STATE OF CHHATTISGARH vs ECI-KEYSTONE (JV)

Digitally signed by
MOHAMMED
AADIL KHAN
Date: 2026.09.17
18:44:27 +0530
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CGHC010253552026 2026:CGHC:40702
AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Reserved for orders on 02-07-2026
Order passed on 17-09-2026
WP227 No. 768 of 2026
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Government of Chhattisgarh, Public
Works Department Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Raipur Chhattisgarh.
(The Petitioner No. 1 was not a party before the Learned Commercial Court (District
Judge Level) Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur (C.G.) but has been impleaded
as petitioner No. 1 in the instant petition as the proper course is to implead the State
Government through the Secretary of the concerned department)
2 - The Superintending Engineer, National Highway Circle, PWD, Government of
Chhattisgarh, at Pension Bada, Raipur Chhattisgarh. Email-
[email protected]....... (Judgment Debtor)
... Petitioners
versus
1 - ECI-Keystone (JV) Represented by its Managing Director Shri Pratap Potluri H.No.
8-2-338/6, Road No. 3, Panchavati Colony, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad- 500034 Email
[email protected], [email protected].... (Decree Holder)
... Respondent
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
:
For Petitioners Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, Govt. Advocate and Mr.
Ghanshyam Kashyap, Deputy Govt. Advocate.
:
For Respondent Mr. Parvesh Buttan and Mr. Pushkar Bhandarkar,
Advocates.

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.
C A V Order
1. The petitioner/State has filed the present writ petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, against the orders dated 30.04.2026, 14.05.2026,
22.05.2026, 01.06.2026 and 22.06.2026, passed by the learned Commercial
Court (District Judge Level), Nawa Raipur, in Execution Case No. 06 of 2023,
and prayed for the following reliefs:-
“i. The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire
records, pertaining to the orders impugned (Annexure-P-1)
passed by the Learned Judge, Commercial Court (District Judge
Level) Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur (CG) in Execution
Case No. 06/2023.
ii. The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue appropriate
writ of certiorari by setting aside the impugned orders dated
30/04/2026, 14/05/2026, 22/05/2026, 01/06/2026 and
22/06/2026 (Annexure-P-1) (Colly.) passed by the Learned
Judge, Commercial Court (District Judge Level) Nava Raipur,
Atal Nagar, Raipur, Chhattisgarh in Execution Case No. 06 of
2023 between parties ECI-Keystone (JV) Vs. The
Superintending Engineer.
iii. Cost of the petition be allowed.
iv. Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper
under the facts and circumstances of the case.
2. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present petition are that the Government of
India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (in short “MoRTH”), accorded
administrative and technical sanction for construction of a two-lane road on
various stretches of NH-63 (Old NH-16) in District Bastar under the Left Wing
Extremism (LWE) Scheme, initially for an amount of Rs. 169.23 crores, which
was subsequently revised to Rs. 211.53 crores. The project was wholly funded

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by the Government of India, and the State Public Works Department,
Chhattisgarh, acted as the executing agency. Pursuant to the tender process,
the respondent/contractor was declared the successful bidder and, upon
acceptance of the tender, the letter of acceptance was issued on 31.10.2012,
followed by the work order dated 01.12.2012. The respondent completed the
work on 30.06.2019 and thereafter, on 27.01.2020, raised an additional claim
of Rs. 190.33 crores, which came to be rejected by the department.
Consequently, the respondent invoked the arbitration clause contained in the
contract and sought appointment of a sole arbitrator. Shri Rangraju was
appointed as the sole arbitrator on 10.08.2020, and the arbitral proceedings
commenced on 20.08.2020. During the arbitral proceedings, the State
authorities repeatedly requested MoRTH to provide an authorised
representative and legal assistance for conducting the arbitration and
preparing the statement of defence. It is the case of the petitioners that, by
communications dated 19.03.2021 and 19.07.2021, MoRTH directed that the
dispute be resolved either through conciliation or before a panel of three
arbitrators and indicated that approval of the competent authority was required
before accepting a sole arbitrator. The respondent declined to participate in the
conciliation proceedings and insisted upon continuation of the arbitration
before the sole arbitrator. In the absence of an authorised representation and
statement of defence on behalf of the State, the sole arbitrator proceeded ex
parte and rendered an award dated 02.09.2022 directing payment of Rs.
160,30,11,411/- to the respondent along with applicable interest. The
respondent thereafter initiated execution proceedings before the learned
Commercial Court, registered as Execution Case No. 06 of 2023.
3. The petitioners subsequently challenged the arbitral award under Section 34 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short, “the Arbitration Act”);
however, the said application was dismissed as barred by limitation by order
dated 01.11.2023. The challenge to the said order under Section 37 of the Act

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was also dismissed by this Court in Arbitration Appeal No. 51/2023 vide order
dated 10.06.2024. The Special Leave Petition preferred against the said order
was thereafter dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 19.01.2026 on the
ground of delay of 484 days in its institution.
4. During the pendency of the execution proceedings, the petitioners also raised
an objection under Section 47 of the Arbitration Act, read with Section 151 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “CPC”), which was allowed by the
learned Commercial Court vide order dated 23.07.2024, and the execution
petition was dismissed. The said order was challenged by the respondent in
W.P.(227) No. 691/2024, which was allowed by this Court on 04.07.2025. The
challenge to the said judgment before the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No.
28500/2025 was dismissed on 10.02.2026. It is stated that review petitions
against the orders dated 19.01.2026 and 10.02.2026 are presently pending
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
5. In the aforesaid backdrop, the grievance of the petitioners in the present
proceedings is directed against the manner in which the learned Executing
Court has been proceeding with the execution of the arbitral award. Despite
being apprised of the difficulties in making payment of the awarded amount
and the pendency of the review proceedings before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, the Executing Court has passed coercive directions requiring personal
affidavits and personal appearance of the concerned officers and has made
observations regarding initiation of contempt proceedings for alleged wilful
disobedience. The petitioner’s contention is that such directions and
observations are beyond the jurisdiction vested in an executing court while
enforcing an arbitral award under Section 36 of the Arbitration Act, read with
Order XXI of the CPC, giving rise to the present petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners/State would submit that the
impugned orders passed by the learned Executing Court are wholly without

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jurisdiction and travel beyond the powers conferred upon an executing court
under Section 36 of the Arbitration Act, read with Order XXI of the CPC. He
would submit that the arbitral award is a money award and the manner in which
such award is required to be executed is governed by the provisions contained
in Order XXI CPC, particularly Rule 30 thereof. The petitioners have already
placed before the learned Executing Court the details of the accounts and
properties of the award-debtor, and therefore, if the award is to be enforced,
the Executing Court may adopt any of the modes prescribed under the CPC,
including attachment and sale of the property of the judgment-debtor, but it
cannot compel the individual officers of the department to satisfy the award
from their personal resources or otherwise make them personally responsible
for non-payment of the awarded amount. He would further submit that the
entire project was funded by MoRTH under the Left Wing Extremism Scheme
of the Government of India and the State Public Works Department was merely
the executing agency. The sanctioned budget for the project has already been
utilised and, consequently, the concerned officers cannot on their own make
payment of the awarded amount without obtaining necessary sanction and
following the prescribed governmental procedure. He would submit that the
officers have been continuously corresponding with MoRTH for making
arrangements for payment and a proposal has also been placed before the
State Cabinet for necessary approval. Thus, there is neither wilful
disobedience nor deliberate refusal to comply with the award; rather, the delay
is attributable to the procedural requirements governing release and utilisation
of public funds. The Executing Court cannot compel the officers to bypass such
statutory and administrative procedures merely because interest continues to
accrue on the awarded amount.
7. He would next submit that the learned Executing Court has exceeded its
jurisdiction by repeatedly directing the concerned officers to remain personally
present, furnish personal affidavits and undertakings and by threatening them

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with a recommendation for initiation of contempt proceedings and personal
liability. Such coercive directions are impermissible in execution of a money
award, particularly when the award-debtor is a department of the State and the
officers before the Court are not themselves the judgment-debtors in their
personal capacity. It is submitted that the jurisdiction of contempt cannot be
invoked as a substitute for the procedure prescribed for execution of a decree
or award, and the Executing Court is required to remain within the statutory
framework of Order XXI CPC. The observations made by the learned
Executing Court in its order dated 22.06.2026 describing the review petitions
pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as “hoping against hope” are
wholly unwarranted and beyond the scope of the execution proceedings. The
petitioners are pursuing a remedy lawfully available to them before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, and the merits or otherwise of the pending review petitions
cannot be prejudged by the Executing Court. He would submit that the
petitioners have not sought to evade the award but have placed before the
Court the genuine procedural difficulties in arranging the requisite funds and
have been taking steps with the competent authorities for securing the
necessary approval and funds. In these circumstances, the continued
issuance of coercive directions, instead of adopting the modes of execution
prescribed under Order XXI CPC, amounts to an exercise of jurisdiction not
vested in the learned Executing Court and, therefore, warrants interference by
this Court in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. In support of his submissions, he would rely upon the
judgment of “ R.N. Dey and Others v. Bhagyabati Pramanik and Others ”
2000 (4) SCC 400, “ Food Corporation of India v. Sukh Deo Prasad ” 2009 (5)
SCC 665, “ Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi ” 2012 (4) SCC 307,
and “ State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Dr Manoj Kumar Sharma ” 2021
(7) SCC 806.

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8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/award-holder would submit that
the arbitral award dated 02.09.2022 has attained finality, the challenge thereto
having been rejected at every stage and the Special Leave Petition arising
therefrom having also been dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Therefore, there remains no legal impediment in enforcement of the award and
the award-debtor cannot indefinitely postpone its satisfaction on the pretext of
pursuing review proceedings or seeking further administrative approvals. It is
submitted that the award amount of Rs. 160,30,11,411/- has already escalated
to Rs. 2,22,06,54,058/- as on 16.06.2026 solely on account of continued non-
payment, with interest accruing at approximately Rs. 4.5 lakhs per day. Despite
repeated opportunities and assurances before the learned Executing Court,
including the categorical statement made by the Engineer-in-Chief on
22.05.2026 that payment could be ensured pursuant to a specific direction of
the Court, the petitioners have failed to make payment. It is further submitted
that the plea that the State PWD is merely an executing agency of MoRTH or
that the requisite budgetary approvals are awaited cannot furnish a justification
for frustrating a final and executable award. The internal arrangements
between the State Government, PWD and MoRTH are matters inter se and
cannot prejudice the vested rights of the award-holder. The repeated
correspondence with MoRTH and the subsequent proposal placed before the
State Cabinet have not resulted in any concrete step towards payment. Even
after the last opportunity granted on 01.06.2026, the State has merely placed
before the Court a communication regarding the Cabinet decision, which does
not disclose any definite arrangement for satisfaction of the award. The
conduct of the award-debtor demonstrates not a genuine inability to comply but
a persistent unwillingness or failure to take effective steps, resulting in
substantial and continuing loss to the public exchequer. The award-holder
cannot be compelled to indefinitely wait while the State authorities deliberate
upon their internal financial or administrative arrangements, particularly when

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the liability is crystallised, and the interest burden continues to increase every
day.
9. He would further submit that the present petition under Article 227 is an attempt
to obstruct the lawful execution of the award by questioning the coercive
measures adopted by the learned Executing Court after repeated defaults and
assurances by the petitioners. The personal appearance and affidavits of
responsible officers were directed only after ordinary directions for payment
had failed to produce any result and were intended to ascertain responsibility
and secure compliance with the Court's orders. The learned Executing Court
was, therefore, justified in expressing concern regarding the avoidable
depletion of public funds and in requiring the senior officers of the department
to explain the continued non-compliance. It is submitted that once the officers
had appeared before the Court and represented that payment could be made
pursuant to a specific judicial direction, failure thereafter to act in terms of such
direction could legitimately invite appropriate consequences. The respondent
would, therefore, submit that no interference is warranted in the exercise of the
limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, particularly when the
impugned proceedings are aimed at ensuring enforcement of a final award and
preventing further accumulation of interest and consequent loss to the public
exchequer. He would rely upon the judgment of “ Chaduranga Kanthraj URS
and Another v. P. Ravi Kumar and Others ” 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3681, and
“ Pam Developments Private Limited v. State of West Bengal ” 2019 (8) SCC
112.
10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents
annexed with the petition.
11. It is necessary here to note the various orders passed by learned Executing
Court time to time. The relevant part of the order dated 30.04.2026 is as under:-
“ Conclusion
24. In view of above discussion, this Court feels compelled to
order for presence of such officers to apprise this Court

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about the efforts undertaken so far and likely to be
undertaken henceforth towards immediate payment of
award amount to the award-holder.
25. The award-debtor has placed on record copy of the letter
dated 26/02/2026 addressed to the Chief Engineer,
National Highway Zone, PWD, and letter dated 27/02/2026
shown to have been forwarded to the Secretary,
Government of Chhattisgarh, PWD as also the Engineer-in-
Chief, PWD. Therefore, the Engineer-in-Chief, PWD and
the concerned Chief Engineer, PWD, be called in person
before this Court to apprise about efforts undertaken so far
for expeditious payment of award amount, and to present
on affidavit a time frame within which such payment is likely
to be made positively.
26. Further, following directions are also issued for compliance
by the award-debtor on the next date of hearing:-
(i) The award-debtor shall file a detailed affidavit disclosing all
bank accounts, including project-wise accounts, funds
received, balances and receivables;
(ii) The affidavit shall disclose the complete particulars of the
bank accounts, including the name of the bank, branch,
account number, and IFSC code, in which the monies
towards compliance of the award are to be allocated to the
award-debtor.
27. In the event of failure of the award-debtor in ensuring the
above compliances, this Court will have no option but to call
for personal appearance of the Secretary, PWD,
Government of Chhattisgarh before this Court.
28. I.A. No. 01/2026 stands disposed of accordingly.
Ordered accordingly.”
12. On 14.05.2026, the learned Executing Court passed the order that:-
"Today the case has been fixed for personal appearance
of Engineer-in-Chief, PWD and the concerned Chief Engineer,
PWD and further proceedings.",
The affidavits of Mr. Vijay Kumar Bhatpahari, Engineer-
in-Chief, PWD, Mr. Gyaneshwar Kashyap, Chief Engineer, PWD

10
and Mr. Surendra Singh Manjhi, Superintending Engineer in
terms of previous direction of this Court are placed on record.
The counsel for award-holder raised strong objections
regarding non-compliance of this Court's order as the affidavits
tendered today do not conform with the specific directions of this
Court.
He also submitted that the award-debtor has again
shown utter insincere and causal approach and not taken any
effective steps towards expeditious payment of award amount.
He also highlighted that an amount of around 80 lakhs
has further been accumulated in terms of interest on the award
amount from the last date of hearing.
The counsel for award-debtor requested for grant of
some time to come up with additional affidavits in consonance
with this Court's directions.
This Court cannot but express its dismay at the sheer
consistency in the conduct of award-debtor in not taking any
effective steps towards ensuring expeditious payment of award
amount.
It would appear that the award-debtor is simply content
with writing letters to MoRTH and looking hopefully at its door for
the payment, in spite of the fact that the MoRTH has shown its
unwillingness in making any payment owing to the very conduct
of award-debtor in suffering the ex-parte award.
As a measure of financial wisdom, the award-debtor may
as well choose to make the payment of the award amount on its
own at the earliest, leaving its inter se issues with MoRTH to be
settled separately. This would obviate any further undesirable
accumulation of hefty interest and unnecessary and totally
uncalled for burdening of public exchequer.
Matter is again fixed for filing additional affidavits of
Engineer-in-Chief, PWD and further proceedings on
22.05.2026.
13. On 01.06.2026, the following order has been passed by the learned Executing
Court:-
“The matter is fixed for further proceedings.

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The counsel for award-debtor submitted that in pursuance
to this Court's order the departmental proposal for payment to the
award-debtor has been got prepared, and is now required to be
approved by the State Cabinet. However, due to some
unforeseen circumstances same could not be got approved.
Therefore, grant of some more time has been requested by him.
The copy of departmental proposal to be placed before
the Cabinet has also been placed on record.
Copy supplied to the counsel for award-holder, who has
again objected to the non-compliance of this Court's order by the
award-debtor.
It is submitted that in spite of this Court's categorical order
the award-debtor has failed to make the payment and therefore
some strict actions may be considered as per observations made
by this Court in its previous order.
After hearing the parties, record has been perused.
Vide order dated 22/05/2026 this Court had directed the
award-debtor to ensure payment of award amount to the award-
holder. It was also observed that the failure in this regard would
entail orders fixing personal responsibility of the officials of PWD
for the amount of interest accrued thenceforth.
Clearly, the award-debtor has failed to comply with this
Court's order leaving this Court with no option but to pass
appropriate orders, which this Court intends to do on the next
date of hearing.
The counsel for award-holder is not averse to grant of 2
weeks' time as requested by the counsel for award-debtor for the
payment of award amount.
In these circumstances, last opportunity is granted to the
award-debtor to make the payment of award amount to the
award-holder.
The requisite details of the bank account of the award-
holder has already been shared today with the award-debtor.
The case is now fixed for further proceedings on
16.06.2026. ”

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14. On 16.06.2026, the following order has been passed by the learned Executing
Court:-
“The matter is fixed for further proceedings.
The counsel for award-holder filed a fresh calculation
sheet and submitted that a further amount of Rs. 66,16,967/- has
accrued on account of interest.
The counsel for award-debtor filed a copy of memo dated
12/06/2026 issued by under Secretary, PWD to Chief Engineer,
PWD intimating about the decision of the Cabinet in its meeting
dated 09/06/2026.
Copy supplied to the counsel for award-holder, who
strongly objected to the non-payment of award-amount in spite of
this Court's clear directions.
He submitted that the award-debtor has shown very little
intent to make the payment of award amount and continues to
show scant regard to this Court's orders. He also submitted that
his party is not at all desirous of undergoing the "Vivad se
Vishwas II" conciliation process as they are not willing to let go of
any part of their rightful entitlement to the complete award
amount.
The Ld. Counsel for award-holder also requested that
looking at the evasive and contumacious conduct of the award-
debtor the top official of the State Government namely the Chief
Secretary may be called before the Court to elicit a definitive
timeline for payment.
Both the parties have been heard.
Matter is fixed for passing appropriate directions on
22.06.2026 .”
15. On 22.06.2026, the following order has been passed by the learned Executing
Court:-
“10. It is only when this Court has found itself compelled to resort
to extreme measures in the form of calling for personal
appearance of the Engineer-in-Chief and Chief Engineer of
PWD that the said officers have appeared before this Court
and on being prodded have cared to divulge that the

13
payment of award amount may in fact be ensured on
Court's directions (ref.- proceedings under order sheet
dated 22/05/2026).
11. Clearly, there has been an absolutely abysmal and
extraordinary lack of concern and intent on the part of
award-debtor and their superior authorities towards
satisfaction of award amount. Even after 22/05/2026, when
the Engineer-in-Chief has made a categorical statement of
making the payment of the award amount in terms of this
Court's specific directions, the award-debtor has simply
failed to comply with the same in spite of this court's
categorical and peremptory order.
12. Significantly, on 01/06/2026, the award-debtor has again
made a specific submission that the departmental proposal
for payment now only remains to be approved by the State
Cabinet and same is going to be ensured within a period of
two weeks. However, even after the said period of two
weeks all that the award-debtor has managed to come up
with on 16/06/2026 is a letter issued by Under Secretary,
PWD to Chief Engineer, PWD informing about the decision
of the State Cabinet.
13. The decision of the State Cabinet appears to have been
reproduced in the said letter, wherein certain measures
have been resolved to be undertaken. However, neither of
those measures relate to any foreseeable desire or
intention to make the payment of award amount. Rather,
some potentially unproductive measures appear to have
been opted for, such as seeking legal advice or any other
alternative, pursuing review petition in an effective manner,
attempting recourse to Vivad se Vishwas II (Contractual
Disputes), and proposing actions against culpable officers.
14. The Ld. Counsel for award-holder has categorically ruled
out any desire to undergo any conciliation in terms of Vivad
se Vishwas II scheme. Insofar as obtaining proper legal
advice or pursuit of other appropriate legal proceedings are
concerned, these can only be seen to be more in the nature

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of hoping against the hope, as the litigation between the
parties has already attained finality. Hence, there does not
appear any probable reason for the award-debtor to delay
the payment of award amount any further, especially when
an amount in excess of rupees 5 crores has already been
laid waste to in the form of accumulated interest due to
sheer apathy and indifference of the award debtor and their
superior authorities.
15. It would seem that the award-debtor and their superior
officers, right up to its top rung, have either not cared to
grasp the severity of the matter and corresponding
deleterious impact on public exchequer, or perhaps have
been inexorably incompetent in properly bringing out the
same before the State Cabinet. Quite discernibly, the
resolution of State Cabinet as depicted in the letter dated
16/06/2026 nowhere mentions anything about the aspect of
payment of award amount.
16. Unfortunately, all this has taken the present proceedings
back to square one, with no end in sight to the ongoing
squandering of the public exchequer. To put things in
perspective, an unnecessary and completely avoidable
burden in excess of rupees 5 crores on account of interest
has already been allowed to accumulate on the award
amount payable, despite award having attained finality vide
order dt. 10/02/2026 passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court.
17. The award-debtor and their superior authorities have
continued to indulge in willful disobedience of this Court's
clear directions for payment of award amount. The whole
conduct on the part of award-debtor has appeared to have
shown very little, if any at all, deference to this Court's
directions. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
defines civil contempt as 'willful disobedience to any
judgment, decree, direction, order or other process of a
Court'. The contumacious conduct on the part of award-
debtor and their superior authorities does call for strictest of
measures to obviate any further loss to public money. Time

15
is ripe for initiation of action for fixing personal financial
responsibility of officials whose slumber and persistent
inactions have resulted in such wasteful loss to public
exchequer.
18. This Court vide order dated 30/04/2026 had directed for
personal appearance of Engineer-in-Chief and Chief
Engineer, PWD and had also made clear that non-
compliance with this Court's order will likely entail a
direction for personal appearance of the Secretary, PWD.
Quite clearly, personal appearance of Engineer-in-Chief
and Chief Engineer, PWD has had a profound impact on
the present proceedings and helped immensely in charting
a meaningful course for swift and logical conclusion of the
present proceedings. This phenomenon reinforces this
court in its belief that personal appearance of superior
officers/authorities of the PWD may be the only way to
enforce the proceedings and ensure swift payment of
award amount to the award-holder and the vital prevention
of uncalled-for profligacy of public money.
19. In view of what has transpired after order dated 30/04/2026,
to prevent further frittering away of public money this Court,
in spite of strong disinclination, feels constrained as also
obligated to order for the personal appearance of the
Secretary, PWD, Engineer-in-Chief and Chief Engineer,
PWD, Government of Chhattisgarh, to show-cause as to
why matter be not referred to Hon'ble High Court of
Chhattisgarh for initiation of contempt proceedings for
sustained willful disobedience to this Court's Orders and
further to explain as to how exactly the award is intended to
be satisfied and payment made to the award-holder
expeditiously.
Ordered accordingly.”
16. There can be no dispute that the arbitral award dated 02.09.2022 has attained
finality for the purposes of execution, and the award-holder is entitled to seek
its enforcement in accordance with law. At the same time, the finality of the

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award does not enlarge the jurisdiction of the Executing Court beyond the
statutory framework governing execution. Section 36 of the Arbitration Act
makes the award enforceable in accordance with the provisions of the CPC in
the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court. Consequently, the
Executing Court is required to enforce the award in accordance with the
procedure prescribed under Order XXI CPC. It is equally well settled that an
executing court cannot travel beyond the decree or adopt a mode of execution
which is not sanctioned by law. The Supreme Court has reiterated that while an
executing court is required to be diligent in securing the fruits of the decree, it
must execute the decree as it stands and in accordance with law and cannot go
beyond it.
17. In the present case, the grievance of the petitioners is not against execution of
the award as such, but against the manner in which the learned Executing
Court has proceeded to secure its satisfaction. From the orders extracted
hereinabove, it is evident that the learned Executing Court, after noticing the
continued non-payment of the awarded amount, has directed the personal
appearance of senior officers of the PWD, required them to furnish affidavits
and has proceeded to observe that failure to make payment would entail fixing
personal financial responsibility upon such officers and even initiation of
contempt proceedings. Such directions, in the considered opinion of this Court,
cannot be sustained in the execution proceedings in the manner in which they
have been issued. The award is against the award-debtor and not against the
individual officers in their personal capacity. The liability created by the award
cannot, in execution, be converted into a personal monetary liability of an
officer merely because such officer happens to be responsible for processing
or arranging payment on behalf of the department. If the award-debtor is a
State department or authority, the Executing Court may certainly require the
competent authority to disclose the position regarding assets, funds, sanctions
or the steps taken for satisfaction of the award and may adopt the modes of

17
execution permissible under Order XXI CPC; however, it cannot, merely for
securing payment of a money award, impose upon individual officers a liability
which does not flow from the award or from any adjudication in which they were
personally liable.
18. The distinction between execution and contempt jurisdiction is also material.
Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 contemplates “wilful
disobedience” of a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a
Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that contempt
jurisdiction is not a substitute for execution and that a money decree or order is
ordinarily required to be enforced through the remedy of execution available in
law. In R.N. Dey (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court specifically cautioned
that the weapon of contempt should not be used for execution of a decree
where an alternative remedy of execution is available. In paras 7 and 8, it has
been held that:-
“ 7. We may reiterate that the weapon of contempt is not to be
used in abundance or misused. Normally, it cannot be used for
execution of the decree or implementation of an order for which
alternative remedy in law is provided for. Discretion given to the
court is to be exercised for maintenance of the court's dignity and
majesty of law. Further, an aggrieved party has no right to insist
that the court should exercise such jurisdiction as contempt is
between a contemner and the court. It is true that in the present
case, the High Court has kept the matter pending and has ordered
that it should be heard along with the first appeal. But, at the same
time, it is to be noticed that under the coercion of contempt
proceeding, appellants cannot be directed to pay the
compensation amount which they are disputing by asserting that
claimants were not the owners of the property in question and that
decree was obtained by suppressing the material fact and by
fraud. Even presuming that the claimants are entitled to recover
the amount of compensation as awarded by the trial court as no
stay order is granted by the High Court, at the most they are

18
entitled to recover the same by executing the said award wherein
the State can or may contend that the award is a nullity. In such a
situation, as there was no wilful or deliberate disobedience of the
order, the initiation of contempt proceedings was wholly
unjustified.
8. Further, the decree-holder, who does not take steps to execute
the decree in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law,
should not be encouraged to invoke contempt jurisdiction of the
court for non-satisfaction of the money decree. In land acquisition
cases when a decree is passed the State is in the position of a
judgment-debtor and hence the court should not normally lend
help to a party who refuses to take legally-provided steps for
executing the decree. At any rate, the court should be slow to haul
up officers of the Government for contempt for non-satisfaction of
such money decree.”
19. The same principle has been reiterated in Sukh Deo Prasad (supra), in which
it has been held that:-
“31. At all events, if a garnishee, or a defendant, who is directed to
pay any sum of money, does not pay the amount, the remedy is to
levy execution and not in an action for contempt or
disobedience/breach under Order 39 Rule 2-A. This is evident
from Rule 46-B of Order 21 read with Rule 11-A of Order 38 of the
Code. Contempt jurisdiction, either under the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971, or under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code, is not intended
to be used for enforcement of money decrees or directions/orders
for payment of money. The process and concept of execution is
different from the process and concept of action for
disobedience/contempt.”
20. In Kanwar Singh Saini (supra), it has been reiterated that:-
“ 18. In case there is a grievance of non-compliance with the terms
of the decree passed in the civil suit, the remedy available to the
aggrieved person is to approach the execution court under Order

19
21 Rule 32 CPC which provides for elaborate proceedings in which
the parties can adduce their evidence and can examine and cross-
examine the witnesses as opposed to the proceedings in contempt
which are summary in nature. Application under Order 39 Rule 2-A
CPC is not maintainable once the suit stood decreed. Law does
not permit to skip the remedies available under Order 21 Rule 32
CPC and resort to the contempt proceedings for the reason that
the court has to exercise its discretion under the 1971 Act when an
effective and alternative remedy is not available to the person
concerned. Thus, when the matter relates to the infringement of a
decree or decretal order embodies rights, as between the parties, it
is not expedient to invoke and exercise contempt jurisdiction, in
essence, as a mode of executing the decree or merely because
other remedies may take time or are more circumlocutory in
character. Thus, the violation of permanent injunction can be set
right in executing the proceedings and not the contempt
proceedings. There is a complete fallacy in the argument that the
provisions of Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC would also include the case
of violation or breach of permanent injunction granted at the time of
passing of the decree.
19. In Food Corporation of India v. Sukh Deo Prasad [(2009) 5
SCC 665], this Court held that the power exercised by a court
under Order 39 Rule 2-A is punitive in nature, akin to the power to
punish for civil contempt under the 1971 Act. Therefore, such
powers should be exercised with great caution and responsibility.
Unless there has been an order under Order 39 Rule 1 or 2 CPC in
a case, the question of entertaining an application under Order 39
Rule 2-A does not arise. In case there is a final order, the remedy
lies in execution and not in an action for contempt or disobedience
or breach under Order 39 Rule 2-A. The contempt jurisdiction
cannot be used for enforcement of decree passed in a civil suit.
20. The proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2-A are available only
during the pendency of the suit and not after conclusion of the trial
of the suit. Therefore, any undertaking given to the court during the
pendency of the suit on the basis of which the suit itself has been

20
disposed of becomes a part of the decree and breach of such
undertaking is to be dealt with in execution proceedings under
Order 21 Rule 32 CPC and not by means of contempt
proceedings. Even otherwise, it is not desirable for the High Court
to initiate criminal contempt proceedings for disobedience of the
order of the injunction passed by the subordinate court, for the
reason that where a decree is for an injunction, and the party
against whom it has been passed has wilfully disobeyed it, the
same may be executed by attachment of his property or by
detention in civil prison or both.
21. The provision of Order 21 Rule 32 CPC applies to prohibitory
as well as mandatory injunctions. In other words, it applies to
cases where the party is directed to do some act and also to the
cases where he is abstained from doing an act. Still to put it
differently, a person disobeys an order of injunction not only when
he fails to perform an act which he is directed to do but also when
he does an act which he is prohibited from doing. Execution of an
injunction decree is to be made in pursuance of Order 21 Rule 32
CPC as the CPC provides a particular manner and mode of
execution and therefore, no other mode is permissible. (See
Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. v. Haridas Mundhra [(1972) 3
SCC 684].)”
21. In the case of Dr Manoj Kumar Sharma (supra) , it has been held that:-
“ 18. A practice has developed in certain High Courts to call officers
at the drop of a hat and to exert direct or indirect pressure. The line
of separation of powers between judiciary and executive is sought
to be crossed by summoning the officers and in a way pressurising
them to pass an order as per the whims and fancies of the Court.
19. The public officers of the executive are also performing their
duties as the third limbs of the governance. The actions or
decisions by the officers are not to benefit them, but as a custodian
of public funds and in the interest of administration, some
decisions are bound to be taken. It is always open to the High
Court to set aside the decision which does not meet the test of
judicial review but summoning of officers frequently is not

21
appreciable at all. The same is liable to be condemned in the
strongest words.”
22. It is true that the learned Executing Court was justified in expressing concern
over the continued accrual of interest on the awarded amount and in requiring
the award-debtor to take expeditious steps for satisfaction of the award. The
fact that the amount payable is increasing on account of post-award interest
cannot, however, authorise the Executing Court to depart from the procedure
prescribed by law. The Court may certainly issue appropriate directions to the
award-debtor to disclose its financial position, identify attachable assets and
comply with the permissible modes of execution. It may also consider the
consequences contemplated under the relevant provisions of Order XXI CPC.
But the Court cannot substitute such statutory modes by compelling individual
officers to furnish personal undertakings or affidavits promising payment, or by
threatening to make them personally liable for the interest accruing on the
award amount. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently maintained that
the executing court's duty is to execute the decree in accordance with law and
not to travel beyond the decree or create a liability which the decree itself does
not impose.
23. So far as the affidavits and submissions made by the officers are concerned,
the learned Executing Court was certainly entitled to ascertain from the
competent departmental authorities the steps being taken for implementation
of the award. However, an affidavit filed by an officer explaining the
administrative or financial position cannot, by itself, be treated as an
undertaking creating a personal obligation to discharge the liability of the
award-debtor. Equally, a statement made during the course of hearing by an
officer regarding the possibility or expected timeframe of obtaining sanction
cannot be converted into a personal decree against that officer. If the
department has made a categorical submission before the Executing Court
that payment is subject to governmental sanction, budgetary allocation or

22
approval by the competent authority, the Court may examine the bona fides
and adequacy of the steps taken and may require the competent authority to
place the relevant record before it. However, it cannot proceed on the basis
that such submission must necessarily result in personal liability of the officer if
the payment is not made within the time indicated.
24. The observations contained in the order dated 22.06.2026 concerning the
review petitions pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court also require
interference. The petitioners may or may not ultimately succeed in the review
proceedings; that question is exclusively within the domain of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. The Executing Court was concerned with enforcement of the
award and was not called upon to express an opinion on the merits or
prospects of a pending proceeding before the superior Court. The expression
“hoping against hope”, particularly when employed in relation to a pending
judicial remedy, was therefore unnecessary and ought not to have formed part
of the order under challenge. The pendency of the review petitions, however,
does not by itself operate as a stay of the award; therefore, the award-holder
remains entitled to proceed with execution unless there is an order of stay from
the competent Court.
25. At the same time, this Court is conscious of the fact that the award-holder has
been deprived of the awarded amount for a considerable period and that the
liability towards interest continues to increase. The State authorities cannot
indefinitely postpone execution merely by referring to internal correspondence
or administrative difficulties. The finality of the award requires the competent
authorities to take all lawful and expeditious steps for its satisfaction. The
Executing Court, therefore, shall be at liberty to proceed with Execution Case
No. 06/2023 in accordance with Section 36 of the Arbitration Act and the
provisions of Order XXI CPC, including by requiring the award-debtor to
disclose the particulars of its assets, funds and other means available for
satisfaction of the award and by adopting such mode of execution as is

23
permissible under law. What the Executing Court cannot do is to convert the
execution proceedings into proceedings against individual officers who are not
personally liable under the award or to employ contempt jurisdiction as a
mechanism for execution of the money award. The Supreme Court has
expressly recognised that execution and contempt are distinct jurisdictions and
that contempt cannot ordinarily be employed as a substitute for execution. 
26. The decision in Chaduranga Kanthraj Urs (supra) does not assist the
respondent to contend that the learned Executing Court could employ coercive
measures in the nature of contempt for securing payment of the arbitral award.
In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was examining the scope of
contempt jurisdiction and held that contempt cannot be used as a substitute for
execution, and that civil contempt requires a clear, conscious and wilful
disobedience of an explicit direction of the Court. In the present case, there is
no independent direction of this Court which the petitioners or their individual
officers are alleged to have wilfully disobeyed; rather, the learned Executing
Court itself is seeking to secure satisfaction of a money award through
personal affidavits, personal appearance and personal liability of departmental
officers. Thus, the ratio of Chaduranga Kanthraj Urs (supra) must be
undertaken through the remedies prescribed by law, and that contempt cannot
be utilised as a means to enforce the monetary liability of the award-debtor.
27. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that
the impugned orders, insofar as they require personal affidavits/undertakings
from the officers, threaten to fix personal financial liability upon them for the
amount of interest accruing on the award, or contemplate initiation of contempt
proceedings merely for non-payment of the money award, cannot be
sustained. To that extent, the said directions are set aside , and the writ petition
is partly allowed .

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28. However, the execution of the arbitral award shall continue, and the learned
Executing Court shall proceed with the execution strictly in accordance with
Section 36 of the Arbitration Act read with Order XXI CPC and pass
appropriate orders by adopting the modes of execution permissible in law.
29. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the entitlement of
the respondent to recover the awarded amount or the accrued interest, nor
does this order prevent the learned Executing Court from requiring the
competent authority to furnish necessary particulars or to take steps for
satisfaction of the award in accordance with law.
30. No orders as to costs.
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Aadil

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HEAD-NOTE
The executing Court cannot convert the execution proceeding into contempt
proceeding against individual officers who are not personally liable under the award,
as a mechanism for execution of money award.