Sanjay Goel & Ors. vs Manju Suri & Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 23.09.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 06.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010609032024
+ RC.REV. 254/2024, CM APPL. 53917/2024 (Stay ) & CM
APPL. 65495/2026 (Seeking direction filed on behalf of the
petitioners)
SANJAY GOEL & ORS. ....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Jawahar Raja and Mr.
Abhey Narula, Advocates
versus
MANJU SURI & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. O.P. Aggarwal, Advocate
for R-1
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present Rent Control Revision Petition has been preferred
by the Petitioners under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi
1 2
Rent Control Act, 1958 , assailing the Order dated 13.05.2024
passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller (Central), Tis
3
Hazari Courts, Delhi in RC ARC No. 796/2019, whereby the
Application seeking leave to defend filed by the Petitioners in the
Eviction Petition instituted by the Respondent No. 1 under Section
1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Order
3
Learned ARC
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:06.11.2026
17:40:23
14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the DRC Act was dismissed,
resulting in an Order of eviction in respect of Shop No. 5564,
situated on the ground floor of Property bearing Municipal Nos.
5561–5564, Nai Sarak, Delhi-110006, measuring approximately 16
4
ft. × 6 ft .
BRIEF FACTS:
2. The Respondent No. 1 instituted the Eviction Petition dated
5
16.10.2019 , seeking eviction of the Petitioners from the subject
premises on the ground of bona fide requirement. The Respondent
No. 1 asserted that she was the owner/landlady of Property bearing
Municipal Nos. 5561–5564, Nai Sarak, Delhi-110006, having
purchased the same vide registered Sale Deed dated 24.09.1999. The
subject premises had been let out to Smt. Kishan Devi, the
predecessor-in-interest of the Petitioners, and the tenancy was stated
to have devolved upon her legal heirs following her demise.
3. The Respondent No. 1 pleaded that the property comprised four
shops on the ground floor, apart from accommodation on the upper
floors. It was her case that, following the vacation of two shops by the
tenants, Shop Nos. 5562 and 5563 had been converted into a single
shop, which was being used by her son, Mr. Nikhil Suri, for carrying
on the business of musical instruments under the name and style of
M/s Anand Musical Store . The Respondent No. 1 further pleaded that
she was carrying on tailoring work from her residential premises and
required the subject premises, situated on the main road, for running
her own tailoring business and earning her livelihood. She asserted
that the subject premises was the most suitable shop for the said
4
Subject Premises
5
Eviction Petition
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:06.11.2026
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purpose and that no other alternative accommodation was available to
her.
4. The Respondent No. 1 had earlier instituted eviction
proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, being E. No.
277/2008, against the predecessors-in-interest of the Petitioners in
respect of the subject premises. In the said proceedings, the
Respondent No. 1 had pleaded a bona fide requirement for herself as
well as her son. An Eviction Order was passed on 14.02.2013, which
was assailed before this Court in RC. REV. No. 235/2013. During the
pendency of the Revision Petition, the Respondent No. 1 sought
permission to withdraw the earlier eviction proceedings on account of
certain technical mistakes in the Petition. The earlier proceedings were
accordingly disposed of on 28.08.2019, with permission to withdraw
the aforesaid Eviction Petition.
5. Thereafter, the Respondent No. 1 instituted the present Eviction
Petition on 19.10.2019, pleading a bona fide requirement of the
subject premises for her own tailoring business. The Petitioners
contested the Eviction Petition and filed an Application seeking leave
to defend, raising objections to the bona fides of the requirement
pleaded by the Respondent No. 1 and asserting the availability of
alternative accommodation. The Petitioners, inter alia , contended that
the requirement earlier pleaded in respect of the Respondent No. 1's
son stood satisfied, as he was already carrying on his musical-
instrument business from the shop created by combining Shop Nos.
5562 and 5563. They further disputed the Respondent No. 1's
assertion that the subject premises was required for her own business,
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:06.11.2026
17:40:23
pointing out that she was already carrying on tailoring work from her
residence.
6. The Petitioners also questioned the assertion that no suitable
alternative accommodation was available to the Respondent No. 1. In
this regard, they relied upon the other shops situated in the same
property, the accommodation on the upper floors and certain other
commercial properties which, according to them, belonged to the
Respondent No. 1. The Respondent No. 1 disputed the availability and
suitability of the premises relied upon by the Petitioners and
maintained that the subject premises was required for her own bona
fide commercial requirement.
7. The learned ARC, upon consideration of the pleadings and the
material placed on record, dismissed the Application seeking leave to
defend vide the Impugned Order dated 13.05.2024, holding that the
Petitioners had failed to raise any triable issue warranting grant of
leave to defend. Consequently, an Order of eviction was passed in
favour of the Respondent No. 1 in respect of the subject premises.
Aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the Petitioners have preferred the
present Revision Petition.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
8. Though the present Revision Petition assails the Impugned
Order on various grounds, the submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties before this Court have been confined to the
bona fide requirement pleaded by the Respondent No. 1 and the
availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.
Accordingly, the discussion herein is restricted to the aforesaid
aspects.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:06.11.2026
17:40:23
9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners submits
that the learned ARC failed to properly appreciate the material placed
on record while rejecting the Application seeking leave to defend. It is
contended that the bona fide requirement pleaded by the Respondent
No. 1 in the present Eviction Petition was liable to be examined in the
context of the earlier eviction proceedings, wherein the requirement of
the Respondent No. 1 as well as her son had been projected. Learned
counsel submits that the requirement relating to the son stood
satisfied, as he had been carrying on his musical-instrument business
from the shop formed by combining Shop Nos. 5562 and 5563.
10. Learned counsel for the Petitioners further submits that the
Respondent No. 1 admittedly carries on tailoring work from her
residential premises and has not demonstrated why the subject
premises is indispensable for the said purpose. It is contended that the
mere preference for a shop situated on the main road cannot, by itself,
conclude the enquiry into the bona fides of the requirement,
particularly when the Respondent No. 1 is already engaged in the
same line of work from her residence. Learned counsel submits that
the learned ARC failed to adequately consider the aforesaid
circumstances while rejecting the Petitioners‘ plea that the
requirement projected in the Eviction Petition was not bona fide .
11. On the issue of alternative accommodation, learned counsel for
the Petitioners submits that the Respondent No. 1 had recovered
possession of Shop Nos. 5561, 5562 and 5563, besides having access
to other accommodation in the larger property. It is contended that the
availability and suitability of the said premises ought to have been
examined in conjunction with the Respondent No. 1‘s pleaded
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:06.11.2026
17:40:23
requirement. Learned counsel also relies upon municipal records
concerning other properties allegedly owned by the Respondent No. 1
and submits that the learned ARC failed to properly appreciate the
documentary material relied upon by the Petitioners. It is, accordingly,
contended that the objections raised by the Petitioners disclosed
triable issues warranting grant of leave to defend.
12. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent No. 1 supports the Impugned Order and submits that the
requirement pleaded in the present Eviction Petition is distinct from
the requirement projected in the earlier proceedings, as the subject
premises is now sought for the Respondent No. 1‘s own tailoring
business and livelihood. It is contended that the fact that the
Respondent No. 1 presently carries on tailoring work from her
residence does not negate her bona fide requirement of a commercial
premises situated on the main road. Learned counsel submits that the
Respondent No. 1 is the best judge of her requirements and that the
Petitioners cannot dictate the manner or place in which she ought to
carry on her business.
13. Learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1 further submits that
the Petitioners have failed to establish the availability of any
reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. It is contended that
the other shops and portions of the property relied upon by the
Petitioners were either being utilised for existing commercial purposes
or were otherwise unsuitable for the requirement pleaded in the
Eviction Petition. The Respondent No. 1 also disputes the inference
sought to be drawn from the municipal records relied upon by the
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:06.11.2026
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Petitioners and submits that such records, by themselves, do not
establish the present availability of suitable premises.
14. It is, therefore, contended that the learned ARC rightly
concluded that no triable issue had been disclosed and that the
Impugned Order does not warrant interference in revisional
jurisdiction.
15. No other submissions were advanced on behalf of the parties.
ANALYSIS:
16. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length
and, with their able assistance, perused the relevant documents as also
the Impugned Order.
17. Before proceeding to examine the rival submissions, it is
necessary to delineate the scope of the jurisdiction exercised by this
Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, 1958. The
jurisdiction exercised thereunder is supervisory in nature and does not
permit a reappraisal of the material on record as in an appeal.
Interference is warranted where the impugned order suffers from an
error of law, material irregularity or perversity, or where a material
aspect bearing upon the determination of the application seeking leave
to defend has been overlooked.
18. The scope of the aforesaid jurisdiction stands elucidated by the
6
Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua ,
wherein it was reiterated that the High Court, while exercising
revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC
Act, is required to examine the legality of the decision-making process
6
(2022) 6 SCC 30
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:06.11.2026
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and cannot convert such jurisdiction into a regular appellate
proceeding. The Hon‘ble Supreme Court observed as under:
― 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court
exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent
Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior
court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural
compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and
supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the
appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process
adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very
restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on
the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence
of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to
disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving
inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to
converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first
appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.‖
19. At the stage of considering an application for leave to defend,
the Court is required to determine whether the facts disclosed by the
tenant, if established, would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an
order of eviction. A defence raising a bona fide triable issue cannot be
rejected merely because the landlord disputes it; equally, objections
which do not disclose a legally tenable defence do not warrant a trial.
The Impugned Order is required to be tested against this standard.
Bona Fide Requirement
20. The relevant findings recorded by the learned ARC in the
Impugned Order on the issue of bona fide requirement are extracted
hereinbelow:
― Bonafide Requirement
19. It is stated in the application for leave to defend that the
need disclosed by the petitioner is not bonafide, as at the ripe age
of 60, it would not be possible for her to run a boutique from the
demised premises. It is stated that the residence of the petitioner is
at Ghaziabad and that would make it unfeasible for her to start her
business from the demised premises. In the considered opinion of
this Court, it is not open to the tenants to contest the bonafide
nature of the requirement disclosed by the petitioner on such
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:06.11.2026
17:40:23
flimsy grounds. It is trite that the bonafide of the requirement
disclosed by the landlord is to be presumed. (Ref: Sarla Ahuja Vs.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (1998) 8 SCC 119) . The
respondent has to show facts which would make the requirement of
the petitioner malafide. Merely stating that she stays some distance
away from the demised premises and her old age would be a
hindrance to her setting up her own business is not a ‗fact‘ in terms
of Section 25-B (4) of the DRC Act which would entitle the
respondents to grant of leave to defend the eviction petition. With
respect to the argument pertaining to the age of the petitioner
specifically, it is the considered opinion of this Court that
requirement disclosed by the petitioner cannot be considered to be
malafide merely because she is over 60 years old, and she cannot
be denied a chance to start her own business at such an age if she
so willing. Reliance at this juncture can be placed on Brij Mohan
Singh Vs. Tulsi Ram, 2019 (2) RCR (Rent) . In the said case, it
was held by the Hon‘ble High Court of Delhi that age is no bar for
a person wanting to open his business, and a senior citizen cannot
be knocked out of an eviction petition merely because of his old
age.
20. The fact that petitioner is running a tailoring business from
her residence at present would not make her petition for seeking
‗additional accommodation‘, in as much as she wants to shift her
business to demised premises. Her doing some work at present
from her residence does not mean that the residence can be
considered as constituting her primary place of business.
21. It is seen that petitioner had filed a prior petition under
Section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act to obtain vacant possession of shops
bearing no. 5561, 5562 and 5563, besides the room and tin-sheds
on the second floor of the larger property. The basis of petition was
her requirement for one shop for her boutique business, one shop
for her son, and another shop for storage purposes. In the said
petition itself, she had disclosed requirement for four shops. As
such, the fact that eviction order was passed against Sh. Anil Singh
for three shops and some portion of building which can be used for
storage reasons only does not make the instant petition infructuous.
It is also worthwhile that the said eviction petition was allowed on
19.09.2011, more than 15 years removed from now.During the said
period, petitioner chose to combined shops bearing no. 5562 and
5563, so that her son could run his business therefrom. This act of
the petitioner cannot prejudice her at this stage, as the petitioner is
the best judge of her own requirements. As such, filing of instant
petition for eviction of respondents from the demised premises
cannot be considered to be malafide. This is moreso in view of the
fact that petitioner has also stated that shop no. 5561 was not
available with her at the time of filing of the instant petition, since
the same was destroyed in a fire which had engulfed the larger
property prior to the filing of the subject proceedings, destroying
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:06.11.2026
17:40:23
all the upper portion of the building. Petitioner placed on record
photographs of the building reflecting the same fact.
To controvert this, respondents reasserted on oath in the
rejoinder filed by them that shop no. 5561 as well as the room and
tin sheds on the second floor of the larger property are available
with the petitioner. However, the photographs filed by the
respondent of a room where several musical instruments
(harmoniums and tablas) have been stacked itself shows that the
same is in dilapidated condition. The said photograph infact
supports the case of the petitioner, despite the fact that respondent
nowhere stated as to exactly which floor of the larger property the
said photograph pertains to. Furthermore, even if the said shop on
the first or second floor of the larger property was available with
the petitioner, the same could not constitute alternate
accommodation available with her, in view of the fact that
petitioner has stated that she requires the demised premises for
opening her own business, which she could not have reasonably
done from a shop on the first or second floor of the building as
profitably as from the demised premises situated on ground floor.
22. It has been contended by the respondents that the fact that
need of the petitioner was fulfilled when vacant possession of shop
no. 5561-5563 was granted to her was also taken note of by the
Hon‘ble High Court which was seized of the Revision Petition
bearing no. 235/2013 arising out of the eviction proceedings filed
by the petitioner against their predecessors-in-interest. It was
argued by the respondents that when the Hon‘ble High Court was
seized of the fact, the petitioner chose to withdraw her eviction
petition. Bare perusal of the order of the Hon‘ble High Court of
Delhi dated 28.08.2019 reveals that the petitioner was permitted
simpliciter to withdraw the proceedings, and it was categorically
noted therein that the contention that the need of the petitioner is
still subsisting or had grown or had been eclipsed by the petitioner
obtaining vacant possession of the other shops was not considered
by the Hon‘ble High Court. In such a situation, the fact that
petitioner had filed a petition against the predecessors-in-interest of
the respondent, which was later withdrawn by her, does in no
manner prejudice her in the instant case.
23. By way of an additional affidavit, the respondents brought
on record the fact that during the pendency of the instant petition,
‗M/s. Anand Musical Store‘ has been shifted to the first floor of the
building which has been duly repaired by petitioner, making
combined shop no. 5562-5563 available with her. It is stated that in
the premises which were earlier occupied by the son of petitioner,
another business of Sherwanis in the name of ‗M/s. Royal
Sherwani‘ has been started by the petitioner along with her son.
Photographs of newly renovated premises have also been placed on
record, showing that ‗M/s. Anand Musical Store‘ is now being run
on the first floor of the building, and with petitioner‘s son as the
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:06.11.2026
17:40:23
proprietor, ‗M/s. Royal Sherwani‘ is being run in the combined
shop no. 5562 and 5563, Nai Sarak, Delhi-110006. It has been
contended by the respondents that shop bearing no. 5562-5563 has
been put to use by petitioner for her own business, which she runs
with her son. It is stated that the requirement of the petitioner
stands completely eclipsed, and there is no outstanding bonafide
requirement of the petitioner to seek vacant possession of the
demised premises.
24. In the considered opinion of this Court, such a proposition
is merely to be urged to be rejected. It is trite that crucial date for
deciding the bonafide of the requirement of landlord is the date of
the application for eviction. The fact that during judicial process
which was protracted for reasons beyond the control of the
landlord, not each subsequent event that transpires needs to be
considered as having eclipsed the need of the landlord completely.
While the Courts are required to be cognizant of the subsequent
events, given the principles of natural justice, it is well settled that
only such subsequent events are to be given credence which would
completely overshadow the genuineness of the requirement shown
by the landlord. Reliance at this juncture can be placed on the
judgment of the Hon‘ble Apex Court titled Gaya Prasad vs Shri
Pradeep Srivastava Appeal (civil) 1071 of 2001 Appeal (civil)
1072 of 2001 DoD 07.02.2001. Reliance can also be placed on the
recent pronouncement of our own parent Hon‘ble High Court titled
Laxmi Narain & Ors vs Vishal Moondhra& Ors dated 18.01.2024
in RC Revision 333 of 2019 . In this case, similar to the facts of the
case instant, it was urged that the landlord has acquired the vacant
possession of two shops adjacent to the demised premises during
the pendency of the eviction petition. It was held by the Hon‘ble
High Court of Delhi that the demised premises / demised premises
can cater to the needs of only one of the three landlords /
respondents and even after taking into consideration the
availability of two additional shops, the need of the respondent /
landlord will not be fulfilled without the demised premises. It was
held therein:
―14.2 The Supreme Court in the Gaya Prasad case relying
on the Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General
Traders1,2, has however cautioned that in the field of rent
control litigation, cognizance of subsequent events should
be taken with care so that the rules of fairness are
available to both parties.
14.3 Since the process of litigation is slow, by the time
litigation reaches its final stages, there are likely to be
several subsequent events. However, only some are
‗subsequent‘ events of such nature, that would completely
overshadow the genuineness of a landlord‘s requirement.
14.4 The need as set forth in the Eviction Petition by the
Respondents/landlords, who are three brothers, is that each
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:06.11.2026
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of them requires one or more shops. Each of the three
Respondents/landlords are doing separate businesses and
have set up and need for their respective businesses which
is set forth in paragraph 3.1 above. The demised premises
can, at best, cater to the requirement of one of the
Respondents/landlords only. Even after taking into
consideration the availability of two additional shops (the
subsequent event), the need of the Respondents/landlords
is not fulfilled - at least not without the demised
premises.‖
When this legal position is applied to the facts of the case
instant, it would become amply clear that the bonafide requirement
of the petitioner still subsists. Essentially, during the pendency of
the petition, which was filed five years removed from now, the
petitioner or her son expended efforts in getting the upper floors of
the larger property renovated again, and made more shops on the
upper floors of the same functional. As per petitioner‘s version, her
son shifted his business from the ground to the first floor
thereafter, and his wife started running a business of sherwanis on
the ground floor in the premises earlier occupied by her husband.
There is some dispute on record as to exactly who is the proprietor
of ‗M/s. Royal Sherwani‘. As per the photographs filed by the
respondent, it is Mr. Nikhil Suri, and as per petitioner, it is her
daughter-in-law who runs it.
In the considered opinion of this Court, even if it is
conceded that it is the son of petitioner and not her daughter-in-law
that is running the business of ‗M/s. Royal Sherwani‘, the same
would still not be considered an event of such a nature as would
eclipse the need of the petitioner in its entirety. If the petitioner is
made to accommodate herself in the shop no. 5562-5563 earlier
used by her son, her son and daughter-in-law will be left with no
accommodation to run a Sherwani business from, in addition to the
business of musical instruments. They would then be constrained
to file an eviction petition afresh. Neither petitioner, nor her son
can be prejudiced in such a manner. The need of petitioner cannot
be considered to be eclipsed due to the subsequent renovation of
larger property by petitioner.
25. No triable issue has been raised by respondent qua this
criteria as well.‖
21. The principal contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioners
is that the bona fide requirement pleaded by Respondent No. 1 is not
genuine, inasmuch as she is already carrying out tailoring work from
her residence at Ghaziabad. It is further contended that the
requirement pleaded in the earlier eviction proceedings, which
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BHATIA
Signing Date:06.11.2026
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included the need of her son, stood satisfied upon the latter
commencing his musical instruments business from Shop Nos. 5562
and 5563, and that the subsequent availability and utilisation of the
said premises ought to have weighed with the learned ARC while
examining the present claim.
22. The aforesaid submissions must be considered in the context of
the requirement actually pleaded in the present eviction petition. The
earlier Eviction Petition, instituted in 2008, had been filed for the
requirements of Respondent No. 1 as well as her son. The present
Petition, instituted on 19.10.2019, proceeds on the specific plea that
Respondent No. 1 herself requires the subject premises to carry on her
tailoring business and earn her livelihood. Further, the Order dated
28.08.2019 passed in RC.REV. 235/2013 permitted withdrawal of the
earlier proceedings; it did not adjudicate that the requirement now
pleaded by Respondent No. 1 had been satisfied or had ceased to
subsist. The withdrawal of the earlier proceedings, therefore, cannot,
by themselves, furnish a basis to reject the distinct requirement
pleaded by the Respondent No. 1 in the present Petition.
23. The Petitioners have also relied upon the subsequent use of
Shop Nos. 5562 and 5563, including the business conducted therein
under the name and style of M/s Royal Sherwani . The learned ARC
considered the explanation furnished by the Respondent No. 1
regarding the use of the said shop and the redevelopment of the upper
floors, and held that the subsequent developments did not extinguish
the requirement pleaded in the present petition. In Gaya Prasad v.
7
Pradeep Srivastava , the Hon‘ble Supreme Court held that the crucial
7
(2001) 2 SCC 604
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BHATIA
Signing Date:06.11.2026
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date for assessing bona fide requirement is ordinarily the date of the
eviction petition, and that subsequent events displace the pleaded need
only where their nature and magnitude completely eclipse that
requirement. Applying this principle, the mere fact that the combined
shop came to be used for another business does not, by itself, establish
that the Respondent No. 1‘s requirement for her own tailoring
business had ceased to subsist or is not genuine. The relevant portion
of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
― 10. We have no doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to the
bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his
application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have
utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If
every subsequent development during the post-petition period is to
be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement
pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as
the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow-process system
subsists. During 23 years, after the landlord moved for eviction on
the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord
nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest,
joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at
the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a
stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more
would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long
interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new
enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a
tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get
faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional
lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina
might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain
intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It
is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an
applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing
through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the
ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because
the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such
unduly long period.
11. We cannot forget that while considering the bona fides of the
need of the landlord the crucial date is the date of petition. In
Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram [1992 Supp (2) SCC 623] a two-
Judge Bench of this Court (M.N. Venkatachaliah, J., as he then
was, and N.M. Kasliwal, J.) pointed out that the normal rule is that
rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined as they
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were when the lis commenced and the only exception is that the
court is not precluded from moulding the reliefs appropriately in
consideration of subsequent events provided such events had an
impact on those rights and obligations. What the learned Chief
Justice observed therein is this: (SCC pp. 626-27, para 6)
― 6 . The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and
obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they
obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject
to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or
law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of
the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the
moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded
from taking a ‗cautious cognizance‘ of the subsequent
changes of fact and law to mould the relief.‖
12. This Court reiterated the same principle in Kamleshwar Prasad
v. Pradumanju Agarwal [(1997) 4 SCC 413] that the crucial date
normally is the date of filing the petition. In that case, a two-Judge
Bench (K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.) has held that even
the subsequent event of death of the landlord who wanted to start a
business in the tenanted premises is not sufficient to dislodge the
bona fide need established by him earlier. This is what Pattanaik J.
has observed for the Bench: (SCC p. 415, para 3)
―That apart, the fact that the landlord needed the premises
in question for starting a business which fact has been
found by the appellate authority, in the eye of the law, it
must be that on the day of application for eviction which is
the crucial date, the tenant incurred the liability of being
evicted from the premises. Even if the landlord died
during the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court
the bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the
business in question can be carried on by his widow or any
other son.‖
13. In our opinion, the subsequent events to overshadow the
genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a
dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party
should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events.
A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v.
Motor and General Traders [(1975) 1 SCC 770] which pointed to
the need for remoulding the reliefs on the strength of subsequent
events affecting the cause of action in the field of rent control
litigation, forewarned that cognizance of such subsequent events
should be taken very cautiously. This is what learned Judges of the
Bench said then: (SCC pp. 772-73, para 4)
―We affirm the proposition that for making the right or
remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also
legally and factually in accord with the current realities,
the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious
cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the
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institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness
to both sides are scrupulously obeyed.‖
14. The next three-Judge Bench of this Court, which approved and
followed the above decision, in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad
[(1981) 3 SCC 103] has taken care to emphasise that the
subsequent events should have ―wholly satisfied‖ the requirement
of the party who petitioned for eviction on the ground of personal
requirement. The relevant passage is extracted below: (SCC pp.
113-14, para 14)
―Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where
possession is sought for personal requirement it would be
correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord
must not only exist on the date of the action but must
subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is
made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which
would show that the landlord's requirement is wholly
satisfied then in that case his action must fail and in such
a situation it is incorrect to say that as decree or order for
eviction is passed against the tenant he cannot invite the
court to take into consideration subsequent events .‖
(emphasis supplied)
15. The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has
acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long
long years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady
afflicting the system. During this long interval many many events
are bound to take place which might happen in relation to the
parties as well as the subject-matter of the lis. If the cause of action
is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of the
malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant,
despite the impairment already caused.‖
24. Also, the fact that Respondent No. 1 is presently carrying out
tailoring work from her residence at Ghaziabad does not, in itself,
negate the requirement of a commercial premises for carrying on that
activity. The question, therefore, is whether the fact that Respondent
No. 1 is already carrying out tailoring work from her residence
disentitles her from seeking the subject premises for the same purpose,
particularly when the latter is situated on the main road and is claimed
to be more suitable for her business. In Budh Singh & Sons v.
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8
Sangeeta Kedia , the Hon‘ble Delhi High Court considered an
eviction petition in which the landlady was already carrying on the
business of stitching suits and other apparel, yet sought a commercial
premises for that business. The Court rejected the challenge to the
dismissal of the tenant‘s application for leave to defend. The relevant
portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
― 10. The eviction petition has also clearly and categorically
disclosed the bonafide need of the landlady Sangeeta Kedia. It has
come on record that she is carrying on business since the last eight
years and this has been supported by her income tax returns which
had been filed along with the eviction petition as also the bills
supporting her submission that she is carrying on the business of
stitching of suits and other apparel. There is no doubt that on this
eviction petition it has not been mentioned from where she is
carrying on the said business; her need for the present premises
(which is a shop measuring 9 ft × 21 ft on the ground floor of
premises bearing No. 1855, Chandani Chowk, Delhi) is for running
the business of ladies suits and garments which she is admittedly
carrying on and is supported by her documents as aforenoted. In
this factual scenario the submission of the tenant that the petitioner
is only a housewife and is not doing any business is negatived. The
premises in occupation of the respondent is also admittedly in a
highly commercial area i.e. in the heart of the Delhi being on the
main road of Chandani Chowk; the petitioner has also averred
(unchallenged) that she has no other properties in her name and
thus admittedly this disputed premises (being in a commercial
area) from where she wishes to carry a business of ladies suits and
garments would definitely be a viable and profitable business
venture for her; her Todar Mal residence where she is residing is
admittedly residential. In these circumstances mere fact that the
landldady has not disclosed the address from where she is carrying
on this business would not diminish her bonafide need.
11. The present case is also not a case of additional
accommodation. The judgment of S.K. Mehra (supra) and Santosh
Devi (supra) were distinct on their facts. In the first case the
landlord was occupying the ground floor as also entire second
floor; the question was whether the landlord required the first floor
as well. In the second case the landlady was in the possession of
the first floor; certain additional accommodation was thereafter
subsequently made available to the landlady; it was in these
circumstances that the court thought it fit as being described as a
case of additional accommodation for which a trial would be
8
2011 SCC OnLine Del 4811
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required. From these judgments relied upon by the petitioner are
half page judgments; further facts cannot be deciphered; each case
even otherwise has to be weighed in its own context. In fact if the
submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner on this score is
accepted, all cases where the landlord is living even in a one room
tenement owned by him would become a case of additional
accommodation raising a triable issue and leave to defend should
have to be granted and to which query the leaned counsel has no
answer. To say the least, this argument is wholly misplaced; this
was definitely not the intent and purpose of the legislature while
engrafting the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRCA which
has to be read with Section 25 B of the DRCA wherein it has been
reiterated time and again by the Supreme Court that this is a
summary procedure which is available for effective and summary
disposal of an eviction petition filed by the landlord on the ground
of a bonafide need either for himelf or any member of his family
dependent upon him. In fact if this argument of the learned counsel
for the petitioner is accepted this entire procedure would have to be
given a go by; this argument is thus rejected. The language of this
section also clearly states that the need may be of the landlord or
any member of his family dependent upon him and the landlord or
such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation.
12. In the judgment of Prithipal Singh v. Satpal Singh (dead)
through legal heirs , (2010) 2 SCC 15 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 271
the Supreme Court has noted herein as below:
―20. The scope of Chapter III-A of the Rent Act has been
elaborately discussed in Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal
Bhargava in which this Court duly discussed the object of
the Rent Act and also the insertion of Chapter III-A of the
same in the following manager:
The dominant object of the act is to provide a speedy,
expeditious and effective remedy for a class of landlords
contemplated by Sections 14(1)( e ) and 14A and for
avoiding unusual dilatory process provided otherwise by
the Rent Act. It is common experience that suits for
eviction under the Act take a long time commencing with
the Rent Controller and ending up with the Supreme
Court. In many cases experience has indicated that by the
time the eviction decree became final several years
elapsed and either the landlord died or the necessity which
provided the cause of action disappeared and if there was
further delay in securing eviction and the family of the
landlord had by then expanded, in the absence of
accommodation the members of the family were virtually
thrown on the road. It was this mischief, which the
legislature intended to avoid by incorporating the new
procedure in Chapter III-A. The legislature in its wisdom
thought that in cases where the landlords required their
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own premises for bona fide and personal necessity they
should be treated as a separate class along with the
landlords covered by Section 14(A) and should be allowed
to reap the fruits of decrees for eviction within the
quickest possible time. It cannot, therefore, be said that the
classification of such landlords would be an unreasonable
one because such a classification has got a clear nexus
with the objects of the Amending Act and the purposes,
which it seeks to subserve. Tenants cannot complain of
any discrimination because the Rent Act merely gave
certain protection to them in public interest and if the
protection or part of it afforded by the Rent Act was
withdrawn and the common law right of the tenant under
the Transfer of property Act was still preserved, no
genuine grievance could be made.
…………………..
22. A challenge was thrown to Section 25B of the Rent
Act in Kewal Singh v. Smt Lajwanti , questioning the
classification held to be not in consonance with the
objective sought to be achieved and the aforesaid
provision must be held to be unconstitutional wherein this
Court held that the special provision, namely, Section 25B
of the Rent Act providing summary procedure for eviction
while the landlord pleading bona fide personal
requirement, separate classification of such landlords were
held to be justified as such classification must be held to
be in consonance with the objective sought to be achieved
and provision not unconstitutional. Accordingly, in the
aforesaid decision, this Court held that Section 25B does
not suffer from excessive delegation. Keeping in view the
aforesaid observations of this Court in this case and
considering the special provisions made in Section 25B of
the Act, we conclude that Section 25B of the Act is a
complete code by which the entire procedure to be
adopted for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide
requirement filed by the landlord in respect of a premises,
shall be followed.‖
13. In the instant case impugned order dismissing the application
for leave to defend suffers from no infirmity.‖
25. The principle that the existence of an ongoing business does
not, by itself, foreclose a landlord‘s right to seek possession of
premises better suited to the proposed use also finds support in Anil
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9
Bajaj & Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja . There, the landlord was carrying on
business from a shop situated in a narrow lane, but sought possession
of the tenanted premises situated on the main road. The Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held that the fact that the landlord was carrying on
business from other premises could not foreclose his right to seek
eviction, so long as he intended to use the tenanted premises for his
own business. The Court further reiterated that it is not for the tenant
to dictate how the landlord should utilise his property for the purposes
of his business. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is
reproduced hereinbelow:
― 6. In the present case it is clear that while the landlord (Appellant
1) is carrying on his business from a shop premise located in a
narrow lane, the tenant is in occupation of the premises located on
the main road which the landlord considers to be more suitable for
his own business. The materials on record, in fact, disclose that the
landlord had offered to the tenant the premises located in the
narrow lane in exchange for the tenanted premises which offer was
declined by the tenant. It is not the tenant's case that the landlord,
Appellant 1, does not propose to utilise the tenanted premises from
which eviction is sought for the purposes of his business. It is also
not the tenant's case that the landlord proposes to rent out/keep
vacant the tenanted premises after obtaining possession thereof or
to use the same is any way inconsistent with the need of the
landlord. What the tenant contends is that the landlord has several
other shop houses from which he is carrying on different
businesses and further that the landlord has other premises from
where the business proposed from the tenanted premises can be
effectively carried out. It would hardly require any reiteration of
the settled principle of law that it is not for the tenant to dictate to
the landlord as to how the property belonging to the landlord
should be utilised by him for the purpose of his business. Also, the
fact that the landlord is doing business from various other premises
cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted
premises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted premises for
his own business.
7. The grounds on which leave to defend was sought by the tenant
and has been granted by the High Court runs counter to the
fundamental principles governing the right of a tenant to contest
the claim of bona fide requirement of the suit premises by the
9
(2014) 15 SCC 610
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landlord under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Even assuming
the assertions made by the tenant to be correct, the same do not
disclose any triable issue so as to entitle the tenant to grant of leave
to defend.‖
26. The aforesaid principle is consistent with the decision in Sait
10
Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors. ,
wherein the Hon‘ble Supreme Court recognised that a landlord‘s
requirement to commence or carry on business from premises owned
by him must be assessed in the context of the genuine requirement
pleaded, and that the landlord cannot be compelled to indefinitely
defer such use. The inquiry is not whether the landlord is managing to
conduct some activity from another place, but whether the
requirement for the premises in question is bona fide and whether
reasonably suitable alternative accommodation is available. The same
assessment must, however, remain anchored to the pleadings and
material on record; the mere assertion of a commercial purpose
cannot, by itself, dispense with scrutiny of the genuineness of the
requirement. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is
reproduced hereinbelow:
― 4. First of all we shall take up the question of bona fide need of
the landlords. So far as the partition of the property and the present
premises coming to the share of the landlords are concerned, there
is no dispute that the portion of the building has come to the share
of the landlords and they are the owners as a result of the partition
of the family properties. But the question is whether the landlords
who are the owners of the portion of the building have
substantiated the allegation with regard to the bona fide need or
not. We have gone through the findings of the trial court as well as
that of the Appellate Authority and the High Court and after
closely scrutinising the same, we do not think that the finding
recorded by the appellate court and the High Court can be
interfered with by this Court on the ground of being perverse or
without any basis. The landlords have led evidence to show that
one of their sons who had requisite qualification for starting a
10
(2005) 8 SCC 252
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computer institute wants to establish the same at Calicut and others
for extension of their business. The trial court as well as the first
appellate court and the High Court examined the statements of
PWs 2 and 3 and after considering their evidence, the appellate
court reversed the finding of the trial court and held that the need
of the respondent landlords to start a business at Calicut, is bona
fide and genuine. It was held that it cannot be said that a person
who is already having a business at one place cannot expand his
business at any other place in the country. It is true that the
landlords have their business spreading over Chennai and
Hyderabad and if they wanted to expand their business at Calicut it
cannot be said to be unnatural thereby denying the eviction of the
tenant from the premises in question. It is always the prerogative of
the landlord that if he requires the premises in question for his
bona fide use for expansion of business this is no ground to say
that the landlords are already having their business at Chennai and
Hyderabad therefore, it is not genuine need. It is not the tenant who
can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him what he should
do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord
to choose the nature of the business and the place of business.
However, the trial court held in favour of the appellant tenant. But
the appellate court as well as the High Court after scrutinising the
evidence on record, reversed the finding of the trial court and held
that the need of establishing the business at Calicut by the
landlords cannot be said to be lacking in bona fides.‖
27. In the present case, Respondent No. 1 has categorically pleaded
that she carries out tailoring work from her residence and requires the
subject shop, situated on the main road at Nai Sarak, to carry on the
said activity from a commercial location. The fact that she has been
able to conduct tailoring work from her residence does not establish
that the residential premises are reasonably suitable for the
commercial purpose now pleaded. Nor does the fact that her son had
carried on a different business from Shop Nos. 5562 and 5563
establish that Respondent No. 1‘s own requirement for the subject
premises is fictitious. The Petitioners‘ reliance on the earlier
proceedings and on the existing tailoring activity, without more, does
not disclose a triable issue as to the genuineness of the requirement
pleaded in the present petition.
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28. In view of the aforesaid principles and the findings recorded by
the learned ARC, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the
conclusion that the Petitioners had failed to raise a triable issue on the
bona fide requirement. The earlier requirement relating to the son, the
withdrawal of the earlier proceedings, and the Respondent No. 1‘s
existing tailoring work from her residence do not, in the circumstances
pleaded, establish that the present requirement is a mere pretence. The
challenge to the Impugned Order on this ground is, accordingly,
rejected.
Availability of Reasonably Suitable Alternative Accommodation
29. The Petitioners next contend that the learned ARC failed to
properly appreciate the material placed on record demonstrating the
availability of alternative commercial accommodation with
Respondent No. 1. The properties specifically relied upon are Property
No. 5533, Katra Rathi, Nai Sarak; Shop No. 5, Nai Sarak; and Shop
No. 5559, Katra Rathi, Nai Sarak. Reliance has also been placed on
the other portions of the larger property bearing Nos. 5561–5564,
including Shops Nos. 5561, 5562 and 5563 and the accommodation
on the upper floors.
30. The relevant observations of the learned ARC in the Impugned
Order, while dealing with the objection regarding the availability of
alternative accommodation, are extracted hereinbelow:
― Suitable Alternate Accommodation
26. Respondents have also urged that petitioner owns sufficient
alternate commercial accommodations, i.e., shop no. 5533, shop
no. 5, and shop no. 5559 on Katra Rathi, Nai Sarak, Delhi and any
of the said shops can be put to use by her for the requirement
disclosed in the eviction petition.
27. With respect to shop no. 5533, it is the case of the
respondents that at present one Mr. Rakesh Jain is occupying the
same as a tenant since year 2018, and is since running his business
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of ladies ethnic wear under the name and style of ‗M/s. Salman
Fashion‘ therefrom. The contention of respondents itself makes it
amply clear that the said premises are not available to the petitioner
for the requirement disclosed by her. As such, they cannot be said
to constitute alternate accommodation available with the petitioner
for the requirement disclosed by her.
28. Respondents have also contended that the second floor of
this property no. 5533 has been handed over by petitioner to Mr.
Anil Singh, son of Raghubir Singh.
In reply to this contention, the petitioner has stated that she
has severed all ties with her husband Anil Singh, and therefore the
said property is not available to her. Even this submission of the
petitioner has been controverted by the respondents who have
stated that the petitioner and Mr. Anil Singh are still living together
as husband and wife. Even if that were the case, the second floor of
the property bearing no. 5533, Katra Rathi, Nai Sarak, Delhi-
110006 cannot constitute alternate accommodation to the demised
premises, which is situated on the ground floor, and therefore
would be more suitable for the requirement disclosed by the
petitioner.
29. Respondents have stated that shop no. 5559, Katra Rathi,
Nai Sarak, Delhi-110006, is also available with the petitioner, as
also shop no. 5, Katra Rathi, Nai Sarak, Delhi-110006.
In reply to this, the petitioner has explained that in property
bearing no. 5559, Katra Rathi, Nai Sarak, Delhi-110006, she had
two shops bearing no. 4 and 5, but she sold the aforesaid shops in
October 2009, and at present, has no concern therewith. It has been
stated by her that she was constrained to sell the same because of
financial exigencies faced by her. Then, to buttress their
contention, respondents have placed on record receipts reflecting
payment of property tax by the petitioner qua these premises in the
year 2012-2013. It was argued that the payment of property tax
itself reflect the ownership of petitioner over these premises. This
contention was refuted by the petitioner who argued that it is only
because the new owners of the property have not obtained the
mutation of relevant records in their name is the reason why the
property tax receipts are still being generated in the name of the
petitioner. This argument of the petitioner does not seem to be
without merit.
In the considered opinion on this court, if the respondent
had to establish that the shops are available with the petitioner,
they could have placed on record photographs of the said shops,
alongwith the photographs of hoarding, etc. therein, which could
have shown that the same are in some manner connected with the
petitioner. But not to be. Property tax receipts do not reflect the
title of the petitioner over the said shops, and when they are
juxtaposed to the contention of the petitioner on oath to the effect
that she had sold the shops way back in October 2009, this Court is
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impelled to raise an inference that the said shops are not owned by
the petitioner at present.
30. In the considered opinion of this Court, the respondents
have not been able to raise any triable issue as regards availability
of alternate accommodation with the petitioner either.‖
31. The governing principle is that the mere existence of another
property does not, by itself, defeat a claim for eviction under Section
14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. The alternative accommodation must be
available to the landlord and reasonably suitable for the requirement
11
pleaded. In M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma , the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held that where the tenant demonstrates the existence
of vacant premises with the landlord, the Court must examine whether
such premises are suitable for the purpose for which eviction is
sought. The landlord‘s choice is not immune from scrutiny; equally,
the tenant cannot succeed merely by identifying another property
without establishing its availability and suitability in the context of the
pleaded requirement. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment
is reproduced hereinbelow:
― 17. Once this subsequent event of landlord's interest in the
property getting extinguished as the property in question is allotted
as an exclusive owner to a sharer upon a partition amongst co-
sharers, is properly evaluated, unless some proper explanation is
offered by the landlords who are parties to the proceedings, the
plaintiffs are liable to be non-suited. This does not require much of
a discussion because plaintiffs sought possession for personal
requirement of Respondent 1 Manohar Lal Sharma. Manohar Lal
Sharma wanted to start his clinic, as he is a qualified medical
practitioner, in the suit premises. Manohar Lal Sharma is neither an
owner nor a co-owner nor has he any interest in the suit property
since the date of partition effected by compromise between the co-
sharers in Suit 4 of 1974. If action were to start today or a day after
the decree for partition, could Manohar Lal Sharma ever file a suit
for evicting the present appellant from the suit shop on the ground
that he wanted to start his clinic in the suit shop? If Manohar Lal
Sharma can bring such an action he can as well evict any tenant
11
(1981) 3 SCC 36
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from any premises with which he has no connection. Even if at the
commencement of the action Manohar Lal Sharma was a co-owner
along with his brother and uncle and, therefore, he had a semblance
of title to commence action for eviction, once the co-owner parted
company, partitioned the property by metes and bounds and the
suit property came to be allotted to Pyarelal as an exclusive owner,
Manohar Lal Sharma cannot claim eviction of the tenant from such
property in which he has no subsisting interest. And even if this
event occurred subsequent to the passing of the decree by the trial
court, this subsequent event should have been noticed at the
appellate stage because the appeal is nothing else but a
continuation of the suit and in a proceeding under the Rent Act the
relief has to be moulded according to the situation on the date of
the decree; the decree would mean the decree which is final and
not correctible by any judicial proceeding. Manohar Lal Sharma,
therefore, cannot seek to evict the tenant for his personal
requirement. Therefore, the suit for eviction under Section 11(1)( c )
would ordinarily fail on this ground. However, as the fresh
evidence is being taken into consideration and as both the appellate
courts and the High Court have erred in approaching the matter by
ignoring the subsequent event, it would be presently pointed out
that in order to do justice between the parties the matter will have
to be remanded to the first appellate court.
18. Before turning to the next topic, a word about the judicial
approach to the question of personal requirement of the landlord
under the Rent Act would not be out of place. The learned Judge of
the first appellate court while upholding the claim of personal
requirement of Respondent 1 has observed as under:
―It is for the plaintiffs to decide whatever they think fit
and proper. It is not for the defendant to suggest as to what
they should do. The defendant has led evidence to show
that the plaintiffs have got some more houses at Giridih ...
The defendant-appellant has also filed certified copy of
judgment of one Suit 47 of 1973 which is Ex. D only to
show that plaintiffs have got a decree for eviction with
respect to the other house at Giridih. I have already
pointed out earlier that it is for the plaintiffs to decide
which of the houses is suitable for them. It is not for the
defendant to suggest that the house which will fall vacant
in the near future is most suitable house for the plaintiffs.‖
This approach betrays a woeful lack of consciousness relatable to
circumstances leading to enactment of Rent Acts in almost all
States in the country. The time-honoured notion that the right of re-
entry is unfettered and that the owner-landlord is the sole judge of
his requirement has been made to yield to the needs of the society
which had to enact the Rent Acts specifically devised to curb and
fetter the unrestricted right of re-entry and to provide that only on
proving some enabling grounds set out in the Rent Act the landlord
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can re-enter. One such ground is of personal requirement of
landlord. When examining a case of personal requirement, if it is
pointed out that there is some. vacant premises with the landlord
which he can conveniently occupy, the element of need in his
requirement would be absent. To reject this aspect by saying that
the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to
negative the very raison d'être of the Rent Act. Undoubtedly, if it is
shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant
premises in his possession, that by itself may not be sufficient to
negative the landlord's claim but in such a situation the court would
expect the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is
not suitable for the purpose of his occupation or for the purpose for
which he requires the premises in respect of which the action is
commenced in the court. It would, however, be a bald statement
unsupported by the Rent Act to say that the landlord has an
unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that too
irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in
possession which he would not occupy and try to seek to remove
the tenant. This approach would put a premium on the landlord's
greed to throw out tenants paying lower rent in the name of
personal occupation and rent out the premises in his possession at
the market rate. To curb this very tendency the Rent Act was
enacted and, therefore, it becomes the duty of the court
administering the Rent Act to bear in mind the object and
intendment of the legislature in enacting the same. The court must
understand and appreciate the relationship between legal rules and
one of the necessities of life — shelter — and the way in which
one part of the society exacts tribute from another for permission to
inhabit a portion of the globe. In the Sociology of Law , edited by
Pat Carlen, the author examines the rent and rent legislation in
England and Wales and observes as under:
―The prevailing paradigms of neo-classical economics and
empiricist political theory have determined the conceptual
insularity of law and legal institutions, with the result that
they and other social events appear as random existences
independent of their historical formation. The force of any
theory of law must of course lie in its explanatory power,
and this in turn depends on the wider image of social
relations which produces it.‖
32. The Hon‘ble Delhi High Court in Lalta Prasad Gupta v. Sita
12
Ram , further explained that a tenant raising a plea of alternative
accommodation must furnish the particulars of the premises, the
landlord‘s right or title thereto, their availability at the relevant time,
12
2017 SCC OnLine Del 13026
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and their suitability for the requirement pleaded. The tenant must also
place material capable of substantiating the plea that the landlord has
deprived himself of such accommodation by sale or letting. The
standard at the stage of seeking leave to defend does not require
conclusive proof of every assertion; however, the defence must rest on
material particulars and not on a mere allegation that other properties
exist. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“17. The word ―discloses‖ in Section 25 B (5) of the Rent Act has
to be understood as disclosing facts which if proved would
disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under
Section 14(1)( e ). Unless the words ―discloses such facts‖ in
Section 25B(5) are understood and interpreted as placing before
the Rent Controller facts which when proved will result in
dismissal of petition for eviction, the Rent Controller will be
unable to apply summary procedure prescribed in Section 25B for
such petitions for eviction. If it were to be held that every plea in
the application for leave to defend, howsoever vague and without
particulars and without anything in support thereof, should be
permitted to be proved, the advocates for tenants, with their astute
drafting skills, will not allow the summary procedure, prescribed
by legislature to be followed for petitions for eviction of tenants on
the ground of requirement of the landlord of the tenancy premises
for self use, to be followed in any case and leave to defend will
have to be granted and each case put to trial.
18. Thus, if the tenant seeks leave to defend controverting the
requirement pleaded by landlord on the ground of the landlord,
though at the time of requirement having alternate premises,
having not used the same and instead having commercially
exploited the same, the tenant must plead (a) the particulars of such
premises; (b) the right/title of the landlord to the same; (c) that the
said premises were vacant and available for use at the time of the
pleaded requirement of landlord; (d) how the said premises were
suitable for the pleaded requirement; and (e) how the landlord has
deprived himself thereof i.e. by sale or letting and support the said
pleas with material on the basis whereof such pleas will be proved.
I say that it is essential to place such material before the Rent
Controller because the purpose of trial, resulting from grant of
leave to defend, is to prove the said pleas and if the tenant has
nothing from which he can possibly prove the said pleas, the trial
also will not result in the landlord being ―disentitled from
obtaining an order for recovery of possession of premises on the
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ground specified in Clause (e) of proviso to sub Section (1) of
Section 14‖ of the Act, within the meaning of Section 25B(5)
supra. This is not to say that the tenant should file fool proof
documentary evidence at the stage of leave to defend. However
there must be placed on record all the requisite particulars. The
onus on the tenant, at the stage of seeking leave to defend, is thus
somewhere in between fool proof documentary evidence and a
totally vague, bereft of any particulars plea. Where, in between the
said onus lies, depends on facts of each case.
19. Applying the aforesaid test, the petitioner/tenant is found to
have not discharged the onus.
20. Even otherwise, sale, 3 or 4 years prior to the institution of the
petition for eviction, does not entitle the petitioner/tenant to leave
to defend.
21. The requirement pleaded by the respondent/landlord of the
shop in the tenancy of the petitioner is that (a) he has a room along
with the store room measuring 4′ 7″ × 5′ 8″ on the ground floor in
his possession; the same is also borne out of Sale Deed in his
favour; (b) that he was using the store room for his personal use
before giving the same on rent to the petitioner/tenant; (c) that the
respondent/landlord at that time had need for rent for Rs 1200 from
the said store room; (d) however now after 13 years of letting of
the said store room, the respondent/landlord required the same for
use as a residence for himself and his expanding family members;
(e) that the respondent/landlord has grown old and is suffering
from Asthma and the wife of the respondent/landlord is also unable
to move up to the first and second floor of the property; (f) that the
respondent/landlord thus required the shop in the tenancy of the
petitioner/tenant for his own use.‖
33. Applying the aforesaid principles, the objection concerning
Property No. 5533, Katra Rathi, does not, on the material presently
available, establish the availability of reasonably suitable alternative
accommodation. The case of the Petitioners is that the property is
owned by Respondent No. 1 and that its second floor was handed over
to Mr. Anil Singh. Respondent No. 1, on the other hand, stated that
the ground-floor premises were occupied by Mr. Rakesh Jain, who
had been carrying on business there since 2018, and that the property
was no longer available to her. The learned ARC accepted that the
occupied ground-floor premises could not be treated as alternative
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accommodation available for the pleaded requirement. The Petitioners
have not demonstrated any material error in that finding. As regards
the second floor, the mere allegation that it was handed over to Mr.
Anil Singh does not establish that the said portion was available to
Respondent No. 1 for carrying on her tailoring business. In any event,
the accommodation relied upon is situated on an upper floor, whereas
the requirement pleaded is for a commercial shop on the main road.
The distinction in location and access is a relevant consideration in
assessing reasonable suitability.
34. The Petitioners have also relied upon Shop No. 5, Nai Sarak,
and Shop No. 5559, Katra Rathi, Nai Sarak. Respondent No. 1
asserted that the two shops had been sold in October 2009 and were
no longer in her possession. The Petitioners relied upon municipal
property-tax records reflecting payments in respect of the premises for
the years 2012–2013, and emphasised that no sale deed had been
produced by Respondent No. 1 to substantiate the alleged sale. The
learned ARC held that the tax receipts, by themselves, did not
establish ownership or present availability of the shops with
Respondent No. 1. The absence of a sale deed in support of the plea of
sale cannot, in isolation, establish that the premises continue to be
owned by Respondent No. 1 or remain available for her use.
Conversely, property-tax receipts do not, by themselves, conclusively
establish title or present vacant possession. The material must be
assessed cumulatively.
35. In the present case, although the Petitioners have identified the
properties and relied upon municipal records, the material referred to
in the Impugned Order does not establish that either shop was vacant
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and available to Respondent No. 1 at the time of institution of the
eviction petition. Nor does the fact that tax payments were reflected in
her name for an earlier period, without further material regarding
possession or subsequent use, establish that the shops constituted
reasonably suitable alternative accommodation on the relevant date.
The plea of sale and the evidentiary value of the tax records must,
therefore, be kept distinct from the question of actual availability. On
the material relied upon before this Court, the Petitioners have not
demonstrated that the learned ARC‘s conclusion on this aspect
warrants interference in revisional jurisdiction.
36. The Petitioners have, even otherwise, failed to substantiate the
plea concerning Shop No. 5, Nai Sarak, and Shop No. 5559, Katra
Rathi, Nai Sarak, by placing on record any cogent material, such as
photographs of the premises, hoardings or advertisements indicating
their availability, a site plan depicting their location and layout, or any
other documentary evidence establishing their present status,
possession, accessibility and suitability for the commercial
requirement pleaded by Respondent No. 1. As rightly observed by the
learned ARC, the mere identification of these properties, without
material demonstrating their actual availability and reasonable
suitability for the stated purpose, does not suffice to sustain the
objection of alternative accommodation.
37. The remaining objection concerns Shops Nos. 5561, 5562 and
5563 and the upper-floor accommodation forming part of the larger
property. The record indicates that Shop No. 5561 and the room and
tin sheds on the second floor were stated by Respondent No. 1 to be in
use for storage, whereas Shop Nos. 5562 and 5563 had been combined
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and were being used for the business carried on under the name and
style of M/s Royal Sherwani. It was further stated that, following
renovation and redevelopment of the upper floors, an additional shop
had been created on the first floor, from which the musical-
instruments business of M/s Anand Musical Store was being
conducted. The Petitioners rely upon these circumstances to contend
that Respondent No. 1 has sufficient accommodation within the same
property and that her requirement for the subject premises is,
therefore, not made out.
38. The availability of other portions of the same property cannot
be determined merely by counting the number of shops or floors. The
inquiry is whether any identified portion is available to Respondent
No. 1 and is reasonably suitable for the particular commercial use
pleaded. The material on record indicates that the other shops and
portions are being put to existing uses, including storage and
businesses carried on by members of the family. The Petitioners have
not demonstrated, at this stage, that these portions are vacant and
available to Respondent No. 1 for the proposed tailoring business. Nor
can the requirement for a ground-floor shop situated on the main road
be rejected merely by assuming that an upper-floor portion or a shop
presently being used for another business must necessarily serve as an
adequate substitute. The principle recognised by the Hon‘ble Supreme
13
Court in Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari , that the
Court cannot ordinarily dictate to a landlord which floor should be
used for a business, reinforces the need to assess suitability in the
13
(2010) 1 SCC 503
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context of the proposed use. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
― 7. In our opinion, once it is not disputed that the landlord is in
bona fide need of the premises, it is not for the courts to say that he
should shift to the first floor or any higher floor. It is well known
that shops and businesses are usually (though not invariably)
conducted on the ground floor, because the customers can reach
there easily. The court cannot dictate to the landlord which floor he
should use for his business; that is for the landlord himself to
decide. Hence, the view of the courts below that the sons of
Plaintiff 1 should do business on the first floor in the hall which is
being used for residential purpose was, in our opinion, wholly
arbitrary, and hence cannot be sustained. As regards the finding
that the sons of Plaintiff 1 are getting a salary of Rs 1500 from the
firm, in our opinion, this is wholly irrelevant and was wrongly
taken into consideration by the High Court.‖
39. The Petitioners‘ reliance upon the alleged availability of Shop
No. 5561, along with the room and tin-sheds situated on the second
floor of the larger property, is devoid of merit. The parties have
advanced rival contentions with respect to the damage allegedly
caused by a fire. While Respondent No. 1 relied upon photographs
placed on record to substantiate the condition of the premises, the
Petitioners asserted on oath that the said accommodation continued to
be available with Respondent No. 1. However, the learned ARC, upon
consideration of the material on record, categorically observed that the
photographs relied upon by the Petitioners themselves depicted the
subject premises, where musical instruments were stored, to be in a
dilapidated condition. Thus, even proceeding on the Petitioners‘ own
reliance upon the photographs, the material on record does not support
the contention that the premises constituted reasonably suitable
alternative accommodation for Respondent No. 1. The determinative
consideration is not merely whether the premises remained in her
possession, but whether they were, in their existing condition, capable
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of being put to the commercial use for which eviction was sought. The
mere assertion of availability, unsupported by material demonstrating
the usability and suitability of the premises, cannot sustain the
Petitioners‘ objection.
40. The Petitioners have further referred to the fact that the husband
of Respondent No. 1 owns or occupies other properties in the vicinity
and have questioned the explanation that the spouses are living
separately. However, even otherwise, the mere ownership or
occupation of property by the husband does not, without material
establishing Respondent No. 1‘s right or access to such property,
demonstrate that it is accommodation available to her for the purpose
of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. The allegation concerning the
husband‘s properties, in the absence of particulars establishing
Respondent No. 1‘s entitlement to use them, cannot be treated as
proof of alternative accommodation available to her.
41. Considered cumulatively, the material relied upon by the
Petitioners identifies other properties and portions of the larger
property, but does not establish that the same were available to
Respondent No. 1 and reasonably suitable for the tailoring business
for which the subject premises are sought. The learned ARC examined
the specific properties relied upon, considered the explanation
furnished by Respondent No. 1 and found that the Petitioners had not
raised a triable issue on this ground. The Petitioners have, therefore,
failed to raise a triable issue with respect to the availability of
reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.
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CONCLUSION:
42. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the
Petitioners have failed to demonstrate any illegality, material
irregularity or perversity in the Impugned Order dated 13.05.2024
passed by the learned ARC in Eviction Petition bearing RC ARC No.
796/2019, warranting interference in the exercise of the revisional
jurisdiction of this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and the present Revision Petition is
consequently dismissed.
43. The Eviction Order passed in respect of Shop No. 5564,
situated on the ground floor of property bearing Nos. 5561–5564, Nai
Sarak, Delhi–110006, measuring approximately 16 ft. × 6 ft., is
accordingly affirmed.
44. The Respondent No. 1 shall be entitled to seek execution of the
Eviction Order in accordance with law, subject to the statutory
protection under Section 14(7) of the DRC Act, if still applicable.
45. The Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any, stands
disposed of in the above terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
NOVEMBER 06, 2026/ma
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