot be expanded beyond the limits
consciously prescribed by the legislature.
According to him, the Hon’ble Apex Court has
categorically held that although beneficial
legislations are ordinarily required to be
interpreted liberally so as to advance their
object, such interpretation cannot result in
extending statutory benefits to persons or
situations not contemplated within the
legislative scheme.

12.65. He contends that the Supreme Court has
emphasised that where a statute contains a

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self-contained scheme defining the classes of
persons entitled to its benefits, the courts
cannot travel beyond that scheme on
considerations of equity or sympathy.
Consequently, it is his submission that statutory
benefits under a welfare enactment can be
claimed only by those who clearly fall within the
ambit of the provisions of the statute, and any
attempt to extend such benefits beyond the
legislative framework would be contrary to
settled principles of statutory interpretation.

12.66. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of
India vs. Nitdip Textile Processors Pvt.
16
Ltd., more particularly Paras 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11 and 45, which are reproduced hereunder for
easy reference:
6. The Scheme, as contained in Chapter IV of the Act, is
a code in itself and statutory in nature and character.
While implementing the Scheme, liberal construction
may be given but it cannot be extended beyond
conditions prescribed in the statutory scheme. In ESI
Corpn. v. Ramanuja Match Industries [(1985) 1 SCC
218, this Court observed:
“10. … We do not doubt that beneficial legislations
should have liberal construction with a view to
implementing the legislative intent but where
such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its

16
(2012) 1 SCC 226

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own there is no warrant for the court to travel
beyond the scheme and extend the scope of the
statute on the pretext of extending the statutory
benefit to those who are not covered by the
scheme.”
7 . In Hemalatha Gargya v. CIT [(2003) 9 SCC 510] ,
this Court has held: (SCC pp. 516-17, para 10)
“10. Besides, the Scheme has conferred a benefit on
those who had not disclosed their income earlier
by affording them protection against the possible
legal consequences of such non-disclosure under
the provisions of the Income Tax Act. Where the
assessees seek to claim the benefit under the
statutory scheme they are bound to comply
strictly with the conditions under which the
benefit is granted. There is no scope for the
application of any equitable consideration when
the statutory provisions of the Scheme are stated
in such plain language.”
8. In Union of India v. Charak Pharmaceuticals (India)
Ltd. [(2003) 11 SCC 689], this Court has observed
thus:
“8. If benefit is sought under a scheme, like KVSS,
the party must fully comply with the provisions
of the Scheme. If all the requirements of the
Scheme are not met then on principles of equity,
courts cannot extend the benefit of that
Scheme.”
9 . In Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd. [(2004) 5 SCC 385 at p. 404, this Court
observed as:
“53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus,
deserves liberal construction with a view to
implementing the legislative intent but it is trite
that where such beneficial legislation has a
scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or
doubt therein, the court would not travel beyond
the same and extend the scope of the statute on
the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to
those who are not covered thereby. (See ESI
Corpn. v. Ramanuja Match Industries”

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10. In Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal [(2005) 2 SCC
638:, this Court has observed:
“39. … A beneficial statute, as is well known, may
receive liberal construction but the same cannot
be extended beyond the statutory scheme. (See
Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd. [(2004) 5 SCC 385 : 2004 SCC (Cri)
1623] )”
11. In Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand [(2005) 3 SCC
551, this Court has held:
“93. We are not oblivious of the proposition that a
beneficent legislation should not be construed so
liberally so as to bring within its fore a person
who does not answer the statutory scheme. (See
Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd.”
45. To sum up, Article 14 does not prohibit reasonable
classification of persons, objects and transactions by
the legislature for the purpose of attaining specific
ends. To satisfy the test of permissible classification,
it must not be “arbitrary, artificial or evasive” but
must be based on some real and substantial
distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to
the object sought to be achieved by the legislature.
The taxation laws are no exception to the application
of this principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of
the Constitution of India. However, it is well settled
that the legislature enjoys very wide latitude in the
matter of classification of objects, persons and things
for the purpose of taxation in view of inherent
complexity of fiscal adjustment of diverse elements.
The power of the legislature to classify is of wide
range and flexibility so that it can adjust its system of
taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. Even so,
large latitude is allowed to the State for classification
upon a reasonable basis and what is reasonable is a
question of practical details and a variety of factors
which the court will be reluctant and perhaps ill-
equipped to investigate. It has been laid down in a
large number of decisions of this Court that a taxation
statute, for the reasons of functional expediency and
even otherwise, can pick and choose to tax some. A

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power to classify being extremely broad and based on
diverse considerations of executive pragmatism, the
judicature cannot rush in where even the legislature
warily treads. All these operational restraints on
judicial power must weigh more emphatically where
the subject is taxation. Discrimination resulting from
fortuitous circumstances arising out of particular
situations, in which some of the tax-payers find
themselves, is not hit by Article 14 if the legislation,
as such, is of general application and does not single
them out for harsh treatment. Advantages or
disadvantages to individual assessees are accidental
and inevitable and are inherent in every taxing
statute as it has to draw a line somewhere and some
cases necessarily fall on the other side of the line. The
point is illustrated by two decisions of this Court. In
Khandige Sham Bhat v. ITO (Ag) [AIR 1963 SC 591] .
The Travancore-Cochin Agricultural Income Tax Act
was extended to Malabar area on 1-11-1956 after
formation of the State of Kerala. Prior to that date,
there was no agricultural income tax in that area. The
challenge under Article 14 was that the income of the
petitioner was from areca nut and pepper crops,
which were harvested after November in every year
while persons who grew certain other crops could
harvest before November and thus escape the liability
to pay tax. It was held that, that was only accidental
and did not amount to violation of Article 14. In Jain
Bros. v. Union of India [(1969) 3 SCC 311] , Section
297(2)(g) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was
challenged because under that section proceedings
completed prior to April 1962 was to be dealt under
the old Act and proceedings completed after the said
date had to be dealt with under the Income Tax Act,
1961 for the purpose of imposition of penalty. 1-4-
1962 was the date of the commencement of the
Income Tax Act, 1961. It was held that the crucial
date for imposition of penalty was the date of
completion of assessment or the formation of
satisfaction of authority that such act had been
committed. It was also held that for the application
and implementation of the new Act, it was necessary
to fix a date and provide for continuation of pending
proceedings. It was also held that the mere possibility
that some officer might intentionally delay the

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disposal of a case could hardly be a ground for
striking down the provision as discriminatory .
16

12.67. By relying on Nitdip Textile Processors’s
case he submits that where a statutory scheme
confers specific benefits subject to defined
conditions, such benefits can be claimed only
upon strict compliance with the requirements
prescribed under the scheme. According to him,
the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated that
although beneficial legislations may be
interpreted liberally to advance their object,
courts cannot extend the scope of a statutory
scheme beyond the conditions expressly
stipulated therein.

12.68. He contends that the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has further held that when a party seeks to
avail a benefit under a statutory scheme, it
must strictly satisfy the eligibility criteria and
procedural requirements laid down in the
statute, and equitable considerations cannot be
invoked to relax or dilute those statutory
conditions. It is therefore his submission that
where the language of the statute or scheme is
clear and unambiguous, there is no scope for
importing equitable considerations or enlarging

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the scope of the benefit by judicial
interpretation.

12.69. He accordingly submits that the statutory
benefits contemplated under the relevant
legislative framework must be applied strictly
within the confines of the scheme enacted by
the legislature, and any attempt to extend such
benefits beyond the statutory parameters would
be contrary to the settled principles laid down
by the Hon’ble Apex Court.

12.70. On the basis of all the above he submits that
the Writ Petition is required to be allowed and
reliefs sought for granted.

13. Ms.Jayna Kothari, learned Senior Counsel, appearing
for Respondent No.1 - teacher, would submit that:

13.1. Admittedly the teacher was an employee of the
School from 8.7.2008 to 31.5.2015, during
which time, she had performed her duties in a
diligent, timely and satisfactory manner. She
does not dispute the events which occurred on
22.8.2013 but only submits that the teacher
took a proactive stand to try and save the
student.

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13.2. The fact that the teacher fell down and had
such an injury would indicate the selfless
conduct on part of the teacher in putting her
life at risk to save the life of one of her wards,
namely the student. Though there may be
Standard Operating Procedures which may be
fixed or prescribed, the teacher having acted in
the interest of the student and there being no
malafide on the part of the teacher, the school
ought to have been more proactive, more
sympathetic, empathetic and liberal with the
teacher.

13.3. On account of the accident, the teacher has
acquired a permanent 90% PP1 locomotor
disability and has become traumatically
paraplegic.

13.4. In this regard, she submits that the student
could reach the windowsill on account of there
being no grill on the windows. If the School had
installed the basic grills, then the event would
never have occurred. It is the School which is
to be blamed for the entire situation. Her
submission is that the teacher was transported
to the hospital without calling for an ambulance

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in another teacher's vehicle, in a reckless
manner, making her sit upright in an injured
state, which caused further damage to the
spinal cord of the teacher.

13.5. There is no qualified doctor or nurse at the
premises of the school, and if there was, no one
attended to the teacher. If a qualified doctor or
a nurse was available, then adequate
safeguards could have been taken to ensure
that no further injury is caused to the teacher.

13.6. The Chairman of the Institution had promised
that all medical expenses of the teacher would
be taken care of and as such the said assurance
and promise is required to be fulfilled by the
school, which is what has been taken into
consideration by the Commissioner.

13.7. She obtained a disability certificate on
10.02.2016 and again requested the Petitioner
to consider her demands for reasonable
accommodation which was refused. It is only
after the claim by the teacher was filed before
the Commissioner, that contentions of the
teacher having acted contrary to the SOP and
or the like have been taken up to get over the

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liability of the school. The actions on part of the
teacher being laudible instead of doing so are
being criticized by the school which only
establishes the conduct on part of the school.

13.8. Though expenses in Fortis hospital was paid,
the injuries which have been sustained by the
teacher could not be treated in India. The
teacher having been discharged from Fortis
Hospital was advised to undergo specialized
treatment in the United States at the Kennedy
Krieger Institute in Baltimore, which was
informed to the school and even the school at
that time had promised to take care of the
medical expenses. Emails which have been sent
by the husband of the teacher on 5.8.2014,
8.8.2014, 3.1.2015 and 17.3.2015 bear witness
to this correspondence.

13.9. Thus, she submits that the allegation of the
school that the teacher was, incommunicado for
almost a year is completely false. The teacher
underwent neuro-rehabilitation treatment from
12.8.2014 to 11.9.2014 as regards which an
amount of Rs.16,25,984/- was incurred. After
she came back from the US, she underwent

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treatment and rehabilitation therapy costing
about Rs.50,000/- to Rs.60,000/- per month
and until 28.8.2019 she has incurred expenses
of Rs.24,48,000/- which would also be required
to be made good by the school. She submits
that out of the total expenses only a sum of
Rs.6,03,603/- has been paid and as such, the
amount of Rs.10,00,000/- directed to be paid is
not arbitrary or unreasonable.

13.10. Insofar as payment of salary and
reinstatement, she submits that the teacher
having been injured during the course of her
employment and within the scope of her
employment, the termination being invalid, the
teacher having required to undergo intensive
treatment, the teacher being ready to come
back and resume her teaching work, it is the
school which refused to provide reasonable
accommodation and was forcing her to resign
from her post and thereafter continue her as a
retainer role for six months, which was not
acceptable to the teacher and as such the
teacher refused to resign.

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13.11. The termination of services has been made
without issuing any notice despite the School
having assured the Respondent and her
Husband that her job was secure and that her
services would not be terminated. The
respondent has been in continuous contact with
Petitioner requesting them to reconsider
termination but to no avail. The principles of
natural justice have been completely violated.
Thereafter, the promise now being made that
the school will provide her a job as
administrative support staff is not tenable. By
which the salary, which was Rs.24,915/- per
month, would be reduced to Rs.15,000/- per
month and as such, amount to demotion.

13.12. Her submission is that disability incurred by an
employee during the course of employment,
cannot be a reason to terminate such employee
or demote such employee. Such employee
would have to continue in the same job with
the same salary, with the same perquisites.
Anything to the contra would amount to
discrimination on account of disability which is
not permissible.

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13.13. She refers to sub-section (i) of Section 2 of the
Disabilities Act of 2016 which is reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
(i) “ establishment ” includes a Government
establishment and private establishment;

13.14. By relying on subsection (i) of Section 2 she
contends that an establishment includes both a
government and a private establishment and as
such, the school cannot now contend that it
being a private establishment the Act would not
apply.

13.15. Whenever any employee suffers from physical
disability during course of her employment she
submits that there is an obligation on part of
the employer to make available reasonable
accommodation and in this regard, she relies on
sub-section (y) of Section 2 of Disabilities Act of
2016 which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference;
(y) “ reasonable accommodation ” means
necessary and appropriate modification and
adjustments, without imposing a disproportionate
or undue burden in a particular case, to ensure to
persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise
of rights equally with others;

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13.16. By relying on sub-section (y) of Section 2 she
submits that appropriate modification
adjustments are required to be made without
imposing disproportionate or undue burden in a
particular case to ensure that persons with
disabilities exercise their rights equally with
others. Despite the teacher being ready to
come back to work on reasonable
accommodation being made, the school has
refused to do so and the school as such cannot
take undue advantage of its own wrong.

13.17. She refers to subsection (3) of Section 3 of the
Disabilities Act of 2016 which is reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
3. Equality and non-discrimination .—
(1) ….
(2) ….
(3) No person with disability shall be discriminated
on the ground of disability, unless it is shown that
the impugned act or omission is a proportionate
means of achieving a legitimate aim.
(4) …..
(5) …...

13.18. She refers to subsection (3) of Section 3 to
contend that no person with disability shall be

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discriminated on the ground of disability unless
it is shown that the act or omission is a
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate
aim. In this regard, she submits that demotion
of the petitioner would amount to
discrimination. Changing the role of work from
teacher to administrative would amount to
discrimination, which affects the rights of the
teacher under Article 14, 19 and 21 of the
Constitution.

13.19. By relying on Chapter 3 of the Disabilities Act of
2016, she submits that the same applies to
both government establishment and private
education institutions. The school in the present
matter is also covered by Chapter 3 and all the
requirements thereof are required to be fulfilled
by the school.

13.20. She refers to Section 20 of the Disabilities Act
of 2016 which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
20. Non-discrimination in employment .—(1) No
Government establishment shall discriminate
against any person with disability in any matter
relating to employment:

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Provided that the appropriate Government may,
having regard to the type of work carried on in any
establishment, by notification and subject to such
conditions, if any, exempt any establishment from
the provisions of this section.
(2) Every Government establishment shall provide
reasonable accommodation and appropriate barrier
free and conducive environment to employees with
disability.
(3) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely
on the ground of disability.
(4) No Government establishment shall dispense
with or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a
disability during his or her service:
Provided that, if an employee after acquiring
disability is not suitable for the post he was holding,
shall be shifted to some other post with the same
pay scale and service benefits:
Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust
the employee against any post, he may be kept on
a supernumerary post until a suitable post is
available or he attains the age of superannuation,
whichever is earlier.


13.21. By referring to Section 20 of the Disabilities Act
of 2016 she submits that there shall be no
discrimination in employment nor can
promotion be denied on the basis of disability,
nor can there be any reduction in the rank of an
employee who acquires disability during his or
her service. She submits that if it is not

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possible to adjust the employee against any
post, he or she may be kept on a
supernumerary post with the same pay scale
and benefits. This she submits has not been
done by the school.

13.22. She refers to Section 21 of the Disabilities Act
of 2016 which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
21. Equal opportunity policy .—(1) Every
establishment shall notify equal opportunity
policy detailing measures proposed to be taken
by it in pursuance of the provisions of this
Chapter in the manner as may be prescribed by
the Central Government.
(2) Every establishment shall register a copy of
the said policy with the Chief Commissioner or
the State Commissioner, as the case may be.


13.23. By relying on Section 21, she submits, that it is
not only applicable to a government institution,
but also to a private institution. And the
requirement of providing equal opportunity is
applicable to even a private institution.

13.24. On the basis of a reading of all the provisions,
she submits that the school could not have
terminated the teacher from her employment

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due to her disability or demoted her, which
amounts to discrimination and violation of the
Disabilities Act of 2016. The reasonable
accommodation which had been sought for to
discharge the duties have not been so
permitted. She submits that the teacher
continues to be a valuable asset to the society
and she can discharge her duties as a teacher
so long as basic amenities are provided like
access to a lift, if she has to go to a different
floor or to provide for teaching in a classroom
which is accessible by a physically disabled
person, access to a washroom as also to basic
medical services so as to resume her job apart
from proper transport facilities from home to
school.

13.25. She refers to the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of Jeeja Ghosh and Another Vs.
17
Union of India and Others , more
particularly Para 18 thereof, which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:-
18. We have already taken note of some of the
international covenants and instruments
guaranteeing rights to persons with disabilities.
Insofar as obligation to fulfil these rights are

17
( 2016) 7 SCC 761

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concerned, the same is not limited to the
Government or government agencies/State but
even the private entities (which shall include
private carriers as well) are fastened with such
an obligation which they are supposed to carry
out. We have also mentioned that in the year
2000, Respondent 2 i.e. DGCA had issued CAR
with regard to “carriage” by persons with
disabilities and/or persons with reduced
mobility.
17

13.26. By referring to Jeeja Ghosh’s case, she
submits that the obligation to respect, protect
and fulfil the rights of persons with disabilities
is not confined merely to the State or its
instrumentalities, but extends equally to private
actors operating in the public sphere. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court has unequivocally
recognised that private entities, particularly
those engaged in providing essential or public-
facing services such as transportation, are
under a positive and enforceable duty to ensure
non-discrimination, dignity, and accessibility for
persons with disabilities.

13.27. She would further contend that the said
principle is not merely declaratory in nature,
but imposes a binding obligation, reinforced by
regulatory frameworks such as the Civil
Aviation Requirements (CAR) issued by the

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Directorate General of Civil Aviation, which
mandate compliance by private carriers. Thus,
according to her, any failure on the part of such
private entities to accommodate or safeguard
the rights of persons with disabilities would
amount to a violation of their fundamental
rights, particularly those emanating from
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India,
read in the light of international conventions to
which India is a signatory.

13.28. On that basis, she submits that the respondent,
though a private entity, cannot evade liability
by contending absence of a statutory
obligation, as the law laid down in Jeeja
17
Ghosh’s case clearly fastens a duty of care
and non-discriminatory treatment upon it,
thereby rendering its impugned action legally
unsustainable.

13.29. Whether the school is an unaided private
education institution or not, the applicability of
the Disabilities Act of 2016 is not taken away.
There is no distinction under Disabilities Act
made between aided, unaided or a private
education institution.

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13.30. She refers to Section 81 of the Disabilities Act
of 2016 which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
81. Action by appropriate authorities on
recommendation of State Commissioner .—
Whenever the State Commissioner makes a
recommendation to an authority in pursuance of clause
(b) of section 80, that authority shall take necessary
action on it, and inform the State Commissioner of the
action taken within three months from the date of
receipt of the recommendation:
Provided that where an authority does not accept a
recommendation, it shall convey reasons for non-
acceptance to the State Commissioner for Persons with
Disabilities within the period of three months, and shall
also inform the aggrieved person.

13.31. She submits that the actions on part of the
Commissioner are proper and valid. The
Commissioner has power suo moto or otherwise
to take steps where rights of persons with
disability are deprived and in terms of Section
82 of the Act can acs as a Civil Court.

13.32. In this regard, she relies on the judgement of
the Apex Court in Geetaben Ratilal Patel vs
District Primary Education Officer , (2013)

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18
7 SCC 182 Paras 20 & 27 which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
20. The provisions of Sections 47 and 62 of the Act,
when read together, empower the Commissioner to
look into the complaint with respect to the matters
relating to deprivation of rights of persons with
disabilities and non-implementation of laws, rules, bye-
laws, regulations, executive orders, guidelines or
instructions issued by the appropriate Governments or
local authorities and to take up the matter with the
appropriate authorities for the welfare and protection of
rights of persons with disabilities including matters
relating to dispensation with service or reduction in
rank. The power of the Commissioner “to look into the
complaints with respect to the matters relating to
deprivation of rights” as provided under Section 62 of
the Act is not an empty formality and the Commissioner
is required to apply his mind on the question raised by
the complainant to find out the truth behind the
complaint. If so necessary, the Commissioner may suo
motu inquire into the matter and/or after giving notice,
hearing the parties concerned and going through the
records may decide the complaint. If it comes to the
notice of the Commissioner that a person with disability
has been deprived of his rights or that the authorities
have flouted any law, rule, guideline, instruction, etc.
issued by the appropriate Government or local
authorities, the Commissioner is required to take up the
matter with the appropriate authority to ensure
restoration of rights of such disabled person and/or to
implement the law, rule, guideline, instruction if not
followed. A complaint may be made by any disabled
person himself or any person on behalf of disabled
persons or by any person in the interest of disabled
persons. Thus the issue as involved is decided

18
(2013) 7 SCC 182

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affirmatively in favour of the appellant and against the
respondent.
27. Having regard to the fact that we have upheld the
order passed by the Commissioner, we direct the
authorities to reinstate the appellant in service
immediately and to pay her regular salary every month.
The appellant shall be entitled to arrears of salary
w.e.f. 1-2-2008 which the respondent shall pay within
three months, else the appellant shall become entitled
to interest at the rate of 6% per annum with effect
from 1-2-2008 till the actual payment.
18

13.33. Relying on Geetaben Ratilal Patel’s case it
is submitted that the statutory framework
governing the rights of persons with disabilities
confers substantive and effective powers upon
the Commissioner to inquire into complaints
relating to deprivation of such rights and to
secure their enforcement. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court has authoritatively held that the powers
vested in the Commissioner under Sections 47
and 62 of the relevant enactment are not
merely procedural or symbolic, but are coupled
with a duty to conduct a meaningful inquiry,
ascertain the veracity of the complaint, and
take appropriate steps to ensure restoration of
the rights of the aggrieved person. It is
emphasised that the Commissioner is
empowered not only to act upon complaints but

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also to initiate suo motu proceedings, and upon
being satisfied that there has been a violation
of statutory protections, to require the
concerned authorities to remedy such violation.

13.34. She would further submit that the binding
directions issued by the Supreme Court in the
said case, including reinstatement with
continuity of service and payment of arrears
with interest, underscore the enforceability of
such rights and the obligation of authorities to
provide effective and restitutive relief.
Therefore, according to her, once a deprivation
of rights of a person with disability is
established, the competent authority is under a
legal obligation to take corrective measures,
and any failure to do so would render the action
arbitrary, illegal, and liable to be set aside.

13.35. On that basis, it is contended that in the
present case also, the competent authority
having failed to discharge its statutory duty to
adequately address and remedy the violation
complained of, the impugned action cannot be
sustained in law.

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13.36. She refers to Section 47 and 62 of the
Disabilities Act of 1995 which are reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
47. Non-discrimination in Government
Employment - (1) No establishment shall dispense
with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a
disability during his service:
Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability
is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be
shifted to some other post with the same pay scale
and service benefits:
Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the
employee against any post, he may be kept on a
supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or
he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is
earlier.
(2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely
on the ground of his disability:
Provided that the appropriate Government may,
having regard to the type of work carried on in any
establishment, by notification and subject to such
conditions, if any, as may be specified in such
notification, exempt any establishment from the
provisions of this section.
62. Commissioner to look into complaints with
respect to matters relating to deprivation of
rights of persons with disabilities - Without
prejudice to the provisions of section 61 the
Commissioner may of his own motion or on the
application of any aggrieved person or otherwise look
into complaints with respect to matters relating to –

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(a) deprivation of rights of persons with disabilities;
(b) non-implementation of laws, rules, bye-laws,
regulations, executive orders, guidelines or instructions
made or issued by the appropriate Governments and
the local authorities for the welfare and protection of
rights of persons with disabilities, and take up the
matter with the appropriate authorities.

13.37. Reliance has been placed on the judgement of
the Delhi High Court in Bank of Baroda v
19
Sumita Saha , Para 30 which is reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
30. A Chief Commissioner under the Act functions as a
quasi-judicial authority and has ample powers to decide
the issues entrusted to it. The orders passed by the
Chief Commissioner are not to be ignored and must be
given serious and due consideration and weightage. It
has to be kept in mind that the Act is a beneficial
legislation and, therefore, the provisions should be
interpreted and construed in a manner which advances
the benefits given under the said legislation.
Consequently, the powers and functions of the
Commissioner would have to be given the widest
amplitude possible within the four corners of the
provisions of the said Act itself. The Chief
Commissioner is certainly required to and is
empowered to look into any transgression of the rights
of persons with disabilities as also to examine the issue
of non-implementation of laws etc., which are for the
welfare and protection of rights of persons with
disabilities.
19

13.38. By referring to Sumita Saha’s case it is
submitted that the statutory authorities

19
2019 SCC OnLine Del 7846

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constituted under the disability rights
framework, particularly the Chief
Commissioner/Commissioner, exercise quasi-
judicial powers of a substantive and
determinative nature, and their decisions
cannot be treated as mere recommendations
devoid of binding effect.

13.39. She submits that the Hon’ble Delhi High Court
has categorically held that the orders passed by
such authorities are entitled to due weight,
serious consideration, and effective
implementation by all concerned. It is
emphasised that the enactment in question
being a beneficial legislation, its provisions are
required to be interpreted in a purposive and
expansive manner so as to advance, rather
than dilute, the rights and protections conferred
upon persons with disabilities.

13.40. She would further contend that the powers of
the Commissioner are to be construed with the
widest possible amplitude within the statutory
framework, enabling the authority to inquire
into violations, examine instances of non-
implementation of laws, rules, and guidelines,

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and to take necessary steps to secure
compliance and redressal. Therefore, according
to her, any attempt to trivialise, disregard, or
bypass the findings or directions issued by the
Commissioner would be contrary to the
legislative intent and the law laid down by the
High Court.

13.41. On that basis, it is submitted that in the
present case, the findings and directions issued
by the competent authority ought to have been
accorded due deference and implemented in
their true spirit, and the failure to do so renders
the impugned action unsustainable in law.

13.42. Reliance has been placed on the judgement of
the Bombay High Court in General Manager
of B.E.S.T Undertaking v. Mohammad
20
Ramjan M. Shahban & Anr. 2018 more
particularly paras 4 & 11 thereof which are
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
4. The argument that the Commissioner simply has to
take up the matter with the appropriate authority,
whatever that means, and can pass no direction, has
no substance. If all that is meant to be done by the
Commissioner for persons of disabilities under Section
62 of the Disabilities Act, is to correspond or take up

20
SCC OnLine Bom 912

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the issue with the appropriate authority, that is to say,
the employer as in this case, he is an authority with no
effective role or purpose. It is difficult to understand in
that case the reason for conferring extensive powers of
the civil court on the Commissioner for the purposes of
discharging his functions under Section 61 and 62 of
the Act. If at the end of the day, all that he is expected
to do is to correspond or enquire with the authority,
there is no need to confer such elaborate procedural
powers on him. The only reasonable meaning that can
be ascribed to the expression “take up the matter with
the appropriate authorities” is that, in an appropriate
case, the Commissioner can issue suitable instructions
to the concerned authorities, that is to say, in case of
an employment related dispute to the employer, for
redressing the grievance of the employee who may be
a person with disability or who may have acquired
disability during service. The power may be to “take up
the matter with the appropriate authority”, but then the
matter itself must be taken up with a view to redress
the grievance and do so effectively. If such redressal
involves implementation of any particular measure, or
taking any particular step provided in the Disabilities
Act, the authority, in an appropriate case, can certainly
be asked to follow the mandate of the statute or take
the particular step as may be required thereunder.
11. These dicta clearly govern the facts of our case.
What we have to see is whether Respondent No. 1
acquired a disability within the meaning of Section 2(i)
and if yes, whether for that reason he was being
terminated from service rather than being shifted to
any other suitable post, if he was held to be unsuitable
for the job he was engaged in. If that is so, the
mandate of Section 47 is breached and corrective
measures can be ordered under Section 62. It is not
necessary to further consider if he is a person with
disability within the meaning of Section 2(t).

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13.43. Relying on Mohammad Ramjan M.
20
Shahban’s case it is submitted that the
powers conferred upon the Commissioner under
the disabilities legislation are not merely
advisory or recommendatory in character, but
carry with them the authority to issue effective
and enforceable directions for redressal of
grievances.

13.44. She submits that the Hon’ble Bombay High
Court has expressly rejected the contention
that the Commissioner’s role is limited to mere
correspondence or facilitation with the
appropriate authority. On the contrary, the
Court has held that such an interpretation
would render the statutory scheme otiose,
especially in light of the conferment of powers
akin to those of a civil court. The expression “to
take up the matter with the appropriate
authority” has been purposively interpreted to
mean that the Commissioner is empowered, in
appropriate cases, to issue suitable directions
or instructions to ensure effective compliance
with the statutory mandate and to secure
meaningful redressal.

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13.45. She would further contend that the judgment
underscores that where a violation of statutory
protections, particularly those relating to
employment security under Section 47, is
established, the Commissioner is not only
competent but duty-bound to require the
employer to take corrective measures, including
reassignment to suitable posts or other
remedial steps contemplated under the statute.

13.46. On that basis, it is submitted that the authority
of the Commissioner extends to directing
substantive compliance and cannot be diluted
into a mere recommendatory function; and
consequently, any contention to the contrary,
seeking to undermine the binding nature of
such directions, is liable to be rejected as being
contrary to the settled legal position.

13.47. There is no limitation prescribed under the
Disabilities Act of 2016 and as such, the claim
of the School that the complaint is barred by
limitation is completely unfounded. The cause
of action being a continuing one, which
continues even on today, she submits that the
same cannot be said to be barred by limitation,

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so long as the school has terminated and / or
does not permit the teacher to discharge her
role as a teacher and so long as the school does
not make payment of the due amounts to the
teacher, the cause of action being continuing
one would continue to be applicable.

13.48. Reliance has been placed on the judgement of
the Supreme Court in North Eastern
Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd & Anr. Vs
21
Ashok Paper Mill (Assam) Ltd. & Anr
more particularly paras 17, 22 23 & 30.2
thereof which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference :
17. The above description of the powers of either the
Code or CrPC clearly testifies to the intent of the State
Legislature to specifically restrict the application of
both the said Codes, to only the extent provided. The
principle of statutory interpretation : expression unius
est exclusion alterius (the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of the other) supports such a view. We
also notice this Court holding International Asset
Reconstruction Co. of India v. Official Liquidator
[International Asset Reconstruction Co. of India v.
Official Liquidator, (2017) 16 SCC 137 : (2018) 2 SCC
(Civ) 724] as extracted below : (SCC p. 140, para 9)
“9. The fact that the Tribunal may be vested with some
of the powers as a civil court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, regarding summoning and enforcing

21
AIR Online 2023 SC 1147

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attendance of witnesses, discovery and production of
the documents, receiving evidence on affidavits,
issuing commission for the examination of witnesses or
documents, reviewing its decisions, etc. does not vest
in it the status of a court. Section 22(1), in fact,
provides that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the
procedures under the Code, and can regulate its own
procedures in accordance with natural justice.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. Having come to the conclusion as above, we are
required to consider, whether the instant appeal, filed
against the order of the Commissioner of Payments is
maintainable or not? Prior to delving into such a
question, we would also need to examine as to
whether in the absence of an expressly prescribed
limitation, can an appeal from an order passed by the
Commissioner of Payments, be entertained,
irrespective of passage of time?
23. This dispute concerns the exercise of a statutory
right. The issue of no express limitation being provided
in regard to the exercise of a right to assail the order
has captured the attention of this Court, earlier, on
certain occasions. We may refer to some decisions
hereinbelow.
23.1. In State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop.
Milk Producers Union Ltd. [State of Punjab v. Bhatinda
District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd., (2007) 11
SCC 363] this Court observed that : (SCC p. 367, para
18)
“18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been
prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its
jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however,
shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the
nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder
and other relevant factors.”

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The principle stands reiterated in SEBI v. Sunil Krishna
Khaitan [SEBI v. Sunil Krishna Khaitan, (2023) 2 SCC
643]
23.2. In Jagdish v. State of Karnataka [Jagdish v.
State of Karnataka, (2021) 12 SCC 812 : (2023) 2 SCC
(Civ) 654] , this Court referred to a number of
decisions to reiterate that where the statute in
question does not prescribe a limitation, the rights
conferred therein must be exercised within reasonable
time.
23.3. This aspect of reasonable time was recently
discussed by this Court in Madras Aluminium Co. Ltd v.
T.N. SEB [Madras Aluminium Co. Ltd v. T.N. SEB,
(2023) 8 SCC 240] , having referred a three-Judge
Bench decision in SEBI v. Bhavesh Pabari [SEBI v.
Bhavesh Pabari, (2019) 5 SCC 90] stating that the
concept is to be applied and judged in each case per
its own peculiar facts.
30.2. In the absence of any particular period of time
being prescribed to file an appeal, the same would be
governed by the principle of “reasonable time”, for
which, by virtue of its very nature, no straitjacket
formula can be laid down and it is to be determined as
per the facts and circumstances of each case. In the
present lis, having regard to the sequence of events,
as taken note of above, the appellant claimants cannot
be said to have transgressed the boundaries of
reasonable time in filing their appeal before the District
Judge.

13.49. Relying on North Eastern Chemicals
21
Industries’s case it is submitted that where a
statute does not expressly prescribe a period of
limitation for the exercise of a statutory right,
such right is nevertheless required to be