Vijay Gopal vs N.V. Ramana Goud,
- Court
- High Court for the State of Telangana
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
C.C.No.2297 of 2025
(CNR.No.HBHC010352752025)
Between:
Vijay Gopal
… Petitioner
And
N.V. Ramana Goud and Others
…Respondents
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON 21.09.2026
HON’BLE JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers : Yes
may be allowed to see the Judgment?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes
3. Whether her Lordship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes
_______________________________________
JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
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CC.No.2297 of 2025
HON'BLE JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
C.C.No.2297 of 2025
(CNR.No.HBHC010352752025)
% 21.09.2026
Between:
# Vijay Gopal
.... Petitioner
And:
$ N.V. Ramana Goud and Others
....Respondent
< Gist:
> Head Note:
! Counsel for the petitioner: Party-in-person
^ Counsel for Respondent Nos.3, 5 & 7: Sri G.Ashok Reddy
^ Counsel for Respondent Nos.6, 8 & 9: Sri M.P.K.Aditya
^ Counsel for Respondent Nos.13: Sri Ponnam Ashok Goud
^ Counsel for Respondent Nos.14, 15 & 18: Sri Mohd. Muzaffer Ullah
Khan
? Cases Referred:
1. 2003 (2) SCC 45
2. (2006)9 SCC 304
1
3. 2023 Live Law (SC) 331
4. 2018 SCC Online SC 304
5. 2026 SCC OnLine Del 243
6. 1998 4 SCC 409
7. 2006 9 SCC 295
8. (1914) ILR 41 Cal 173
9. 1966CRILJ632
10. 2021 6 SCC 258
11. 19811 SCC 436
12. 2001 6 SCC 735
13. 2003 (2) SCC 45
14. 2018 SCC Online SC 304
15. 1988 3 SCC 167
16. 1996 (74) FLR 2052
17. 2003 11 SCC 1
18. 2021 SCC 593
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HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT
HYDERABAD
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
C.C.No.2297 of 2025
(CNR.No.HBHC010352752025)
Reserved on 17.07.2026 Pronounced on 21.09.2026
Uploaded on 21.09.2026
Between
Vijay Gopal
….Petitioner
And
N.V. Ramana Goud and Others
….Respondents
ORDER :
This Contempt Case is filed to punish the respondents {all Office-
bearers of Metropolitan Criminal Court Bar Association, Nampally,
Hyderabad (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as ‘MCCBA,
Nampally’} under Sections 10 to 12 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
(for stopping the petitioner-advocate from entering the Court citing
boycott call and physically assaulting the Advocate petitioner with
blunt force causing injury and wrongful restraint and for passing
resolution dated 16.06.2025 to boycott/abstain from work) for willful
violation of the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Ex-
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Capt. Harish v. Union of India and Another { 2003 (2) SCC 45} and
Rule-17 of the Telangana High Court Rules of Practice and
consequently, to debar all the office bearers of MCCBA, Nampally for
maximum term under the law and for consequential reliefs.
2. Heard Sri Vijay Gopal, party in person, Sri G. Ashok Reddy,
learned Counsel for respondent Nos.3, 5 and 7, Sri M.P.K.Aditya,
learned Counsel for respondent Nos.6, 8 and 9, Sri Poonam Ashok
Goud, learned Counsel for respondent No.13 and Sri Mohd Muzaffer
Ullah Khan, learned Counsel for respondent Nos.14, 15 and 18.
3. The brief facts as averred in the affidavit filed in support of the
Contempt Case are that the contemnors, being the office-bearers of the
MCCBA, Nampally, passed a resolution vide Ref. No.13505/MCCA/
Hyd/2025, dated 16.06.2025, calling for boycott of the Courts on
16.06.2025; that on the same day, the petitioner was required to appear
before the XVII Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Nampally,
in connection with FIR No.274 of 2023 on the file of Film Nagar Police
Station, wherein he had filed two criminal miscellaneous petitions and
the matter was posted on the said date; and that, when the petitioner
attempted to enter the Court premises to attend his matter, he was
allegedly confronted and obstructed/prevented by certain advocates
participating in the boycott from proceeding further; that the General
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Secretary of the Bar Association thereafter threatened the petitioner and
directed him to remove his advocate’s band and leave the Court
premises, failing which he would face consequences; that the petitioner
objected to such conduct, whereupon the General Secretary slapped the
petitioner, following which the members of the Bar present at the place
assaulted the petitioner; that in the course of the said incident, the
petitioner fell down the stairs and sustained injuries to the left side of
his head and forehead after hitting the ground and the banister.
3.1. It is further averred that the police personnel present at the Court
premises intervened and that the Inspector of Police, Nampally Police
Station, instead of permitting the petitioner to proceed to the Court,
accused him of creating a nuisance and took him into custody in a
police patrolling vehicle; that the petitioner lodged a complaint against
the General Secretary and the office-bearers of the MCCBA, Nampally,
pursuant to which FIR No.159 of 2025 was registered for the offences
punishable under Sections-115, 126, 351, 352 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; that the General Secretary subsequently lodged a
counter-complaint against the petitioner, pursuant to which FIR No.160
of 2025 was registered; that, after the petitioner brought the matter to
the notice of the superior police officers, he was permitted to return to
the Court premises and attend the matter pending before the XVII
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Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court. Aggrieved by the
aforesaid acts of the respondents, the petitioner filed the present
Contempt Case.
3.2. The petitioner, who appeared as party-in-person, submitted that
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that advocates have
no right to resort to strikes or boycotts or protests and that the
functioning of Courts cannot be obstructed on account of such calls;
that every individual advocate is entitled to appear before the Court and
discharge his professional duties notwithstanding a call for strike or
boycott by a Bar Association; that no advocate can be compelled to
participate in a boycott, nor can any advocate who chooses to attend the
Court be subjected to threats, coercion, restraint or any other adverse
consequences; that the office-bearers of a Bar Association are under an
obligation to ensure that no member is prevented, intimidated or
coerced from appearing before the Courts.
3.3. He further submitted that the alleged acts of the respondents
obstructing/preventing the petitioner from entering into the Court
premises and subjecting him to threat and physical assault for refusing
to participate in the boycott, constitute interference with the
administration of justice and amount to a deliberate violation of the
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binding directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ex. Capt.
Harish Uppal’s case (cited supra).
3.4. He further submitted that the resolution issued by respondents
calling upon advocates to abstain from Court work, is a violation of
Rule 17 of the Telangana High Court Rules of Practice,1980(for short
“Rules of Practice”); that the respondents, in their counter-affidavit,
have not offered any satisfactory explanation with regard to the
violation of Rule 17 of the Rules of Practice to show that the boycott
dated 16.06.2025 falls under exceptional cases as enumerated by the
Hon’ble Apex Court.
3.5. He further submitted that the resolution was not merely a
symbolic expression of protest; but, expressly called for abstention
from Court work and, therefore, cannot be characterised as a mere
symbolic protest; that the video graphic evidence secured during the
course of investigation, clearly shows that petitioner was prevented
from entering the Court premises and was subjected to physical assault
when he tried to attend Court despite the boycott call; and that the
respondents cannot avoid responsibility by merely asserting that there
was no coercive boycott or obstruction to the administration of justice.
3.6. He further submitted that the respondents have also failed to
place any material to demonstrate that the office-bearers had obtained
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the requisite approval or permission from the Sessions Judge concerned
before passing the resolution or proceeding with the proposed boycott.
3.7. He further submitted that the pendency of criminal proceedings,
i.e., FIR Nos.159 and 160 of 2025 of Nampally Police Station,
Hyderabad, do not constitute a bar to the present contempt proceedings;
that, the criminal proceedings relates to the physical acts and offences
arising out of the incident, whereas the present contempt proceedings
relate to the alleged disobedience and violation of the binding law and
directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the applicable
Rules of Practice; that the two proceedings operate in distinct fields and
cannot be treated as parallel proceedings in respect of the same cause of
action.
4. He finally submitted that the complaint lodged by the petitioner
before the Telangana Bar Council against the respondents and the
present contempt proceedings operate in separate spheres; that the
disciplinary proceedings, if any, before the Bar Council relates to the
professional conduct of the advocates, whereas the present proceedings
relates interference with the administration of justice and violation of
binding judicial directions. Therefore, the complaint before the Bar
Council does not amount to parallel proceedings or attract the principle
of double jeopardy.
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5. In support of his contentions, the petitioner relied upon the
following judgments.
1
(1) Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India and another ,
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“It is also settled law that if a resolution is passed by
Bar Associations expressing want of confidence in
judicial officers it would amount to scandalising the
Courts to undermine its authority and thereby the
Advocates will have committed contempt of Court.
Lawyers have known, at least since Mahabir Singh’s
case (supra), that if they participate in a boycott or a
strike, their action is ex-facie bad in view of the
declaration of law by this Court. A lawyer’s duty is to
boldly ignore a call for strike or boycott of Court/s.
In conclusion, it is held that lawyers have no
right to go on strike or give a call for boycott, not even
on a token strike. The protest, if any is required, can
only be by giving press statements, TV interviews,
carrying out of Court premises banners and/or placards,
wearing black or white or any colour arm bands,
peaceful protest marches outside and away from Court
premises, going on dharnas or relay fasts etc. It is held
that lawyers holding Vakalats on behalf of their clients
cannot attend Courts in pursuance to a call for strike or
boycott. All lawyers must boldly refuse to abide by any
call for strike or boycott. No lawyer can be visited with
any adverse consequences by the Association or the
1
2003 (2) SCC 45
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Council and no threat or coercion of any nature
including that of expulsion can be held out. It is held
that only in the rarest of rare cases where the dignity,
integrity and independence of the Bar and/or the Bench
are at stake, Courts may ignore (turn a blind eye) to a
protest abstention from work for not more than one day.
It is being clarified that it will be for the Court to decide
whether or not the issue involves dignity or integrity or
independence of the Bar and/or the Bench. Therefore, in
such cases the President of the Bar must first consult the
Chief Justice or the District Judge before Advocates
decide to absent themselves from Court. The decision of
the Chief Justice or the District Judge would be final
and have to be abided by the Bar.
Further appropriate rules are required to be
framed by the High Courts under Section 34 of the
Advocates Act by making it clear that strike by
advocate/advocates would be considered interference
with administration of justice and concerned advocate/
advocates may be barred from practising before Courts
in a district or in the High Court.”
...emphasis supplied
2
(2) Common Cause, A registered Society v. Union of India ,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“No such member who appears in court or otherwise
practices his legal profession, shall be visited with any
adverse or penal consequences whatever, by any
association of lawyers, and shall not suffer any
expulsion or threat of expulsion therefrom.
2
(2006)9 SCC 304
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Office-bearers of a Bar Association (including
Bar Council) responsible for taking decisions mentioned
in clause (1) above shall ensure that such decisions are
implemented in the spirit of what is stated in clauses (1),
(2) and (3) above.”
(3) District Bar Association Dehradun vs. Ishwar Shandilya
3
and Others , wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as
under:
“We once again reiterate that no member of the Bar can
go on strike and/or abstain himself from court working.
Time and again, this Court has emphasised and
criticized the advocates going on strike and abstaining
them from work. If the member of the Bar has any
genuine grievance or the difficulty being faced because
of the procedural changes in filing/listing of the matters
and/or any genuine grievance pertaining to misbehave
of any member of the lower judiciary they can very well
make a representation and it is appropriate that their
genuine grievances are considered by some forum so
that such strikes can be avoided and members of the Bar
who might have genuine grievances like above may
ventilate their grievances.”
4
(4) Krishnakant Tamrakar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh ,
wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“ Since the strikes are in violation of law laid down by
this Court, the same amount to contempt and at least the
3
2023 Live Law (SC) 331
4
2018 SCC Online SC 304
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office bearers of the associations who give call for the
strikes cannot disown their liability for contempt. Every
resolution to go on strike and abstain from work is per
se contempt.
The Court may, having regard to the fact situation,
hold that the office bearers of the Bar Association/Bar
Council who passed the resolution for strike or
abstaining from work, are liable to be restrained from
appearing before any court for a specified period or
until such time as they purge themselves of contempt to
the satisfaction of the Chief Justice of the concerned
High Court based on an appropriate
undertaking/conditions. They may also be liable to be
removed from the position of office bearers of the Bar
Association”.
5
(5) Sangita Rai vs. New Delhi Bar Association and Others ,
wherein the Delhi High Court has held as under:
“ Bar Association is a body of private individual
lawyers and in normal discharge of its functions, it does
not perform any function which can be said to be a
public function. It is a body registered under the Act,
1860; however, its affairs are governed by its
Memorandum of Association, Constitution and Rules.
The functions being generally discharged
by Bar Associations, as observed above, are to protect
the interest of the individual lawyers. It is in fact, a
purely private entity and cannot in any manner or for
5
2026 SCC OnLine Del 243
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any reason, whatsoever, be termed to be ‘State’ or its
instrumentality or agency or authority. ”
6. Per contra, Sri G.Ashok Reddy , learned Counsel for respondent
Nos.3, 5 and 7, submitted that the present Contempt Case is not
maintainable either on facts or in law and is liable to be dismissed in
limine; that the Contempt Case suffers from serious procedural and
substantive infirmities and does not satisfy the requirements prescribed
under the Rules of Practice, 1980.
6.1. He further submitted that the respondents were not properly
described but only by their office positions in MCCBA, Nampally,
without any particulars identifying them as individuals; that
respondents have not been properly arrayed in the present proceedings
as required under Rule 7(1(a)) of Rules of Practice,1980; that the
petitioner has arrayed the office-bearers of the MCCBA, Nampally, as
respondents, without specifically attributing any individual act or
conduct constituting contempt to each of them; that contempt
proceedings, being quasi-criminal in nature, cannot be maintained on
the basis of presumptive or vicarious liability and require specific
allegations and material establishing the alleged role of each
respondent.
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6.2. He further submitted that the petitioner has failed to clearly
specify whether the alleged acts of respondents constitute civil
contempt or criminal contempt within the meaning of the Sections 2(b)
or 2(c) Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; that there is no allegation of
wilful disobedience of any specific judgment, decree, direction or order
so as to constitute civil contempt; that the ingredients necessary to
establish criminal contempt, namely, a direct and substantial
interference with the due course of judicial proceedings or the
administration of justice, are also not made out; that the present
petition, insofar as it seeks to initiate proceedings for criminal contempt
at the instance of a private individual, is also procedurally defective in
the absence of compliance with the statutory safeguards governing such
proceedings, including the requirement relating to the consent of the
Advocate General as mandated under Section 15 of Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971, read with Rule 5 of Rules, 1980; that the petitioner failed to
plead the essential ingredients of either form of contempt and in the
absence of such foundational pleadings, the allegations are vague and
incapable of being examined within the scope of contempt jurisdiction.
6.3. He further submitted that the prayer seeking to debar the office-
bearers of the Bar Association from practising as advocates is not
maintainable in the present contempt proceedings; that the jurisdiction
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to punish for contempt and the jurisdiction relating to professional
misconduct are distinct and operate in separate fields; and that
disciplinary action against an advocate is governed by the provisions of
the Advocates Act, 1961 and the procedure prescribed thereunder.
6.4. He further submitted that the incident dated 16.06.2025 is
already the subject matter of criminal proceedings, with FIR No.159 of
2025 registered at the instance of the petitioner, and FIR No.160 of
2025 registered at the instance of Respondent No.1; that the existence
of counter-case demonstrates that the allegations relating to the incident
involves serious disputed questions of fact; and that such disputed
questions are not amenable to adjudication in summary contempt
proceedings.
6.5. He further submitted that this Court, while disposing of
W.P.No.24351 of 2025, had taken note of the fact that criminal
proceedings arising out of the alleged incident were pending and
observed that adjudication of the relief sought therein could have an
adverse bearing upon the criminal proceedings; and that the same
principle of judicial restraint ought to be applied in the present
proceedings as well; that the allegations relating to the alleged assault,
wrongful restraint and other criminal acts are matters which are already
subject to investigation and adjudication under the criminal law; and
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that contempt proceedings cannot be converted into a proceeding for
determining criminal culpability or conducting a parallel inquiry into
disputed questions of fact.
6.6. He further submitted that the petitioner has already approached
the Bar Council of Telangana by filing a complaint against the
respondents on the basis of substantially the same allegations as that in
the present Contempt; that the petitioner has also initiated criminal
proceedings with regard to the alleged incident and had approached this
Court by way of filing W.P.No.24351 of 2025 seeking substantially
similar reliefs; and that the invocation of multiple jurisdictions on the
same factual foundation amounts to multiplicity of proceedings and
demonstrates an attempt to secure overlapping remedies and forum
shopping .
7. Learned counsel for respondents while relying upon the principle
underlying the proviso to Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971, fairly submitted that the said proviso may not apply in its strict
textual sense to the facts of the present case; that the underlying
principle is nevertheless relevant while considering whether contempt
jurisdiction ought to be exercised where the alleged acts substantially
constitute criminal offences and the criminal law has already been set in
motion; and that, in the present case, the allegations relating to assault,
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wrongful restraint and other acts arising out of the incident are already
the subject matter of criminal proceedings.
7.1. He further submitted that the petitioner has not approached this
Court merely as an informant bringing an alleged act of contempt to the
notice of the Court, but has sought to pursue personal grievances and
punitive action against the respondents; that contempt jurisdiction
cannot be invoked for redressal of individual grievances or as a
substitute for criminal or disciplinary proceedings.
7.2. He further submitted that insofar as respondent No.13 is
concerned, he had no role whatsoever in the alleged incident; that he
was neither present at the place of occurrence nor involved in any
interaction with the petitioner; that he was not a signatory to the
impugned resolution and did not participate in any of the acts alleged
by the petitioner; and that he neither obstructed nor interfered with the
petitioner in any manner.
7.3. He further submitted that respondent No.13 has been impleaded
solely on the ground that he is an Executive Committee Member of the
MCCBA, Nampally; that in the absence of any specific allegation or
overt act attributable to him, such impleadment is legally unsustainable.
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7.4. He further submitted that the impugned resolution dated
16.06.2025 was not intended to be a call for a coercive strike or
boycott, but was a symbolic and one-day expression of solidarity with
members of the legal fraternity in the backdrop of the attacks on
advocates; that the resolution was passed in response to concerns
regarding the safety and dignity of advocates and was not intended to
interfere with the administration of justice or obstruct the functioning of
the Courts; that the respondents did not intend to prevent any advocate
or litigant from accessing the Court premises or participating in judicial
proceedings; that the petitioner himself stated that he was ultimately
permitted to enter the Court and attend to his matter; and that there was
no cessation of Court work or disruption of judicial proceedings on
account of the resolution.
8. He finally submitted that though the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal ‘s case (cited supra) has held that advocates
have no right to resort to strikes or call for a boycott of Court work, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has also recognised limited exception to cases
where the dignity, integrity and independence of the Bar is involved;
that, in such exceptional circumstances, a peaceful protest or abstention
from work for a period not exceeding one day may be overlooked by
the Courts; that, the resolution dated 16.06.2025 was issued in the said
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context as a one-day symbolic expression of solidarity concerning the
safety and dignity of advocates and was neither intended to obstruct the
functioning of the Courts nor to interfere with the administration of
justice.
9. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for respondents
relied upon the following judgments.
6
i. Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union of India ,
wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
The power of the Supreme Court to punish for
“
contempt of court, be though quite wide, is yet limited
and cannot be expanded to include the power to
determine whether an advocate is also guilty of
“professional misconduct” in a summary manner, giving
a go-by to the procedure prescribed under the Advocates
Act. The power to do complete justice under Article 142
is in a way, corrective power, which gives preference to
equity over law but it cannot be used to deprive a
professional lawyer of the due process contained in the
Advocates Act, 1961 by suspending his licence to
practice in a summary manner while dealing with a case
of contempt of court. ”
7
ii. Common Cause v. Union of India , wherein, the Hon’ble
Apex Court has held as under:
6
1998 4 SCC 409
7
2006 9 SCC 295
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“ Pursuant to the discussion that took place at the last
hearing on 30-11-1994, the following suggestions have
emerged as an interim measure consistent with the Bar
Council of India’s thinking that except in the rarest of
rare cases strike should not be resorted to and instead
peaceful demonstration may be resorted to, to avoid
causing hardship to the litigant public .
The above will not preclude other forms of protest
by practising lawyers in courts such as, for instance,
wearing of armbands and other forms of protest which
in no way interrupt or disrupt the court proceedings or
adversely affect the interest of the litigant. Any such
form of protest shall not however be derogatory to the
court or to the profession.”
8
iii. Legal Remembrancer vs. Matilal Ghose and others ,
wherein, the Calcutta High Court has held as under:
“The distinction between criminal and civil contempt is
of a fundamental character, though it has been
sometimes overlooked. A criminal contempt is conduct
that is directed against the dignity and authority of the
Court. A civil contempt is failure to do something
ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the
benefit of the opposing party therein.”
9
iv. Vijai Pratap Singh vs. Ajit Prasad and Others , the
Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:-
“Mere disobedience of an order passed in a civil
proceeding, where the object of the contempt
8
1914) ILR 41 Cal 173
9
1966CRILJ632
21
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proceedings is to secure compliance with the order and
protect the rights of the aggrieved party, is essentially
civil contempt. In such cases, the contempt constitutes
an injury to private party whose rights under the order
have been affected. On the other hand, where the act
complained of interferes with or obstructs the due
course of justice, particularly when such interference
constitutes an injury to the public or affects the
administration of justice, the contempt assumes the
character of criminal contempt.
10
v. P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. ISPAT (P) LTD. ,w herein in
the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:-
“The distinction between civil and criminal contempt
may, in certain cases, be broad as well as thin. Mere
disobedience of a court order made for the benefit of a
private party ordinarily constitutes civil contempt;
however, where such disobedience is accompanied by
defiance of the authority of the Court or conduct
obstructing or interfering with the administration of
justice, the contempt may assume a mixed character,
partaking of both civil and criminal contempt.
11
vi. S.K. Sarkar v. Vinay Chandra Misra , the Hon’ble Apex
Court held as under:-
“ Where a private person directly approaches the High
Court alleging the commission of contempt, without
obtaining the written consent of the Advocate General,
the High Court has the discretion either to refuse to
10
2021 6 SCC 258
11
19811 SCC 436
22
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entertain such petition or to treat the information
contained therein as the basis for taking suo motu
cognizance. However, before exercising such suo motu
jurisdiction, the High Court must be prima facie
satisfied that the information furnished is not frivolous
and that the alleged act of contempt is neither merely
technical nor trivial. It was further held that the power
to take suo motu cognizance, particularly in respect of
contempt of a subordinate court, must be exercised
sparingly and ordinarily in cases involving grave and
serious contempt, so as to ensure that the procedural
safeguards contemplated under Section 15 are not
rendered otiose .
vii. J.R. Parashar and Others v. Prasant Bhushan and
12
Others , w herein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:-
“That the power of the Court to take suo motu
cognizance of criminal contempt should be exercised
rarely and with caution, particularly where the statutory
procedure requiring the consent of the Attorney-General
or Advocate-General is otherwise applicable.
13
viii. Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India and another ,
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“ It is held that only in the rarest of rare cases where the
dignity, integrity and independence of the Bar and/or the
Bench are at stake,Courts may ignore (turn a blind eye)
to a protest abstention from work for not more than one
day. It is being clarified that it will be for the Court to
12
2001 6 SCC 735
13
2003 (2) SCC 45
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decide whether or not the issue involves dignity or
integrity or independence of the Bar and/or the Bench.
Therefore, in such cases the President of the Bar must
first consult the Chief Justice or the District Judge
before Advocate decide to absent themselves from Court.
The decision of the Chief Justice or the District Judge
would be final and have to be abided by the Bar. “
14
ix. Krishnakant Tamrakar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh ,
wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“Thereafter, the Law Commission referred to
observations in the judgment of this Court in Harish
Uppal case that there should be no strikes by the Bar
except in rarest of rare situations which should also not
exceed one day. The Bar Councils were called upon to
take appropriate action in the matter.”
15
x. P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shankar , w herein the Hon’ble Apex
Court has held as follows:-
“That criminal contempt proceedings may be initiated
by the Court suo motu, on a motion by the Attorney-
General or Solicitor-General, or by any other person
with their written consent. It further clarified that where
a private person merely places information before the
Court requesting it to take suo motu action, such
information does not itself initiate contempt
proceedings; the proceedings commence only when the
Court considers the information and decides to take
cognizance.
14
2018 SCC Online SC 304
15
1988 3 SCC 167
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xi. India Forge Drop Stampings Ltd v. Employees Union
16
High Court, Madras , wherein the Madras High Court
has held as hereunder:-
“Civil contempt, as defined under Section 2(b) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 arises from the wilful
disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order,
writ or other process of a Court, or the wilful breach of
an undertaking given to a Court. It essentially concerns
the failure of a party to comply with an order passed for
the benefit of the opposite party, whereas, criminal
contempt, generally consists of conduct that offends the
majesty of law and undermines the dignity and authority
of the Courts. The Court further referred to Section 12 of
the Act, which provides for the punishment that may be
imposed for contempt of Court.
17
(xii) Akhileshwar Mishra v. Dharam Godha , wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court has explained the scope of Section 2(b) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which defines civil contempt as the
wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or
other process of a Court, or a wilful breach of an undertaking given to
the Court. The Court held that wilfulness denotes deliberate and
intentional disobedience with the specific purpose of disregarding the
order of the Court. It further observed that, for a person to be held
guilty of civil contempt, the order must be capable of compliance in the
16
1996 (74) FLR 2052
17
2003 11 SCC 1
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CC.No.2297 of 2025
ordinary course and should not require extraordinary efforts or depend
upon the acts or omissions of third parties. The question of wilful
disobedience must, therefore, be determined with reference to the facts
and circumstances of each case.
10. On careful consideration of the rival submissions advanced by
the petitioner who appeared as party-in-person and learned counsel
appearing for respondents and perused the material available on record,
the following issues arise for consideration of this Court:
(1) Whether the resolution vide Ref. No.13505/MCCA/Hyd/2025,
dated 16.06.2025, passed by the Metropolitan Criminal Court
Bar Association, Nampally, calling upon its members to abstain
from Court work is in violation of the guidelines laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ex-Capt. Harish’s case (cited
supra).
(2) Whether obstructing and assaulting the petitioner in
furtherance of the resolution amounts to contempt under the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Issue No.1 :-
11. At the outset, it is necessary to consider the manner in which the
present proceedings have been initiated. The present Contempt Case
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CC.No.2297 of 2025
has been filed by the petitioner in his personal capacity alleging
commission of contempt by the respondents. The distinction between a
case filed by an individual and the exercise of suo motu contempt
jurisdiction by the Court assumes significance.
12. It is pertinent to note that during the course of submissions, it has
been stated that the allegations in the present proceedings are not
sought to be sustained as constituting criminal contempt, but essentially
relate to the alleged disobedience of the binding directions passed by
Hon’ble Apex Court governing strikes and boycotts by the advocates.
The respondents, however, have contended that the present proceedings
are not maintainable, in the absence of foundational pleadings attracting
either civil or criminal contempt; and that the allegations relating to the
incident dated 16.06.2025 involve disputed questions of fact which are
already the subject matter of criminal proceedings.
13. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to Section 15 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which for better appreciation, is
extracted as hereunder:-
“ (1) In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt
referred to in section 14, the Supreme Court or the High
Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made
by (a) the Advocate-General, or (b)any other person, with the
consent in writing to the Advocate-General, or (c)in relation
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CC.No.2297 of 2025
to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi, such Law
Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other person,
with the consent in writing of such Law Officer;”
14. The allegation insofar as it concerns the resolution dated
16.06.2025 and the alleged abstention from Court work pursuant
thereto, is founded upon the alleged wilful disobedience of the binding
directions issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ex-Capt. Harish
Uppal ’s case (cited supra) . Therefore, the requirement of obtaining the
written consent of the learned Advocate General under Section 15 of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which specifically applies to
criminal contempt, does not arise. In view of the aforesaid position, the
objection raised by the respondents regarding the absence of the
consent of the learned Advocate General under Section 15 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, cannot, by itself, be a ground to reject
the present proceedings, when the allegation is examined within the
framework of civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Act, 1971. The
question, therefore, is whether the conduct alleged against the
respondents constitutes wilful disobedience of the binding directions of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court so as to attract Section 2(b) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
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CC.No.2297 of 2025
15. There can be no dispute regarding the settled legal position that
advocates have no right to resort to strikes or to give a call for boycott
of Court work. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ex-Capt. Harish
Uppal’s case (cited supra) , Common Cause’ s case (cited supra) and
Krishnakant Tamrakar’s case ( cited supra) , has reiterated that lawyers
have no right to call for a strike or boycott the Courts and that an
advocate cannot be compelled to participate in such strike or boycott.
However, a limited exception has been recognised in the rarest of rare
cases involving the dignity, integrity and independence of the Bar
and/or the Bench, where abstention from work for a period not
exceeding one day may be considered. The said exception is subject to
the conditions indicated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In particular,
the President of the Bar is required to consult the Chief Justice or the
District Judge, as the case may be, before the advocates decide to
abstain from Court work and the decision of the judicial authority
concerned would be final and have to be abided by the Bar.
16. In the present case, the impugned resolution for abstaining the
Court work was confined to one day i.e. 16.06.2025. The material on
record indicates that the resolution was passed as an expression of
solidarity and to condemn the brutal attacks on the advocates
mentioned therein. Mere expression of solidarity by members of the
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CC.No.2297 of 2025
legal fraternity in circumstances involving an alleged attack upon an
advocate cannot, by itself, be treated as an act directed against the
administration of justice. The safety and dignity of advocates are
matters which have a direct bearing on the independence and effective
functioning of the Bar.
17. However, no material has been placed before this Court to
establish that the President of the Bar Association had consulted the
District Judge concerned, i.e., in the present case, Metropolitan
Sessions Judge concerned before passing the resolution dated
16.06.2025. Therefore, the respondents cannot seek to justify every act
undertaken pursuant to the resolution merely on the ground that the
protest was confined to one day or was claimed to be in solidarity with
an advocate. Even assuming that the circumstances leading to the
resolution could be brought within the limited exception recognised in
Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal’s case (cited supra) , such exception would
extend only to the limited abstention from Court work contemplated
therein and would not extend to any act of coercion, intimidation,
obstruction or physical assault upon an advocate who chooses to attend
Court.
18. It is pertinent to note that the contduct/overt act attributed to
respondent No.5, i.e., he physically obstructing and assaulting the
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CC.No.2297 of 2025
petitioner is outside the aforesaid exception and, if established, would
constitute violation of the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal’ s case (cited supra). Such conduct cannot be
justified even though the impugned resolution was confined to one day
or was passed in purported solidarity with an advocate.
Issue No.2 :-
19. It is apt to note that the respondents have not been described in
their individual capacity and not properly arrayed in the manner
contemplated under Rule 7(1)(a) of the Rules of Practice, 1980. The
petitioner has substantially sought to implead the office-bearers of the
MCCBA, Nampally, collectively and, in effect, seeks to initiate
contempt upon all the office-bearers on the basis of their respective
positions in the Bar Association. Contempt proceedings cannot,
ordinarily, be proceeded on the respondents collectively in the absence
of specific allegations and material demonstrating the individual role
and involvement of each respondent. In this regard it is pertinent to
refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. U.N. Bora,
Ex. Chief Executive Officer and Ors Vs. Assam Roller Flour Mills
18
Association and others , wherein it is held as hereunder:-
18
2021 SCC 593
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CC.No.2297 of 2025
“Merely because a subordinate official acted in disregard of an
order passed by the Court, a liability cannot be fastened on a
higher official in the absence of knowledge. When two views
are possible, the element of wilfulness vanishes as it involves a
mental element. It is a deliberate, conscious and intentional
act. What is required is a proof beyond reasonable doubt since
the proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature.”
20. Applying the aforesaid principle to the instant case, it is to be
seen that the material placed on record does not disclose any specific
act attributable to each of the respondents so as to fasten individual
liability for contempt except respondent No.5, against whom specific
allegations are made. Even insofar as respondent No.13 is concerned,
there is no material to show his presence at the place of occurrence,
participation in the alleged incident, or involvement in any act of
obstruction. In the absence of specific material establishing an overt act
or conscious participation, contempt liability cannot be imposed merely
on account of his position as a Executive Committee Member of the
Bar Association. Consequently, no vicarious liability for the alleged act
of respondent No.5 can be fastened upon the other office-bearers.
21. Furthermore, the question that arises is whether, in the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court should pursue
further action in contempt against respondent No.5. The alleged acts of
assault and wrongful restraint of the petitioner have already resulted in
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CC.No.2297 of 2025
registration of FIR No.159 of 2025 and FIR No.160 of 2025 arising out
of the same incident. The versions of the parties in respect of the
occurrence are disputed questions of fact and are presently the subject
matter of the aforesaid criminal proceedings. This Court, in exercise of
its contempt jurisdiction, would not be justified in conducting a parallel
adjudication upon such disputed questions of fact, particularly when the
alleged physical assault is specifically attributed to respondent No.5
and not to the office-bearers collectively.
22. It is also relevant that the material placed before this Court does
not disclose that, on the said date, any other advocate who choose to
attend Court despite the boycott call was similarly subjected to physical
assault, intimidation or coercive treatment by the office-bearers. The
allegation before this Court essentially pertains to the incident
involving the petitioner on 16.06.2025. Here, it is not out of place to
note that subsequently, on the same day, the petitioner had entered the
Court premises and attended the matter pending before the XVII
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.
23. Having regard to the nature of the allegations, the disputed
questions of fact arising from the incident dated 16.06.2025, the
pendency of criminal proceedings arising out of the same incident, and
the absence of sufficient material to establish willful disobedience
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CC.No.2297 of 2025
attributable to the individual respondents, this Court is not inclined to
proceed further in contempt against the respondents. The aforesaid
view of the Court shall not be understood as approving, condoning or
legitimising any act of assault, intimidation, coercion or obstruction of
an advocate seeking to attend Court, despite call of boycott by ar
association. The legal position remains unequivocal that the limited
exception recognised in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal’s case (cited supra)
does not authorise a Bar Association or its office-bearers to prevent an
advocate from attending his professional duties or to subject such
advocate to any adverse consequence for disregarding a boycott call.
24. Before parting with the matter, this Court deems it appropriate to
observe that the office-bearers of Bar Associations must exercise due
care, restraint and responsibility while organising or participating in
any boycott/protest. Even where a boycott/protest is undertaken in
circumstances claimed to be exceptional, no advocate, litigant or other
person shall be subjected to intimidation, coercion, obstruction or harm
for choosing to attend Court or pursue his or her legal remedy. The
office-bearers shall ensure that any future protest/call for a
strike/boycott is conducted strictly in accordance with the guide lines
law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and shall not
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CC.No.2297 of 2025
obstruct/prevent access to Court or interfere with the administration of
justice.
25. Accordingly, the Contempt Case is dismissed.
26. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. No
costs.
___________________________________
LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY, J
Date:21.09.2026
Dr